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Letter to President Takehiko Nakao, Asian Development Bank

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Dear President Takehiko Nakao,

The Asian Development Bank has acknowledged the importance of participation, good governance, and accountability for development. As both human rights and development experts have noted, respect for human rights of freedom of expression, assembly, and association is crucial for achieving participatory, sustainable, and accountable development.

Unfortunately, in many ADB client countries, these rights are under attack.  The organization Global Witness recently identified 2015 as the most dangerous year for killings of land and environmental defenders, while CIVICUS’ 2016 State of Civil Society report identified serious violations of the freedoms of association, expression and peaceful assembly in 109 countries over the course of 2015. In many countries, those who speak out about development activities may suffer threats or attacks by government or company officials. This environment of violence, intimidation, and closing civil society space renders meaningful public participation in development virtually impossible. It also significantly increases the risk that ADB-financed activities will contribute to or exacerbate human rights violations.

This issue was brought to the fore recently by attacks on human rights defenders documenting labor abuses in Uzbekistan’s agricultural sector. Over the last year, officials retaliated brutally against Dmitry Tikhonov, Elena Urlaeva, and other rights defenders for reporting about forced labor in the cotton sector. Police arrested, beat, and filed charges of “disorderly conduct” against Tikhonov on the same day that his home office was destroyed by arson, eventually forcing him to flee the country. Officials have arrested Urlaeva five times and subjected her to body-cavity searches twice. The ADB is investing in projects that benefit Uzbekistan’s cotton sector, but has not worked to support an environment in which people can speak freely about rights abuses linked to its investments without risk of reprisal.

Last week, 154 civil society organizations from around the world launched the attached statement on the “Responsibility of International Financial Institutions to ensure Meaningful and Effective Participation.” The statement lays out concrete ways the ADB and other development finance institutions can support an enabling environment for public participation and ensure that their activities do not cause or contribute to human rights violations. The statement is attached here and a live version together with case studies and supplemental information is available at www.rightsindevelopment.org/hrd.

We believe that the ADB has a responsibility to ensure that the activities it finances respect human rights and that there is space for people to participate in the development of ADB-financed activities and to hold the ADB to account without risking their security.

We know that the challenges of closing civil society space and threats to human rights defenders may be new to the ADB. However, as these challenges are growing more acute day by day, we urge you to devote the necessary resources to grapple with them in a serious and effective manner. We are eager to work with you and to bring the technical expertise of human rights institutions, human rights defender organizations, and other relevant experts to assist you in understanding these issues and identifying effective means to address them.

We therefore request the opportunity to meet with you at your earliest convenience. Please contact Jessica Evans for more information or for scheduling purposes.

 

Signed,

Jessica Evans, Human Rights Watch

Kristen Genovese, Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO)

Mary Lawlor, Front Line Defenders

Rayyan Hassan, NGO Forum on ADB

Liliana De Marco, Protection International

 

Cc:       ADB Board of Executive Directors

            Compliance Review Panel

            Special Project Facilitator


Letter to President Jim Kim, World Bank Group

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Dear President Jim Kim,

The World Bank has repeatedly acknowledged the importance of participation, good governance, and accountability for development. As both human rights and development experts have noted, respect for human rights of freedom of expression, assembly, and association is crucial for achieving participatory, sustainable, and accountable development.

Unfortunately, in many World Bank client countries, these rights are under attack.  The organization Global Witness recently identified 2015 as the most dangerous year for killings of land and environmental defenders, while CIVICUS’ 2016 State of Civil Society report identified serious violations of the freedoms of association, expression and peaceful assembly in 109 countries over the course of 2015. In many countries, those who speak out about development activities may suffer threats or attacks by government or company officials. This environment of violence, intimidation, and closing civil society space renders meaningful public participation in development virtually impossible. It also significantly increases the risk that World Bank Group-financed activities will contribute to or exacerbate human rights violations.

This issue was brought to the fore recently by attacks on human rights defenders documenting labor abuses in Uzbekistan’s agricultural sector. Over the last year, officials brutally retaliated against Dmitry Tikhonov, Elena Urlaeva, and other rights defenders for reporting about forced labor in the cotton sector. Police arrested, beat, and filed charges of “disorderly conduct” against Tikhonov on the same day that his home office was destroyed by arson, eventually forcing him to flee the country. Officials have arrested Urlaeva five times and subjected her to body-cavity searches twice. The World Bank and the International Finance Corporation are investing in projects that benefit Uzbekistan’s cotton sector, but have not worked to support an environment in which people can speak freely about rights abuses linked to their investments without risk of reprisal. At the same time, Pastor Omot Agwa, the Inspection Panel’s interpreter and facilitator during its investigation in Gambella, Ethiopia, remains behind bars on baseless terrorism charges.

Last week, 154 civil society organizations from around the world launched the attached statement on the “Responsibility of International Financial Institutions to ensure Meaningful and Effective Participation.” The statement lays out concrete ways World Bank Group and other development finance institutions can support an enabling environment for public participation and ensure that their activities do not cause or contribute to human rights violations. The statement is attached here and a live version together with case studies and supplemental information is available at www.rightsindevelopment.org/hrd.

We believe that World Bank Group has a responsibility to ensure that the activities it finances respect human rights and that there is space for people to participate in the development of activities it finances and to hold the bank to account without risking their security.

As these challenges are growing more acute day by day, we urge you to devote the necessary resources to grapple with them in a serious and effective manner. We are eager to work with you and to bring the technical expertise of human rights institutions, human rights defender organizations, and other relevant experts to assist you in identifying effective means to address these issues.

We therefore request the opportunity to meet with you at your earliest convenience. Please contact Jessica Evans for more information or for scheduling purposes.

 

Signed,

Jessica Evans, Human Rights Watch

Kristen Genovese, Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO)

Carla García Zendejas, Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL)

Mary Lawlor, Front Line Defenders

Rayyan Hassan, NGO Forum on ADB

Liliana De Marco, Protection International

 

Cc:       Philippe Le Houérou, Executive Vice President and CEO of IFC

            Compliance Advisor Ombudsman

            Inspection Panel

            World Bank Board of Executive Directors

Double Thumbs Down, Gap Inc.

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Gap’s latest ad campaign is being raked over the coals for reinforcing gender stereotypes. The ads feature “The Little Scholar,” an aspiring scientist boy and “The Social Butterfly,” a girl. Many are outraged that a company like Gap, which prides itself on its social responsibility, is peddling gender stereotypes.

The sign for a Gap store is seen on 5th avenue in midtown Manhattan in New York June 16, 2015.

The sign for a Gap store is seen on 5th avenue in midtown Manhattan in New York June 16, 2015.

Looking at the ad, I couldn’t also help wonder how workers – mostly women – who produce Gap’s clothes would react. They might wistfully contemplate the luxury of a social butterfly.

My colleagues and I have met scores of women who work in garment factories in Cambodia and Bangladesh, producing for global apparel brands. These women toil long hours in tough conditions, often enduring forced overtime and other labor rights abuses. Back home, they juggle caregiving demands and household chores.

Trying to improve working conditions in garment factories can be dangerous. Recently, I met three women workers in Cambodia. Until a couple of months back, they had worked in a factory they said produced for Gap and other clothing brands. Tired of being repeatedly forced to do overtime work, they dared to form a union. The factory fired them.

One of them, a widow living with her elderly mother and child, said she was broke at that time. Her child was sick and needed medical treatment. She tried to borrow money, but “people refused,” she recalled. “‘You don’t have a job. How would you pay back?’”

To their credit, Gap has expressed a strong commitment to worker rights and helped form the International Labour Organization’s Better Factories Cambodia program, which expanded into the global Better Work program. They also have a good Code of Vendor Conduct, backed by a team of committed social compliance officers who at least seem to respond to labor rights complaints. But sadly, they are also among the brands that have held out on a key tool that would enhance due diligence in the first place: publishing supplier factory lists.

Transparent supplier lists help workers and advocates swiftly alert brands to labor rights risks. They also make it easier for workers to alert brands when factories subcontract to others without brand approval. Adidas, H&M, Levi’s, Marks and Spencer, Nike, and Patagonia are among the top brands that publish supplier lists.

Human Rights Watch has joined others in calling on brands like Gap to publicly disclose the factories that produce for them. Gap has thus far declined, for “competition reasons.”

Gap has some serious catching up to do – not just on eliminating gender stereotypes in their ads, but also on transparency. 

 
Tweet for Rights:
 
Gap transparency graphic

Thailand: Labor Activist Convicted for Reporting Abuses

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(New York) – A Thai court’s conviction of the British researcher Andy Hall for his work on labor abuses will have a serious chilling effect on workers’ rights monitoring in Thailand, Human Rights Watch said today. On September 20, 2016, the Bangkok South Criminal Court found Hall guilty of criminal defamation and violating the Computer Crime Act and sentenced him to four years in prison, which the judge suspended because Hall’s work was beneficial to Thai society. Hall was also ordered to pay a 150,000 baht (US$4,300) fine and to publish the verdict in print and online media.

Labor activist Andy Hall was found guilty of criminal defamation and violating the Computer Crime Act on September 20, 2016.

Labor activist Andy Hall was found guilty of criminal defamation and violating the Computer Crime Act in Bangkok on September 20, 2016.

The prosecution of Hall, whose work focused on the mistreatment of migrant workers, demonstrates the hollowness of Prime Minister Gen. Prayut Chan-ocha’s support for the United Nations General Assembly’s New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants.

“Andy Hall’s conviction and sentence is a major blow to desperately needed research and reporting on labor rights violations in Thailand,” said Brad Adams, Asia director. “Instead of punishing the messenger, the government should fully investigate abuses against migrant workers and press companies to respect labor rights.”

Hall researched alleged serious labor rights abuses, including poor working conditions, low wages, and child labor at the Natural Fruit Company, Ltd.’s factory in Prachuap Khiri Khan province. In February 2013, the company sued Hall in response to an investigative report by the nongovernmental organization Finnwatch, which Hall had co-authored. The report, “Cheap has a high price: Responsibility problems relating to international private label products and food production in Thailand,” investigates the production practices of private label juices and fruit sold in Finland – including by the Natural Fruit Company.

In recent years, Thai government officials and companies have frequently retaliated against individuals who report allegations of human rights violations. Common tactics include filing criminal defamation charges and seeking prosecution for computer crimes.

International companies sourcing from Thailand should press Thai authorities and exporters to stop using criminal charges to silence critics.

Brad Adams

Asia Director

Human Rights Watch, along with an increasing number of governments and international bodies, believes that criminal defamation laws should be abolished because criminal penalties are always disproportionate punishments for reputational harm, and infringe on the right to free expression. Criminal defamation laws are easily abused, resulting in very harsh consequences for the accused, including imprisonment. An increasing number of countries have repealed criminal defamation laws, showing that such laws are not necessary to protect reputations.

Human Rights Watch’s own research has found the human rights and labor rights of migrant workers in Thailand from Burma, Cambodia, and Laos have been regularly violated with impunity over the years. Migrant workers frequently receive little or no protection from Thai labor laws despite government assertions that all legally registered migrant workers will be protected under those laws. Migrant workers who raise complaints against Thai employers commonly face retaliation.

“The Thai government should recognize that freedom to investigate corporate abuses is critical for ensuring compliance and accountability under Thai laws and international human rights standards,” Adams said. “At the same time, international companies sourcing from Thailand should press Thai authorities and exporters to stop using criminal charges to silence critics and obstruct investigation of human rights violations.”

Malawi: Mining Puts Residents at Risk

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Nagomba E., 75, standing where her house used to be in Mwabulambo, Karonga district.

Nagomba E., 75, standing where her house used to be in Mwabulambo, Karonga district. She and her family were told to relocate in 2008 because the land was needed for coal mining. 

(Lilongwe) – Malawi’s government has failed to protect the rights and livelihoods of people living in nascent mining communities, Human Rights Watch said today in a report released on eve of the International Right to Know Day. Families living near coal and uranium mining operations face serious problems with water, food, and housing, and are left in the dark about health and other risks from mining.

The 96-page report, “‘They Destroyed Everything’: Mining and Human Rights in Malawi,” examines the impact of extractive industries on communities in some of Malawi’s first mining areas, in Karonga district located on the northwestern shores of Lake Malawi. Malawi’s government has promoted private investment in mining and resource extraction to diversify its economy. But environmental risks are common in resource extraction and mining significantly contributes to climate change, which in turn affects governments’ ability to realize the rights to health, water, and food.

Malawi’s government has failed to protect the rights and livelihoods of people living in nascent mining communities. Families living near coal and uranium mining operations face serious problems with water, food, and housing, and are left in the dark about health and other risks from mining.

“Malawi shouldn’t repeat the mistakes made in resource extraction in other countries in Southern Africa,” said Katharina Rall, researcher at Human Rights Watch. “It is not enough to create a fertile investment climate for mining companies. The government urgently needs to protect the rights of affected communities.”

The report is based on research in Malawi from July 2015 to July 2016, including more than 150 interviews, 78 of which were with people living in areas where companies are actively mining or had mining operations in the recent past. Human Rights Watch also interviewed representatives of the companies; the central, regional, and local governments; national and international nongovernmental organizations; and international organizations.

Human Rights Watch documented rights violations in Karonga district communities affected by coal and uranium mining operations of Eland Coal Mining Company, Malcoal, and Paladin Africa Limited (Paladin). Human Rights Watch found that Malawi lacks adequate safeguards to ensure the necessary balance between development efforts and protecting the rights of local communities, and that weak government oversight and a lack of information leave local communities unprotected.

“Since the mining came we have had many problems,” a woman at Mwabulambo said. “The coal is in our gardens and running into our fields. The way the crops look, you would think that someone had poured petrol on them.”

Human Rights Watch found that mining operations have forced several families to resettle. These families said that they were notified so late that they had no time to find alternative housing, leaving some without shelter. Many said that compensation procedures were unclear and, in several instances, compensation fell short of what they needed to rebuild or sustain a comparable standard of living, including access to land.

Residents said that they did not receive sufficient information about the planned mining operations and any associated risks, fueling concerns about serious respiratory diseases and other health and environmental impacts. Villagers do not have adequate access to healthcare facilities where they could be assessed and treated for any mining-related health conditions. The government and companies operating in Karonga district said that they monitor the impacts of mining, but they don’t release the results.

Villagers said they worried about contamination of the water they depend on for drinking and irrigation. Residents said that trucks pass along narrow village roads, coating homes and schoolhouses in dust, and worried about health consequences, including respiratory diseases. Scientific studies in other countries have associated such illnesses with exposure to mining-related pollution. Farmers said that coal dust and poor water quality decreased their harvests. Eland coal mine, which ended operations in 2015, left behind piles of coal and open pits filled with water that can be dangerous for children and threaten local water sources.

“The inadequate healthcare infrastructure and secrecy around monitoring results leads to a lot of uncertainty about what is actually happening,” said Rall. “This is part of the problem, the government and companies need to finally take monitoring seriously and people have a right to know the results.”

Women, who are the primary caregivers and are largely responsible for growing crops in the fields and fetching water, were particularly affected. Women said it was difficult for them to get information about mining and its risks because their participation in meetings with companies or the government was limited. When mining impacts crop productivity and threatens water sources, women have to work long hours to sustain their families and walk farther to fetch water.

“The pipes were right by my house, [with running water] in the kitchen and bathroom, and then they destroyed everything” said Nagomba E., resident of Mwabulambo, a village in Karonga district. “As an old woman I find it very difficult to walk to the river all the time.”

Companies in Karonga district have also largely failed to deliver on promises to build health centers and additional boreholes for water. Malawian nongovernmental organizations have voiced concern. “The push for industrialization and growth needs to be accompanied by a social license and companies should deliver on their promises,” said Reinford Mwangonde, executive director of Citizens for Justice, which hosts Secretariat of the Natural Resources Justice Network, a Malawian network of nongovernmental organizations advocating for sustainable resource extraction.

Malawi’s extractive industries are still in their infancy, providing opportunities for the government and investors to respect rights and minimize the risks facing communities and natural ecosystems, even as they push for economic development.

While Malawi has some laws and policies that protect the rights of communities potentially affected by mining, they are poorly enforced. Government watchdogs stand by while mining operations are allowed to progress, regardless of the risks for local communities or the environment. A new draft law, the Mines and Minerals Bill, while relatively progressive in many respects, fails to address the lack of transparency about the risks related to mining.

The government has begun to create a more comprehensive legal framework and has promised to improve enforcement. But mining communities are still waiting for inspection results and remedies for harm suffered.

The government needs to help level the playing field by providing information about risks of mining to the communities and ensuring their participation in decision-making, Human Rights Watch said.

“The Karonga district mines are just the first in many extractive projects in Malawi, making the lessons they have to offer extremely important,” Rall said. “The government should put effective protections in place as a priority so that people affected by new projects won’t suffer the hardships faced by people in Karonga.”

Select testimony from Karonga interviews:

“[The company] had promised us a health center, new taps, and bridges. They didn’t talk about any risks.” – 41-year-old woman, Kayelekera, March 2016

“The company put white crosses on all the houses that should be relocated. They also put such a cross on our house…. They first came in March 2012 and said that we need to move in April. But they only waited one week and then came back to say that now is the time to move. We didn’t know where to go. We had to sleep outside for a couple of days. It was difficult to move as this was in the rainy season and we ended up putting up at someone’s verandah and under the tree.” – Sinya M., resident, Mwabulambo, March 2016.

“One of the big problems with the primary school is the dust from the road [used by trucks from Paladin and Malcoal]. I have two of my children there and they cough a lot. We had written to the [manager of Malcoal] and they started using another road. But then this year’s rainy season made the other road impassable and they started using the old road again that passes directly by the primary school.” – 34-year-old woman who lives with her husband and five children, Kayelekera, March 2016.

“I had six acres of land. But because the coal mine had spread some coal on the road to make the road better for their trucks, during the rainy season the coal seeps into my gardens and this has negatively affected my [fruit] crop output…. Why did you destroy our land? They left us behind with nothing. We are suffering from hunger.” – 75-year-old woman, Mwabulambo, March 2016.

 

Witness: “The Mining Company Brought Me Problems”

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Nagomba E. is no longer young; her hip is giving her trouble and her back is stooped from years of bending over her corn and rice fields. Yet every morning, at the crack of dawn, the wiry 74-year-old sets out on a strenuous half-hour walk to fetch water from a nearby river so that her ailing husband can take a bath. Despite her limp, Nagomba moves fast and with the sure-footedness of a mountain goat. 

Nagomba E., 75, standing where her house used to be in Mwabulambo, Karonga district.

Nagomba E., 75, standing where her house used to be in Mwabulambo, Karonga district. She and her family were told to relocate in 2008 because the land was needed for coal mining. 

It would be easier for her to fetch her water from a borehole that is closer to her house. But the water is often “bad” she says, “you cannot even use it for bathing.” Besides, she adds, “if you oversleep, you are there till noon,” waiting for a turn at the pump.

Before coal was discovered in Mwabulambo, a remote rural community of Karonga District in northern Malawi, water was never something Nagomba and her neighbors would have to worry about or even line up for. “I used to have two taps right at my house,” Nagomba says, “with running water in the kitchen and bathroom.” But then heavy trucks moved in -- which turned out to belong to a mining company. The company, with government’s approval, claimed her land, forced her to relocate to the edge of the coal field further south, and tore down her house. With it went the taps and water pipes. That was almost nine years ago. Since then, the coal mine, which Nagomba and her neighbors hoped would bring progress and development, has mainly caused regression, hazards, and hardship. 

Over the past decade, Malawi, one of the world’s poorest countries, has promoted private investment in mining and resource extraction as a way to grow and diversify its largely agriculture-based economy. Karonga, where Nagomba lives, is the country’s test case for industrial mining. Malawi’s first uranium mine and two of the country’s biggest coal mines are located here, on the western shores of Lake Malawi. The government said the mines would provide jobs and improve people’s livelihoods. Schools were promised, and clinics as well as boreholes to restore access to drinking water. Hardly any of these promises ever materialized. 

Weak enforcement of existing laws and policies combined with lack of transparency and community involvement in decision making have left local communities unprotected and in the dark about their rights and about the risks mining activities might pose to their daily lives, Human Rights Watch says in a new report, “They Destroyed Everything.” Mining companies meanwhile are allowed to monitor themselves and are almost never held to account if they cause devastation.

Mining machinery left behind at Eland coal mine at Mwabulambo after closure in 2015.

Mining machinery left behind at Eland coal mine at Mwabulambo after closure in 2015. Locals said that before the mine was closed, they were not informed about the closure or how the company intended to mitigate risks stemming from the abandoned mining site.

When strangers knocked on her door during the 2008 rainy season and told her that she would have to move to make room for a coal mine, Nagomba was taken by surprise.  

Nagomba, who supported three grandchildren and her sick husband with the income from farming a small but fertile plot of land, eventually accepted the inevitable, thinking that she would get “a lot of money.” She never asked how much, however. As it turned out, the compensation was not even enough to rebuild her house.  The family had to sell two cows to put a roof over their heads again. She received no money for the land itself. It was “customary land” that her family had farmed for generations, but for which they held no individual title. 

Over the years, Nagomba’s story repeated itself again and again in the mining areas of Karonga. In Mwabulambo alone, more than 30 households were relocated from their customary land between 2008 and 2015, when the mining company suspended operations.  At times, the bulldozers moved in so fast that people had neither time to rebury their loved ones interred on the community’s land, nor to finish reconstructing their homes. One family spent weeks sleeping under a tree before they could move into their rebuilt house. 

Young girl washing dishes at a borehole near Eland coal mine in Mwabulambo, Karonga district.

Young girl washing dishes at a borehole near Eland coal mine in Mwabulambo, Karonga district. Women and girls who are largely responsible for fetching water often have to walk longer distances—as a result of mining activity that has affected usual water sources—to fetch water from what they believe are less contaminated sources, farther away from the mines, risking danger and losing time to attend school, earn money, and rest.

The mine is owned and operated by Eland Coal Mining Company, a subsidiary of the Isle of Man-based Heavy Mineral Limited, which in turn is owned by Independent Oil & Resources PLC – a company based in Cyprus. Although it has not been operational for more than a year, it continues to affect the area, its water resources, and Nagomba’s source of income, her crops. “We used to grow corn, cassava and rice,” she recalls. “Now we are complaining of hunger.”  The fields she was given lie on the edge of the mine. Every time it rains, blackish, potentially acidic, mine water runs into her fields, withering her crop and diminishing her yield. “We cannot afford to buy food. We need to farm,” she says.  “But they have destroyed the land where we were producing fruit, and left us behind with nothing.”

Since the mine’s closure, the community has tried to get the company to clean up, restore their broken pipes, ensure that mine water no longer seeps into their borehole and onto their fields, and close the deep pits that were left behind. In 2015, the villagers went to the District Commissioner’s Office to air their grievances. Getting no help there, they marched to the gates of the company. “We told them ‘you are really wronging us,’” Nagomba recalls. “We don’t have water. We don’t have food. But we are still waiting for an answer.” 

To this day, residents fear that the borehole and river water is putting their health at risk. Cows and even children have fallen into ill-secured, water-filled pits the company left behind. And villagers say the pits themselves have become breeding grounds for malaria-carrying mosquitos.

Dry rice fields by the road to Eland coal mine, Mwabulambo.

Dry rice fields by the road to Eland coal mine, Mwabulambo. Residents said that the heavy mining trucks destroyed culverts that were part of the water irrigation, decreasing their harvest. 

“If they had built a health center, they could at least have saved some lives from malaria,” says Rojaina, another community member who was forced to relocate. As the promised clinic was never built and the nearest hospital is miles away in town, “people die on the way,” she says.  

Few are aware of the dangers the water in the pits itself poses. The government had the water tested last year.  These tests confirmed that the water is acidic, the deputy director for water quality at the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water told Human Rights Watch, which means that it is neither safe for consumption nor bathing. But the results have never been made public. Children regularly swim in the pits behind Nagomba’s house. And no signs warn of the dangers these pools pose to human health. 

Now that Nagomba no longer has piped water, she depends on the river a lot, particularly during dry season, when borehole and well run dry, walking there up to four times a day to fetch water for bathing, drinking and cooking. She worries about the safety of the river water, too, but at least she can treat it with chemicals the government provided after a cholera outbreak at the beginning of the year.

Open pit filled with water at Eland coal mine, Mwabulambo.

Open pit filled with water at Eland coal mine, Mwabulambo. After closure in 2015, the company left behind several open pits, piles of coal, and deep holes filled with water. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water, water testing results from 2015 indicated that the water in the open pits is acidic and therefore harmful to human health. 

The river Nagomba depends on flows into Lake Malawi, a fragile ecosystem and a key source of livelihood for over 1.5 million people. More than 10 extraction projects are located on the lake’s shores and tributaries, which are protected UNESCO World Heritage sites. Not all are active yet. But the risks these mining activities pose to the lake’s ecosystem and to the bordering communities’ health and livelihoods are enormous without proper government oversight. 

So far, Malawi’s law has failed to protect the needs and rights of mining communities like Nagomba’s and her neighbors’ from the adverse effect mining has had on their lives.  It has also failed to protect their environment and water resources.  A new mining bill being drafted could help change this, strengthening governmental control over mining projects and the communities’ right to know. 

Malawi’s government has taken some steps in the right direction, and acknowledged the need to enforce a rehabilitation plan  the owners of the defunct Mwabulambo mine had promised to carry out. So far the company has done nothing. 

“I never had problems,” says Nagomba, recalling a time where there was enough to eat and safe water to drink. “The mining company brought me problems.” After nine years of suffering and hunger without protection from the government or the mining company, she has little hope that things will change for the better in her lifetime. “Time is already up,” she says in a voice that sounds as if she is reciting poetry. “We are just waiting to go to our graves now."

US, Companies Should Protect Child Tobacco Workers

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On Sunday, the Washington Post Magazinepublished an article with compelling stories of two boys who work on North Carolina tobacco farms to help their families make ends meet. Many parents of child tobacco workers are themselves poorly paid farmworkers. There is no question that the families need the money.

16-year-old tobacco worker

A 16-year-old tobacco worker standing in a tobacco field in North Carolina wearing her work clothes. “I don’t feel any different in the fields than when I was 12,” she said. “I [still] get headaches and … my stomach hurts. And like I feel nauseous…. I just feel like my stomach is like rumbling around. I feel like I’m gonna throw up.” 

But that is all the more reason why we shouldn’t let the United States government and tobacco companies off the hook for this dangerous child labor. Tobacco farming exposes children to nicotine, toxic pesticides, extreme heat, and other dangers that could have long-term consequences on their health. These toxins pose special dangers to children with developing brains and bodies. Child labor can also interfere with schooling and lock children into low-wage, low-opportunity jobs, trapping children in a cycle of poverty.

Over the last three years, I’ve interviewed more than 100 child tobacco workers and very few of them had received education or training about the dangers of the work or how harmful it could be for them in the long-term. We know much more now than we ever have about the dangers of nicotine, and our public policies should catch up with scientific evidence.

It’s the job of policymakers to prohibit children from activities that could harm their health or safety. It’s also the job of the companies buying tobacco from US farmers to ensure that there are no human rights abuses in their supply chains.

The Washington Post Magazine article brought an important issue to the attention of many readers who probably never knew children too young to legally buy a pack of cigarettes are cultivating and harvesting tobacco in the US. But I fear some readers might have come away believing that child labor on tobacco farms is an inevitable symptom of poverty, and a problem that can’t be fixed. Tobacco companies, the Obama administration, and Congress can fix this problem, and the fact that children are suffering harm because they need the money is all the more reason why they urgently need protection.

 

Azerbaijan: Transparency Group Insists on Reforms

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(New York) – The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a prominent international coalition, on October 26, 2016, declined to restore Azerbaijan’s full membership status in the organization, Human Rights Watch said today. EITI gave the government four months to reform its laws shackling civil society or face suspension.

At its meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan, EITI’s board found that Azerbaijan had not made satisfactory progress on meeting the initiative’s standards for fostering a free environment for independent groups, and outlined further steps that the government needs to take before the next board meeting in April 2017.  

2016-10-eca-azerbaijan-eiti

An Azerbaijan state flag on an oil platform in the Caspian Sea east of Baku, January 22, 2013. 

“The Azerbaijani government has spared no effort to dismantle independent groups, so it’s no surprise that EITI didn’t restore its status,” said Giorgi Gogia, South Caucasus director at Human Rights Watch. “Now it’s up to the government to enact meaningful reform and it’s up to its international partners to make sure it happens.”

The EITI brings together governments, companies, and nongovernmental groups to encourage better governance of resource-rich countries by fostering open public debate about how oil, gas, and mining revenues are used. The EITI requires the governments to foster “an enabling environment for civil society” and to “refrain from actions which result in narrowing or restricting public debate in relation to implementation of the EITI.”

In April 2015, as the government was in the midst of a sweeping crackdown on independent groups and activists, the EITI board downgraded Azerbaijan’s status in the initiative and issued a list of steps the government had to take to have its status restored. These included ensuring that nongovernmental groups involved in EITI could freely access and use funding to carry out their work, and be able to speak freely about natural resource governance without threat of reprisals.

The Azerbaijani government has been engaged in systematic efforts to undermine activists and independent organizations, Human Rights Watch said. In a new report, Human Rights Watch documented government prosecution of leaders of nongovernmental groups, and new draconian laws and regulations that make it virtually impossible for critical independent groups to operate, particularly for those working on human rights, transparency, and government accountability.

Even after the EITI downgraded Azerbaijan, its government continued to adopt new restrictive laws and regulations, requiring both donors and grantees to separately obtain government approval of each potential grant and giving the authorities broad discretion to deny the approvals. As a result, many groups have had to downsize, suspend their activities, and even close.

In the lead up to the EITI board decision, the Azerbaijani government took some limited positive steps, unfreezing bank accounts of some groups involved in the initiative and relaxing travel restrictions on some activists.

 

Several days before the board meeting, President Ilham Aliyev signed a decree tasking the government with simplifying some of the bureaucracy associated with the registration and operation of funding for nongovernmental groups, but leaving in place the government’s wide discretion to control these groups’ funding.

To avoid further sanction in the EITI, however, the Azerbaijani government has to substantially reform its domestic laws and policies, by easing the registration process for nongovernmental organizations and allowing them to receive foreign funding.

“It is going to take more than the change in form if Azerbaijan is serious about its EITI commitments,” Gogia said. “It has four months to ensure the change in substance by repealing restrictions on the registration and operation of nongovernmental groups.”


Dakota Access Pipeline Protests Put Right to Water at Center Stage

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Since August, over 400 people have been arrested protesting the Dakota Access Pipeline – 140 in the last week alone. This after the tribe sued the federal government in July, stating that they were not properly consulted about the construction project.

One underlying reason for the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s opposition to the construction of the oil pipeline is the tribe’s concern about safe drinking water. The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe lawsuit argues that the US government failed to properly consider the potential risks of the pipeline construction to the source of the Tribe’s drinking water.

Dakota Access Pipeline protesters square off against police near the Standing Rock Reservation and the pipeline route outside the little town of Saint Anthony, North Dakota, U.S., October 5, 2016.

Dakota Access Pipeline protesters square off against police near the Standing Rock Reservation and the pipeline route outside the little town of Saint Anthony, North Dakota, U.S., October 5, 2016.

Courts have twice denied the tribe’s request to stop the pipeline construction for now, agreeing with the government’s position that the Tribe was not sufficiently able to show that they were likely to win their lawsuit.

Then there’s the broader context of the situation  -- that government at all levels has too often done a poor job of ensuring that everyone has access to safe water.The 1,172-mile-long Dakota Access Pipeline is slated to cross under the Missouri River, less than a mile upstream of the reservation’s boundary. Pipeline breaches can risk water sources. Earlier this month the breach of a different pipeline near the Susquehanna River in Pennsylvania prompted warnings to consumers to reduce their water usage. The Dakota Access Pipeline itself was rerouted because of concerns that a spill could affect the drinking water for the city of Bismarck. 

The dispute over the Dakota Access Pipeline is one of a number of water-related controversies currently facing the US. This includes the issues around tainted water in Flint, Michigan, and in the aging water systems in municipalities beyond Flint that are yet to be resolved.

All around the world, when water is at risk, it is often marginalized populations—like indigenous people—who suffer the most. But for indigenous communities like Standing Rock, what’s at risk if water is tainted goes beyond the impact on health. Dave Archambault II, the chairman of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, spoke before the United Nations Human Rights Council last month, noting that by putting their drinking water at risk, the “pipeline threatens our communities, the river, and the earth.”

Elders in the community and those who have traveled to support it speak about the relationship of water to life. Human Rights Watch research in Canada looked at First Nations communities that recognize a similar relationship to water. Indigenous women we spoke with detailed not only their constant worry that contaminated water would make their families sick, but the ways their spiritual relationship to water – part of their heritage as indigenous women – is altered when water is too filthy to consume.

Any resolution of the protest of the Dakota Access Pipeline needs to, at minimum ensure that all people living along the pipeline’s route have a say in continued access to safe, clean water.  

“The Farmer Becomes the Criminal”

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Summary

Some things are getting better. There is electricity in the next village, and we may get electricity here, too. But none of that matters if our land is gone.

–Nu Yee, San Klo, Karen State, February 2015

The businessman takes the land from the farmer, but when the farmer protests, he becomes the criminal.

–Lawyer, Hpa-an, Karen State, August 2015

In Burma, where 70 percent of people earn a living through agriculture, securing land is often equivalent to securing a livelihood. But instead of creating conditions for sustainable development, recent Burmese governments have enacted abusive laws, enforced poorly conceived policies, and encouraged corrupt land administration officials that have promoted the displacement of small-scale farmers and rural villagers.

Conflicts over land have come to the forefront of Burma’s national agenda in recent years. These tensions have intensified as the country has embarked on a process of democratic transition and reform, with greater openness in some areas, but continued military dominance in other sectors, particularly where the military controls key government ministries.

Officials regularly charge villagers with criminal trespass if they refuse to leave land, and in one case, police torched a village. Militia commanders have also used threats, force, and arbitrary arrests to intimidate farmers and take land, particularly in areas still contested by ethnic Karen armed groups.

Land disputes are a major national problem, with rising discontent over displacement for plantation agriculture, resource extraction, and infrastructure projects—often without adequate consultation, due process of law, or compensation for those displaced. In many parts of the country, those contesting land seizures have taken to the streets in frequent demonstrations but have faced retaliation in the courts.

The dual problems of land confiscation and reprisals against protesters is particularly acute in Karen State. Located along the border with much more prosperous Thailand, Karen State is viewed by many as a desirable site for investment in the tourism, extractive, and agriculture industries.

The economic opening of the country to investors has made land more valuable, while the peace process in Karen State and other ethnic areas has given access to areas previously beyond the reach of the Burmese armed forces and military-linked businessmen. The result is that powerful interests are gaining land through questionable means while farmers are losing it, often without adequate compensation.

As peace negotiations continue and the return of refugees from Thailand gains credence,land tenure issues will likely intensify, particularly as those who return find that land they previously farmed has now been occupied by government or business interests.[1]

This report focuses on government abuses related to land confiscation in areas near Hpa-an, the capital of Karen State. The villages in this area are under the effective control of the Burmese military, called the Tatmadaw, and military-controlled militias called Border Guard Forces (BGFs), or are located in areas of mixed governance by the ethnic armed group Karen National Union (KNU) or other militias and the government.

The report illustrates the dynamics of land confiscation in Karen State—a longstanding problem previously documented by Human Rights Watch and local organizations such as the Karen Human Rights Group.[2] It details cases in which government officials, military personnel and agents on behalf of the army, local militia members, and businessmen have used intimidation and coercion to seize land and displace local people. It also documents the impact of land loss on local villagers, some of whom have farmed land for generations but lack legal documentation to prove it.

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Human Rights Watch found that farmers who protest land-taking and try to stake a claim to their land face retaliation by police and government officials, and prosecution under peaceful assembly and criminal trespass laws. Many farmers whose land has been confiscated as far back as a decade have not been able to obtain any redress and, in some cases, continue to suffer abuses after calling for compensation or attempting to reclaim land. The government’s failure to provide adequate compensation or other redress for land confiscation means that victims struggle to make ends meet, and frequently must become migrant workers abroad or rely on relatives working in Thailand or elsewhere abroad for economic survival.

Villagers and local groups say that government land registration services are effectively inaccessible to them, and farmers assert that local government offices fail to uphold their rights against more powerful moneyed interests. In some cases, villagers allege that local government officials have acted as brokers for land deals or facilitated the granting of licenses for mining and other projects, leaving long-time residents and farmers empty-handed and without effective recourse.

Burma’s departing national government adopted a cabinet resolution to enact a National Land Use Policy in early 2016, which could form the basis of future land law reform. The new policy aims to improve land classification and land information management systems, recognize communal tenure systems and shifting cultivation practices, create more independent dispute resolution procedures, and provide restitution for victims of land confiscation or those who have been forced to abandon lands due to past or ongoing conflict.

In November 2015, the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi, swept nationwide elections. The party assumed executive power in March 2016 and appointed U Htin Kyaw as president. Since then the NLD government has made little progress on reforming land policy to advance these policy goals or otherwise ensure that rights are protected.

To address the problems facing farmers and other villagers such as those detailed in this report, the government should adopt additional safeguards (see Section IV). Crucial is tackling the significant gap between government documentation of land rights and the manner in which land is actually being used or occupied, and by whom, in rural communities. Measures to be adopted should include recognizing community land tenure systems and shifting cultivation systems, providing formal documentation to farmers and villagers recording existing land use, and ensuring that villagers can challenge government decisions about land in an independent forum or body with the power to adjudicate land disputes.

In addition, the government should enact administrative changes to ensure that land reform at the national level results in actual changes at the local level, including by providing genuine notice to farmers where proposed land use changes would affect their livelihoods, and by implementing robust public consultation procedures. The government should also end the arbitrary arrest and detention of land activists for engaging in peaceful activities to protest land seizures.

A special taskforce consisting of the Burmese Defense Services (Tatmadaw), the Justice Ministry, and the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission should investigate all alleged abuses by Border Guard Forces (BGF) connected to land confiscation in BGF-controlled areas, make public the findings of the investigation, and ensure the return of land taken improperly by members of the BGF to the villagers and farmers who had previously been using it.

Methodology

From January to August 2015, Human Rights Watch conducted interviews in Burma with ethnic Karen farmers, laborers, and other villagers from 27 different villages in Hpa-an township and Hlaingbwe township, Karen State. Some villages were visited multiple times. In April 2015, Human Rights Watch also interviewed Karen migrant workers in Mae Sot and Bangkok, Thailand.

Altogether, Human Rights Watch interviewed 72 farmers and laborers, 48 men and 24 women. Interviews were conducted in Po Karen, Sgaw Karen, and Burmese with the help of interpreters, and in English. Local groups working on land rights helped identify individuals to interview. Human Rights Watch also conducted interviews with people displaced during fighting in October 2014. Migrant workers in Thailand were referred to Human Rights Watch by family members in Burma.

All participants were informed of the purpose of the interview, its voluntary nature, and the ways in which the data would be collected and used. All orally consented to be interviewed. The names and other identifying details of some interviewees and villages have been withheld or changed to prevent possible reprisals.

Most interviews were conducted in villagers’ homes with between one to four people interviewed. Often the interviews included other members of the village, some of whom participated in the interviews.

A number of villagers expressed concerns about security and possible retaliation if they spoke with Human Rights Watch in their villages. In such instances, Human Rights Watch reimbursed villagers for travel expenses to meet in a secure location.

Human Rights Watch also interviewed and obtained information from land experts, former government officials, nongovernmental organization workers, and local community members.

Human Rights Watch sought information from the national government and the Karen State government relating to land confiscation in Karen State and in Burma more generally. A Human Rights Watch representative met with the vice chair of the Hpa-an Special Industrial Zone in August 2015 in Hpa-an, and officials from the national Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation in Burma’s capital, Naypyidaw, in February 2016.

In October 2015, Human Rights Watch received a letter from the office of the chief minister of Karen State in response to our letter seeking information on alleged human rights abuses related to land confiscation.

Throughout the research, Human Rights Watch collected copies of land use certificates, tax receipts, letters to government officials and responses received, land registers prepared by villages, and site maps. We visited almost all of the sites of land confiscation discussed in this report.

Because of government-imposed travel restrictions and security concerns at the time of the research, Human Rights Watch was unable to conduct interviews in areas under the control of the Karen National Union (KNU), the main ethnic Karen political organization, whose armed wing, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), has waged a war against central government control since 1948. As a result, this report does not document abuses that may be occurring in KNU-controlled areas.

Glossary

ADB

Asian Development Bank

ASEAN

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BGF

Border Guard Force

CCVFV

Central Committee for the Management of Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands

CEDAW

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

DKBA

Democratic Karen Benevolent Army

ESIA

Environmental and Social Impact Assessment

FAB

Farmland Administration Body

FPIC

Free, Prior and Informed Consent

GAD

General Administration Department

GMS

Greater Mekong Sub-region

ICCPR

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

ICESCR

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

IDP

Internally Displaced Person

JICA

Japan International Cooperation Agency

KNLA

Karen National Liberation Army

KNU

Karen National Union

LUC

Land Use Certificate

MoECaF

Ministry of Environmental Conservation and Forestry

MNREC

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation

SIZ

Special Industrial Zone

SLORC

State Law and Order Restoration Council

SLRD

Settlement and Land Records Department

SPDC

State Peace and Development Council

Terminology

In this report Human Rights Watch uses the terms “Burma” in reference to the country and “Burmese” for the population generally, regardless of specific ethnicity. “Karen” is used in reference to the state and its predominant ethnic group. The Burmese government refers to the country as “Myanmar” and the state and ethnic group as “Kayin,” reflecting changes to the English translations of names made by the military State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) after it seized power in 1989. All of these terms are still commonly used inside Burma. The 2008 constitution also changed the administrative areas called “Divisions” to “Regions,” so for example Pegu Division became Pegu Region after March 2011 when the constitution came into force.

In this report, Human Rights Watch uses the term “land confiscation” to describe instances in which the government, military, or private individuals claiming ownership appropriate via legal or extralegal means land that is already occupied or used by another. In most cases addressed in this report, the “legal” means by which government and businesses have acquired land fail to meet domestic procedural requirements and international legal standards, notably notice and compensation requirements.

Article 37 of Burma’s constitution establishes the state as the ultimate owner of all land in the country, while also recognizing the right to private property. Given this legal framework, Human Rights Watch uses the term land use rights to refer to the rights of farmers to work farmland. The term claim to land is used for individuals who may qualify for land use rights, particularly through inheritance or under a customary system, but have not yet registered land with the government. In Karen communities visited by Human Rights Watch, references to ownership were often made, as reflected in direct quotes of interviews.

I. Background

The population of Karen State has for decades suffered from armed conflict between the Burmese military and Karen armed groups, widespread human rights violations, and forced displacement and outflows of refugees. These have created a complex, competing, and overlapping governance system in the state that affects land ownership and use as well as access to justice.[3]

A nationwide census in Burma in 2014 recorded the population of Karen State as approximately 1,573,000. However, observers criticized the census for not including certain areas of Karen State, including conflict-affected areas covered by this report.[4] Most residents of Karen State are ethnic Karen, but there are also ethnic Mon, Shan, Pa-o, and Burman populations.[5] Most people earn their living in agriculture or animal husbandry.

Since Burma attained independence in 1948, ethnic armed groups, including those in Karen State, have operated in many areas along Burma's borders. After Karen nationalist hopes for independence at the end of British rule were left unrealized, the Karen National Union (KNU) and its armed wing, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), advanced the nationalist cause both politically and militarily.[6]

Successive Burmese civilian and military governments have sought to suppress the Karen nationalist movement. The Burmese military’s counterinsurgency strategy—known as the “Four Cuts” strategy aimed to cut insurgents off from food, supplies, intelligence, and recruits—resulted in widespread and systematic human rights violations and displacement. Several major waves of refugees fled over the border into Thailand to seek protection in the 1980s and 1990s. The military committed with impunity countless acts of extrajudicial killings, rape, torture, child soldier use, and abusive forced labor, as documented by Human Rights Watch and others.[7]

Internal divisions in Karen political and insurgent organizations have created difficulties in articulating or achieving a unified political position on behalf of the Karen. The KNU suffered a serious split in the mid-1990s, when the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army broke away in 1994.[8] Additional fractures occurred with the formation of the Karen Peace Force in 1997, and the KNU/KNLA Peace Council (KPC) in 2007. Various smaller “peace groups” run by retired military or non-state armed group officers also operate throughout Karen State.

In 2010, a large section of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army broke away and renamed itself the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), while other units transitioned to become various units of the Border Guard Force (BGF). BGFs are militia units that the government created after the adoption of the 2008 constitution to assimilate ethnic armed groups into the national army.

Conflict After the 2010 Elections

Karen State today remains a zone of intermittent armed conflict, though fighting has decreased dramatically since the signing of an initial peace agreement in 2012 and a nationwide ceasefire agreement in October 2015.[9]

In September 2014, fighting broke out between the Burmese army and the DKBA, causing thousands of villagers to flee their homes.[10] In early 2015, skirmishes continued between the DKBA and the army in Hpapun and Kawkareik.[11] Starting in July 2015, clashes occurred along the Asia Highway between Myawaddy and Kawkareik.[12] In February 2016, a BGF unit was attacked by remote-controlled landmines and gunfire along the same road.[13] Landmines generally remain a major problem, and reports indicate that fighters continue to plant new mines in the region.[14] In September 2016, clashes between DKBA units and BGF battalions #1011 and #1012 broke out in Hlaingbwe township, displacing nearly 4,000 civilians.[15]

In a July 2016 survey, The Border Consortium (TBC), an umbrella group of nongovernmental organizations, counted the number of refugees living in camps along the Thai-Burma border at 104,149, of whom about 79 percent are Karen.[16] A large number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) still living in Karen State face challenges in obtaining basic services including health care and education due a lack of humanitarian access. A 2014 TBC survey found there were approximately 400,000 IDPs in southeast Burma who are displaced due to armed conflict, generalized violence, large-scale development projects, or natural disasters.[17]

Many Karen have also migrated to Thailand for economic reasons. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), in 2015 the total number of Burmese migrants in Thailand was just under 2 million.[18] Human Rights Watch found that migrants face harsh and often abusive conditions upon reaching Thailand, including killings, torture, sexual violence, and extortion.[19]

Karen State Governance

Karen State governance is divided among government-controlled (as designated by the government) “white” areas, non-state armed group-controlled “black” areas, and mixed-controlled or contested “brown” areas.

The chief minister runs the state government, with various other state ministers covering portfolios such as transport, security and border affairs, forestry and mining, and social development, among others.

The KNU divides Kawthoolei (its name for the free state of Karen) into nominally civilian-administered districts that are each correlated with an armed group military brigade.[20] The KNU has its own governance systems delivering health care, education, and land and forestry regulation.[21] After the signing of an initial ceasefire agreement with the government in 2012, the KNU also opened offices to help liaise with the government.

Areas near Hpa-an, the state capital, are heavily government-controlled, while the KNU exercises greater control in border zones close to Thailand. In some areas, villagers continue to pay taxes to both the government and armed groups. Furthermore, in contested areas, business projects may require permission from both the government and the KNU, or from any combination of armed groups. Powerful business interests and companies, many of whom are former members of the military or ethnic armed groups, play a dominant role in local life.

Business Development Plans

Political reforms in Burma have promoted new laws and international agreements to enable investment, sparking plans for infrastructure development and special economic zones. Foreign investment in Burma reached US$8 billion in 2014-2015, double that of the previous year.[22]

At the national level, the government has accelerated plans to encourage foreign investment. In December 2015, parliament passed a new investment law, developed with the assistance of the International Finance Corporation (IFC).[23]

The new law consolidates the Foreign Investment Law of 2012 and the Myanmar Citizens Investment Law.[24] In addition to guarantees of regulatory stability for investors, it protects the government’s “right to regulate” in favor of human rights, including health and the environment.[25] In a reversal of prior drafts, the final version of the law removed a contentious investor-state dispute mechanism clause opposed by many civil society groups.[26]

Karen State is considered an attractive area for investment because of its abundant natural resources and strategic location on the Thai border. Construction of the Asia Highway, which the Asian Development Bank (ADB) asserts will “dramatically improve connectivity within Kayin [Karen] State, between the state and the economic hub of Yangon [Rangoon], and regionally between Myanmar and Thailand, and onwards across the GMS [Greater Mekong Sub-region],” is already underway.[27] A portion of the road, which links the border town of Myawaddy to Kawkareik, was financed by Thailand and is already complete. The second portion, financed by the ADB as part of its GMS East-West Economic Corridor project, will connect Kawkareik to Eindu, a small town close to Hpa-an.[28]

Hydropower is also being developed in the area, with seven dam sites planned along the Salween River, including the Hatgyi, Weigyi, and Dagwin dam sites in Hpapun district, Karen State, all backed by the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT).

In 2005, the Burmese government signed a Memorandum of Understanding to develop the Hatgyi dam site with EGAT, and pledged 60 percent of electricity flow to China, 30 percent to Thailand, and 10 percent to Burma.[29] The dam has been controversial, with protesters raising environmental, economic, and social concerns, and blaming the project for an increased Burmese military presence in the area.[30]

In 2011, the Karen State government opened the 1,000-acre Hpa-An Industrial Zone, where three factories were operating at time of writing.[31] Land around the industrial zone has reportedly tripled in value since its opening.[32]

Cement production is another source of investment, with a French-led factory near Hpa-an constructed in 1986, and two military-backed plants that caused relocation of at least five villages around 2000.[33] Four large-scale mining licenses for limestone extraction and at least 10 exploration permits have also been granted in Karen State.[34] In 2014, villagers in Mi Kayin village resisted development of a Chinese-led cement factory near the banks of the Salween River. At time of writing, the KNU’s refusal to grant permission has halted the project, though it still retains official government permission.[35]

Tourism has greatly increased in Burma since 2011, with the country on track to draw 7.5 million tourists in 2016.[36] Though most tourism to date is concentrated in Rangoon, Bagan, Inle, and Kyaiktiyo, the opening of four new crossings on the Thai border adds the potential for expansion of tourism in Karen State.[37]

Japan is a major supporter of investment in the area. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is considering development in the Hpa-an to Myawaddy corridor, with plans for additional special economic zones that would utilize labor from displaced ethnic minority communities, including refugees living in camps across the border in Thailand.[38] In response, the Karen Peace Support Network, a network of Karen civil society organizations, has expressed concern over potential exploitation of low-wage workers and natural resources, and encouraged the Japanese government to consult with local communities on the planned projects and to protect vulnerable populations.[39]

II. Barriers to Realization of Land Rights

The following section presents a range of challenges faced by communities in Karen State, particularly farmers and other villagers in the Hpa-an area, as they try to maintain use of land they depend on for their livelihoods.

Intimidation by the Border Guard Force and Other Armed Groups

Human Rights Watch received several complaints of land confiscation that involved armed units operating in Karen State.[40] These cases ranged from alleged land grants by the government to more straightforward forced expropriations of land by Border Guard Force (BGF) commanders and various militias.

The BGFs often used intimidation to silence villagers’ objections—including firing assault rifles, bringing in armed soldiers to guard disputed land, and threatening villagers.[41]

Human Rights Watch witnessed firsthand BGF threats to detain villagers in relation to land confiscation in Hlaingbwe township. Villagers in Htantabin village in Hlaingbwe told Human Rights Watch of land appropriation by the BGF, which had built a compound near their farmland in 2012. U Be Be, who lives in the village, said when the BGF arrived in the area, they laid claim to the 20-acre plot used for sugarcane and vegetables that he said had been in his family for four generations, planning to divide the land into blocks and sell it for houses. BGF commanders resisted repeated requests by some villagers to show them their legal documents providing evidence of their right to the land, and insisted the land was in a military zone. U Be Be, like many of the villagers, said his family lacked documents for the land: “In 2013, we planted some rubber on that land. A year later, the BGF came to us and said that they would build a road on the land and they were going to divide the land into blocks 80 feet by 60 feet and sell it for houses.”[42]

In April 2015, a few weeks after villagers held a meeting about land confiscation in the area, a BGF commander arrived with two trucks filled with armed soldiers in an attempt to intimidate villagers from speaking out further. The dispute followed a series of efforts by a local family to get back land they claimed as their own from the BGF commander.

After a direct conversation with the BGF commander, who would not return the land to the family, the family matriarch sent a letter directly to the commander’s superior officer.[43]

While Human Rights Watch was visiting the village, the BGF commander arrived with armed troops and confronted the woman. “Why would you do this?” he shouted. “If you do this to me, I can arrest you.” The commander called to the soldiers outside, and six rushed into the house with ropes, threatening to tie up family members and take them to BGF headquarters. After protracted discussions, the BGF commander eventually withdrew with his troops from the village.

The villagers remained terrified of the BGF unit and told Human Rights Watch they felt it was hopeless to seek redress through direct contact with the BGF unit or higher levels within the BGF. They said that they were too fearful to initiate legal action against the BGF unit.[44]

In some reported cases, BGF units have acted on their threats to carry out arrests, including without apparent legal basis. In May 2015, in a different village in Hlaingbwe township, a BGF unit held a man, Yar Kut, in Mae Thein jail for four days regarding a land dispute in which the BGF claimed rights to land which the man’s family asserted they had been working for generations.[45]“They didn’t charge me, they didn’t tell me any number [of the penal code] that I broke in the law,” Yar Kut said. “They just said it’s because of the land.” He was he was held in jail for four days without charge, and only released from jail after his parents paid 50,000 kyat (US$41).

In some cases, armed groups stood guard over land for businesses seeking to develop the site.[46] In Mine Kan, villagers said BGF soldiers came to protect land claimed by the Kyaw Hlwan Moe Company for a 450-acre agricultural project on land claimed by villagers, who were actively protesting the project. According to villager Kaw Doe: “The company came to destroy the land [in early 2015] with big machines. Most of the land is destroyed now. They planted some teak and other trees just to show that they own the land.”[47]

Villagers said that armed soldiers from the BGF, led by Gen. Thein Zaw Min, had since come to guard the land. One local resident said: “The villagers don’t dare to go to that area anymore. The villagers are afraid because when the BGF came, they shot a lot, almost every day when they first came.”[48]

Daw Mu Pulu of Ateyebu village told Human Rights Watch that in 2006, Bo Sar Yay—who was in charge of a group of 10 DKBA fighters—seized the 20 acres of land she and her sister had inherited from her mother: “He started to plant teak and rubber on our land. He didn’t tell us anything. We wanted to complain but we were too afraid to say anything.”[49]

U Di Yay, a farmer in the village, said: “We are afraid of [the BGF]. They have guns. Even if we are angry we can’t argue very strongly because they have guns.”[50]

Smaller militias or “peace groups” have also been involved in land confiscation.[51] In February 2015, Human Rights Watch interviewed a group of villagers in San Klo, near Eindu.[52] The villagers complained that in 2013, Padoh Aung Sang, a member of the KNU who had left to form his own “peace group” in the late 1990s, had started to plant rubber on land owned and used by villagers for generations.

The villagers said they feared retaliation if they contested his seizure of their land. They stated that Padoh Aung San leads a local militia, the “Pyago Peace Group,” that consists of about 15 to 20 armed men living within 20 minutes of the village.[53] As Nu Yee explained:

Padoh Aung San and his armed group stay 10 minutes from here. When they came to plant the rubber, we didn't say anything to him because we were afraid of him. They have guns; they came with their guns when they checked the soil for planting.[54]

Even when less explicit threats are used, some villagers remain fearful because of the shadow of past abuses by BGFs and other armed groups in Karen State. The threat of violence by BGFs and other armed groups remains a reality in Karen State, which may explain why many farmers are reluctant to protest against the taking of their land when armed groups are involved.

In January 2015, Human Rights Watch interviewed seven villagers from Myaingyinu who were displaced due to fighting between the BGF and the DKBA in October 2014. One villager said: “The BGF shot at my house. I ran away to another village and stayed with my niece.… Sometimes I cannot sleep the whole night.… One of the BGF soldiers has beaten my son three times.”[55]

Villagers also said that BGFs continue to use forced labor:

The BGF told us we had to help them build a BGF camp. We worked for about a week, collecting bamboo. They didn’t pay us anything. The BGF soldiers speak rudely to the villagers, and threaten to kill them if they don’t do what they say.[56]

BGF leaders in one case refused to respect villagers’ requests that BGF personnel be stationed away from the children at the village school.[57]

Similar findings were reported by Karen Rivers Watch after interviewing displaced villagers.[58] Many BGF soldiers were also reportedly belligerent in areas they controlled. As one villager told Human Rights Watch, “When they are drunk, they shoot around and can hit the homes.”[59]

Forced Eviction and Destruction of Property

Villagers said police have destroyed houses and other property in response to protests or other efforts to prevent the seizure of land which villagers had long used.

New Ahtet Kawyin

In June 2015, police officers torched more than 100 houses in New Ahtet Kawyin village, west of Hpa-an, after evicting over 200 people. The eviction followed villagers’ attempts to reclaim land they said had long belonged to their village. Several elderly villagers told Human Rights Watch that local people had previously farmed the disputed area of land. One elder, Mu Htaw, said:

Before the government seized our land, we did taungya farming [shifting cultivation] in that area. We grew vegetables and collected bamboo shoots from the forest. We used leaves to shelter our houses from the rain.[60]

Villagers said that after they refused police demands in March 2015 to remove huts from the disputed land, they joined villagers from Kaw Sa Ka Lo village in a peaceful protest in Hpa-an on March 21, 2015, where police arrested 13 people under section 18 of the Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Law.

In June 2015, police began making arrests under the Forest Law. Twenty-seven men charged under articles 40 and 43 were later convicted, and served between two to six months in prison. Article 40 prohibits trespassing in a reserved forest, with a penalty of up to six months in prison and a fine of 5,000 kyat (US$4). Article 43 prohibits cutting teak trees in government forests, with a penalty of up to seven years in prison and a fine of 50,000 kyat (US$40). Villagers dispute that there were any teak trees on the land that they occupied.[61]

Villagers said that they had not seen any documents specifically naming individuals for arrest.[62] According to Daw Hla Nyut, 21, who was in the village: “The police came on June 2, 4, and 9, and they came to arrest people. If they saw any men [there], they would arrest them.”[63]

On June 15, Hpa-an police held a meeting in the village, informing villagers that they had one week to leave their homes. They also posted signs on fences notifying villagers that any houses not vacated by June 22 would be burned down. Most villagers decided to remain on the land. According to Daw Hla Nyut, “Many people had no place to go, and so they had to stay in the village.”[64]A week after the meeting, police officers came and destroyed the village. Tin Shwe, another villager, said:

On June 22, the police came. There were 20 cars and over 40 police and they hired some villagers from a different village to come with them. The police were wearing dark blue shirts. The police cut down all of the houses with chainsaws and they burned the bamboo houses.[65]

The house of 27-year-old Mu Kalote’s mother was among those destroyed, even though family members said they had no idea that the home was part of the disputed area and no signs had been posted indicating that they had to leave. According to Mu Kalote: “Two days after the police burned the village in New Ahtet Kawyin, they came to my mother’s house and destroyed it. We didn’t expect this. We had lived there for 16 years.”[66]

In February 2016, the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission concluded, in the event of an eviction of “squatters”:

Measures should be taken, based on humanitarian principles, such as, treating them humanely, giving educative talk prior to eviction, giving prior notices, making arrangements for transportation, providing assistance in health, education and social welfare needs and resettlement following the eviction.[67]

Obstacles in the Justice System

Several villagers said they faced arrest when peacefully attempting to defend their continued use of land they had been living on.

“In the past, even if you didn’t have documents for your land, nobody would arrest you,” one villager said.[68]

Human Rights Watch received several reports of charges against farmers whose land had been confiscated under section 447 of the penal code for “trespass” or “squatting.”[69] Charges were also brought for trespass under article 40 of the Forest Law against individuals foraging for food and materials in areas traditionally used by Karen as communal forests.[70] Since trespass is a criminal charge, those convicted face fines and prison.

Ka Sa Ka Lo

In Ka Sa Ka Lo village, police arrested a group of villagers who in March 2015 had built structures on land they said had been in their possession since their grandparents’ time, although they lacked documents to prove it. Six were charged with trespass under section 447 of the penal code. One of the villagers present said:

The [police] asked us questions about our land ownership. At the [police] station we were charged with [article] 447. Each person needed two guarantors to be released. It is 1 million kyat [US$800] guarantee.[71]

“This land is old land, owned by our grandparents,” Shue Kalay, a woman from the village, said.[72] A group of Kaw Sa Ka Lo villagers walked the land with Human Rights Watch, pointing out old trees planted by their grandparents and a stone post that marks the site of the village, and telling local folklore about a tiger living in the mountain at the base of the town. When Human Rights Watch visited the village again in August 2015, the farmers had managed to maintain their huts on the land.

Trespass cases often arise when villagers oppose claims by businessmen who receive government permission to take land. When farmers dispute such claims by attempting to return to the land as a form of protest, businesses file a complaint and police initiate trespassing charges against the farmers. “The businessman takes the land from the farmer,” said one lawyer. “But when the farmer protests, he becomes the criminal.”[73]

In these cases, farmers usually had little more than tax receipts from the government to argue for their claims to the land, which under Burmese law do not count as evidence of “ownership” against which a trespass charge may be defended.

Villagers often do not have the resources to defend themselves in court against criminal charges. As one villager whose land was confiscated for a hotel project said, “The hotel said, ‘If you don’t like it you can go to court against us.’ I want to go to court, [but] if you don’t hire a lawyer it doesn’t work. But I don’t have any money to pay a lawyer.”[74]

Farmers pointed out that the trials can become onerous, especially when government officials fail to appear, and complained that it is time consuming and expensive for them to travel to get to courtrooms—adding to the costs of defending themselves.[75]

Moung Pi, a villager from a town just outside of Hpa-an, was charged in 2013 with trespass after building a fence on land he claimed as his own. He said the cost of defending the suit was overwhelming: “I’ve nearly bankrupted myself trying to defend against the trespass suit. I had to sell another piece of land just to pay for the lawyer.”[76]

After being convicted of trespass, Moung Pi spent two months in prison with hard labor, working in an agriculture field: “I worked in the heat as a farmer. If you wanted a rest, you had to pay a 50,000 kyat [US$45] bribe.”[77]

Tokawklay

In Tokawklay village, land just outside the Hpa-an Special Industrial Zone is now the subject of a trespassing case instigated by U Khin Kyu, an influential local businessman who was an army general and government official in Karen State during the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) military government. Villagers interviewed by Human Rights Watch indicated that they had claims to the land—showing tax receipts dating back to as early as 2004.[78] However, the value of the land near the zone has reportedly tripled since its opening.[79]

Villagers told Human Rights Watch they had put up a fence to demarcate the boundaries of their land in May 2014. Hpa-an police officers then came to the village and ordered the farmers to remove the fence. In July, after the farmers did not comply with the order, police filed trespass charges against seven villagers under section 447 of the Penal Code.

In June 2015, the Hpa-an court convicted six of the villagers—U Ne Win, U Myint I, Maung Kyaw Klone, U Ti Lone, U Tin Win, and U Shwe La Nge—and ordered them to each pay a 500 kyat (US$0.40) fine. While the final fine was nominal, the villagers said that at many of the 21 court hearings they were compelled to attend, government officials failed to turn up, delaying the trial and adding to the cost of defending the suit. Villagers added that it was difficult to travel to court, and each time their effort to go to court prevented them from working the entire day. The six convicted farmers estimated that they each spent 440,000 kyat (US$360) defending themselves against the charges.[80]

Farmers find it difficult to obtain lawyers who will represent them against powerful figures in the community. Lawyers in Hpa-an and Rangoon said that few lawyers in Hpa-an were willing to take on land cases.[81] To defend high-profile cases in Karen State involving political activists, legal aid lawyers had to be brought in from other parts of the country.

At time of writing, there is no institutionalized legal aid infrastructure to assist farmers with their land issues.[82] While nongovernmental legal aid services have cropped up throughout the country, few such activities are currently being undertaken by civil society groups in Karen State.[83]

Lack of Free Expression and Assembly

Many farmers said that positive initiatives by the newly elected government meant that, unlike in the past, they could now raise their voices against governmental abuses.[84]

However, as farmers gain confidence to speak out in public spheres, charges related to protests are becoming increasingly common. The authorities and local police frequently deny applications for demonstrations; those who protest without permission face arrest and charges under section 18 of the Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Law.[85]

According to one activist, some 40 to 50 people are currently detained in Hpa-an prison in relation to land issues.[86]

Nongovernmental organizations in Hpa-an repeatedly expressed frustration over the restrictive environment imposed by the local government. In October 2015, the Hpa-an township General Administration Department (GAD) issued an order prohibiting domestic and international nongovernmental organizations from holding meetings in hotels without first obtaining official permission from the township.[87]The letter stated no apparent rationale for the decision.

Since 2014, protesters said authorities were unresponsive to requests to hold demonstrations against land confiscation, and that several of those who decided to protest without official permission were arrested. For example, Saw Maung Gyi, leader of the 88 Karen Student Generation Organization, which was prominently involved in organizing protests in Karen State, reported that on August 16 and 18, 2014, organizers sought police permission to protest, but were ignored:

We officially requested permission to protest peacefully but [the police] didn't reply to us until the night before the protest would take place. If we have to do things according to the law, they are responsible to get back to us in 48 hours prior to a demonstration but police officer [name withheld] said that he failed to reply to us just because he was so busy that night. So we prepared everything necessary and went to protest anyway.[88]

Although they say the protest was peaceful, local police arrested 10 people—six farmers and four activists. The Hpa-an court sentenced four activists to four months in Hpa-an’s Taungalay prison. Farmers had to pay a fine but avoided any prison time. The activists allege they were kept in solitary confinement for 10 days in prison before they were allowed to interact with others.[89]

Similarly, in March 2015, a group of nearly 300 people organized by the 88 Karen Student Generation Organization to protest their problems securing land in Karen State decided to go ahead with their demonstration, despite lack of official permission. Although the protest was peaceful, police called a number of participants to the Hpa-an police station the next day for questioning and charged 13 people under section 18 of the Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Law.[90] The protesters secured bail after guarantors provided a financial guarantee of 2 million kyat (US$1,600) per person.[91]

The activists also faced intimidation and threats of closer police surveillance. Saw Maung Gyi was charged on August 17, 2015, on trumped-up charges under section 17(1) of the Unlawful Associations Act and sentenced in November 2015 to two years’ imprisonment. He ended up spending four months in solitary confinement until he was released on parole through a pardon from then-President U Thein Sein on January 22, 2016.

After assuming office in April 2016, the NLD-led government of President U Htin Kyaw released scores of political prisoners, including prominent land rights activists and community leaders imprisoned for their activities connected to defending land and natural resources.

In May 2016, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) estimated that 86 people were in prison for politically related offenses and exercising their civil and political rights.[92] Observers noted that a significant number of these political prisoners were imprisoned for their work related to land issues.[93]

Lack of Notice, Consultation

Human Rights Watch found that in general the state and local governments, or companies involved, did not provide villagers with notice that would allow them to contest a proposed sale or confiscation, or even plan ahead for relocation.

Tin Shwe from New Ahtet Kawyin village, where police torched more than 100 houses in June 2015 after evicting 200 people, told Human Rights Watch: “We never had a chance to explain. The government just sent a letter to the village chief and then he had to stick it up on the fence.”[94]

The provisions of the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Act (“Lands Management Act”) and the Farmland Law provide farmers the opportunity to contest land sales that affect their historical land use. The Farmland Law requires that a notice for objection be posted at the township department office as well as ward/village tract administration office pertaining to the land in question. The objection should be filed within 30 days after the notice was issued.[95]

Similarly, the Lands Management Act requires the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (“Agriculture Ministry”) to notify the public by posting an objection form on the notice board of the “Naypyidaw Department Office or Regional or State Department Office, the District Department Office, the Township Department Office, and the Administrator’s Office of the ward or village tract where the vacant, fallow and virgin lands are located.” Individuals have 30 days from notification to object to the proposal.[96]During this period, the Agriculture Ministry must inquire into whether the allegedly vacant lands are truly vacant, and “whether there is a holder currently utilizing the land,” among other things.[97]

In practice, villagers interviewed by Human Rights Watch did not receive these notifications nor were such measures apparently applied. Consequently, many were not aware of impending projects until it was too late to formally object under the regulations.

Agriculture Ministry officials told Human Rights Watch that most land problems occur between investors and villagers or government and villagers. They conceded that notice was a fundamental issue with the land system, and while farmers have the right to object to land sales, most often they do not.[98]

In some instances we documented, villagers received no advance notification at all about a governmental project, only finding out about the project when their paddy fields were flooded or construction on a new project began.[99]

In Naw Kyaw Myine village, more than 3,000 acres of land were flooded by the Ye Bo irrigation dam project initiated by the Agriculture Ministry in 2009. Despite villagers’ claims to the land, when the dam project planning started in 2006, the government did not inform most villagers of their impending land loss. Aung Thay, a local man who organized and collected documentation to oppose the dam, said:

The government called the district and village tract administrator and made a decision. There was no consultation with the villagers. The village administrator did not share information about the project. He only invited leaders from only three of the four affected villages to a meeting about the dam.

He added that villagers were dismayed over the loss of their ancestral lands: “It feels like we lost our parents.”[100]

In late 2014, the Agriculture Ministry built a new channel for the dam, affecting another 10 acres and displacing two more families. Again, families reported that they received no notice of the impending flood or compensation.

In addition, most farmers received no advance notice when the land they were using was sold to private parties, in many cases only learning of the sale after its execution. Mit Tarlar, a villager from a town outside of Hpa-an, told Human Rights Watch that the government developed the land without consultation with local people, who were not given a chance to raise their objections.[101]

Another villager, Hla Khin, said he was not even notified of the government meeting with the affected community: “They didn’t invite us to the meeting because we do not own large parcels of land. They only invited landowners with over five acres of land.”[102] Hla Khin owned less than one acre of land. He said that he had had plans to use the land to build a house for himself and his wife.

In a few cases, government officials visited the village or issued a written notice that farmland would be repurposed but then failed to provide information about the scope of the project, or its impact on farmland. One villager said of the Hpa-an Special Industrial Zone: “The big problem is that we do not know the size of the industrial zone. We do not know whether it will reach our land or not, and we don’t know whether we can register land that is not yet registered.”[103]

In other cases, consultation was offered but did not provide villagers with a meaningful opportunity to give views and inputs into plans for the zone.

With respect to the Hpa-an Special Industrial Zone, of which foundations were laid in December 2011, the government’s consultations about land with villagers were cursory and incomprehensible to many attendees. According to farmer U Ne Win, in May 2014, Special Industrial Zone authorities invited villagers from affected communities to a meeting regarding the industrial zone; however, it was conducted in Burmese, which most Karen villagers do not understand.[104]

This lack of adequate notice by government officials puts people who would contest a sale or development of land at a severe disadvantage. Discussions with local lawyers in Hpa-an indicated that any legal appeal of a land transfer will likely be rejected if the buyer already has received the proper forms from the government.[105]

Further, as described below, the grievance mechanisms put in place by the Farmland Law fail to provide an adequate substitute for a court of law in deciding such issues. As a result, failure to properly notify individuals of proposed land projects often results in a nearly uncontestable legal transfer of land without input from those utilizing the land.

Difficulties Demonstrating Land Claims

Prior to the 2012 land reforms, tax receipts were the only form of documentation available to farmers. Among farmers who spoke to Human Rights Watch, they were the form of documentation most commonly held.

However, while tax receipts document land use they are not a legal document that can be used to certify land ownership. As such, they do not protect against government confiscation and government officials have been unwilling to consider these when making land grants.

Human Rights Watch found numerous cases of farmers who had worked land for years and had recorded their land and paid tax to the government, but then lost the land to the government, or businessmen or non-state armed groups who had obtained more recent government certification of ownership of the land.[106]

For example, U Muu Tay from Ta Nyin Kone village said local residents had been working the land since 1985 and had registered the land with the government in 1999. From 2000 to 2006, the villagers regularly paid tax on the land, and received receipts for those payments.[107] In 2006, he said, the DKBA came:

When they first arrived, they told us that we owned the land. But later they took 500 acres [of the land tax had been paid on] for their own plantation. They never offered us any money for the land. Since the DKBA took the land, we haven’t received any tax payment requests [for that land] from the government.[108]

Despite recent legal reforms related to land rights, there has not been significantly improved land tenure for farmers whose claims were not already registered at government offices. Only since 2012 have farmers been able to access Land Use Certificates (LUCs), which contain the right to sell, exchange, and lease land in a manner comparable to a system of private property rights.

Most of the villagers interviewed by Human Rights Watch had not received LUCs for their land, which are supposed to be given to all individuals with farmland currently on record with the Agriculture Ministry.[109] Those interviewed said that apparently as a result of the poor registration and documentation system, there were frequent mismatches between the land use maps in possession of the land office and actual land use in communities.[110]

For example, some farmers affected by the newly opened Hpa-an Special Industrial Zone showed Human Rights Watch tax bills paid to the government for use of their land and maps from local government land administration offices marking use rights to the land that they allege the government has now taken for the zone.[111] The dates of the documents varied, with some having been issued as far back as 2004.

Villagers stated that the government had not recognized their claims to the land nor given them any compensation. One aggrieved villager said, “They [government officials] look at the maps in the land office but they don’t compare them to the real use [of the land],” pointing out that the current land office maps do not reflect the community’s historical use of the land.[112]

Even where farmers possessed some form of documentation for their land, Human Rights Watch found that it often provided little protection against confiscation.[113]

U Lwan Kyaw, 72, one of several villagers who said their land was taken for the construction of the Zwebakin Hotel on the outskirts of Hpa-an, said that efforts to prove his ownership with records were dismissed: “We sent a letter to Shwe Mann [then speaker of the national parliament] but didn’t get any response. Before the hotel came, the land office said, ‘The government has taken the land, you cannot have it.’”[114]

Villagers presented Human Rights Watch with documents that showed they had paid taxes for the right to use the land, as well as maps provided by the local land office indicating that their names were on record at the local government offices as the farmers utilizing the land.[115] U Lwan Kyaw said that in 2013, he and his wife approached the local land administration office for assistance, but officers there told them they could do nothing to help. Later, the General Administration Department under the Ministry of Home Affairs told villagers they should go to court if they were unhappy with the decision.

Burma’s land registration system primarily focuses on farmland that has already been recorded.[116] As a result, LUCs have been issued only to those whose rights to land are already on record. Farmers that are actively using land but whose rights have never been recorded have still not benefited from the new registration systems. The registration maps on record are notoriously outdated, in some cases with maps dating back to the early 1960s.[117]

Further, the government’s land registration system appears ill-equipped to address the problems faced by people living in rural, ethnic, or conflict-affected areas, where farmers find it difficult to access government services and thus obtain registration.[118]

Registration in conflict-affected areas is particularly low. According to one study, fewer than a quarter of farmers in these areas have land documentation.[119] Humanitarian access is coordinated through the state chief minister’s office but is not comprehensive, leaving many internally displaced persons without access to personal identification documents, which are necessary to show to government officials when seeking land registration.[120]

Many of these farmers in conflict-affected areas possessed no government-registered land documents whatsoever; neither tax documents nor LUCs.[121] In these communities that Human Rights Watch visited, land ownership was recognized through community practices based on physical boundaries and historical land use, resulting in arrangements in which all the villagers knew who possessed which piece of land.[122] During times of conflict, when villagers either abandoned land or were prevented from accessing government services to pay land use taxes, the community land practices were simply not recorded or maintained.

In addition, LUCs cover only farmland, whereas many earn livelihoods in Karen State from land other than farmland.[123] One common example is land used in a shifting cultivation system. In some cases, land that is classified as vacant, fallow, and virgin by the government may actually be land that is part of the local community’s taungya (shifting cultivation) practice in which crops are rotated and sections of land are left vacant for periods for the soil to recover.[124]

There is currently no form of land title available to protect this type of use, meaning that farmers must attempt to request that the government transfer classification of such land to farmland before the use rights can be documented.[125] In the meantime, the government may determine that land is vacant, fallow, or virgin, and grant land use rights to others without protecting the rights of villagers who have traditionally used the land. As noted above, while individuals under the law have the right to contest such grants, they are rarely informed in a timely manner so as to do so.

Human Rights Watch also encountered some villagers with land registration documents issued by the insurgent Karen National Union. At times, land recognition by the government and the KNU came into conflict.[126] In some conflict-affected areas, villagers perceived the possession of KNU land registration documents as putting them at grave risk. One villager from Hlaingbwe township, an area now controlled by the Border Guard Force, explained that she had at one point received registration documents from the KNU, which evidenced her family’s ancestral possession of the land: “In the past, we had documents from the KNU. But if the military sees KNU documents they will kill you, so we threw them away.”[127]

Problems with Local Land Administration Offices

Farmers reported problems dealing with government offices in charge of administrating the land system, particularly when they were seeking to register land.

Academic research has found that Settlement and Land Records Department (SLRD) offices are severely understaffed and do not have adequate capacity to perform their legal and regulatory functions.[128] Interviewees also indicated that offices made little effort to respond or fulfill requests put forth by farmers, and many villagers told Human Rights Watch that they perceived the offices as focused solely on furthering the interests of businesses or wealthy individuals.

In Karen State, several factors make it difficult for farmers to access the SLRD. Many farmers do not speak Burmese and are illiterate; the government has not undertaken serious efforts to ensure that its land offices in Karen State have officers who can speak Karen.[129]

Illiteracy and an inability to speak Burmese means that language is a major barrier for villagers seeking to access government services. “It is not easy for me to communicate with government officials,” said one villager. “I don’t speak Burmese and they do not speak Karen.”[130]This language barrier has led farmers to sign documents that they did not fully understand.[131]

Farmers stated other practical factors, such as poor road conditions and lack of public transport, that made it difficult, time consuming, and expensive for them to travel from remote rural areas to the records departments, which are based in cities.[132]

Villagers also alleged that in many cases, SLRD officers failed to perform their duties or demanded bribes to do so. Several villagers stated that the SLRD did not respond to their inquiries, claiming that officials were out to lunch, that the weather was “too hot” to travel to their village to measure the land, or other apparent excuses.[133] In one village, farmers reported having to bribe officials with 400,000 kyat (US$325) simply to get them to visit their land.

In some instances where village leader permission was sought, farmers complained that they were unresponsive, refused to perform their duties, or were corrupt.[134] In one village, the local village leader is said to have told villagers that he expected to receive new motorbikes in exchange for his acquiescence.[135] Other farmers also stated they believed village leaders took pay-offs from people and groups trying to get ownership of land.[136]

San Klo

Villagers from San Klo,[137] near Eindu, said the local land administration office provided little support in their attempt to fight a land grant given to a former Karen armed group commander—Padoh Aung Sang, a KNU member who had left to form his own “peace group” in the late 1990s—without adequate consultation with local communities who had historical ties to the land.

Although the villagers’ use of the land had been recognized by the government through the granting of usage rights, such documents offered no protection when they sought help at the land administration office against Padoh Aung Sang’s appropriation in 2013 of more than 100 acres on which he planted rubber trees.

Nu Yee, one of several farmers who met with Padoh Aung San’s family at the local land administration office, said:

We went to the land office in September 2014 and we showed them our [tax] documents. They asked us questions about how long we have lived on this land. Padoh Aung San’s family was summoned as well. After that we went back to the land office four or five times to discuss who owns the land. They said there is nothing we can do for you. There was no explanation.[138]

Villagers added that they had asked the local land administration office to do a site visit, but the office had yet to do so. Nu Yee said: “The land office said, ‘It is too hot to measure your land,’ and it never came back to measure. We tried to phone them but there was no answer.”[139]

Villagers said they had received no compensation from Padoh Aung San for their land and could only support themselves with help from relatives abroad. Nu Yee added: “We have given up. We have no job or source of income anymore.”[140]

Nonexistent or Inadequate Compensation

In most of the cases that Human Rights Watch documented, people who had had their land seized received no compensation. This was true even where villagers could produce some form of documentation providing evidence of government-recognized land use rights.

Aung Thay from Naw Kyaw Myine village said the government provided no compensation and that most farmers in his area, including almost “80 percent of the village youth,” had to go to Thailand when it flooded their land for a dam project.

“Now I’m just planting rubber and other small plants,” another farmer from the village said. “I have six kids. Two are in Thailand and one is in Malaysia.”[141]

Villagers in Htantabin village, Hlaingbwe township, said they had tried speak to the Border Guard Force commander of the area, requesting compensation for their destroyed rubber trees: “We told him we wanted some compensation for the rubber [trees] that we had planted. He said to us, ‘Who told you to plant rubber on that land?’ He wouldn’t give us any money.”[142]

Failure to compensate occurred even in a number of cases involving official taking of land by the government for a public purpose under the 1894 Land Acquisition Act, which requires the government to provide compensation.[143]

In cases where villagers were compensated, many said it fell far short of what they were owed or what allowed them to earn a sustainable living or even survive.

In June 2015, the BGF commander offered to give the villagers five blocks of the developed land, significantly less than the 20 acres they claimed. According to villager U Be Be:

Now the commander has offered to give us five blocks of the land, but it is not the same.… My grandmother on my father’s side is already old, she cannot work. If I can work that land I can give some money to my grandmother. If we lose that land, I will be very upset.[144]

Villagers from New Ahtet Kawyin also said that the land which the Karen State government offered before they were evicted in 2015 was not sufficient for all of the families to move to. The government told villagers they would determine who could receive land plots through a so-called lucky draw.[145]One of the villagers explained that the plots on offer were too small to earn a sufficient livelihood:

The plot [offered by the government] is 40 by 90 feet. On land that size we can only build a home, we cannot make anything or do farming. We cannot even build an outhouse. Also, there are some farmers who have small plantations already on that land. How can we know that we are not taking their land?[146]

Moung Pi, from a village just outside of Hpa-an, said that despite possessing an executed land sale contract and land tax receipts, the government confiscated his land without compensation. He noted: “It is good land. You could not work in Thailand for 10 years and make enough money for this kind of land.”[147]

Mit Tarlar from Ta May[148] said that the two parcels of land sized 60 by 160 feet that the government offered to compensate him for his 5-acre plot was woefully inadequate:

We cannot do farming on the land [given for compensation] because it is so small. You can only build a small house.… The economic situation is worse here since we lost the land. There aren’t a lot of jobs here. All of our sons and relatives had to go to work in Thailand.… I only have the house I am living in now because I went to Thailand to work.[149]

In the case of the newly opened Hpa-an Special Industrial Zone, villagers told Human Rights Watch that they were not offered any compensation for the land, though they reported that other people dispossessed of land within the zone did receive other land.[150]U Ne Win, whose eight acres was flooded by a dam built within the zone, told Human Rights Watch that he was still waiting for the government to fulfill its promise to give him land. In the meantime, his sons and daughters had moved to Thailand to find work to support the family.[151]

Government officials did not appear to apply consistent criteria for determining the amount of compensation. When determining compensation, officials did not take into account the livelihood impact of the land confiscations.

In Kaw Klone village, then-chief minister U Zaw Min promised the return of land confiscated for rubber plantations.[152] However, when Human Rights Watch visited the village in March 2015, villagers indicated that only 186 acres out of a total of 700 acres had been returned.[153] In another case, villagers were told that they would receive new land, only to discover that the new land in question was already claimed by other people.[154] As one farmer said, “The government offered us new land, but we cannot move there because our neighbors already own that land.”[155]

Others have yet to receive the land promised, and have no information as to when or whether it may come. One villager dispossessed by the Hpa-an Special Industrial Zone said: “Two years ago the government built a small dam and it flooded our land.… The SLRD [Settlement and Land Records Department] has promised new land but we still haven’t received anything.”[156]

In a few cases, businesses involved in land seizures offered token payments aimed at placating those whose land was confiscated. Villagers told Human Rights Watch that they refused to accept such payments, which they did not consider to be fair compensation for their land.In the case of the Zwekabin Hotel described above, villagers are still seeking compensation from the company. They said that they have received a 1 million kyat (US$800) “donation,” but not actual compensation for the land.[157]

The instances in which villagers were successful in obtaining compensation often came through political, rather than legal, means.[158]For example, in some cases villages banded together with the assistance of an influential Buddhist monk, the help of a local nongovernmental organization, or through a well-educated individual within the village, such as a school teacher or headmaster. The most successful strategies for obtaining compensation or the return of land appeared to be appealing directly in writing to the Karen State chief minister at the time, U Zaw Min, or then-President Thein Sein. In other cases, villagers sought assistance of non-state armed groups with political clout in the area to help negotiate an acceptable outcome.

In the rare instances when the government has admitted an error in seizing land, redress has been limited. Villagers in Kaw Klone said that the Karen State government had eventually acknowledged in a letter to the villagers that their land was improperly confiscated in 2008 by a wealthy businessman, Myit U, who had forced them to pay to keep the land and threatened violence against those who could not or would not pay. Despite this admission, they said, more than 1,000 acres of their land have yet to be returned, and some of the returned land is now in the hands of non-villagers. A Kuklo visitor said:

Chief Minister U Zaw Min now said that he has given back 700 acres of land, but in reality, they’ve given it to businessmen, cronies. We received a document that lists land return for 58 individuals. But some of the people on the list are not from this village. About 30 [people] from the village are missing from the list. Villagers from here got back only 186.31 acres.[159]

Recognizing land to be one of the most pressing issues facing the country, the government in 2012 established a Land Acquisition Investigative Commission to deal with complaints of improper land confiscation, though the commission has no authority to actually resolve cases. In its first report issued in 2013, the commission concluded that most land acquisitions broke existing land laws.[160]

The commission noted that more than 117,000 acres were acquired for industrial zones, agriculture projects, or urban growth.[161] It found a lack of transparency between government, businesses, and individuals. It further found that, though required by law, most projects which were incomplete had not reverted back to the original landowners.[162]

If compensation was paid, it was most often well below market level.[163]

In April 2016, Burma’s parliament announced it would investigate 6,000 out of some 18,000 complaints in its next term.[164]

Loss of Livelihood, Migration to Thailand

Like much of Burma, Karen State remains a primarily agrarian society where individuals rely heavily on rice production for incomes.[165] Access to land is central to livelihoods, as there are few other methods to earn income. One farmer, who lost her land and did not know what other job she could do, said, “I know everything about rice farming, but I have no other education. I did not go to school.”[166]

A family’s loss of land typically results in significant loss of earnings, and the resulting harm to livelihoods and food security can place immense burdens on those for whom there is little or no economic cushion. Government policies that facilitate unlawful or uncompensated land seizures reflect a failure to take adequate steps to ensure everyone’s rights to an adequate standard of living, including food and shelter.[167]

Htee Htar from Ta Nyin Kone described the impact the loss of land has had on his village: “With no land, we cannot do farming and we cannot make a business. Since 2006 we have been working as day laborers in other fields.”[168]

Daw Mu Pulu from Ateyebu said that after DKBA soldiers seized her 20 acres of land in 2006, she became a day laborer and others in her family were compelled to become migrant workers in Thailand. While they occasionally sent her money, the situation had deteriorated since they farmed their own land. She said: “Now we only make 3,000 kyat (US$2.40) per day and we have to buy rice. If we had our own paddy, we could grow our own rice.”[169]

Despite the recent establishment of factories and agricultural plantations around Hpa-an, villagers claim that the factories and plantations have created few jobs for local people. They say that instead, the businesses are employing laborers from other parts of the country who may be in debt and thus accept very low wages.[170] The vice chair of the Hpa-an Special Industrial Zone told Human Rights Watch that he estimated that only 30 percent of workers employed at the Hpa-an Special Industrial Zone are from Karen State.[171]

Families have also been fractured by land confiscations. Human Rights Watch found in the cases examined that land confiscation in Karen State almost always prompted migration for work to Thailand by at least one member of an affected family.[172]

Kaw Sa Ka Lo villagers said that after their land was seized, “most of the young people went to Thailand.”[173] One villager, whose brother is now in Thailand, told Human Rights Watch: “We just want our land back. We have large families but no land for our children. Our brothers and sisters are in Thailand now. They want to come back but there is no land to support them.”[174]

An elderly woman said, “Now that I have no farm … my family in Bangkok sends me money to support me.”

Many individuals said that they would have preferred to keep their families intact and would not have migrated were it not for the confiscation: “After our land was ruined, about half of the young people left for Bangkok. Before the factory came, we were happy farming; we could create jobs for the youth.”[175]

Those who lost land and wished to stay were sometimes able to rent farmland from neighbors, borrowing money from relatives living abroad.[176] Other landless farmers who were determined to remain in their area turned to day labor if it was available: “We have nothing to do now. We are just looking for new land, and some of us do day labor. With day labor we earn 3,000 or 4,000 kyat (US$3-4) per day.”[177]

Land confiscation has led to cross-border migration for some, but many have migrated to Thailand for economic reasons apart from land confiscation. Overall, migrants to Thailand often face poor working conditions and exploitation. “Our relatives want to come back,” said one villager. “The working conditions [in Thailand] are poor and the salary is low.”[178]

Lack of Redress

Villagers interviewed by Human Rights Watch repeatedly cited the lack of compensation or other forms of redress when their land had been seized. “It’s like hitting a cement wall,” one community leader said.[179]

When a land dispute arises, the first avenue of recourse for villagers is with the Ward or Village Tract Farmland Administration Body. The committee consists of a chairperson from the General Administration Department, a secretary from the Settlement Land Records Department, and two farmer representatives. It is unclear what processes or criteria are used to select farmer representatives.

From this first level committee, contested decisions can be appealed to the township, district, and ultimately region/state level Farmland Management Bodies. Redress becomes more difficult when land disputes cannot be resolved at the ward or village tract level.

Farmers typically said their ward or village tract representative had been their initial point of contact in expressing a complaint over a land problem.

Local representatives frequently were unable to resolve the disputes. National-level Agriculture Ministry officials conceded that farmer representation at the district and region/state level was weak, and said this was because the farmer organizations were weak.[180] This suggests that farmers’ interests are likely to be less well-represented the higher their appeal goes.

While the land administration system allows for review of local level decisions, there is no mechanism to challenge or review decisions by an independent administrative or judicial body.[181] Under the 2012 Farmland Law, decisions made by the Farmland Management Body regarding land classification and land ownership may not be appealed in a court of law.[182]

The Ta Nyin Kone case highlights the difficulties faced by villagers seeking redress for land confiscation.

Ta Nyin Kone

In the village of Ta Nyin Kone, locals started experiencing land problems after a DKBA unit arrived in their village in 2006. U Muu Tay, a local villager, said the villagers had been working the land since 1985 and had registered it with the government in 1999. From 2000 to 2006, the villagers regularly paid tax on the land, and received receipts for those tax payments.[183] But in 2006:

The DKBA came. When they first arrived, they told us that we owned the land. But later, they took 500 acres [of the land we had been paying tax on] for their own plantation. They never offered us any money for the land. Since the DKBA took the land, we haven’t received any tax payment requests [for that land] from the government.[184]

The villagers sought redress for their land taken, but because Border Guard Forces operating in their village were themselves involved in the land confiscation, they were afraid of retaliation if they raised the issue. U Muu Tay told Human Rights Watch that villagers wanted to protest in 2006 when the DKBA soldiers seized their land but had been too frightened to do so. “We wanted to complain but we didn’t dare,” he said.

Villagers from Ta Nyin Kone stated that they brought their case through the land dispute system but at every level the Farmland Management Body ruled against them.

Villagers said that BGF commander Bo Sar Yay was responsible for many problems in the village, and alleged that he had started using land that the villagers set aside to build a new Buddhist monastery. Several also alleged that Bo Sar Yay threatened them concerning their land. A villager said that when they raised their problems directly with him, “Bo Sar Yay said to us, ‘You should be careful because there are no police here and there is no lawyer.’”[185]

Despite those warnings, in early 2015, the villagers attempted to initiate a lawsuit against Bo Sar Yay to get the land returned to them. However, the court dismissed their suit—accepting the government’s classification and registration of the land as belonging to Bo Sar Yay—on the grounds that under the Farmland Law the court had no jurisdiction to review the matter and reevaluate the decision of the land committee.

Agriculture Ministry officials confirmed that the mechanisms under law to address land disputes were not often helpful to farmers whose land was confiscated. However, they considered this to be a problem of farmers’ failing to understand and assert their rights, which could be address with public education.[186] In October 2015, Agriculture Ministry officials responded to a Human Rights Watch letter requesting information about land issues in Karen State by saying that they had received no complaints at their office of land confiscations. This suggests that farmers were either not aware of the requirements to file complaints—or found such mechanisms inaccessible or futile.

III. Land Rights Under Domestic and International Laws and Policies

National Law

Land Laws

Current land laws in Burma are a continuation of land policies adopted after independence in 1948, when the government asserted ownership over all land within the country. Under the 2008 constitution, land ownership still rests with the government, which retains the power to rescind any grant of land rights.[187]

The acquisition of land for government purposes remains governed by colonial-era legislation. The 1894 Land Acquisition Act remains a key piece of legislation detailing legal requirements for proper land acquisition for public purposes. Under this law, the government can compulsorily acquire land for “public purposes” or for a companywhen notice is given and compensation is at market value.[188] Human Rights Watch’s research found little evidence of proper compensation being provided as required under the Land Acquisition Act.

Farmland and Virgin Lands Management Laws

Recent legal developments from 2012—such as the passage of the Farmland Law and the Lands Management Act—have initiated what is akin to a private property system. Under the two land laws, land is classified into different categories including farmland, virgin, fallow, or vacant land, and forest land. The Farmland Law regulates paddy land; the Land Management Law regulates a range of lands including unused plots and abandoned lands.[189]

Under the Farmland Law, farmers can register, sell, mortgage, and lease land.[190] Farmers can secure their rights to land by obtaining Land Use Certificates (LUCs).[191] Farmland must be used for agricultural purposes and is not permitted to become fallow.[192] Ultimately, the state still retains ownership of all land, though it must continue to comply with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act where the government acquires the land for a different purpose.

The Farmland Law and its rules create Farmland Management Bodies (FMBs).[193] FMBs carry out a variety of duties including issuing LUCs for farmlands, scrutinizing land use, and revoking land use rights. FMBs are also the bodies that resolve disputes relating to farmland.

The Lands Management Act regulates land that is not currently in use, or was previously used but was been subsequently abandoned. The act is important for farmers in Karen State because the traditional ways in which many Karen farmers cultivate land, including through taungya, or shifting cultivation, may cause the government to classify their land as vacant or fallow.[194] In addition, the “majority of these areas of land fall outside of the land surveys conducted by the SLRD,” meaning they are not well-documented at local land administration offices.[195]

The Lands Management Act contains provisions that recognize use of informal and undocumented farming, providing that such land can be reclassified as farmland and subsequently an LUC can be issued. In addition, rules implementing the Lands Management Act provide individuals informally using land with the right to contest the grant of land to a proposed user.[196]

Forests are important for the livelihood of rural Karen, many of whom forage in forests for fruits, herbs, and building materials. Such uses of forest are regulated under the Forest Law of 1992, so those who forage for materials in the forest can be accused of improper use and charged with trespass.

In some parts of Karen State, the KNU also plays a significant role in land disputes, in some cases issuing land documents under its own land regime for those within its zone of governance.[197] In 2014, the KNU formally adopted its own Land Use Policy, which “envisions recognition, restitution, protection and support of the socially-legitimate tenure rights of all Karen peoples.”[198]

National Land Use Policy

In January 2016, the outgoing cabinet adopted a new National Land Use Policy. Key topics addressed by the policy include land administration, classification, dispute resolution, equal rights of men and women, and communal tenure systems.[199] The policy is intended to form the basis for amendments to existing land laws as well as implementation by new bodies to address land issues.

Adopted after several rounds of government-led expert and public consultations, the policy envisages that the government review and amend existing land classifications, including “recognition and registration of rights for all stakeholders including ethnic nationalities and smallholder farmers, when their rights have not previously been recognized and registered,” and specifically mentions rotating and shifting cultivation.[200]

Key aspects of the policy include a call for:

  • A review of the status of land, including forest land, currently used for village livelihoods;
  • Protection of that land as “customary land”;[201]
  • Suspension of land use other than for public purposes until such a review is possible;[202]
  • Emphasis on community consultations and participatory procedures;[203]
  • Ensuring “equal rights” for individuals “to access accurate and complete information related to land use”;[204]
  • Ensuring equal rights for men and women;[205]
  • Creation of new procedures to oversee processes to provide notice and share information;
  • The right to appeal land use changes;[206]
  • Representation and participation of local farmer organizations when dealing with dispute resolution;[207]
  • Providing for Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs), conducted by future land use committees; and
  • Providing for policy monitoring and evaluation by a still to be formed National Land Use Council, including assessing and analyzing “whether environmental and social safeguards are being applied for impact assessment purposes,” and whether those procedures guarantee free, prior, and informed consent.[208]

Part 5 of the policy speaks to issues of land acquisition, relocation, compensation, rehabilitation, and restitution, stipulating application of international best practices and human rights standards, and participation of “township, ward or village tract level stakeholders, civil society, representatives of ethnic nationalities and experts.”[209] It also provides for land use and housing rights for individuals who lost land due to conflict.[210]

While civil society organizations have been generally positive about the adoption of the policy, representatives have expressed some serious concerns, including the need to promote democratic access to land for poor, vulnerable, and marginalized people who have little or no access, in line with the UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s Voluntary Guidelines for Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security.[211]

Land Administration

The Ministry of Forestry, recently merged into the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation (MNREC) as part of President U Htin Kyaw’s policy implemented in March 2016,[212] and the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, are the responsible ministries for forestry and agriculture, respectively.

Under the MNREC, the Settlement Land Records Department (SLRD) is the main office responsible for managing land. The SLRD’s mandate includes “recording and registering interests in farmland and vacant, fallow and virgin land and for issuing LUCs to farmers whose use rights have been approved by a Farmland Management Body.”[213] The SLRD has officials at the state, division, district, and township levels.[214] The SLRD acts as the administrative office executing the decisions of FMBs, described above, as well as performing other administrative tasks and record keeping.

One problem is the SLRD has ostensibly conflicting mandates. On one hand, it is tasked with deciding rights to farmland but on the other hand, it is responsible to grant land for agri-business projects.[215] As a result, decisions over issues of land use and approving such projects need closer scrutiny. Per the Farmland Law, a fundamental problem is there is no explicit provision to appeal an FMB decision to a court of law, and courts have resisted taking jurisdiction in such cases.[216]

The strong military presence among the staff of many Burmese administrative offices dealing with land is another issue, raising conflict of interest concerns among bodies that are supposed to be independent.

At the district and township level, FMBs are staffed by members of both the MNREC and the Ministry of Home Affairs’ General Administration Department (GAD), which “acts as the civil service for the new state and region governments and provides the administration for the country’s districts and townships.”[217] The Ministry of Home Affairs is one of three ministries reserved by the 2008 constitution to be headed by a high-ranking active duty military official appointed by the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.[218]The Ministry of Home Affairs, particularly the GAD, is predominantly staffed by former military officers, a process of reassignment and retirement that increased during the Thein Sein administration.

Military “retirement” to civilian ministries elicited a series of public protests in 2015, although there is little the new NLD-led government can do in regard to the Ministry of Home Affairs because of its control by the military.

International Law

In the context of land issues, the government of Burma is obligated under international human rights law to respect rights to food, housing, and an adequate standard of living, as well as rights to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression. The government must also act to end discrimination against women and ethnic minorities in all spheres, including in public and political life and development planning.

Burma’s land laws and practices concerning confiscation of land, as well as restrictions on fundamental liberties, have resulted in violations of the rights of Karen farmers and other villagers in Karen State. The absence of adequate avenues for redress both to contest confiscation and to obtain compensation add to the abuses.

Right to Adequate Food, Housing, and Standard of Living

The right to food, housing, and an adequate standard of living are enshrined in article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is generally considered to be reflective of customary international law. The declaration provides that everyone has a right to “a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care.”[219]These rights are also set out in article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The ICESCR obligates member states to undertake steps to the “maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization” of the rights enshrined therein.[220] Burma has signed but not ratified the ICESCR, which means that it must not take actions that undermine the object and purpose of the treaty.[221]

A growing body of international human rights norms recognize the importance of access to land in ensuring these rights, particularly in areas where families rely on land to provide for their food. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in its General Comment No. 12 on the Right to Adequate Food, noted:

[Access to food] is indivisibly linked to the inherent dignity of the human person and is indispensable for the fulfilment of other human rights.… It is also inseparable from social justice, requiring the adoption of appropriate economic, environmental and social policies, at both the national and international levels, oriented to the eradication of poverty and the fulfilment of all human rights for all.[222]

In addition to the right to housing under the ICESCR, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) obligates governments to respect and protect the rights of all people from arbitrary interference in their home and family life.[223] International standards prohibit “the permanent or temporary removal against their will of individuals, families and/or communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection.”[224]

The UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security reflect international best practices in relation to land tenure security. The guidelines specify that relevant political authorities should engage and seek:

The support of those who, having legitimate tenure rights, could be affected by decisions, prior to decisions being taken, and responding to their contributions; taking into consideration existing power imbalances between different parties and ensuring active, free, effective, meaningful and informed participation of individuals and groups in associated decision-making processes.[225]

The guidelines urge governments to encourage “mechanisms for monitoring and analysis of tenure governance in order to develop evidence-based programs and secure on-going improvements” in land tenure programs, “to prevent corruption through transparent processes and decision-making,” and that beneficiaries are “selected through open processes” in which there is no political or other discrimination in order to promote social equality.[226]

The guidelines recommend that to achieve all this, authorities should “set up multi-stakeholder platforms and frameworks at local, national and regional levels” to monitor and evaluate the implementation of land tenure policies and programs, including with technical support from international bodies.[227]

Right to Peaceful Assembly

Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 21 of the ICCPR recognize the right to peaceful assembly.[228]

Under Burma’s 2012 Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Law, protesters can be charged for violating a variety of limitations that the law places on freedom of speech and assembly. Those wishing to hold an assembly must apply for advance permission from the chief of the township police force.[229] The law also states that the organizer of an assembly can be held criminally liable if the assembly deviates from the announced location of the protest or if participants use different chants than those notified to the authorities, even if the assembly was peaceful and did not disrupt public order.[230]The application process under the law not only requires basic date, time, and place information about the planned assembly, but seeks unnecessarily invasive information about the assembly’s purpose and schedule, the names and addresses of organizers and speakers, and even the chants they wish to use.

A new Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Law—passed by the upper house of parliament on May 31, 2016, but still pending debate in full parliament at time of writing—corrects some of the flaws of the 2012 statute yet still restricts freedom of assembly and freedom of expression in ways that significantly exceed those permissible under international legal standards.[231]

The Peaceful Assembly Law contradicts international human rights standards. Maina Kiai, the UN special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, has stated that people wishing to exercise their right to peaceful assembly should not be required to obtain prior authorization to do so.[232] According to the special rapporteur, the imposition of criminal penalties on individuals who fail to ask the government for consent to exercise their right to peaceful assembly is an unacceptable interference with their right to freedom of assembly under international law.

The government has an obligation to facilitate peaceful assemblies “within sight and sound” of their intended target. When it fails to meet that obligation, arresting and prosecuting those who seek to assemble in a more appropriate venue is a disproportionate and inappropriate response.[233]

The special rapporteur noted in a report on the right to peaceful assembly and association in the context of natural resource exploitation that “the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association play a key role in opening up spaces and opportunities for genuine and effective engagement by civil society in decision-making processes across the spectrum of natural resource exploitation activities”[234]

The special rapporteur has commented that the most egregious violations of freedom of association and assembly in relation to natural resource exploitation in many cases occur:

Far from centres of power, [against people] who are often at risk or already marginalized within society. They may lack access to information or the means of effectively advocating for their concerns, or they may be confronted with authorities are that are unable or unwilling to address their grievances. The ability to freely associate and to peacefully assemble are indispensable in this regard.[235]

Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, and Free, Prior and Informed Consent

International law concerning the rights of indigenous peoples is most clearly enunciated in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,[236] which Burma supported at the UN General Assembly in 2007, and in the International Labour Organization Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries.[237] The UN Declaration provides for governments to “consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.”[238]

Under the Declaration, governments should also provide effective mechanisms so that indigenous peoples obtain just and fair redress for any such activities, and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural, or spiritual impact.[239]

As the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) notes, “At present, international law is much less clear about the land and resource rights of other individuals or groups who may not recognize themselves as ‘tribal’ or ‘indigenous’ but who nevertheless gain access to lands and resources through customary law, traditional inheritance or other informal processes.”[240] In its principles of implementation of the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security, the FAO calls for governments to engage in “active, free, effective, meaningful and informed consultation and participation with all those affected, including indigenous peoples and other communities with customary tenure.”[241]

While Burma has not enacted legislation providing for free, prior, and informed consent, its January 2016 National Land Use Policy contains references to “free, prior, informed, consent” without defining what the process or procedures entail.[242]

Women’s Rights

As a party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Burma is obligated to end discrimination against women in laws, policies, customs, and practices. CEDAW requires states to “eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life,” and in particular protects the rights of women to “participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels of government.”[243]

In article 14 on rural women, CEDAW obligates governments to guarantee equal treatment of women and men in land and agrarian reform, as well as in land resettlement schemes.[244] CEDAW also provides that states must “eliminate discrimination against women in rural areas in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, that they participate in and benefit from rural development.”[245] CEDAW calls on states to eliminate discrimination against women in matters relating to marriage and family relations, including with respect to “ownership, acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment, and disposition of property.”[246]

The CEDAW Committee, the UN expert body that monitors state compliance with CEDAW, has stated in its General Recommendation No. 34 on the rights of rural women that states should “ensure that land acquisitions … do not violate the rights of rural women or result in forced evictions, and protect them from the negative impacts of acquisition of land by national and transnational companies, as well due to development projects, extractive industries and megaprojects.”[247]

Business and Human Rights

Although governments have international legal obligations to promote and ensure respect for human rights, businesses also have a responsibility to avoid causing or contributing to human rights abuses. The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights provide that business enterprises should undertake human rights due diligence to identify and mitigate the human rights harm not only of their own activities but also activities to which they are directly linked by their business relationships. Specifically, companies have a responsibility to “avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their own activities,” as well as to “seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or services by their business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts.”[248]

Companies are also expected to undertake adequate due diligence to identify the potential adverse human rights impact arising from their activities and that of their suppliers, and to help ensure that victims have access to adequate remedies for any abuses that occur in spite of these efforts. Under the Guiding Principles, companies should consider ending business activity where severe negative human rights consequences cannot be avoided or mitigated.[249]

IV. Recommendations

To the Government of Burma

  • End the arbitrary arrest of land activists by police, and release activists awaiting trial for undertaking peaceful activities to protest land seizures.
  • Impartially investigate allegations of unlawful land confiscation, including those detailed in this report, publicly report the findings, and investigate and appropriately prosecute those responsible for rights abuses. Provide prompt and adequate compensation to villagers who have wrongfully lost access to their land.
  • Amend the Peaceful Procession and Peaceful Assembly Act to bring it fully into compliance with international human rights standards:
    • Eliminate criminal sanctions for protests that fail to give advance notice or deviate from protest locations notified to the authorities, and eliminate all criminal sanctions for peaceful expression of views by protesters; and
    • Significantly narrow the overly broad restrictions on free expression included in the act, including by removing the ban on “incorrect” information and limits on political speech, and ending the requirement that protesters identify chants in advance.
  • Create a special taskforce consisting of the Burmese Defense Services (Tatmadaw), the Justice Ministry, and the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission to investigate all alleged abuses by Border Guard Forces (BGF) connected to land confiscation in BGF-controlled areas, make public the findings of the investigation, and ensure the return of land taken improperly by members of the BGF to those who had previously been using it.
  • Promptly implement a system to allow villagers to effectively report abuses by local government officials—including Settlement Land Records Department (SLRD) officers and other land officials, village tract and township leaders, and police—and protect complainants against retaliation for reporting abuses. Investigate allegations of improper behavior by district and township-level SLRD officials, including refusals to register land or make site visits for local farmers.
  • Improve access to free or government-subsidized legal services for the rural poor for land and other cases.
  • Amend the Farmland Law to provide a clear procedure that allows individuals to challenge decisions made by Farmland Management Bodies to a court of law. Direct Farmland Management Bodies to implement an independent dispute resolution mechanism for land conflicts, ensuring that such bodies are linguistically and geographically accessible and contain representation of women and relevant ethnic groups.
  • Ensure that in all future government land acquisitions:
    • The “public purposes” for which the government may acquire land under the Land Acquisition Act are clarified;
    • Proper advance notice is given to affected farmers, and farmers are given an adequate opportunity to voice disagreement and have their reasons for disagreement heard by authorities; and
    • When land is taken, fair compensation is paid to affected farmers, including individuals who have long occupied or used the land in question but do not possess land registration documents.
  • Expand programs to ensure effective and fair land registration processes for individuals in conflict-affected and formerly conflict-affected areas. In the interim, adopt policies to ensure that no land parcels for which there are credible existing claims, including historical claims not currently documented by formal government systems, are granted to businesses for new projects.
  • Improve existing local land administration by:
    • Ensuring broad representation of farmers, ethnic minorities, and women in Farmland Administration Bodies;
    • Providing additional support for efforts aimed at documenting existing land usage and claims to land;
    • Amending the land tenure registration system to increase land tenure security for smallholder famers, and include recognition of communal land ownership. The tenure registration system should also recognize that individuals in conflict-affected areas face particular difficulties in obtaining land registration, and relevant officials should take steps to ameliorate those difficulties; and
    • Ensuring that farmers can document claims to land through processes consistent with historical practices in their community, including by seeking attestation of other community members living in the village.
  • Ensure that new laws and regulations promoting business and development contain provisions that take account of the consequences that new investment will have on existing land conflicts.
  • Adopt government monitoring systems to collect land statistics, disaggregated by gender. This should include the percentage of women and men with legally recognized and documented land rights.
  • Implement robust consultation procedures so that affected ethnic minority groups, working transparently through their own representative institutions, can intervene in accordance with the National Land Use Policy prior to the approval or commencement of any project affecting their lands.
  • Ensure that all land evictions or displacements are implemented in accordance with international human rights standards, including the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement and, for indigenous peoples, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

To the Burmese Defense Services (Tatmadaw)

  • Ensure that Border Guard Force (BGF) units operate under the effective control of the military, and ensure that any abuses by BGF personnel, including seizure of land, are impartially investigated and prosecuted.
  • Immediately issue a decree to BGF personnel prohibiting intimidation tactics against individuals who oppose land confiscation, and stating that doing so will subject them to discipline or prosecution as appropriate.

To the Government of Karen State

  • End all arbitrary restrictions on public protests regarding land confiscation and other matters. Permission should be routinely granted subject only to reasonable restrictions on time, place, and manner.
  • Ensure that policy consultations on land issues in Karen State include all relevant stakeholders, including women and ethnic minority groups, and are in accordance with the National Land Use Policy.
  • Immediately end the use of arbitrary arrest and detention and other tactics aimed at intimidating and silencing land rights activists.

To Domestic and Multinational Companies Operating in Karen State

  • Refrain from investments or business activities that involve arbitrary seizure of land from farmers.
  • Operate in accordance with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to ensure that operations do not cause, benefit from, support, or, through other business relationships, engender human rights abuses. Proceed with projects only after assessing human rights risks, including risks concerning seizure of land and labor rights. Identify measures to prevent or mitigate the risk of rights abuses, and establish and implement effective monitoring mechanisms that permit continual analysis of human rights risks.
  • Implement robust consultation procedures with communities affected by business operations, making sure that affected communities fully participate in every part of the process. Take steps to ensure meaningful participation by women in consultations concerning land acquisitions.
  • Establish effective grievance mechanisms, in line with best international practice, so that individuals affected by projects can raise complaints directly to companies in addition to the government.
  • Operate in accordance with the National Land Use Policy on proposed investments and operations using land in Karen State, in negotiation with local communities.
  • Urge the Burmese government to respect existing land rights, including customary land rights, and to reform land laws and regulations in line with international human rights standards.
  • In cases where a company’s operations have contributed to land seizures, ensure that displaced communities are provided with adequate compensation.

To International Donors and Financial Institutions

  • Take measures with respect to activities funded by international donors and international financial institutions to:
    • Undertake due diligence to identify the potential human rights impacts of all proposed activities and avoid or mitigate adverse impacts, and do not support activities that will contribute to or exacerbate human rights violations;
    • Provide relevant information in a timely and easily understood form to communities about proposed and ongoing activities;
    • Consult and cooperate with communities in an effort to obtain support from ethnic minorities whose lands or territories and other resources are affected in any way prior to commencing with activities. Act to ensure full and open public participation without risk of retaliation for those expressing critical views; and
    • In activities that risk an adverse human rights impact, require independent supervision and grievance mechanisms.
  • Support nongovernmental organizations to provide legal services and land rights education to individuals and communities affected by land seizures in Karen State and elsewhere.
  • Support outside training programs for state and local level government land administration offices on best international practice on human rights and land issues.

Acknowledgments

This report was researched and written by Caroline Stover, a fellow with the Asia Division of Human Rights Watch. Lara Casalotti, an intern with the Asia Division, provided research support. David Scott Mathieson, senior Burma researcher, advised and assisted with the research. The report was reviewed by Janet Walsh, deputy director in the Women’s Rights Division; Arvind Ganesan, director of the Business and Human Rights Division; and Jessica Evans, senior researcher and advocate on international financial institutions. This report was edited by Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director, and reviewed by Brad Adams, Asia director. James Ross, legal and policy director, and Danielle Haas, senior program editor, provided legal and program review. Production assistance was provided by Shayna Bauchner and Storm Tiv, Asia Division associates; Olivia Hunter, publications and photography associate; Fitzroy Hepkins, administrative manager; and Jose Martinez, senior coordinator.

Human Rights Watch would like to thank the land rights experts who consulted with us on the laws, policies, and context of land issues in Burma, including SiuSue Mark, Rob Oberndorf, and staff at the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) and Karen Environmental and Social Action Network (KESAN). Above all, we gratefully acknowledge those who shared their stories with us.

[1] See, for example,“Myanmar, UNHCR to ensure safe return of refugees,” Bangkok Post, July 7, 2016, http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asean/1030081/myanmar-unhcr-to-ensure-sa... (accessed August 21, 2016).

[2] Human Rights Watch, “They Came and Destroyed our Village Again”: The Plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Karen State, vol. 17, no. 4(C), June 2005, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/06/09/they-came-and-destroyed-our-villag..., p. 28; Karen Human Rights Group, Losing Ground: Land conflicts and collective action in eastern Myanmar, March 2013, http://www.khrg.org/sites/default/files/losinggroundkhrg-march2013-fullt... (accessed June 12, 2015); Karen Human Rights Group, ‘With only our voices, what can we do?’: Land confiscation and local response in southeast Myanmar, June 2015, http://khrg.org/sites/default/files/full_with_only_our_voices._-_english..., June 2015 (accessed July 1, 2015).

[3] See, for example, Mary Callahan, “Political Authority in Burma’s Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occupation, and Coexistence,” East-West Center; Ashley South, “Burma’s Longest War: Anatomy of the Karen Conflict,” Transnational Institute, 2011, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/Burma%27s%20Longest%... (accessed June 11, 2015).

[4] The Population and Housing Census of Myanmar, 2014, Summary of the Provisional Results, Department of Population, Ministry of Immigration and Population, August 2014, table 1. Human Rights Watch was quite critical of the census, including the Ministry of Immigration and UNFPA. See David Scott Mathieson, “What Burma's Census Missed,” September 4, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/04/dispatches-what-burmas-census-missed; see also, Philip Heijmans, “Myanmar’s Controversial Census,” The Diplomat, September 2, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/myanmars-controversial-census/ (accessed April 11, 2015).

[5] UNHCR, “Kayin State Profile,” June 2014, p. 8. There are at least 12 related Karen dialects, and a variety of Karen subgroups, with the largest being Sgaw Karen and Po Karen. The majority of Karen people are Buddhist or animist, but there is a significant group of Karen Christians, and a smaller group of Karen Muslims.

[6] See Bertil Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948 (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 1999).

[7] Human Rights Watch, “They Came and Destroyed our Village Again”; Human Rights Watch, Dead Men Walking: Convict Porters on the Front Lines in Eastern Burma, July 2011, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/07/12/dead-men-walking-0; Amnesty International, “No Place To Hide”: Killings, Abductions and Other Abuses Against Ethnic Karen Villagers and Refugees, ASA/16/13/95, June 1995, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a9ba0.html (accessed September 22, 2016).

[8] Desmond Ball, Burma's Military Secrets: Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) from the Second World War to Civil War and Cyber Warfare (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 1998); The Border Consortium, Nine Thousand Nights: Refugees from Burma (2012).

[9] Statement on Initial Agreement between KNU and Burmese Government,” January 13, 2012, point 7, http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/images/pdf/KNUandBurmeseGovernment.pdf (accessed April 11, 2015); “Myanmar signs ceasefire with eight armed groups,” Reuters, October 15, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-politics-idUSKCN0S82MR20151015 (accessed April 11, 2016).

[10]“Fighting Continues in Karen and Mon States,” Irrawaddy, September 29, 2014, http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/ fighting-continues-karen-mon-states.html (accessed January 12, 2015); “More Fighting in Karen State Forces Villagers to Flee,” Irrawaddy, October 10, 2014, http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/fighting-karen-state-forces-villagers-fle... (accessed January 12, 2015).

[11]“DKBA and Burma Army fighting Forces Kawkareik Traffic to a Standstill” Karen News, March 12, 2015, http://karennews.org/2015/03/dkba-and-burma-army-fighting-forces-kawkare... (accessed June 11, 2015); “Burma Army Shelling Forces Karen Villagers From Farms,” Karen News, March 6, 2015, http://karennews.org/2015/03/burma-army-shelling-forces-karen-villagers-... (accessed June 11, 2015).

[12] Karen Human Rights Group, “Recent fighting between Tatmadaw and DKBA soldiers leads to killing and displacement of villagers in Hpa-an District, July 2015,” August 31, 2015, http://khrg.org/2015/08/15-13-nb1/recent-fighting-between-tatmadaw-and-d... (accessed April 10, 2016); “Gov’t Troops and DKBA Clash Over New Asia Highway,” Karen News, July 2, 2015, http://karennews.org/2015/07/govt-troops-and-dkba-clash-over-new-asia-hi... (accessed April 11, 2016); “Clashes Continue on Asia Highway between DKBA, Govt, Troops,” Irrawaddy, July 8, 2015, http://irrawaddy.org/burma/clashes-continue-on-asia-highway-bewteen-dkba... (accessed August 14, 2015).

[13]“BGF Militia Commander’s truck attacked by Unknown Group with Mines and Guns,” Karen News, February 9, 2016, http://karennews.org/2016/02/bgf-militia-commanders-truck-attacked-by-un... (accessed March 10, 2016).

[14] International Campaign to Ban Land Mines, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, “Country Profiles, Myanmar/Burma, 2014,” http://www.the-monitor.org/custom/index.php/region_profiles/print_profil... (accessed June 11, 2015).

[15]“Karen State Fighting Escalates,” Karen News, September 7, 2016, http://karennews.org/2016/09/karen-state-fighting-escalates.html/ (accessed September 26, 2016); “Civilians Bear the Brunt of Ongoing Karen State Conflict,” Irrawaddy, September 22, 2016, http://www.irrawaddy.com/burma/civilians-bear-the-brunt-of-ongoing-karen... (accessed September 26, 2016).

[16] The Border Consortium, “Refugee and IDP Camp Populations: July 2016”, http://www.theborderconsortium.org/ media/71671/2016-07-jul-map-tbc-unhcr.pdf (accessed September 18, 2016).

[17] The Border Consortium, Protection and Security Concerns in South East Myanmar/Burma, November 2014, http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs19/TBC_report-2014-11-idp-en-red.pdf, p. 13 (accessed December 1, 2015).

[18] International Organization for Migration, Thailand page, http://www.iom.int/countries/thailand.

[19] Human Rights Watch, From the Tiger to the Crocodile: Abuses of Migrant Workers in Thailand, February 2010, https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/02/23/tiger-crocodile/abuse-migrant-work....

[20] The districts are Thaton, Toungoo, Nyaunglebin, Tenasserim (Mergui-Tavoy), Papun, Dooplaya, and Hpa-an. See Karen Human Rights Group, Losing Ground.

[21] UNHCR, “Kayin State Profile,” June 2014, p. 8.

[22]“Foreign Investment Soars to Record $8B in 2014-15,” Irrawaddy, April 9, 2015, http://www.irrawaddy.org/business/foreign-investment-soars-to-record-8b-... (accessed September 8, 2015).

[23]“After Much Deliberation, Investment Law Approved by Parliament,” Irrawaddy, December 18, 2015, http://www.irrawaddy.com/burma/after-much-deliberation-investment-law-ap... (accessed January 11, 2015).

[24] Ibid.

[25]“Myanmar: public consultation improves new draft investment law,” International Commission of Jurists, September 23, 2015, http://www.icj.org/myanmar-public-consultation-improves-new-draft-invest... (accessed January 11, 2016).

[26] Ibid.

[27]“The Republic of the Union of Myanmar: Greater Mekong Subregion East-West Economic Corridor Eindu to Kawkareik Road Improvement,” Asian Development Bank, Concept Paper, Project Number: 46422, February 2013, http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-document/76022/46422-001-... (accessed May 1, 2015).

 

[28] Ibid.

[29]“If the Dam is Built…We Will Be Disappeared,” Karen News, March 27, 2015, http://karennews.org/2015/03/if-the-dam-is-built-we-will-be-disappeared.... (accessed April 21, 2015).

[30]“Karen Groups Concerned Proposed Dams on Salween River Could Fuel Conflict and Increase Militarization,” Karen News, March 17, 2015, http://karennews.org/2015/03/karen-groups-concerned-proposed-dams-on-sal... (accessed June 11, 2015).

[31]“Kayin industry zone seeks growth,” Myanmar Times, April 29, 2015, http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/business/ 14181-kayin-industry-zone-seeks-growth.html (accessed June 12, 2015). One of the companies to invest was domestically-owned UMEH Garment Industries, which opened in November 2012; see “Clothing factory opened at Hpa-an’s first industrial zone,” Myanmar Times, November 12, 2102, http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/business/3039-clothing-factory-opened-a... (accessed June 12, 2015).

[32]“Hpa-an industrial zones land prices triple,” Karen News, March 14, 2103, http://karennews.org/2013/03/hpa-an-industrial-zones-land-prices-triple.... (accessed June 12, 2015).

[33] Human Rights Watch interviews in Hpa-an, Karen State, January 26, 2015.

[34] Human Rights Watch interview with former Ministry of Mines official, March 31, 2015.

[35]“People Power Wins – KNU and State Officials Let Villagers Have Final Say On Proposed Cement Factory,” Karen News, May 4, 2014, http://karennews.org/2014/05/people-power-wins-knu-and-state-officials-l... (accessed June 12, 2015).

[36]CTV News, “Burma tourism boom set to bring 7.5M visitors a year,” August 2, 2016, http://www.ctvnews.ca/lifestyle/ burma-tourism-boom-set-to-bring-7-5m-visitors-a-year-1.3011719 (accessed August 21, 2016).

[37] Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business, “Myanmar Tourism Sector Wide Impact Assessment,” February 2015, p. 12; “Opening of Overland Border Gates Could Boost Burma Tourism, Investment,” Irrawaddy, August 29, 2013, http://www.irrawaddy.org/democracy/opening-of-overland-border-gates-coul... (accessed June 12, 2015).

[38] Japan International Cooperation Agency, Preparatory Survey for the Integrated Regional Development for Ethnic Minorities in the South-East Myanmar,”October 2013,http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs17/JICA%2012126280_01.pdf (accessed November 1, 2014).

[39] Karen Peace Support Network, “Critique of Japan International Cooperation Agency’s Blueprint for Development in Southeastern Burma/Myanmar,” September 2014, http://www.burmapartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2014/09/critique_of_japan_international_cooperation_agencys_blueprint_for_development_in_south-eastern_burmamyanmar_full_report_english_2.pdf (accessed June 11, 2015).

[40] See also, Karen Human Rights Group, ‘With only our voices, what can we do?’

[41]Human Rights Watch interviews, Mine Kan village, Karen State, August 2, 2015.

 

[43] Human Rights Watch interview, Hpa-an, Karen State, August 9, 2015.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Human Rights Watch interview (name withheld), Q4, Ateyebu, Karen State, August 3, 2015.

[46] Human Rights Watch interviews, Mine Kan village, Karen State, August 2, 2015.

[47] Human Rights Watch interview, Mine Kan village, Karen State, August 2, 2015.

[48] Human Rights Watch interview (name withheld), Y2, Mine Kan village, Karen State, August 2, 2015.

[49] Daw Mu Pulu said ownership documents had been lost in a fire but presented Human Rights Watch with a list of more than 20 elders in the village who attested by fingerprint that she and her sister had occupied the land since her mother’s generation. Copy on file with Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch interview, Ateyebu, Karen State, August 3, 2015.

[50] Human Rights Watch interview, Ateyebu, Karen State, August 3, 2015.

[51] For more information on militias in Burma see John Buchanan, “Militias in Myanmar,” Asia Foundation, July 2016, http://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Militias-in-Myanmar... (accessed August 21, 2106).

[52] The name of the village has been changed for security reasons.

[53] Human Rights Watch interviews, Karen State, February 13, 2015.

[54] Human Rights Watch interview, Karen State, February 13, 2015.

[55] Human Rights Watch interview (name withheld), I1, Hpa-an, Karen State, January 26, 2015.

[56] Human Rights Watch interview (name withheld), I3, Hpa-an, Karen State, January 26, 2015.

[57] Human Rights Watch interview (name withheld), I2, Hpa-an, Karen State, January 26, 2015.

[58] Karen Rivers Watch, “Afraid to Go Home,” November 7, 2014, http://www.burmapartnership.org/2014/11/afraid-to-go-home-recent-violent... (accessed June 12, 2015).

[59] Human Rights Watch interview, Group I, Karen State, January 26, 2015.

[60] Human Rights Watch interview, C1, Ahtet Kawyin, Karen State, April 4, 2015.

[61] Human Rights Watch interview (name withheld), C12, Ahtet Kawyin, Karen State, August 1, 2015.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Human Rights Watch interview, C9, Ahtet Kawyin, Karen State, July 31, 2015.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Human Rights Watch interview, C10, Ahtet Kawyin, Karen State, July 31, 2015.

[66] Human Rights Watch interview, Ahtet Kawyin, Karen State, July 31, 2015.

[67] Myanmar National Human Rights Commission, “Statement No. (1/2016) Myanmar National Human Rights Commission Press Statement Regarding Squatter,” http://www.burmapartnership.org/2016/02/statement-no-12016-myanmar-natio... (accessed April 12, 2016).

[68] Human Rights Watch interview, C1, Ahtet Kawyin, Karen State, April 4, 2015.

[69] Referred to here as trespass, the Burmese word kyuu kyaw used in the Penal Code is also used to mean “squatting,” which may lead to confusion in the application of the law. See “Myanmar Land Briefing No. 4: Special Edition: National Land Use Policy,” GRET, 3/4, November 2014-January 2015.

[70] The Forest Law (1992), http://displacementsolutions.org/wp-content/uploads/THE-FOREST-LAW-1992.pdf (accessed September 18, 2016).

[71] Human Rights Watch interview, Group A, Kaw Sa Ka Lo village, Karen State, March 27, 2015.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Human Rights Watch interview with lawyer, Hpa-an, Karen State, August 8, 2015.

[74] Human Rights Watch interview, V1, Hpa-an, Karen State, March 24, 2015.

[75] Human Rights Watch interviews, Group F, Mizan village, Karen State, January 29 and August 9, 2015.

[76] Human Rights Watch interview, H1, Ta May village, Karen State, April 2, 2015.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Human Rights Watch interview, Group F, Mizan village, Karen State, January 29, 2015. Copies on file with Human Rights Watch.

[79]“Hpa-an Industrial Zone Land Prices Triple,” Karen News, April 19, 2013, http://karennews.org/2013/03/hpa-an-industrial-zones-land-prices-triple.... (accessed June 12, 2015).

[80] Human Rights Watch interview, Mizan village, Karen State, August 7, 2015.

[81] Human Rights Watch interview with lawyer, Karen State, Hpa-an, August 8, 2015.

[82] A new legal aid law has been drafted and is currently under consultation. “Legal Aid Bill Under Review,” Myanmar International, March 20, 2015, http://www.myanmarinternational.tv/news/legal-aid-bill-under-review (accessed June 11, 2015).

[83] Human Rights Watch held discussions with NGOs that hope to start such programs in the future. The shortage of lawyers willing to represent farmers facing trespass charges is exacerbated in Karen State by the absence of a law faculty at Hpa-an University.

[84] Human Rights Watch interview, Group F, Mizan village, Karen State, January 29, 2015.

[85] The use of the Peaceful Assembly Law to quash protests against land confiscation echoes a government approach throughout the country to control public speech. In January 2015, Human Rights Watch raised alarm over prosecutions nationwide under the Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Law. As in Karen State, many of these cases involved land activists. See Human Rights Watch, “Burma: ‘Peaceful Assembly Law’ Fails to End Repression,” January 26, 2015, http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/26/burma-peaceful-assembly-law-fails-end....

[86] Human Rights Watch interview, Saw Maung Gyi, Hpa-an, March 13, 2016,

[87]Officially registered local social organizations (NGOs) may plan and run meetings and workshops in hotels, motels, restaurants and buildings with halls in Hpa'an only if they are able to receive official permission from Pa Ann the Hpa'an Township General Administrative Department, Hpa'an District Administrative Department and the Karen State Government and ministries and international social organizations (INGOs) with memoranda of understanding in hand may do so only when they receive official permission from the Karen State Government.” Hpa-an Township Administrative Department, Letter No: 3, 13-6, October 9, 2015.

[88] Human Rights Watch interview with Saw Maung Gyi, Hpa-an, March 13, 2016. The protest went ahead on August 25, 2014.

[89] Human Rights Watch interview with U Zaw Htike, Hpa-an, Karen State, August 13, 2015.

[90] Sec. 18 states, “If there is evidence that a person is guilty of conducting a peaceful assembly or a peaceful procession, he or she must receive a maximum sentence of one year imprisonment or a maximum fine of thirty thousand kyat or both.”

[91] Human Rights Watch interview (name withheld), A1, Karen State, March 27, 2015.

[92] Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), “List of Political Prisoners,” July 13, 2016, http://aappb.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/86-remainging-PP-list-Update... (accessed September 21, 2016).

[93] Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Growing Political Prisoner Population,” January 17, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/17/burma-growing-political-prisoner-pop...“Burma: Land Rights Activists Are Newest Political Prisoners,” August 15, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/15/burma-land-rights-activists-are-newe....

[94] Human Rights Watch interview, C9, Ahtet Kawyin, Karen State, July 31, 2015.

[95] Farmland Law Rules, Notification No. 62/2012, August 31, 2012, sec. 6.

[96] Vacant Fallow Virgin Lands Management Act Rules, Notification No. 1/2012, August 31, 2012, sec. 9.

[97] Ibid., sec. 10.

[98] Human Rights Watch interview with Agriculture Ministry officials, Naypyidaw, February 5, 2016.

[99] Human Rights Watch interview, D1,Naw Kyaw Mine village, Karen State, January 30, 2015.

[100] Ibid.

[101] Human Rights Watch interview, H4, Ta May village, Karen State, August 5, 2015.

[102] Human Rights Watch interview, H3, Ta May village, Karen State, August 5, 2015.

[103] Human Rights Watch interview, Group L, Mizan village, Karen State, March 23, 2015.

[104] Human Rights Watch interview, F1, Mizan village, Karen State, August 7, 2015.

[105] Human Rights Watch interview with lawyer, Hpa-an, Karen State, August 8, 2015.

[106] Human Rights Watch interviews (names withheld), Q5, Ta Nyin Kone, Karen State, August 3, 2015; Group F, Karen State, January 29, 2015; D1, Karen State, January 30, 2015; B2, Karen State, February 13, 2015.

[107] Human Rights Watch interview, Q5, Ta Nyin Kone, Karen State, August 3, 2015. Copies on file with Human Rights Watch.

[108] Ibid.

[109] Shivakumar Srinivas and U Saw Hlaing, “Myanmar: Land Tenure Issues and the Impact on Rural Development,” Food and Agriculture Organization, February 2015, http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/FAO-2015-05-Myanmar-land_tenure&rural..., p. 36 (accessed May 1, 2015).

[110] Human Rights Watch interview, Group F, Karen State, January 29, 2015; Displacement Solutions, “Land Acquisition Law and Practice in Myanmar: Overview, Gap Analysis with IFC PS1 & PS5 and Scope of Due Diligence Recommendations,” May 2015, p. 4.

[111] Human Rights Watch interview, Group F, Mizan village, Karen State, January 29, 2015. Copies on file with Human Rights Watch.

[112] Ibid.

[113]“Legal Review of Recently Enacted Farmland Law and Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Law: Improving the Legal & Policy Frameworks Relating to Land Management in Myanmar,” Food Security Working Group’s Land Core Group, November 2012, http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_3274.pdf, p. 14 (accessed June 11, 2015).

[114] Human Rights Watch interview, V1, Hpa-an, Karen State, March 24, 2015.

[115] Copies on file with Human Rights Watch.

[116] Shivakumar Srinivas and U Saw Hlaing, “Myanmar: Land Tenure Issues and the Impact on Rural Development,” Food and Agriculture Organization, p. 33.

[117] Ibid.

[118] The final draft of the National Land Use Policy lists as one of its basic principles: “To develop and implement fair procedures relating to land acquisition, compensation, relocation, rehabilitation, restitution, and reclaiming land tenure and housing rights of internal displaced persons and returning refugees caused by civil war, land confiscation, natural disasters and other causes.” National Land Use Policy, January 2016, sec. 8(h).

[119] USAID, “Burma – Property Rights and Resources Governance Profile,” http://usaidlandtenure.net/sites/default/files/country-profiles/full-rep..., p. 16 (accessed June 11, 2015).

[120] Human Rights Watch interviews with NGO workers (details withheld), E1 & E2, Burma.

[121] Human Rights Watch interviews (names withheld), Q3, Ateyebu, Karen State, August 3, 2015; C1, Ahtet Kawyin, Karen State, April 4, 2015; Group A, Kaw Sa Ka Lo village, Karen State, March 27, 2015; Z2, Hlaingbwe Township, Karen State, April 15, 2015; J1, Kuklo village, Karen State, February 14, 2015.

[122] Human Rights Watch interview (name withheld), O1, Karen State, March 24, 2015. See also, Shivakumar Srinivas and U Saw Hlaing, “Myanmar: Land Tenure Issues and the Impact on Rural Development,” Food and Agriculture Organization, p. 36.

[123] It was noted that “a significant amount of currently farmed land is not official classified as farmland…and therefore, is not eligible for LUCs,” in National Action Plan for Agriculture and Food and Agriculture Organization, Myanmar: Land Tenure Issues and the Impact on Rural Development, May 2015, http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/FAO-2015-05-Myanmar-land_tenure&rural... (accessed May 1, 2015), p 33.

[124]“Legal Review of Recently Enacted Farmland Law and Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Law: Improving the Legal & Policy Frameworks Relating to Land Management in Myanmar,” Food Security Working Group’s Land Core Group, p. 14.

[125]“Legal Review of Recently Enacted Farmland Law and Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Law: Improving the Legal & Policy Frameworks Relating to Land Management in Myanmar,” Food Security Working Group’s Land Core Group, p. 9.

[126]“Burma Army Mark KNU Registered Farmlands, Karen News, http://karennews.org/2013/07/burma-army-mark-knu-registered-farmlands.html/ (accessed August 19, 2016). It is unclear to what extent KNU documents will be honored by the government in relation to public projects or when in conflict by business permissions granted by the MoA or MOECAF.

[127] Human Rights Watch interview with Tin Tin Aye, Karen State, April 5, 2015.

[128] Giles Henley, “Case Study on Land in Burma,” Overseas Development Institute, March 2014, http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs20/Henley-2014-03-Burma_case_study_land-..., p. 9 (accessed June 12, 2015).

[129] Human Rights Watch interview, Group F, Karen State, January 29, 2015.

[130] Human Rights Watch interview (name withheld), Group L, Mizan village, Karen State, March 23, 2015.

[131] Human Rights Watch interview, Group F, Karen State, January 29, 2015.

[132] Ibid.

[133] Human Rights Watch interview, B1, Karen State, February 13, 2015.

[134] Human Rights Watch interview, Group L, Mizan village, Karen State, March 23, 2015.

[135] Human Rights Watch interview, Group R, Karen State, February 11, 2015.

[136] Human Rights Watch interview, D1, Naw Kyaw Mine village, Karen State, January 30, 2015. See also, SiuSue Mark, “Are the Odds for Justice ‘Stacked Against’ Them? Challenges and Opportunities to Securing Land Claims by Smallholder Farmers in Myanmar,” May 2015, http://www.iss.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/iss/Research_and_projects/Research_ne..., p. 13 (accessed June 11, 2015).

[137] The name of the village has been changed for security reasons.

[138] Human Rights Watch interview, B1, Karen State, February 13, 2015.

[139] Ibid.

[140] Ibid.

[141] Human Rights Watch interview (name withheld), D2, Naw Kyaw Mine village, Karen State, January 30, 2015.

[142] Human Rights Watch interview (name withheld), Z1, Hpa-an, Karen State, August 9, 2015.

[143] Under the Land Acquisition Act, a variety of factors should be considered, including fair market value and damages incurred by the occupant, damages related to loss of crops, and damages related to relocation costs. 1894 Land Acquisition Act, art. 23.

[144] Human Rights Watch interview, Hpa-an, Karen State, August 9, 2015.

[145] Human Rights Watch interview, C10, Ahtet Kawyin, Karen State, July 31, 2015.

[146] Ibid.

[147] Human Rights Watch interview, H1, Ta May village, Karen State, April 2, 2015.

[148] The name of the village has been changed for security reasons.

[149] Human Rights Watch interview, H4, Ta May village, Karen State, August 5, 2015.

[150] Human Rights Watch interview, Group F, Mizan village, Karen State, January 29, 2015.

[151] Human Rights Watch interview, Mizan village, Karen State, Karen State, August 7, 2015.

[152]“Karen State Minister Order the Return of Confiscated Lands to Farmers,” Karen News, October 24, 2014, http://karennews.org/2014/10/karen-state-minister-order-the-return-of-co... (accessed June 12, 2015).

[153] Human Rights Watch interview, Group J, Kuklo village, Karen State, February 14, 2015.

[154] Human Rights Watch interview, A1, Kaw Sa Ka Lo village, Karen State, August 6, 2015.

[155] Human Rights Watch interview, Group A, Kaw Sa Ka Lo village, Karen State, March 27, 2015.

[156] Human Rights Watch interview, Group L, Mizan village, Karen State, March 23, 2015.

[157] Human Rights Watch interview (name withheld), V3, Hpa-an, Karen State, March 24, 2015.

[158] See also, Karen Human Rights Group, ‘With only our voices, what can we do?’

[159] Human Rights Watch interview, J1, Kuklo village, Karen State, February 14, 2015. Copies of the letter sent by the Chief Minister, as well as the list prepared by the villagers, are on file with Human Rights Watch.

[160] Global Witness, “Guns, Cronies and Crops,” March 26, 2015, https://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/land-deals/guns-cronies-and-crops/, p. 8 (accessed June 12, 2015). For an English copy of the commission’s first report, see Displacement Solutions, “Land Acquisition Law and Practice in Myanmar: Overview, Gap Analysis with IFC PS1 & PS5 and Scope of Due Diligence Recommendations,” May 2015, Annex 4.

[161]“Most acquisitions broke land laws, says commission,” Myanmar Times, April 1, 2013, http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/6195-most-acquisitions-br... (accessed June 15, 2015).

[162] Ibid.

[163] Ibid.

[164]”Parliamentary Committee: 6,000 Land Confiscation Complaints Yet to Be Addressed,” Irrawaddy, http://www.irrawaddy.com/burma/parliamentary-committee-6000-land-confisc... (accessed May 6, 2016).

[165] USAID, “Burma – Property Rights and Resources Governance Profile,” p. 16.

[166]Human Rights Watch interview, Group L, Mizan village, Karen State, March 23, 2015.

[167]International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976, art. 11.

[168] Human Rights Watch interview, Q7, Ta Nyin Kone, Karen State, August 3, 2015.

[169] Human Rights Watch interview (name withheld), Q1, Ateyebu, Karen State, August 3, 2015.

[170]Human Rights Watch interview (name withheld), T1, Karen State, May 19, 2015.

[171] Human Rights Watch interview with U Saw Kyi Lin, vice chair of the Hpa-an Special Industrial Zone, Karen State, August 8, 2015.

[172] Human Rights Watch has documented the dangerous and abusive situations faced by migrant workers in Thailand. In a 2010 report, it exposed trafficking and forced labor between Burma and Thailand, finding that migrant workers were subject to exploitation and police abuse including killing, torture, and physical abuse. See Human Rights Watch, From the Tiger to the Crocodile. In 2012, Human Rights Watch documented continued arrests and exploitation of migrant workers. See Ad Hoc and Inadequate: Thailand’s Treatment of Refugees and Asylum Seekers, September 2012, https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/09/12/ad-hoc-and-inadequate/thailands-tr....

[173] Human Rights Watch interview, Group A, Kaw Sa Ka Lo village, Karen State, March 27, 2015.

[174] Ibid.

[175] Human Rights Watch interview, Group L, Mizan village, Karen State, March 23, 2015.

[176] Human Rights Watch interview, B1, Karen State, February 13, 2015.

[177] Human Rights Watch interview, Group L, Mizan village, Karen State, March 23, 2015.

[178] Human Rights Watch interview, Group A, Kaw Sa Ka Lo village, Karen State, March 27, 2015.

[179]Human Rights Watch interview (name withheld), D1, Naw Kyaw Mine village, Karen State, January 30, 2015.

[180] Human Rights Watch interview with Agriculture Ministry officials, Naypyidaw, February 5, 2016.

[181] Human Rights Watch is not aware of any cases testing the constitutionality of this provision, though the writs enshrined in the 2008 Constitution arguably create a right of judicial review. See also, Melissa Crouch, “Access to Justice and Administrative Law in Myanmar,” USAID: Promoting the Rule of Law Project, October 2014, p. 6, https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BzI030IkeET6UnJ6NUItVUlJTTg/view (accessed August 22, 2016).

[182] Farmland Law, 2012, arts. 22-25.

[183] Human Rights Watch interview, Q5, Ta Nyin Kone, Karen State, August 3, 2015. Copies on file with Human Rights Watch.

[184] Ibid.

[185] Ibid.

[186] Human Rights Watch interview with Agriculture Ministry officials, Naypyidaw, February 5, 2016.

[187] 2008 Constitution, art. 37(a) provides that the Union “is the ultimate owner of all lands and all natural resources above and below the ground, above and beneath the water and in the atmosphere in the Union.”

[188] Land Acquisition Act, arts. 4, 6, 23, and 38.

[189] It also covers land that many Karen and other ethnic minorities use as part of shifting cultivation systems in which plots are temporarily left vacant.

[190] Farmland Law, 2012, art. 9.

[191] Ibid., art. 4.

[192] Ibid., art. 12.

[193] Ibid., chapters V-VI.

[194]“Legal Review of Recently Enacted Farmland Law and Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Law: Improving the Legal & Policy Frameworks Relating to Land Management in Myanmar,” Food Security Working Group’s Land Core Group, p. 9.

[195] Ibid.

[196] Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Act Rules, art. 9.

[197] At times, land grants by the government and land grants by the KNU have come into conflict. See “Burma Army ‘Mark’ KNU Registered Farmlands,” Karen News, July 26, 2013, http://karennews.org/2013/07/burma-army-mark-knu-registered-farmlands.html/ (accessed September 1, 2014).

[198] Karen National Union, Land Policy, March 2014, http://www.theborderconsortium.org/media/69780/2016-06-16-KNU-land-polic..., p. 8 (accessed September 21, 2016).

[199] National Land Use Policy, January 2016. See Daniel Aguirre, “A Sound Basis for Land Reform,” Frontier Myanmar, http://frontiermyanmar.net/en/sound-basis-land-reform (accessed May 6, 2016).

[200] National Land Use Policy, sec. 14 and 29(d).

[201] Ibid., sec. 68.

[202] Ibid.

[203] Ibid., sec. 21(e). See also sec. 17(f).

[204] Ibid., sec..16(d).

[205] Ibid., part IX.

[206] Ibid., sec. 28.

[207] Ibid., sec. 41.

[208] Ibid., sec. 78.

[209] Ibid., sec. 38.

[210] Ibid., sec. 74.

[211] See, for example, Transnational Institute, “Assessment of 6th draft of the National Land Use Policy (NLUP),”https://www.tni.org/en/publication/assessment-of-6th-draft-of-the-nation... (accessed January 11, 2016).

[212]“Myanmar’s new president slashes no. of ministries from 36 to 21,” Myanmar Now, March 17, 2016, http://www.myanmar-now.org/news/i/?id=947fc3ae-c8fd-4735-a0dd-9a840f0cf66b (accessed June 9, 2016).

[213]“Legal Review of Recently Enacted Farmland Law and Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Law: Improving the Legal & Policy Frameworks Relating to Land Management in Myanmar,” Food Security Working Group’s Land Core Group, p. 10.

[214] USAID, “Burma – Property Rights and Resources Governance Profile,” p. 17.

[215] Farmland Law Rules, Notification No. 62/2012, sec. 2(4).

[216] Some analyst argue that this practice is unconstitutional. See, for example,“Legal Review of Recently Enacted Farmland Law and Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Law: Improving the Legal & Policy Frameworks Relating to Land Management in Myanmar,” Food Security Working Group’s Land Core Group, p. 19.

[217] Asia Foundation, “Administering the State in Myanmar,” https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/GADEnglish.pdf (accessed September 21, 2016).

[218] 2008 Constitution, art. 232(b)(ii).

[219] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted December 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948), art. 25.

[220] ICESCR, art. 2.

[221]See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980, art. 18.

[222] UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12, The Right to Adequate Food, E/C/12/1999/5 (1999), art. 11; Oliver de Schutter, “The Emerging Human Right to Land,” International Community Law Review, 12 (2010), pp. 303-305.

[223]International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, art. 17. Burma is not a party to the ICCPR.

[224] UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 7, The Right to Adequate Housing, E/1998/22 (1997), http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/959f71e476284596802564c3005d8d50?Opendocument (accessed September 7, 2015).

[225] United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, “Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security,” 2012, http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2801e/i2801e.pdf, p. 5 (accessed June 29, 2015).

[226]Ibid., p 5, 8, and 27.

[227] Ibid., p. 39.

[228] UDHR, art. 20; ICCPR, art. 21.

[229] The Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Act (The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law No. 15/2011) 7th day of the Waxing Moon of Nadaw in 1373 (2nd December 2011), ch. 3.

[230]The Amendment of Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Law, (2014 Pyi Htaung Hluttaw Law No. 26), June 24, 2014, art. 4.

[231] Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Proposed Assembly Law Falls Short,” May 27, 2016,https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/27/burma-proposed-assembly-law-falls-short.

[232] UN Commission on Human Rights, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association,” Maina Kiai, A/HRC/20/27, May 21, 2012, para. 28, http://freeassembly.net/rapporteurreports/natural-resources/ (accessed April 18, 2015).

[233] Ibid.

[234] UN Commission on Human Rights, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association,” Maina Kiai, A/HRC/29/25, April 28, 2015, http://freeassembly.net/rapporteurreports/natural-resources/ para. 10. (accessed April 18, 2015).

[235] Ibid., para. 19.

[236] United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/1 (2007).

[237]The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has noted that the principle of “free, prior and informed consent” (FPIC) finds support in the ICCPR and ICESCR, in which the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have found FPIC to be an expression of self-determination. See FAO, “Respecting Free, Prior and Informed Consent,” 2014, http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3496e.pdf, pp. 5-6.

[238]Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 32(2).

[239] Ibid., art.32(3).

[240] FAO, “Respecting Free, Prior and Informed Consent,” p. 9.

[241] United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, “Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security,” para. 3B(6).

[242]National Land Use Policy, sec. 33.

[243] Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), adopted December 18, 1979, G.A. res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, entered into force September 3, 1981, art. 7(b). Ratified by Burma in 1997.

[244]Ibid., art. 14(b)(g).

[245] Ibid., art. 14(2).

[246] Ibid., art. 16(1).

[247] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 34 on the rights of rural women, CEDAW/C/GC/34, March 4, 2016, http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/ 1_Global/INT_CEDAW_GEC_7933_E.pdf (accessed May 1, 2016), para. 62.

[248] UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/ GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf (accessed June 14, 2016).

[249]Ibid.

Letter to European Parliament Committee on International Trade regarding EU-Uzbekistan textile protocol

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Brussels, 7 November 2016

RE: Reject the EU-Uzbekistan textile protocol

Dear Members of the European Parliament Committee on International Trade (INTA),

We are writing to urge you as a member of the Committee on International Trade (INTA) not to give consent at this time to the EC-Uzbekistan partnership and cooperation agreement and bilateral trade in textiles (EU-Uzbekistan textile protocol) because of the persistence of forced labour in Uzbekistan.

Adopting the textile protocol now would contradict the principles of the European Union’s foreign policy, and ignore strong evidence of the government’s persistent and continued use of forced labour on a massive, nationwide scale in Uzbekistan.

Instead we call upon you to ensure that the European Parliament return to re-examine the protocol only when there is demonstrable and verifiable evidence of the eradication of forced labour in Uzbekistan.

Thanks in large part to the commitment of your Committee to the rights of the Uzbek people to be free from forced labor, and your commitment to ensuring that there is a level playing field in international trade, the textile protocol with the European Union was in 2011 postponed for consideration until “ILO observers, have been granted access by the Uzbek authorities to undertake close and unhindered monitoring and have confirmed that concrete reforms have been implemented and yielded substantial results in such a way that the practice of forced Labor and child Labor is effectively in the process of being eradicated at national, viloyat and local level…”

Shortly after the European Parliament’s 2011 decision, the Uzbek government dropped its longstanding opposition to monitoring of the cotton harvest by the International Labor Organization and began to engage. We welcomed the signature of by the government of the Decent Work Country Programme in April 2014, in which it committed to work with the ILO to apply labor conventions.

Yet, in 2016, we are still to see these commitments honored.

Anti-Slavery International, the Association for Human Rights in Central Asia, the Cotton Campaign, Human Rights Watch, and the Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights have documented how in the first month of the 2016 harvest the mass mobilization of hundreds of thousands of adults for the cotton harvest continues, as have attacks on human rights defenders, civil society, and even two foreign journalists who attempted to monitor conditions in the fields.

Despite the government’s proclamation to stop the practice, Human Rights Watch has received a steady flow of evidence to the contrary. Quotas for cotton production were once impose again this year and there is no indication that the threat of prosecution for non-fulfilment of these quotas has been reduced.

Thousands of students from universities of the Andijan region, in the Fergana, Namangan, Jizzakh, Surkhandarya and Kashkadarya regions were sent to pick cotton. Screenshots of text messages from Kokand college and Gulistan State University show the summons ordering students to the cotton harvest. While university directors denied that the students were coerced to go, some told human rights monitors prior to their departure that they had to sign “a letter of voluntary participation in the cotton harvest.”   

As in prior years, the forced labor system is organized through a clear chain of command from the top of the government to regional governors and down to administrators of public institutions.  The government forces teachers, doctors and other public-sector workers to pick cotton under threat of dismissal. Local government administrations have to meet the production quota requirements. It is at this level where the pressure is brought to bear as regional governors need to demonstrate compliance with the central government’s demands. 

We were pleased to note that as a result of international pressure since 2013 children have not been forced to pick cotton on a nationwide scale, and child labor has effectively declined. Yet, local officials reportedly still resort to forced child labor out of a need to fulfil their quotas.

Since 2014 we have received steady reports of extortion linked to the cotton harvest. Authorities extorted contributions from domestic and multinational businesses, payments from individuals to avoid field labor, and payments from forced laborers for food, transportation, and unmet quotas.

In addition, the Uzbek authorities routinely retaliate against independent observers and human rights defenders for reporting about forced labor. On October 6, two French journalists, along with an Uzbek journalist Timur Karpov and Elena Urlaeva were detained for several hours while documenting forced labor in the cotton fields.

The Uzbek government has clearly not met the conditions set out by the European Parliament in 2011, and the ILO is yet to confirm “that concrete reforms have been implemented and yielded substantial results in such a way that the practice of forced labor and child labor is effectively in the process of being eradicated.” The evidence is unequivocal - so far we have seen merely a change in strategies aimed at maintaining and concealing the continued use of forced labor rather than substantial results in its eradication.

We are yet to see the tangible indicators of change, such as:  

  • Discontinuation of the production quota
  • Increase in payment to cotton pickers, so that willing seasonal workers can be recruited through proper recruitment processes
  • Proper investigation and prosecution of officials who violate Uzbek national laws against forced labor
  • An end to harassment of independent monitors
  • Official involvement of national and international civil society actors, in monitoring the remaining weeks of the harvest.

Entering now into the textile protocol also risks undermining the EU Flagship Initiative on responsible management of the supply chain in the garment sector. Since the introduction of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, more and more businesses have been calling on governments to honor their obligation to protect the rights of workers through introducing and enforcing laws.

Businesses are by nature risk averse and it is rare that businesses come out and advocate boycotts. Yet hundreds of European businesses signed a pledge not to knowingly source cotton from Uzbekistan. They did so because of the mass scale state sponsored nature of forced labor. EU businesses and investors do not want to put themselves at risk of violating national and European legislation by trading in forced labor produced goods.

For the above reasons, we believe that entering into the textile protocol with Uzbekistan now would have an adverse impact on human rights. We therefore ask you to withhold your consent until such time that there is demonstrable evidence of the government’s political will to eradicate forced labor and its willingness to allow human rights groups, both local and international, participate in monitoring the harvest.

Sincerely,

Civil society:

  • American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)
  • Anti-Slavery International
  • Association for Human Rights in Central Asia (AHRCA)
  • Corporate Responsibility - CORE
  • Human Rights Watch
  • India Committee of the Netherlands
  • INKOTA
  • International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
  • International Labor Rights Forum (ILRF)
  • International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR)
  • International State Crime Initiative (ISCI)
  • Observatorio de Responsabilidad Social Corporativa
  • Seventh Generation Interfaith Coalition for Responsible Investment
  • Solidarity Center
  • Stop Child Labour
  • Stop The Traffik
  • La Strada International
  • Sunshine Coalition

Private sector:

  • Esprit
  • Jade Marketing Group
  • Sonen Capital

World Bank Group: India Tea Investment Tramples Rights

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Sprayer on Hattigor

Worker on APPL tea plantation in Assam, India

A World Bank Group compliance investigation into an investment in Indian tea plantations reinforces the need for human rights risk analysis and oversight of the bank’s investments. The investigation report, released on November 7, 2016, concerned an investment by the bank’s private sector lending arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), in India’s tea plantations. India’s tea sector has raised numerous issues related to living and working conditions, freedom of association, and access to health and education.

“A World Bank investigation has found that the IFC invested millions in Indian tea plantations without taking into account serious labor and other human rights abuses in the sector,” said Jessica Evans, senior international financial institutions researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The IFC failed to identify and address basic risks, including the grossly inadequate living conditions for workers and child labor.”

A World Bank investigation has found that the IFC invested millions in Indian tea plantations without taking into account serious labor and other human rights abuses in the sector.

Jessica Evans

Senior International Financial Institutions Researcher

The Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO), the independent accountability mechanism for the IFC, concluded that the IFC failed to identify and address labor, social, and environmental issues, including potential violations of Indian and international law. The CAO is charged with investigating violations of IFC policy and reviewing complaints from affected communities.

This report follows a December 2013 CAO investigation finding that IFC deficiencies have been in part due to its culture and incentives that measure results in financial terms, encouraging staff to “overlook, fail to articulate, or even conceal potential environmental, social, and conflict related risks,” regardless of IFC policies.

In November 2006, the IFC approved an investment of US$7.87 million to allow Tata Global Beverages to transfer ownership of its tea plantations to a new company, Amalgamated Plantations Private Limited (APPL). The IFC was to receive a 19.9 percent equity stake in APPL, while Tata Global Beverages retained a 49.6 percent share. The IFC investment also supported a program for APPL employees to purchase shares in the new company.

Citing studies that show widespread malnutrition on tea plantations and that wages paid to workers were not enough to cover basic nutritional requirements, the CAO found that the IFC has not met its own standard to create jobs that provide a “way out of poverty” and “protect and promote the health” of workers. The CAO also cites numerous groups that raised concerns about freedom of association on the plantations, including the rights of workers to form unions. In response, the IFC, rather than substantively addressing these objections, contends that it is in legal compliance with its policies and will seek “a fresh legal opinion.”

The IFC’s investment supported a problematic employee share-purchase program, the CAO found, highlighting the company’s misrepresentation of risks associated with buying stock, the financial impact on low-paid workers of purchasing stock by incurring debt, and allegations of pressure placed on workers to participate in the program. The CAO said that the IFC supported issuing more shares, reducing the value of workers’ shares and diluting their stake in APPL, without consulting worker-shareholders. While the IFC has proposed financial literacy programs, among other steps, it is silent on the concerns raised about the impact of its investment on the value of workers’ shares.

The IFC should engage with APPL, the government, nongovernmental groups, and relevant experts to undertake a transparent and consultative assessment of the development and social impact of compensation levels, trade union representation, and the employee share purchase program. The IFC should disclose aggregate health, literacy, and education statistics, and any existing plans to address these issues. The IFC should also assure jobs on the plantations meet its own standard of paying workers “a decent and fair wage” and respect freedom of association.

The CAO recognizes that the IFC investment had significant potential development impact for APPL’s 30,000 employees and the 155,000 people who rely on the tea plantations for work, food, housing, water, health care, and education. But the CAO said that the IFC staff failed to identify social and environmental shortcomings and risk factors, and therefore could not undertake the necessary action to bring the investment into compliance with its own standards. One of the potential causes was the IFC assignment of only environmental specialists to assess environmental and social impacts, but no social, labor, or human rights specialists.

The IFC has acknowledged some of the findings, while contesting and failing to address others. The CAO expressed concerns that an action plan to respond to the findings was not developed in consultation with workers. “The IFC has cast aside its commitment to consult with affected communities and workers both in the development of its India tea investment and in its plan to respond to past mistakes,” Evans said.

The CAO found that the IFC relied too heavily on the Tata Group’s reputation and intention to meet external certification standards instead of conducting an independent environmental and social review, as its own policies require. As a result, it did not give due consideration to systemic and widespread violations of labor protections on tea plantations. In its response to the report, the IFC relied heavily on a Tata Global Beverages-commissioned investigation carried out by a third-party organization, whose findings have not been released to the public or to the CAO.

The IFC should not rely on confidential reports to demonstrate its policy and legal compliance. The IFC should disclose the report to allow for external scrutiny. In general, the IFC should disclose audit reports to affected communities and workers, allowing for consultation and verification of audit procedures and outcomes.

The CAO found that the IFC should have considered whether the investment would have had an impact on the workers under its indigenous peoples policy. The forebears of many of APPL’s workers belonged to indigenous, or Adivasi, groups from central India, who were brought as forced or bonded labor to work on tea plantations. They retain their own language and maintain a culture distinct from the general population, identify as Adivasi, and have a longstanding campaign to gain official recognition.

The IFC challenged this finding, stating that workers are not indigenous because they are not native to the area and do not have a historical dependence on the land. But the CAO said that under the IFC’s own guidance, the IFC should have engaged experts to determine whether the indigenous peoples policy applies. The IFC should undertake such an expert analysis, in consultation with workers and nongovernmental groups.

In its response to the India tea investigation, the IFC announced it would create new procedural requirements to screen for contextual and country risks in its projects. These reforms are long overdue, having been promised in response to the CAO’s December 2013 report. In addition to addressing systemic failures in the future, the IFC should undertake a wholesale review of the social impact of its investments and work with its clients to fully remedy all adverse impact and enhance development outcomes.

The IFC board, which is made up of its member governments, should ensure that the IFC responds in full to the findings. When monitoring the IFC’s response, the board should make available the resources necessary to ensure a positive development impact that protects workers’ rights. In addition, the CAO should use its power to instigate its own investigation to examine system-wide whether the IFC is identifying and addressing the full range of human rights risks in its due diligence and supervision practices.

“The IFC has been sluggish in responding to its endemic failures and done little to remedy the impact of its past mistakes at the community level,” Evans said. “The IFC’s board should send the action plan back to the staff and require it to consult with workers and the groups that filed the complaints to make sure that all the violations are addressed and appropriate responses are developed.”
 

“They Destroyed Everything”

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Summary

Whenever they want to do mining again, they should do it far from the people and not the way they did it this time. They should explain to everyone what the advantages and disadvantages are. People need to know what to expect.

—Nagomba E., Mwabulambo, March 8, 2016

Nagomba E., 75, has lived all her life in Mwabulambo, a small rural community in northern Malawi. Like most women in the area, she works as a farmer to support her family—her husband and three grandchildren who survived their own parents—growing rice, maize, and cassava close to her home.

In 2008, she was surprised to find strangers driving big trucks and carrying heavy machinery near her crop fields. They were workers of Eland, a coal mining company. While the government had already given the company a license to operate a mine right by her village, Nagomba and her neighbors first heard about the mine when they saw the trucks.

Malawi’s government has failed to protect the rights and livelihoods of people living in nascent mining communities. Families living near coal and uranium mining operations face serious problems with water, food, and housing, and are left in the dark about health and other risks from mining.

When she eventually learned that they were digging coal, she hoped it would bring development to the village and some benefits such as job opportunities and healthcare infrastructure for her and her family. Instead, the mining company cut the community’s existing drinking water supply by destroying the water pipes running through the mining area. They left the community with a few boreholes and river water for drinking and domestic use. Nagomba used to have access to tap water near her house. Since the pipes were destroyed, she has had to make the strenuous hike down to the river about four times a day to fetch water. She worries that the river may be polluted from the mine, and she is uncertain if water from the river is safe to drink.

With little information from the company, Eland Coal Mining Company, or the government about the health and environmental impacts associated with mining or how to protect her family against them, Nagomba and other community members also face considerable health risks, especially in the absence of a community health center.

A few months after the trucks arrived, Eland, with the government’s approval, told Nagomba’s family and more than a dozen of their neighbors to move from the land the community had used as farms and upon which they had built their homes for several generations. They were told the company needed the land. The company gave Nagomba’s family just 50,000 Malawian Kwachas (MWK) (about US$150) as compensation: an amount that, she says, fell short of the basic material costs to buy new land and replace her house. As a result, her family was forced to sell two cows to cover the expenses needed to build a new home, and they lost some of their fields. Later on, the company started using coal to fill holes in the dust road leading from the main road to the mine. Nagomba believes that some of the coal floated into her remaining fields by the road and caused her harvest to decrease significantly.

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Two years later, in 2010, the mining company asked Nagomba and her family to move again. This time they refused. “I really wish I had known before moving the first time that where we built our second house was a location that would be used for mining later on,” Nagomba said. In 2015, Eland closed operations in Mwabulambo, leaving behind piles of coal and several open pits filled with water next to Nagomba’s house.

Nagomba is worried about her family’s future. She thinks that children and animals could fall into the open pits and that the river water she and other villagers are using might be polluted because the company has not cleaned up the mining site. The local government officer in charge of environmental inspections at the mine left in 2015, and Nagomba has not seen any government or company official in more than a year.

***

Stories like that of Nagomba are all too common in Malawi’s mining communities. Over the past 10 years, Malawi’s government has promoted private investment in mining and resource extraction as a way to diversify its economy, which previously was mostly comprised of agricultural production. Malawi possesses considerable mineral deposits, including large uranium and coal reserves in the north as well as gemstones and rare earths in the south. The government has issued a high number of prospecting licenses for many parts of the country, allowing exploration for oil and gas extraction in areas including those around Lake Malawi that are protected United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage sites.

Karonga, where Nagomba lives, is located on the northwestern shores of Lake Malawi and on the border with Tanzania. Karonga has been the country’s test case for coal and uranium mining. It is the district where the first uranium mine opened in 2009, and where two out of the four biggest coal mines in the country are now located.

The government hopes that private sector investment from Malawian and international companies will transform the country, creating jobs and improving residents’ livelihoods as well as their access to water, health care, education, and other infrastructure.

But this development strategy poses significant risks to local communities. As multinational extractive companies—including from Australia and Cyprus—have started to explore and mine in Karonga district and neighboring districts around the lake, communities have voiced serious concerns about potential environmental damage, which in turn threatens people’s rights to health, water, food, and housing. More than 10 existing and potential future extraction sites are located on the shores and tributaries of Lake Malawi, a fragile ecosystem and a key source of livelihood for over 1.5 million Malawians. Where mining activities require land acquisitions, communities are worried they might lose their lands and homes without due process, adequate compensation, or suitable alternatives.
 

Based on more than 150 interviews with community members, government officials, civil society groups, and company representatives, this report examines the human rights impacts of Malawi’s nascent mining industry on communities living in and around the country’s mining areas and assesses the nature and extent of the information about mining to which local residents have access. Using Karonga district in northern Malawi as a case study, the report documents how Malawi currently lacks adequate legal standards and safeguards to ensure the necessary balance between developing the mining industry and protecting the rights of local communities. It examines how weak government oversight and lack of information leave local communities unprotected and uninformed about the risks and opportunities associated with mining.

While Malawi has some laws and policies that protect the rights of communities potentially affected by mining—some of which mention the need to monitor impacts of mining licenses and to compensate them for certain losses—they are poorly implemented and enforced. The result is that key government watchdogs stand by as spectators while mining operations are allowed to progress, regardless of the negative impact they may have on local communities or the environment.

A new draft law, the Mines and Minerals Bill (MM Bill), while relatively progressive in many respects, fails to address one of the core problems described in this report: a lack of transparency about the risks related to mining.

This report makes recommendations to strengthen existing laws, to improve the proposed MM Bill and Access to Information Bill (ATI Bill), and to enforce existing regulatory protection standards.

Malawi’s extractive industries are still in their infancy and there are opportunities for the government and investors to respect rights and minimize the risks faced by communities and natural ecosystems, even as they push for economic development. These include ensuring that the draft mining bill protects the rights of local communities, including their right of access to information; that the social and environmental impact of new mining projects is comprehensively and credibly assessed and addressed; that resettlements are implemented with full respect for rights; and that there are enough regulators to evaluate new proposals and follow up with onsite visits. It is important that the government assesses how much damage has already been done due to mining projects, and that it ensure that communities are properly informed about the potential benefits and risks of existing and future projects.

Mining Practice and Promises

Global industry standards have evolved to recognize that unless mine operators exercise caution and vigilance, it is likely that mining will harm surrounding communities. In Malawi and globally, there is evidence that without effective government regulation, not all companies behave responsibly. Even companies that make serious efforts to do so often fall short without proper government oversight. The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights provide basic steps companies should take to respect human rights, including conducting due diligence to avoid causing or contributing to human rights abuses through their operations; avoiding complicity in abuses; and taking steps to mitigate them if they occur.

Several extractive companies have come to Karonga district in the past 10 years seeking to exploit natural resources, particularly uranium and coal. As in Nagomba’s case, communities do not often have prior knowledge of proposed mining operations since consultation is either insufficient or nonexistent. This is especially worrying as mining operations have had a major impact on the daily functioning of these communities, often complicating access to water, health, cropland, and food, and forcing relocations of community members. At the same time, companies operating in the district, including Paladin Africa Limited (Paladin), Eland Coal Mining Company, and Malcoal, have largely failed to deliver on promises to build schools, health centers or clinics, and boreholes, and to create employment opportunities for community members.

None of the communities in Karonga or civil society organizations interviewed by Human Rights Watch indicated they opposed, in principle, exploration or mining activities on their lands. However, community members repeatedly stressed inadequate information about mining-related health risks; inadequate participation in decision-making about the relocation process; a lack of proper notification before resettlement; inadequate compensation for losses from mining; a lack of government oversight to help mitigate current and future risks to health, water, food security, land and livelihoods; and a lack of awareness of their rights or companies’ responsibilities under national laws and international standards.

For example, in the coal and uranium mining areas in Karonga district that Human Rights Watch visited, residents said that they face health and livelihood risks due to the mining and suffer from increasing rates of illnesses that could be mining-related. Some complained that trucks pass along narrow village roads, coating homes and local schoolhouses in dust, and worried about the potential for serious respiratory diseases and other health impacts that scientific studies have associated with exposure to mining-related pollution. Several villagers also claimed that mining had destroyed water pipes or contaminated other water sources such as boreholes they depend on for drinking and irrigation. Farmers complained that dust in the air, coal on the road, and poor water quality impacted their crops and decreased the harvest of their fields, threatening economic ruin. Mining in Karonga district has also resulted in some families being resettled, often without adequate warning, decent resettlement conditions, or compensation.

In some cases, the harm that communities have suffered due to nearby mining operations is reported by the media or documented in studies conducted by international and civil society organizations. But in many other instances, the data simply does not exist to confirm or refute alleged negative impacts or their links to mining operations. Some community activists may wrongly attribute health or environmental problems to nearby mining operations. Others may fail to perceive a link that does in fact exist. The lack of healthcare infrastructure in these communities makes monitoring and addressing the health impacts of mining operations nearly impossible. This uncertainty is part of the problem. Government regulators repeatedly fail to determine whether companies are complying with their legal responsibilities, or whether they are causing harm to nearby communities.

Out of three companies featured in this report and contacted by Human Rights Watch, only one company, Paladin, said that they are monitoring the environmental impact of their mining activities in Malawi and are sharing these reports with the government. But they have never published their results, leaving communities unable to properly assess the risks associated with mining or mitigate the impacts that it can have on livelihoods. None of the companies contacted made any monitoring results available to Human Rights Watch.

Impact on Women

Human Rights Watch found that when mining has negative consequences for communities, women are disproportionately impacted. Malawi’s Constitution and policies recognize women’s right to full and equal protection in the law as well as their right to non-discrimination on the basis of their gender or marital status. However, in practice, their rights are largely curtailedby socio-cultural gender norms and patriarchal beliefs and attitudes.

It has often been particularly difficult for women to access information about mining and its risks—important to them as family caregivers—because their participation in meetings with companies or the government was limited. Women could be directly or indirectly excluded from such meetings. For example, if and when meetings were called by companies or the government they were not typically announced ahead of time, and women would often be busy working on their fields or at home at the time of such meetings. As a result of the short notice, they would not have the time to make the necessary arrangements to be able to attend. Even when women were present, they were sometimes unable to engage due to gender norms that restrict women participation in public gatherings or because of language issues. That is, meetings were sometimes conducted in English or Chichewa, which rural women in Karonga district typically do not speak.

In Malawi, women, both young and old, are often the primary caregivers at home and are also largely responsible for growing crops on the fields that feed the family. Therefore, when mining and climate change impacted crop productivity and contributed to food shortages, women have had to work long hours to make up for the shortfall and sustain the family. Also, concerns about water pollution compelled many women and girls to walk longer distances to fetch water from what they believed was a less contaminated source, further away from the mines. This exposed them to dangers and left them with less time to attend school, earn money, and rest.

The communities in Karonga district follow largely patrilineal systems of land inheritance, and men tend to have more decision-making power concerning land transfers. As a result, women have little say in how compensation is spent.

Government Role

Many human rights abuses described in this report result from the government’s failure to effectively monitor, let alone systematically address, the impacts of mining operations.

International and regional human rights law obliges Malawi’s government to protect the rights of its citizens from potential harmful impacts of mining operations and to ensure that communities have access to information about these impacts and risks before, during, and after operations.

Malawi’s current regulatory framework for mining and the environment is outdated. The laws were passed long before current mining operations started and afford communities little protection from environmental pollution and harmful social impacts. While impact assessments should be mandatory for all projects that potentially affect the environment and community health, Malawi’s regulatory framework regarding Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) for mining operations remains unclear and incomplete as it does not require the assessments of social impacts. Malawi’s mining law also provides little guidance with regard to environmental impacts of mining, leaving the scope and cycle of environmental monitoring at the discretion of government officials. It also largely fails to make information about mining and related risks available and accessible to affected communities. Land laws establish a variety of forms of land tenure and set out standards for land transfers or compulsory acquisitions. However, there is no national resettlement policy, and, in practice, land rights for individuals and communities near mining sites are highly insecure.

The draft MM Bill the government is developing does not address the core problem described in this report: access to adequate information. Quite the contrary, one of its major weaknesses is a broad confidentiality provision that would essentially prevent communities from accessing information about the risks related to mining. This is happening at a time when Malawi has just joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)—a global network aimed at improving transparency in mining governance— as a candidate country and is preparing and negotiating an ATI Bill. Even though the draft ATI Bill from November 2015 appeared to be acceptable to most relevant stakeholders, the government revised the bill again in February 2016. Unlike the 2015 draft, the revised bill does not provide for the establishment of an independent oversight body; it limits the principle of maximum disclosure to documents created after the adoption of the law; and it gives the minister of information the power to determine “fees payable for processing requests for information,” which can discourage poor people from requesting information.

The government should dramatically improve the process for considering mining project proposals to ensure that it assesses and addresses possible environmental and social impacts in a comprehensive and credible manner. This means mandating a greater and more explicit focus on environmental risks and human rights in the licensing and monitoring process in the proposed Mines and Minerals bill. Implementation will also require adequate numbers and capacity of regulators so new proposals can be evaluated properly, including through site visits wherever appropriate. The government should also ensure that communities are properly informed about the potential benefits and risks of mining and are involved in developing mitigation strategies to address any adverse impacts. Moreover, the government should require compensation for loss of land and other resources and ensure that effective and accessible grievance mechanisms provide redress to those who suffer harm.

Government and Company Responses

Several public officials interviewed by Human Rights Watch openly admitted that they do not know how prevalent or how serious the impacts of mining on communities are and that they are not proactively providing information about the risks to affected communities. In fact, some government officials said that the government essentially leaves companies to regulate themselves, a practice that is inconsistent with Malawi’s obligations under international human rights law and that has consistently proven disastrous in other countries, including neighboring countries in southern Africa.

Malawi’s government has also acknowledged the impact mining can have on the health and livelihoods of people living in nearby communities. Government officials are aware of the weaknesses of the regulatory system and admitted that authorities sometimes fail to adequately protect environmental health and monitor pollution due to capacity problems or lack of internal coordination among government agencies at the various levels of government.

In interviews with Human Rights Watch, the government committed to increasing the number of health facilities for residents in mining communities and to including a focus on social issues in guidelines for EIAs. The Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining promised to visit each mine once per month. In a meeting with Human Rights Watch, officials of the ministry said that they were working with Eland to set up a closure plan to ensure the safety of the residents. However, at time of writing no updates about the implementation of these steps were communicated to Human Rights Watch.

The three companies examined in this report have a mixed track record on preventing, mitigating, and monitoring social and environmental harms from mining.

In a letter to Human Rights Watch, Paladin stated that the company maintains safety, health, radiation, and environmental management programs. Paladin also pointed to a Human Rights Policy, highlighting Paladin’s commitment to respecting human rights. However, it is not clear how these programs or the Human Rights Policy intend to assess and mitigate the environmental and social impacts of mining. In an interview with Human Rights Watch, Paladin Malawi said that the company does not publicly disclose monitoring results regarding water testing or other potential environmental impacts. Paladin did not reply to Human Rights Watch’s request for information about the monitoring results at their mine in Kayelekera.

Malcoal stated in an email to Human Rights Watch that they “strive to help the government to reduce rural poverty by providing employment while at the same time taking care of our communities and the environment.” Malcoal disputed that any resettlements had taken place in Kayelekera but did not comment on any of the other issues raised in this report.

Representatives of Eland Coal Mining Company informed Human Rights Watch in writing and by phone that their mine has suspended operations. At the time of writing, they had yet to reply to Human Rights Watch’s request for comment on the substantive issues raised in this report, including plans for rehabilitation of the mining site.

The Way Forward

The government of Malawi should take preventive measures to ensure that mining projects are planned and carried out in a way that does not violate the rights of local communities, and that minimizes displacement and disruption of livelihoods. This includes the addition of provisions to the draft MM Bill that require robust environmental and health monitoring at all stages of the mining process and ensure access to information as guaranteed under the constitution.

The government should also put in place effective mechanisms to oversee the activities and impacts of mining during and after operations. This involves robust reporting requirements for companies and regular, unannounced inspections by the government. The government needs to ensure that impact assessments and periodic inspections contain relevant details, including the potential impacts that exploration, active mining, and abandoned mines may have on communities and their rights; steps the government and companies will take to continually inform and communicate with affected communities; and how adverse rights impacts will be mitigated or avoided. The government should also ensure effective coordination between different ministries and national, regional and district government bodies involved in mining governance and oversight.

Finally, the government needs to effectively disseminate information to communities that may be adversely affected by operations of extractive industries before, during, and after operations. Impact assessments, environmental monitoring reports, and resettlement plans should be easily and readily available and accessible to the public by providing short summaries in non-technical language; translating the summaries and the full reports into local languages; posting them on the Internet; providing copies in public buildings such as local schools; and holding information sessions in directly affected communities.

Key Recommendations

To the Government of Malawi

  • Include provisions in the draft Mines and Minerals Bill that require robust environmental and health monitoring at all stages of the mining process and ensure access to information as guaranteed under the constitution.
  • Ensure coordination between different ministries and national, regional and district government bodies involved in mining governance and oversight.
  • Revise the draft Access to Information Bill to ensure that minimum requirements for access to information follow international best practices and are in line with the model law by the African Union.

To the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining

  • Ensure that impact assessments and periodic inspections contain relevant details, including the potential impacts that exploration, active mining, and abandoned mines may have on communities and their rights; steps the government and companies will take to continually inform and communicate with affected communities; and how adverse impacts will be mitigated or avoided.
  • Ensure impacts on marginalized populations, such as women and children, are monitored and addressed.Such monitoring should cover the cumulative impacts on the environment and livelihoods, including impacts resulting from extractive industries, social changes, and climate change.
  • Ensure that impact assessments, environmental monitoring reports, and resettlement plans are easily and readily available and accessible to the public, including by providing short summaries in non-technical language; translating the summaries and the full reports into local languages; posting them on the Internet; providing copies in public buildings such as local schools; and holding information sessions in directly affected communities.
  • Promptly fill all vacancies for inspectors in the Ministry of Mining and at the district level including the vacant environmental officer position in Karonga district. Increase the number and capacity of staff and resources available to conduct more regular in-field assessments, including unannounced inspections.

To the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development

  • Provide a process for fair compensation and remedy negative human rights impacts of relocation in mining communities, including through compensation for losses that have already occurred. Pay special attention to the impacts on women and ensure they are appropriately compensated for their losses.

To the Ministry of Health

  • Actively monitor health indicators and disease patterns in mining communities and ensure that results are easily available and accessible to the public.
  • Develop a national strategy to improve health in mining communities and increase access to healthcare in mining areas, taking into account the increased health risks for marginalized populations. Include measures to support family caregivers, especially women.

To the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development

  • Map out the boundaries of watersheds potentially impacted by mining operations and actively monitor water throughout watersheds under the influence of mining to identify potential contamination, including monitoring waste water discharges, ground and surface water sources, and drinking water in mining communities on an ongoing basis. Ensure that results are easily available and accessible to the public.

To the Mzuzu Regional Office of Mines and to the Karonga District Commissioner

  • Ensure that environmental monitoring reports are easily available and accessible to the public in the northern region.

To Companies Extracting Minerals in Malawi

  • Improve public access to information and transparency by strengthening communication with local and national civil society and with affected community members. Make the outcomes of environmental assessments, periodic environmental monitoring reports, resettlement action plans, and updates on implementation available in easily accessible formats and fora. Include short summaries of each document available in non-technical language. Summaries and full reports should be translated into local languages, made available online, and posted in public buildings.
  • Provide a process for fair compensation and remedy negative human rights impacts of relocation in mining communities, including compensation for losses that have already occurred. Pay special attention to the impacts on women and ensure they are appropriately compensated for their losses.

Methodology

This report is based on research conducted between July 2015 and July 2016, including six weeks of field research in Malawi. Human Rights Watch visited the capital city, Lilongwe; the regional capital Mzuzu; as well as mining sites in Karonga district and Rumphi district. Human Rights Watch undertook field work in two rural communities in Karonga district. The district was chosen for the research because large-scale and mid-scale mining activities in this area are most advanced. The first large-scale uranium mine was opened in Karonga in 2009, and two out of four major coal mines are located in the area.

Human Rights Watch interviewed more than 150 people for this report, including 78 people living in mining communities; 9 company representatives; and more than 45 people who currently work, or have worked, on mining issues in Malawi and neighboring countries, including: staff of international and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), health administrators, and academic researchers. We also spoke to 24 government officials, including five from the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, two from the Ministry of Health, two from the Ministry of Information, two from the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, one from the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development and six local political representatives.

Of the 78 community members, 45 were adult women and 33 were adult men. Six were traditional leaders. Interviews were conducted in Chichewa, Tumbuka, and Nkhonde via an interpreter. All interviewees provided verbal informed consent and were assured that they could end the interview at any time or decline to answer any questions. Where requested or appropriate, this report uses pseudonyms to protect their privacy. Interviewees were not compensated for speaking to us.

Human Rights Watch reviewed secondary sources—including mining inspection reports, academic research, and media reports—to corroborate information from community members. We also reviewed Malawian laws and policies. In March and August 2016, Human Rights Watch met with government officials at the relevant ministries in Lilongwe. In July 2015, February 2016, and July 2016 Human Rights Watch wrote to the mining companies cited in this report to request information on the steps taken to address the lack of access to information and other human rights issues documented in this report. In response to our request Human Rights Watch received a letter from Paladin in August 2015, an email from Eland in August 2015, and several emails from Malcoal in July 2016. Human Rights Watch also met with then-Paladin Malawi Manager Greg Walker in August 2015.

I.Background

Extractive Industries in Malawi

In this country, as I have said so many times before, we have no mines, no factories. The soil is our only mine, in fact. And all the money that we have here comes from the soil. It comes from the soil in the form of [m]aize, [g]roundnuts, [b]ananas, [b]eans, [p]eas, [t]obacco, [c]offee, [c]otton, [r]ice and so forth.[1]

—Former President Hastings Kamuzu Banda, Lilongwe, 1964

Like many other countries in southern Africa, Malawi is rich in a range of natural resources. Among these are deposits of coal, gemstones, rare earths, cement, uranium, oil, and gas.[2] While the largest coal fields are located in northern Malawi (Karonga and Rumphi districts), most of the gemstones and rare earths can be found in the south. More significant considering Malawi’s small size are the uranium reserves found in Karonga district, which amount to 0.5 percent of global deposits.[3] Oil and gas deposits around Lake Malawi are currently under exploration.

During more than 30 years of dictatorship from 1961 to 1994, former President Hastings Banda promoted farming as the path to development and prosperity. He opposed the extraction of minerals, even denying their existence.[4] In the absence of other industries, most Malawians lived as subsistence farmers in the countryside.

Today, Malawi’s extractive industries only make up a small portion of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is in contrast to most neighboring countries, such as Zambia and Zimbabwe, where mining has long made substantial contributions to the national economy.[5] The mining sector has grown since 2009, with growth rates of 14.9 percent in 2012 and 6.9 percent in 2013.[6] Several mines stalled their operations with the collapse of global commodity prices in 2014, which explains the modest contribution of the mining sector to Malawi’s GDP in recent years. The amount that the mining sector contributes to Malawi’s GDP has fluctuated over the years and data on the matter varies across sources. One government report put the 2014 contribution at around 3 percent, while another one only attributes 0.9 percent of the GDP to mining for the same year.[7] President Peter Mutharika suggested in 2015 that mining was contributing 6 percent to the country’s GDP in that year.[8]

When market prices recover, the government expects substantial increases in Malawi’s extractive output. For 2016, government analysts anticipated growth of 3.6 percent.[9] The government has already approved an estimated total of 500 licenses for industrial and artisanal mining and has repeatedly affirmed its plans to diversify the economy. There are currently only 50 large-scale active mining licenses in Malawi. The number of prospecting licenses for future large scale industrial mining is at 74, which, if all came to production, would more than double the number of active mining operations.[10]

In 2011, the World Bank provided the government with US$25 million in credit for its Mining Governance and Growth Support Project, which aims to increase efficiency and transparency within the mining sector. In 2015, the government published the results of a countrywide, geophysical airborne survey which showed geophysical data about mineral occurrences in Malawi. The extractive sector is likely to attract more investment.[11]

Several existing and potential mining sites, including those for energy resources such as uranium and coal, are located along the shores and tributaries of Lake Malawi, a fragile ecosystem and key source of livelihood for lakeside communities of more than 1.5 million people. In 2009, Paladin (Africa) Limited, a Malawian-incorporated subsidiary of Australia-based Paladin Energy Ltd., started production in Malawi’s first large-scale uranium mine, with around 10,000 tons of yellowcake uranium deposits and a projected capacity of 1,500 tons of yellow cake uranium a year.[12] While the mine is currently not in production because of declining uranium prices after the 2011 nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan, Paladin remains on “care and maintenance," with the possibility of resuming activities in the near future. Exploration for uranium continues in other parts of Malawi such as Mzimba district.[13]

Malawi is also beginning to explore ways to further exploit its coal reserves totaling at least 22 million tons.[14] Malawi’s coal production declined from around 67,000 tons in 2013 to under 63,000 tons in 2014 due to fuel shortages.[15] In 2015 the four largest coal mines had a combined capacity of 10,000 tons per month, with an average workforce in the coal sector of around 600 people between 2013 and 2015.[16]

According to the World Bank-funded 2016 Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment of the Minerals Sector, the Department of Mines has issued 10 mining licenses and 13 prospecting licenses for coal. Most of these licenses were issued for areas located in northern Malawi, including the Lufira coal field where the Eland coal mine is located and the North Rukuru coal field where Malcoal Mining Limited (Malcoal) operates.[17] The assessment also reports that several planned coal power plants are set to open in Malawi, which could increase coal mining and production.[18] In 2015, Chinese companies announced intentions to invest in coal power plants in the Mwanza District of southern Malawi.[19] The cost of a new plant is estimated at $600 million, the bulk of which will be carried by a Chinese bank with contributions from the Malawi government.[20]

Further exploration for oil and gas extraction are underway, including in areas around the lake that are protected UNESCO World Heritage sites. The government started to issue petroleum exploration licenses between 2011 and 2014, awarding prospecting licenses to four multinational companies.[21]Criticism from civil society and allegations of corruption voiced by the attorney general slowed the licensing process down and the attorney general recommended a cancelation of the exploration licenses.[22]

In 2014 UNESCO published a report warning of the risks to Lake Malawi’s ecosystem and asking the government not to issue exploration licenses for areas within the national park.[23] With respect to threats originating outside the protected area, the report also recommended that the government “[p]revent[s] pollution of the lake and its inflowing rivers through effective regulation and control of mining effluents, other industrial and domestic pollution and agrochemicals.”[24] In the same year, the World Heritage Committee urged the State Party to cancel the oil exploitation permit which overlaps with the property and reiterated its position that oil, gas and mineral exploration and exploitation are incompatible with World Heritage status.[25] In July 2016, the committee reiterated its recommendations from 2014 and requested a progress report on their implementation in February 2017 and again in December 2017.[26]

Poverty and Impacts of Climate Change

Today, Malawi remains one of the world’s poorest countries. A series of droughts and floods in 2015, followed by another long period of drought in 2016, adversely impacted Malawi's economy, which is heavily reliant on its agricultural sector.[27] The country's GDP growth slowed from 6.2 percent in 2014 to 3 percent in 2015, and inflation has been growing rapidly.[28] These droughts have caused numerous food shortages, especially of maize, leading to increased food insecurity in the country.[29] In April 2016, the government declared a state of national disaster after drought conditions continued on from the 2015 season. To help the country weather the economic storm caused by the droughts, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently released to Malawi $76.8 million in extra loans, which is in addition to existing programs.[30]

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and other scientific studies, the African continent is already experiencing the effects of climate change in many regions.[31]For example, a recent study characterized countries in southern Africa as “global hotspots” of climate change, noting a high likelihood of drought or flooding and declining crop yields or ecosystem damages in the future.[32]The effects of climate change will put an additional strain on local economies, which already see increasing poverty and high population growth rates.

While Malawi’s current carbon emissions are among the lowest in the world—about 0.1 metric tons of carbon dioxide emission per capita—increasing fossil fuel extraction, including coal mining, contributes to global climate change, which in turn affects food security.[33]

Human Rights Concerns

The extractive industries can be a highly destructive and dangerous industry if not managed and regulated responsibly.[34] Researchers and activists around the world also increasingly perceive it to be an industry that benefits foreign investors while the local economy sees little benefit, and, most importantly, local communities are left empty-handed.[35]

Critics have long alleged that the push for industrialization and growth needs to be accompanied by a government-regulatedsocial license”a legal and policy framework to ensure that local communities will not suffer harminstead of leaving social responsibility to the discretion of mines and other industrial projects.[36] Even the world’s major mining firms generally acknowledge that mining can be dangerous when not carried out responsibly and that painstaking evaluation of possible negative impacts is imperative.[37] In particular, mining activities can impact several fundamental human rights, including the rights to health, water, food, and housing.

Negative health risks are common in mineral mining. The risks are especially high in uranium mining due to its radioactivity and toxicity.[38] Individuals who work in or live near uranium mining activities can face a broad array of health challenges associated with exposure to uranium, including cancers and kidney and respiratory diseases.[39] While most existing studies focus on the health impact of uranium mining on miners, several studies show that uranium can also lead to health problems in nearby communities.[40] Manifestations of negative health impacts are often delayed, however, because the initial cell damage is not lethal.[41]

Health outcomes are also worsening for individuals who work in or live near coal mining activities. Rates of illnesses such as lung and other types of cancers, respiratory and kidney diseases, heart attacks, and high blood pressure are increasing within these communities.[42] Air contamination caused by mining activities affect the health of nearby communities. For example, fugitive dust, small airborne particles generated by the blasting of heavy equipment used in surface coal mining, contains particulate matter that can be toxic to human health.[43] Also, the transport of coal releases dust and rocks, particularly when trucks are uncovered, which can cause respiratory symptoms in surrounding communities.[44] Children in these communities often suffer increased rates of asthma.[45]

Finally, mining also significantly contributes to climate change, which in turn adversely impacts governments’ ability to realize the rights to health, water, and food. Although disaggregated statistics covering the global mining sector are not available, mining has been recognized as a significant contributor to human-made climate change by emitting significant amounts of greenhouse gases during production and through the extraction of fossil fuels.[46]

Minimizing Risks and Protecting Rights

International law requires governments to take effective steps to minimize or mitigate risks and harms stemming from mining operations and to monitor and respond to resulting impacts.[47] Human rights law also imposes procedural obligations with regard to access to information, participation in the formulation and implementation of government policy, and access to a remedy. These obligations are meant to protect the rights of local communities before, during, and after mining operations.[48]

On company responsibilities, the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Guiding Principles) detail basic steps companies should take to respect human rights, including conducting due diligence to avoid causing or contributing to human rights abuses through their operations; avoiding complicity in abuses; and taking steps to mitigate them if they occur. Several voluntary industry initiatives similarly emphasize the important role of risk assessments and regular and transparent monitoring.[49]

First, governments and companies should take preventive measures to ensure that mining projects are planned and carried out in a way that does not violate the rights of local communities and that minimizes displacement and disruption of livelihoods. A central element of any efforts to minimize risks is to assess environmental and social impacts throughout the lifecycle of mining. Governments’ obligations under international human rights law to protect and prevent mean they should investigate the actual and potential implications of mining operations, including generating and collecting information related to environmental and social impacts before mining starts. Data collection should include assessments of:

  1. Hazardous properties and other potential risks from mining;
  2. The likelihood of impacts on community members, including those at higher risk;
  3. The risk of harm to people, communities and the environment; and
  4. Options that are available to prevent harm.

Impact assessments for mining operations should include baseline data for pollutants in water, food, and other natural resources and should evaluate how the project will affect marginalized groups and individuals. Land use also requires careful planning and robust monitoring to minimize the impacts of resettlement on the rights of affected communities.

Second, governments should establish effective mechanisms to oversee the activities and impacts of mining during and after operations and publish updates on the potential health and environmental risks. Such mechanisms involve robust reporting requirements for companies and regular unannounced inspections by the government. Affected groups and individuals should be given the opportunity to contribute to monitoring activities, and data should be disaggregated. Governments should also ensure that adequate healthcare infrastructure is in place to monitor the potential health impacts of the mining activity on communities.

Third, governments should effectively disseminate information to communities that may be adversely affected by operations of the extractive industries before, during, and after operations. Access to information is a prerequisite for communities to participate in discussions with the government and mining companies. Meaningful participation relies upon, and cannot be achieved without, information. Participation also helps to ensure that development projects involving land and natural resources adequately and equitably address the rights of affected communities. The availability and accessibility of information also enables affected communities—especially those vulnerable to mining’s potential impacts—to seek redress for harms suffered.

II. Gaps and Weaknesses in Malawi’s Legal Framework

The 1981 Mines and Minerals Act (MMA) is the principal law currently governing mining in Malawi, and provides for the licensing and regulation of private mining companies. It also contains a section setting out some environmental protection standards throughout the lifecycle of mining.[50] General standards for protecting the environment, including Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), and monitoring are laid out in the 1996 EnvironmentManagementAct (EMA). The 1983 Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act governs oil exploration and production. The 2013 WaterResourcesAct regulates the use of natural water sources for mining activities and the discharge of water from mining operations.

Discretionary Protection and Monitoring Standards

Malawi’s legal and regulatory framework does not ensure proper assessment of the risks from environmental pollution before the mining starts and fails to effectively protect the rights of nearby communities by rigorous monitoring during and after operations. Environmental and social impact assessments and ongoing monitoring are intended to ensure scrutiny and rigor in evaluating the possible negative impacts of proposed new mines and in developing mitigation strategies. Unfortunately, weak regulations for impact assessments and monitoring have rendered this key safeguard largely ineffectual in Malawi.

First, legal standards for EIAs leave too much discretion to authorities. While impact assessments should be mandatory for all projects that potentially impact the environment and community health, Malawi’s regulatory framework on EIAs for mining operations remains incomplete and unclear. Per the MMA it is at the minister’s discretion to require an EIA to be carried out before a license for a mining project is approved.[51] The EMA in conjunction with the 1997 Guidelines for Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA Guidelines) have been interpreted to impose mandatory EIAs for mining projects, but the EIA Guidelines are vague about the types of mining projects that require an EIA.[52] In any event, the current environmental legislation entirely fails to require applicants to evaluate the social impacts of mining on nearby communities.

An additional problem is the weak provisions on public participation during the EIA process. According to Section 26 (1) of the EMA, the public will be invited to send written comments on the EIA, but the nature and structure of public hearings remain at the discretion of the director of environmental affairs (“where necessary”). Furthermore, consultation is not mandatory prior to the commission of the EIA. While the EIA Guidelines are slightly more emphatic about the role of public consultation in the EIA process, the government’s role in ensuring meaningful participation remains discretionary.[53]

Second, Malawi’s mining law provides little guidance with regard to the environmental impacts of mining. In considering whether or not to approve a project, the director is required to “take into account” any likely environmental impact of the project.[54] This provision is weak and highly discretionary, as neither the EMA nor MMA specify the ways in which this impact should be measured or the criteria that need to be fulfilled for the project to go ahead.

Third, according to the EMA, the director of environmental affairs shall conduct “periodic environmental audits of any project” after a project has been approved and begun operating.[55] However, the current law does not specify how often these audits should be carried out and what they entail. As a result, regular monitoring and enforcement of environmental protection measures remain at the discretion of the director and the implementing entities such as the district environmental officers.

Integrating Human Rights Risks into Impact Assessments

Neighboring countries in southern Africa have found ways to incorporate social impacts, especially impact on human health, into the legal regime for environmental assessments with varying levels of implementation.[56]

In Zambia, the 2015 Mines and Minerals Law requires authorities to consider environment and human health “in deciding whether or not to grant any mining right or mineral processing licence.”[57] According to Section 80 (1) b “the need to ensure that any mining or mineral processing activity prevents any adverse socio-economic impact or harm to human health, in or on the land over which the right or license is sought” shall be taken into account.[58]

There are several tools that help governments develop specific guidelines to assess the impacts of mining on marginalized groups and individuals.[59] For example, the Social Water Assessment Protocol developed by Nina Collins and Alan Woodley at the Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining at the University of Queensland, Australia includes modules on gender, indigenous peoples, and health.[60] A pilot study in Ghana conducted an assessment on the basis of the water assessment tool, which was designed to capture the social context around mining operations and integrated human rights considerations.[61] The Toolbox for Socio-Economic Assessment, developed by the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) member and mining company AngloAmerican, covers a broad range of issues: stakeholder engagement, resettlement, indigenous peoples, planning for mine closure, and delivering benefits.[62]

Legal Barriers to Accessing Environmental Health Information

While Malawi’s Constitution sets out various procedural rights that apply to environmental decision-making, such as the right of access to information, the current regulatory regime on mining does not promote access to environmental and health information.[63]

The current MMA contains provisions that could render any information delivered to the government for mining-related activities confidential. In particular Section 7 of the MMA, the Prohibition Against Disclosure of Information, could be read as preventing the release of environmental monitoring and related information for the duration of the mining license’s validity, unless both the director and the holder of the mineral right agree otherwise.[64]

While Section 52 of the EMA appears to emphasize the importance of access to information for the general public, the limitations contained in the same provision act to significantly limit this content. Section 52 (3) of the EMA contains a confidentiality provision relating to the publication or disclosure of proprietary information relating to the environment.[65]

Legal Provisions that Advance Access to Information

Neighboring countries have adopted and implemented laws that promote transparency and public access to environmental information.[66]

In Zimbabwe, the 2003 Environmental Management Act contains a specific provision on the right of access to environmental information.[67] The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act also contains provisions that seek to protect public health and the environment in Section 28 (1) (b). The law requires that the head of a public body disclose to members of the public or interested or affected persons information concerning the risk of significant harm to the health or safety of members of the public or the risk of significant harm to the environment. Such information is to be provided whether or not a request has been made to the public body.[68]

In Tanzania, the 2004 Environmental Management Act states that documents including those relatingto environmental matters in any mining concession; environmental management plans; proposals for preventing pollution; plans for treating waste or reclaiming land and water resources; and environmental impact assessments for proposed mining operations are publicly accessible records.[69] Tanzania has also enacted the Extractive Industries (Transparency and Accountability) Act, which requires the minister of energy and minerals to publish—online or via widely accessible media—concessions, contracts, and licenses relating to the extractive industries and the implementation of environmental management plans.[70]

III. Karonga District: Malawi’s Mining Experiment

Karonga is the northernmost district of Malawi, with Lake Malawi to the east, Tanzania to the north, and highlands to the west and south. The district was isolated until 1981, when the national highway was extended to the district from the south.

Still one of Malawi’s poorest regions, the majority of the district’s 250,000 residents depend on subsistence farming and international and governmental food aid. The terrain is flat and fertile along the lake and increasingly hilly toward the west. The main sources of income for most families are farming maize, rice, and cassava and fishing in the lake.

Momentum and national interest in Karonga’s extractive industries was first ignited by the commissioning of Kayelekera’s uranium mine in 2007. Kayelekera is a community consisting of nine villages and located 52 kilometers west of Karonga amid rolling hills covered with patchy forest. It is located about halfway between the district capital of Karonga town and Chitipa. The population in this area has grown significantly over the past decade—in part due to an influx of migrant laborers—with about 3,000 people living there at its peak in 2009.[71]

The uranium mine in Kayelekera is the largest mine in Malawi. In fact, it is the first and only large-scale mine defined by heavy equipment, sophisticated technology, and a workforce in the hundreds of employees.[72] The mine, which became fully operational in 2009, is operated by Paladin—a company based in western Australia—while the Malawian government maintains a 15 percent stake. Between 2011 and 2014 the mine’s output was near capacity, producing about 1,000 tons of yellowcake per year.[73] In 2014, operations were temporarily stopped due to low uranium prices globally, with the mine placed on so-called “care and maintenance,” but the company continues to employ over 200 workers.[74]

Several other mining ventures followed Paladin’s example. These include Karonga-based Malcoal and Eland Coal Mining that are two of the country’s four biggest coal mines, along with Mchenga and Kaziwiziwi in Rumphi district. Together, these mines make up 95 percent of the total coal production with a combined capacity of 10,000 tons per month.[75]

Mine

Ownership

Sector

Location

Start of operations

Status in August 2016

Malcoal

(coal mine)

Malcoal (Malawi), subsidiary of IntraEnergy (Australia)

Coal

Kayelekera, Karonga

2006

Active

Eland

(coal mine)

Eland Coal Mining Company (Malawi), subsidiary of Independent Oil Resources (Cyprus)

Coal

Mwabulambo, Karonga

2009

Closed

Kayelekera (uranium mine)

Paladin Africa Limited (Malawi), subsidiary of Paladin Energy Ltd (Australia)

Uranium

Kayelekera, Karonga

2009

On Hold

The Malcoal open pit coal mine is based on the back of a mountain close to a river, about 3 kilometers from the Paladin mine. Formerly known as Nkhachira, the mine was taken over by Malcoal in 2013.[76] As of June 2015, Malcoal was a joint venture with 90 percent owned by Australian Intra Energy Corporation (through its subsidiary East Africa Mining Limited) and 10 percent owned by Consolidated Mining Industries Limited, a private Malawian entity.[77] Malcoal was reported to have closed down operations because of a shrinking local market at the end of 2015, but the mine was operational as of July 2016.[78] Intra Energy has also announced plans to construct a coal-fired power station at Chipoka, Salima, with coal supplies coming from the mining site in Kayelekera.[79]

Mwabulambo coal mine, an open pit mine located 30 kilometers north of the district capital, is operated by Eland Coal Mining Company, a Malawian company. Eland is a subsidiary of the Isle of Man based Heavy Mineral Limited, which is in turn owned by Independent Oil & Resources PLC, a company based in Cyprus.[80]Over 70 percent of Independent Oil & Resources PLC is owned by the Norwegian oil magnate Berge Gerdt Larsen and members of his family.[81] The coal mine is located on a flat and fertile area near Lake Malawi where residents have traditionally relied on subsistence farming, especially rice farming. It is unclear when and if operations will resume after they stopped in 2015. According to information given by Jan Egil Moe, chairman of the board of Independent Oil & Resources PLC, in July 2015, “Eland Coal Mine has suspended operations as the operations were not sustainable, and is in the process of being liquidated.”[82]However, site visits in August 2015 and March 2016 suggested that the company still employs a local watchman and has not started rehabilitating the area.

Before Mining Starts

In Malawi’s Karonga district the government and companies have failed to comprehensively assess environmental and social risks and impacts before mining operations begin and have not communicated potential risks with affected communities.

Insufficient Consultation about Risks of Mining

Silence reigns in this country over the mining issue, especially uranium.… When ignorance reins, it’s the poor that suffer. Nobody, whether mine or government officials, takes responsibility to educate people on the hazards of mining. People lack basic education about uranium and coal mining.[83]

—Archibald Mwakasungla, chairman of Uraha Foundation, Karonga, August 2015[84]

Many residents of mining communities, especially women, interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that they did not receive sufficient information about mining and its potential risks before the operations started.

One woman at Mwabulambo, where Eland started operating in 2007, said that she “didn’t know anything about the mining before the machines came in.”[85]"They didn’t give us any information, they just started digging,” she said. Another female resident of Mwabulambo “just saw vehicles coming through…. No government official came to tell us what was going on.”[86]

A 46-year-old woman in Mwabulambo recalled:

The first thing I remember was that a white man came into the village and asked children about the rocks in this area. The people found out that there is coal. They started talking to the government, but they didn’t discuss their plans with us. They only told us that we would all become very rich once they start with the mining. We didn’t know anything about mining and we believed them.[87]

EIAs are supposed to be carried out before mining starts production, and according to EIAs reviewed by Human Rights Watch, companies held community meetings in Mwabulambo and Kayelekera before the mining started or at an early stage of exploration. However, it is not clear how inclusive and comprehensive these consultations were. The EIA for Eland coal mine explicitly states that “[a]lthough a lot of effort was made to ensure gender balance …, women, especially at village levels, were not keen to provide their comments and inputs.”[88] The EIA for Nkhachira Coal Mine, Malcoal’s predecessor, reports that the managing director informed the people that there is a “requirement for establishment or improvements of some infrastructures including health center, Police Unit, potable water, maize mills, roads and many more,” but does not mention any potential risks posed by coal mining.[89]

Villagers interviewed by Human Rights Watch in fact emphasized that the community meetings, if they happened at all, often did not include information about how the project would impact the environment and their livelihoods, including planned use of land, water, and other natural resources.[90]

The minister of mining pointed out that the Mwabulambo and Kayelekera communities’ knowledge about the health centers and schools promised by the companies can be seen as a “sign that they [the communities] have been consulted, otherwise they wouldn’t know that there is a promise.”[91] However, even if this type of information was given prior to the start of mining operations, promising benefits to the community cannot be a replacement for providing adequate information about the associated risks and mitigation strategies.[92]

Government officials confirmed that the current legal framework does not require companies to include and communicate social impacts and health risks of mining, such as threats to water sources or specific impacts on marginalized populations, and does not provide for avenues through which communities may access environmental health information.[93]

Environmental Impact Assessments

The 2006 EIA for the Nkhachira coal mine in Kayelekera, whichwas taken over byMalcoal in 2013, stated that the environmental risk of the mine was “minimal.” However, a Human Rights Watch review found that it failed to comprehensively address the potential impact of mining activity on ground water or surface water, including the risk of acid mine drainage.[94] While the EIA indicated that the nearby community would experience greater levels of dust, noise, and traffic that would negatively impact their quality of life, it contained no recommendation for regular monitoring of the local water and air during or after the mine’s operation.[95]

The EIA for theEland coal project, which Human Rights Watch also reviewed, stated that there was “minimal environmental risk.”[96] The only step it identified to minimize health risks to the community was to prohibit access to the mine site, stating that “any trespassers to be disciplined by the village committee.”[97] The report made no mention of any potential impacts on women or children or how the risks were to be communicated to them.

Australian experts on the environmental impact of mining criticizedPaladin’s EIA, conducted in 2006 by Knight Piésold Ltd consulting firm, because it lacked adequate, high quality environmental and radiological baseline data; an appropriate long-term tailings management plan; adequate characterization and discussion of potential acid mine drainage issues; and it provided an inappropriate rehabilitation plan.[98] Human Rights Watch’s review found that the EIA also failed to discuss gender specific risks of mining and that it was unclear if and how the results of their monitoring programs would be made available to the general public, especially to women.[99]

Relocations

The company put white crosses on all the houses that should be relocated. They also put such a cross on our house…. They first came in March 2012 and said that we need to move in April. But they only waited one week and then came back to say that now is the time to move. We didn’t know where to go. We had to sleep outside for a couple of days. It was difficult to move as this was in the rainy season and we ended up putting up at someone’s verandah and under the tree.[100]

—Resident, Mwabulambo, March 2016.

Mining in Karonga district has resulted in the resettlement of some families often without adequate warning, decent resettlement conditions, or compensation.

Malawi’s laws and policies do not adequately regulate resettlement or land transfers for commercial investment. Although Malawi’s Constitution, the Land Act, and the Mines and Minerals Act (MMA) offer some standards for compulsory land acquisition through the government, they do not provide adequate safeguards or sufficient guidance on this process or related compensation.[101]

Government officials from the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development told Human Rights Watch that the land acquired by mining companies in Karonga district was customary land. Community members and NGO representatives also mostly suggested that this was previously customary land.

When the government claims customary land, they bear the responsibility of resettling and compensating those using such land. According to the constitution, “[f]air and adequate compensation must be given in the event of compulsory acquisition.”[102] The Land Act also stipulates that “any person who … suffers any disturbance … loss or damage to any interest which he ... may have … in such land, shall be paid such compensation for such disturbance, loss or damage as shall be reasonable.”[103]With regard to mining, the MMA also provides for fair and reasonable compensation for disturbance of land rights and damage to any crops, trees, buildings, stock, etc.[104]

However, the principal secretary at the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development told Human Rights Watch that people who have been using customary land in mining communities will not be compensated for the land as such because they do not possess a land title.[105]

Neither of the existing laws defines what “reasonable” compensation is and, to date, Malawi does not have a national resettlement policy that guides the process of resettlements and compensation.[106] This exacerbates a broader problem of insecure land tenure, especially for customary land that is communally owned.[107]

Land Tenure in Malawi

There are a variety of land laws in Malawi which establish various types of tenure. The 1965 Land Act categorizes land as public (government or unallocated customary land) or private (freehold, leasehold, or customary estate).[108] The 2016 Land Bill comprises more than 10 land-related bills, including bills on customary law, land acquisitions, physical planning, and the role of local government role.[109]A new customary law was adopted by parliament in July 2016 and was assented into law by the president in September 2016.

Very few people in rural Malawi have private land titles.[110] Approximately 80 percent of all land in Malawi is considered customary land under Malawi’s 1965 Land Act. Customary land is defined as land falling within the jurisdiction of a recognized traditional authority.[111] In the northern region of Malawi, 83 percent of all land is held as customary land.[112] In the district of Karonga, the share of customary land amounts to 98 percent.[113] Although a preponderance of communities in Malawi pass customary land down from mother to daughter (matrilineal), in the northern region most villages use a patrilineal system, passing land down among male heirs. In Karonga, 99 percent of land is patrilineal.[114]

Under the Land Acquisitions Act, compensation is determined by the lands commissioner or by agreement between parties.[115] According to Section 9, if compensation is not agreed upon by the parties, it will be assessed by the government. Criteria to be considered when calculating compensation are the value of the land, the value of the improvements made to the land, and how much the land has appreciated in value since the land was originally acquired.

According to the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, the process of assessing compensation is carried out by the regional offices of the ministry.[116] The results will be shared with the affected people and district commissioner who will be responsible for implementation.

Further guidance for resettlement in the case of government seizure of customary land can be found in the 2013 Mines and Minerals Policy and the 2002 National Land Policy. According to the Mines and Minerals Policy, “[c]ompensation and resettlement of land owners and communities affected by mining” is identified as a social issue that “the government will adequately address.”[117] According to the National Land Policy, “all land acquisition, including the acquisition of customary land, by the government requires negotiations and payment of compensation at fair market prices.”[118]

While these policies state that it is the responsibility of the government to compensate and resettle those displaced in mining activities, the National Land Policy indicates the mining companies also bear some responsibility. Specifically, the policy states that “mining rights will include conditions for practicing conservation methods including setting aside funds for compensation to those adversely affected by the activity and mining and quarrying operators will be required to meet the costs of reclaiming land.”[119]

With no national guidelines or regulations on resettlement, the mining companies operating in Karonga district have been inconsistent in how they go about this process.[120]

Although the Karonga district commissioner told Human Rights Watch that relocation processes fall under her authority, they said they were unaware of the current situation of relocated families at the Eland or Malcoal mines.[121] The principal secretary at the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development said that they were not aware of any irregularities in the relocation processes in Karonga district.[122]

Complicating the relocation process is the role of local chiefs in negotiating deals for resettled families when customary lands are involved. Both Malawi’s 1967 Land Act and the 2016 Customary Land Bill reaffirm the notion that customary land is administered by the chiefs for the community.[123] In recent years, however, numerous conflicts over land have arisen because chiefs appear to have participated in land deals without fully consulting local residents or gaining their consent.[124] In an interview with Human Rights Watch, Karonga District Commissioner Rosemary Moyo said that, in some cases, chiefs may have taken some of the money meant for the resettled families.[125] Several villagers in Kayelekera and Mwabulambo said that they believed the chiefs had received money from the companies in exchange for agreeing to the relocations.[126] Asked about the allegations of corruption levied against him, Chief Kayelekera told Human Rights Watch: “Whenever I answer questions people will say I am saying the wrong thing.”[127]

In Kayelekera, community members said that Malcoal resettled at least 12 households about 5 kilometers away from the actual mining site in September 2013.[128] A school teacher confirmed to Human Rights Watch that the 12 families who were moved lived next to the Malcoal offices, across the street from the primary school.[129] Even though some of the families had already heard about the planned relocation, three families told Human Rights Watch that they did not know when the move was going to happen. In the process, furniture was destroyed and several animals were killed. A 20-year-old woman at Kayelekera recalled:

The people from the company came to us and said they wanted to build a police station where our house was.… They didn’t give us any notice and just chased us away. Two of our goats died because of a bulldozer. They were in a cage and couldn’t escape while we were busy protecting our furniture.… We couldn’t say anything because the machines were already there. We didn’t manage to save all our belongings. We lost some pots, bags and many other things.[130]

Another woman, whose family was contacted by Malcoal’s workers in June 2013, said that the company had told her family that they “could come any time to make us move.”[131] Three months later, company workers came back to tell them that they have to leave. “They came with bulldozers and told us to pack our stuff immediately,” she said.[132]

Malcoal disputes the assertion that Malcoal has resettled community members. Mr. Hastings Jere, director of Malcoal, said in an email to Human Rights Watch that there was “not even a single villager or village … to be relocated to pave way for mining.”[133] The company did not specifically respond to our request for further information about any resettlements at a later stage, or to the accounts provided by families who reported that they were relocated from their homes, which were near the Malcoal offices.

In Mwabulambo, community members said that more than 30 households were relocated from customary land at different stages of Eland’s operations between 2008 and 2015. Human Rights Watch interviewed individuals from four of these households.[134] They complained that the company did not notify them sufficiently in advance of the resettlement, and they criticized the company and the government more generally about a lack of transparency regarding the terms of the relocation and compensation.[135] They reported that, while they had heard about the relocations before, the actual timing of the resettlement came as a surprise, and they had to leave their homes before they managed to build new ones. One family even had to stay under a tree for about a month because they had to move so quickly.[136]

Eland Coal Mining Company did not respond to our request for information about the resettlement process in Mwabulambo.

In Kayelekera, none of the relocated families Human Rights Watch interviewed said they had received compensation for any of their losses when they were resettled by Malcoal. “We had to ask the chief for new land and had to pay 30,000 MWK (about $90) for it. We had also lost our fields and needed to buy new ones,” one woman said. “The company didn’t pay us any compensation.”[137]

Another family in Kayelekera said that Malcoal’s manager had initially promised to compensate them. “In June 2013 [Malcoal] workers came and wrote down our name and assessed the value of our house. They said that they could come any time to make us move and that we may receive compensation,” the woman remembered. But when the company workers came back three months later, “they came with bulldozers and told us to pack our stuff immediately. They didn’t say anything about compensation anymore.”[138]

In Mwabulambo, each family received some form of compensation from Eland when it relocated them, ranging from 50,000 to 200,000 MWK (about $150 to $600), but the basis for individual payments remains unclear.[139] A community representative interviewed by Human Rights Watch suggested that these were standard amounts that the company paid to each relocated family—independent of the actual value of their belongings—and that they had increased payments over time in response to mounting pressure from the community.[140] A representative of a local NGO who worked with the community for many years said “no one knows” the formula used to determine compensation.[141]A 58-year-old widow and mother of 12 said: “We were never told why we received 50,000 MWK (about $150). They just told us this is the amount you get.”[142] Another family who had also been paid 50,000 MWK (about $150) had to sell two cows to be able to build a new house.[143]

Several families said they could not maintain the same standard of living after resettlement due to the minimal compensation they received. A woman from Mwabulambo said:

Even though they offered us very little money, we had no choice but to move. They said that they own the land and put us under pressure. We didn’t have the power to resist and we were afraid of the risks of coal. 50,000 MWK (about $150) is too little money. We had a brick house in the old location. But the money wasn’t enough to build a new one, so now we only have a mud house.… The area where we had our fields was also taken away by the miners. There is only a small part that we can still use.[144]

In addition to the lack of adequate compensation for the house and other property, several families told Human Rights Watch that the relocation had reduced their income because the new land they acquired after the move was not as fertile. A woman in Kayelekera told Human Rights Watch that her family was relocated to “a really bad piece of land” by Malcoal in 2013. She explained that the land from where they were moved had good soil; she was able to grow maize, cassava, sweet potato, and groundnuts. She used to harvest 30 to 50 bags of maize per season, but now she only has 10 bags or less.[145] Another woman from Mwabulambo who was relocated by Eland said:

Our harvest in these existing fields is also reduced because the coal is flowing into the fields during the rainy season. We used to have 3 bags (50 kg per bag) of maize, now we are left with less than one bag. The maize doesn’t grow well any more.[146]

According to community members, Eland company officials claimed that they had bought the land from the government and would not compensate the families for all their land because they did not have a legal title. One woman said: “Our fields are gone; we can’t use them anymore…. We weren’t compensated for the fields, they just gave us money for the house.”[147]

When asked about plans for how to address these challenges, the principal secretary in the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development said that residents should not have moved out of their homes before receiving compensation.[148] The principal secretary also said that people would usually be assigned new land by the chief. The government has also been working on a draft resettlement policy. However, none of these initiatives include steps that the government will take to investigate and remedy harm already caused by relocations in Karonga district.

The issue of land ownership and control is central to many women’s concerns around mining in Malawi. Most women we interviewed did not possess a formal title or maintain significant control over customary land allocated to families, despite describing making significant improvements to and use of family plots. They said that in Karonga district, traditional leaders assigned customary lands to their husbands and considered them to be in charge.

Several women told Human Rights Watch that they felt excluded from participating in meetings with the company or chiefs.[149] Women from Mwabulambo said that company officials or chiefs often organized meetings on very short notice, which makes it difficult for women to attend, or they otherwise felt uncomfortable attending the meetings, which are traditionally dominated by men. As a result, they said they relied on their husbands as the main source of information about the planned relocation, including the amount of money the family received. Women also said they had little say, if any, in how the compensation was spent. A woman in Mwabulambo said: “The money for the new house was given to my husband. I was not happy with how he spent it. But he is the head of the household, he decides.”[150]

Officials at the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development expressed hope that the new customary land law will increase women’s participation in relocation processes. They emphasized that of the seven members of the planned customary land committees managing the resettlement process at the local level, at least three will need to be women.[151] Ministry officials also said that the new land laws will enable local communities to register their land. The ministry hopes to facilitate joint registration between husband and wife through the development of guidelines and trainings. The ministry also pointed out that the Land Acquisitions Bill will clarify the criteria and process for compensation. At time of writing the Land Acquisitions Bill has not yet been tabled by the parliament.

During Mining Operations

In Karonga District the government has largely failed to put in place effective mechanisms to oversee the activities and impacts of mining operations, and it has failed to effectively disseminate information to affected communities.

Deficient and Irregular Monitoring

It is obvious that mining affects health, but the companies oversee the impact. If there is a problem, we will react. But we are not proactive regarding health monitoring in mining areas.[152]

—Minister of Health Peter Kawale, Lilongwe, March 2016

As described in the following sections, people in communities in Karonga district have numerous concerns about what they perceive to be the impacts of mining on their health, food, soil, and drinking water. For some of their concerns, it is easy to determine that they are linked to mining activity. For others, a link can only be established through regular monitoring and scientific research.

Although Malawi’s government has a duty to monitor the health impacts under the national environmental regulations, Human Rights Watch found that it has often failed to do so in Karonga district. Indeed, weak government oversight and inadequate reporting practices lie at the core of many challenges experienced by mining-affected communities in Karonga district.

During mining operations, the government has failed to regularly and comprehensively carry out environmental and social inspections and monitoring. Government monitoring is not of sufficient frequency and scope to assess the potential community health risks associated with mining. A particular concern in Malawi has been the lack of baseline information about the presence of hazardous substances in air, water, and soil that would allow community members to understand the effects of the extractive industries and to make informed decisions.

While government officials at the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining said that they are planning to visit each mine at least quarterly, the government acknowledged that mining inspections often happen only about once per year.[153] A review by Human Rights Watch of a total of 27 inspection reports by the Regional Mining Office from 2004 to 2014 suggested that inspections at most mining sites are conducted less than once per year.[154]

In an interview with Human Rights Watch, chief mining engineer at the Regional Mining Office in Mzuzu also said that they are planning “quarterly inspections at the mines.” However, he admitted that the current equipment and staff is not sufficient to do this.[155] He also indicated that inspections are focused on workers’ health and safety, rather than on community impacts.

An August 2014 inspection report from the northern region states that the government “should seriously consider (without fail) carrying out quarterly inspections in order to enforce mining regulations which have been abandoned by mining companies as noted in the previous financial year.”[156] The same report indicates that no inspections were conducted in 2013 due to insufficient funds.[157]

At the local level, government officials in Karonga district told Human Rights Watch that they often fail to do regular monitoring visits. The director of the Water Department in Karonga, Aaron Chaponda, said that his office only takes water samples from the Paladin uranium mine, but does not perform any testing at Eland or Malcoal mines.[158] In Karonga district, where Paladin, Malcoal, and Eland are based, there is an additional challenge for monitoring and access to information. The district environmental officer, who oversees environmental monitoring at the district level, was moved to Lilongwe after a conflict with the community in 2015. According to ministry officials, the communities in Karonga had accused the officer of not telling them the truth about the water quality, but government officials denied the allegation.[159] At time of writing, the position has not been filled and District Commissioner Rosemary Moyo told Human Rights Watch that she had not visited the communities since the departure of the district environmental officer.[160] As a result, no testing may have been undertaken by a qualified government official for more than a year.

The scope of the inspections of the Regional Mining Office is often limited to qualitative observations made by the inspection team, including observations of working conditions and safety equipment for mine workers. None of the reports Human Rights Watch examined included results of water or soil testing or any indication that such testing had been conducted.[161] Ministry officials also told Human Rights Watch that the scope of their monitoring is limited to occupational health and safety and does not include community impacts.[162] A government official from the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water also told Human Rights Watch that water testing is not performed more than once a year.[163]

There are also indications that government decisions about which mines to prioritize for inspection or monitoring are taken on based on the reputation of the company, rather than the risks posed to the community. For example, one government official pointed out: “Paladin is very mindful and they have a reputation of protecting the environment and the community. We go there less often, because the smaller mines and underground mines are more concerning.”[164] Another government officer said that the costs for water testing will be shared between the company and the Water Department. As a result, the Water Department only carries out inspections for Paladin uranium mine.[165] Ministry officials told Human Rights Watch that they sometimes rely on company test results, which undermines the independence of the monitoring process. They also said that they sometimes receive financial or transportation support from the companies. For example, government officials may travel to the mines in vehicles owned by the company.[166] This can create additional mistrust and fear among communities that companies may be influencing monitoring results.

In interviews, government officials made conflicting statements about who bore the responsibility for monitoring the operations of mines and overseeing the follow up to inspections. For example, the district commissioner in Karonga told Human Rights Watch that they are not responsible for mining issues in the district because this is not an area of governance that falls under their responsibilities after the devolution of the government.[167] Harry Hardson Mwanyembe, chairman for health and environment on Karonga’s District Council, also said that the local government is not responsible for the mines and that this would be one of the reasons why things were “not going right.”[168] Local government representatives also told Human Rights Watch that they do not receive the environmental monitoring reports.[169]“The [central] government fears that the community will act on the reports if given access,” said Patrick Kishombe, chair of the district council. “They don’t want that.”[170]

Ministry of Mining officials claimed, however, that the district commissioner represents the government at the district level and should be the first point of contact for the communities, including for monitoring.[171] At the same time, central government officials acknowledged that the ministry is not appropriately represented at the district level. “We have very few offices, only in Lilongwe and two additional ones in the regions, but not at the district level,” said Charles Kaphwiyo, then-director of the Department of Mines.[172] Company officials indicated that the government performs inspection visits at the mines, but did not specify the scope, frequency, or agencies involved.[173]

At the core of many people’s concern about the risks of mining is the fact that neither Mwabulambo nor Kayelekera have health facilities where they can be diagnosed and have their treated. Even the district hospital in Karonga town, serving more than 200,000 district residents, is not equipped to run the necessary tests to determine whether patients might have become ill from mining.

Dr. Ted Bandawe, medical officer at the District Hospital in Karonga, told Human Rights Watch that the hospital lacks “basic equipment to do proper diagnostic” procedures and, consequently, “[they] are failing to undertake basic procedures.”[174] For example, blood testing equipment is so basic that it cannot test for the presence of toxic substances such as lead or arsenic in blood. Such substances can get into the water, or food sources that live in that water, through the mining process.

A woman told Human Rights Watch that her husband had worked at Paladin from 2006 to 2014, and she said that he has suffered from asthma since 2009. “We don’t know whether this is caused by uranium or coal,” she said. “We live very close by the road to Malcoal. Right now there are two [mining] vehicles passing by about seven times a day. My small son also has asthma.”[175]

In Kayelekera, the closest health center is about 15 kilometers away from the village, and most families struggle with paying the costs for transportation to this location. “I can hardly afford [to get there],” said one 33-year-old woman, who lives with her husband and six children in Mwenelupembe village.”[176]

In Mwabulambo, a traditional leader explained that community members often cannot access appropriate health care for themselves or their children because the health center is too far away.[177] The health worker, who is only trained to distribute vitamins, also observed that his patients sometimes do not go to the health center because they cannot afford the trip. “They just go to the grocery store instead and buy some of the simple medication that is sold there,” he said.[178]

According to the community, Paladin and Eland committed to building a clinic or health center when they started mining several years ago, but this has not yet happened.[179] In fact, the commitment to “construct at Kayelekera … a clinic to a typical standard for such facilities in Malawi” is part of the development agreement between the Government of Malawi and Paladin.[180] A community member in Kayelekera remembered: “By the time they opened the Kayelekera [uranium mine] they promised the community a clinic, but until today they have not built it. We are poor, so they will never keep their promises.”[181]

“The situation for women is especially difficult,” said a 37-year-old woman who is the wife of a chief in Mwabulambo. “There is a law that says that women have to give birth at the hospital, otherwise they need to pay a fine. But the hospital is too far and the poor women can’t afford to go there…. People here are crying.”[182]

When asked about implementation of these commitments, Minister of Health Peter Kawale indicated that his ministry was “not involved in the monitoring of company commitments for healthcare.”[183] Officials at the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining acknowledged that health centers are urgently needed in mining communities, but admitted that the government has not yet managed to promote enforcement of company commitments.[184] None of the three companies responded to this issue when contacted by Human Rights Watch.

Lack of Access to Environmental and Health Information

Malcoal had promised us a health center, new taps, and bridges. They didn’t talk about any risks.[185]

—41-year-old woman, Kayelekera, March 2016

Communities in Kayelekera and Mwabulambo told Human Rights Watch that they did not receive regularly updated information about ongoing risks associated with mining, nor did they receive monitoring results from the mining companies. People are concerned that the dearth of knowledge about mining makes it difficult to protect themselves from risks, properly diagnose diseases, and access treatment. “The government should come and talk to the community about mining. They should educate us, including about the risks of coal mining,” one woman said.[186]

A resident of Kayelekera, where Paladin and Malcoal are located, recalled that the community had asked Malcoal to do water quality testing for any harmful substances, but the company refused. She said: “Paladin does its own testing but they don’t tell us about the results.”[187]

In 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development recognized access to environmental information, public participation in decision-making over natural resources, and access to justice as important pillars of sustainable development.

Chiefs, teachers, and health workers also confirmed the lack of access to the results of environmental testing done by both the government and the companies.[188]“The government was here last month to test the water. But they usually don’t report back,” a teacher at a public primary school in Kayelekera told Human Rights Watch. She said: “I told them that they should come back and explain to the people what they found, but they never did.”[189] Paramount Chief Kyungu, who is the traditional authority for the entire district, also expressed concern about the lack of access to environmental and health information for the communities affected by mining.[190]

Malawian civil society organizations have voiced concern about the lack of access to information. Activists in Karonga said that they have contacted the companies several times to gain access to EIAs and monitoring reports but did not receive a response.[191] Rachel Etter-Phoya, head of accountability and programs at Citizens for Justice, said: “The government keeps talking about win-win situation for the country and companies, and that's not going to happen when there is limited communication [with the communities] and poor access to information.”[192]

Government officials at the Ministry of Mining acknowledged that they often fail to report back to communities after monitoring visits because they are afraid that this might create further tension.[193]

Mining ministry officials pointed to a communications strategy that they are developing for the mineral sector.[194] The draft of the strategy from November 2015 includes elements that could help improve communications with the communities. The strategy acknowledges that significant knowledge gaps exist on some key issues relating to the sector, including “the potential role of mining in local development, the legislative framework governing the sector; the appropriate roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders; and the typical steps of a mine lifecycle (including wrong perceptions that are widely held about the exploration phase, and the length of time required to develop a mine from exploration to full production).”[195]It seeks to improve and increase direct communication with community members about “health issues; protection of vulnerable groups, including women and children; …relocation; resettlement; and land ownership.”[196] However, the strategy fails to ensure that mining-affected communities receive regular and updated information about the results of environmental monitoring.

Ministry of Mining officials also said that Malawi is in the process of developing a new online cadaster system, which could also serve as a portal to make inspection reports available to the public.[197] The Malawi Mining Cadastre Portal was launched in August 2016 and currently displays all large-scale mining licenses at the exploration and production stages.[198]According to the portal “additional datasets will be included as and when the data are validated and made available”.

The District Commissioner in Karonga said that they have never seen any monitoring reports.[199] Local and foreign NGOs have long argued that the lack of access to results of the monitoring in Karonga district fuels rumors of contamination.[200]

When asked about their environmental testing results in Kayelekera, Paladin’s then-Malawi Manager Greg Walker said the company tests the discharged water every four hours and submits monthly, quarterly, and yearly reports to the government. However, Greg Walker admitted that the company doesn’t disclose monitoring results regarding water testing.[201] Mr. Walker said: “We don’t disclose our monitoring results regarding water testing because there might always be outliers that can be misinterpreted by the general public.”[202]Mr. Walker said Paladin would not be opposed to the government sharing the results with the villagers, but the government has not done so to date.

Women and girls may be particularly affected by lack of access to information about mining and its dangers. Malawi’s Constitution and policies recognize women’s right to full and equal protection in the law, and non-discrimination on the basis of their gender or marital status. However, in practice, their rights are largely curtailedby socio-cultural gender norms and patriarchal beliefs and attitudes.[203] Poverty and discriminatory treatment in the family and in public life also negatively affect women and girls. Patrilineal systems of land ownership in parts of the country, including Karonga district, can further perpetuate discrimination against women in the family.[204]

Limited participation in meetings with companies or the government is one of the main challenges women face regarding access to information about mining, often of particular importance to them as family caregivers.

Several women said that they would learn from their husbands or the chiefs about promises companies made to the community, but could not access information about the risks of mining themselves. A woman who lives in Kayelekera recalled:

Many women attended a meeting [with Malcoal] but weren’t given the opportunity to speak. I attended the meeting but I didn’t raise my hand … I didn’t dare to ask a question. I would have liked to ask about transportation for child delivery.[205]

At Mwabulambo, several women said that women were excluded from participating in meetings organized by Eland.[206] One woman said: “Only the men can get information directly from the company or the government.”[207]As a result, women often rely on their husbands for information about what is happening.

Threats to Water

The pipes were right by my house, [with running water] in the kitchen and bathroom. And then they destroyed everything.[208]

—Nagomba E., 75, Mwabulambo, July 2016

Mining can have significant impacts on water in communities, and on watersheds more broadly.[209] These can include declining water quality—both ground and surface water—due to contamination; reduced availability of water; inadequate amounts of water for domestic and other uses; and decreased access to water and sanitation facilities due to resettlement.[210] Steps can be taken to mitigate the impact on communities or watersheds, but monitoring is necessary to ensure that the most severe effects are contained.

Both coal and uranium mining are known to be potential threats for nearby water sources and watersheds. Explosives used in coal mining can damage water tables; mining can release heavy metals in bodies of water and create acid mine drainage (AMD) and methane gas, contaminating nearby water supplies.[211] Surface coal extraction also directly causes AMD because it exposes rocks, both in the mine and in mine waste, to sun and rain. This exposure causes chemical reactions that lead to the formation of sulphuric acid and dissolved iron. When rain washes over the acidified rocks, the runoff into streams and groundwater acidifies water sources. Slurry (also known as tailings), a byproduct created when the coal is chemically washed to separate it from other minerals, can also contaminate water used by communities.[212]

Uranium mining creates radioactive and chemically toxic waste. The tailings retain radioactive elements as well as other hazardous materials including heavy metals.[213]

Open pit uranium mining sites produce waste rock on an average scale of 40 tons of waste to every one ton of recovered uranium, and the waste rock can also retain radioactive elements.[214] Historically, water overflows during heavy rains and leaching of contaminants into groundwater through the bottom of the tailings pond are the most common causes of accidental radiation release into communities.[215]

Interviewees in Kayelekera, where Malcoal and Paladin operate, described changes in the color, taste, and smell of the water used by households for drinking, cooking, and cleaning. One woman described the water that she believed to be contaminated as “sour and salty.”[216] While most people observed that the water they used generally looked clear, one woman stated: “During the rainy season the coal is swept from the mountain into the river as well as from the gulley, and at those times the water turns blackish.”[217] They do not know what impact this has had on the safety of the water since water testing does not happen on a regular basis, and, even when it does, results are not reported back to the community.[218]

Residents in Kayelekera complained that Malcoal does not properly manage its mining site and coal, and potentially dangerous coal run-off can enter the local river during the rainy season between November and March.[219] In particular, the mining company failed to take appropriate measures to segregate and contain tailings from the watershed and prevent the coal and mining waste from running into the local river.[220] An inspection report from the Regional Mining Office from 2014 also indicated that the mine “pose[s] severe environmental challenges to the local community and Sere River.”[221]

Malcoal company representatives interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported that government officials come about every three months for an inspection. “I don’t know whether the government is doing any testing,” said a site administrator at Malcoal. “But we make sure that the river does not get polluted.” Despite repeated requests, he and other company officials did not provide any details on the company’s strategy for mitigating the risks.[222]

People living in the community were also concerned about potential water pollution from the Paladin mining site. Bruno Chareyon, a French scientist who undertook partial testing of water sources in the village in 2012, warned that some “water sources will probably be impacted by the mining activities [including by] spillage, direct discharges and contamination of underground water resources.”[223]

In a letter to Human Rights Watch, Paladin explained that the company maintains safety, health, radiation, and environmental management programs.[224] Beginning in 2015, Paladin had started to discharge water from one of its tailings ponds into the river system. The company justified this by claiming it became necessary because the mine was not operational at the moment.[225] Company representatives said the water had been treated prior to discharge to ensure that uranium levels were below the World Health Organization’s guidelines for drinking-water quality, an authoritative basis for the setting of national regulations and standards for water safety in support of public health; however, the community remains skeptical.[226] A 24-year-old woman in Kayelekera said: “Everyone I know is scared of the water. But people still drink it because they are too far away from the taps or because they are not fit enough to walk such long distances.”[227]

For the community in Mwabulambo, one of the biggest worries is the destruction of previously available water sources by the mining company. Former President Hastings Banda ran a nationwide program to install piped water in rural areas. Mwabulambo was one of its beneficiaries, and the government installed several community drinking water taps.[228] When mining started in 2007, the company destroyed the pipes that supplied these taps in the process of their mining operations.[229] A 75-year-old woman who has lived all her life in Mwabulambo told Human Rights Watch:

When the company came in 2007, they cut the pipes of water from the government water supply and left the villagers to drink water from the river. The company promised that they would drill boreholes for us, but they didn’t. I worry about the safety of the [river] water due to the fact that it has remnants of coal from the water from the abandoned mining pits, which bursts at the seams and leaks into the river.[230]

Community members complained repeatedly to the government and company managers and asked for boreholes to replace the taps, but they said that it was not until 2015 that two boreholes were installed. Without access to improved sources for water, many villagers explained that they have used water collected directly from the river for many years, including for drinking, even though they did not think it was safe because of mining. A woman explained: “Before the mining started, we used tap water. But after the company destroyed the pipes my family used river water for drinking for a while.”[231]

The experience of some families in Mwabulambo, who see no alternative but to use river water because their homes are too far from boreholes,runs counter to that of many other Malawians. Most Malawians (86 percent) have access to improved water—i.e., boreholes, shallow wells with a hand pump, protected wells, and tap water—due to efforts made by government and international donor to meet the Millennium Development Goals, a set of anti-poverty goals agreed to by 189 countries in 2000.[232] Some 62 percent use a tube well, boreholes with pumps, or a water point connected to a piped source as their source of drinking water.[233]

The challenges in accessing safe water for household use disproportionately impact women and girls, who are often primarily responsible for getting water for the family. Caregivers, often women, also shoulder a greater burden of care work and bear the responsibility of ensuring that vulnerable individuals—children, older people, and those recovering from surgeries or illnesses—avoid exposure to unsafe water.

In Karonga’s mining communities, women often walk longer distances to access what they believe to be safer, less contaminated water, even if that can mean having to walk more than several kilometers up to five times a day.[234]

The limited number of boreholes in the community means that women often face significant wait times to fill the containers they carry to the water source. A Mwabulambo resident told Human Rights Watch that she has to travel one hour round trip to the borehole and back. As a result, her family sometimes uses water from the closest river, including to drink. She said:

The river is pretty far from my house, but the advantage is that there is no waiting line for the water there.… When we started drinking the river water, it was ok. But the coal changed the color of the water. Fishermen also complained. The water eventually turned black.[235]

Traveling long distances or waiting in line to collect water can expose women and girls to danger and leaves them with less time to attend school, earn money, or simply to rest. Having to walk long distances can also have a distinct impact on older women, pregnant women, or women with physical disabilities. A 75-year-old woman in Mwabulambo told Human Rights Watch:

As an old woman I find it very difficult to walk to the river all the time. My husband is very old and needs me to bring him water for bathing, my three grandchildren are at school during the day, so the situation is difficult for me. I go to the river three times a day. In the morning I collect water for my husband to bathe. Then mid-morning I go and collect water for drinking, and then midday I go and collect water for cooking.[236]

Community Health Concerns

My husband … would spit black saliva when he returned from work. He eventually got really sick. He has difficulty breathing and his heart is weak…. The doctors told him not to work because of his illness. He can’t help me with the household, so I am responsible for everything.

—Lucia K., Kayelekera, 41, who lives in a household of 13 people, March 2016

In Karonga district, many community members whom Human Rights Watch interviewed reported illnesses, including respiratory diseases, gastrointestinal illnesses, and skin problems that they believe might be related to coal or uranium mining due to the prevalence in the community since the mining started.[237]

The absence of regular environmental monitoring and limited access to healthcare make it difficult to attribute specific diseases to the impacts of mining operations on the environment. However, it is important to recognize that environmental health studies in other countries have shown that mining increases the health risks for people living in areas near mining operations.[238]

In Kayelekera, the dirt road to the coal mining and uranium mining sites passes by several mud and stone houses, tucked away behind hills and trees, and the primary school with five classrooms. Community members interviewed by Human Rights Watch complained about the dust blowing up from the mining trucks on the road and reported increasing prevalence of bad coughs and asthma in their community.[239] A 34-year-old woman who lives with her husband and five children in a house by the road to Paladin told Human Rights Watch:

One of the big problems with the primary school is the dust from the road [used by trucks from Paladin and Malcoal]. I have two of my children there and they cough a lot. We had written to Mr. Jere [manager of Malcoal] and they started using another road. But then this year’s rainy season made the other road impassable and they started using the old road again that passes directly by the primary school.[240]

High dust volumes alongside the dirt road and from coal trucks also created problems for the community in Mwabulambo. Residents said that he Eland coal mine produced 15 truckloads of coal per day when it was still operational. “They went in and out the whole day, covering the road, our houses and our fields with dust,” said a woman from Mwabulambo.[241]

Community members in Mwabulambo also complained about an increased prevalence of illnesses that they suspect might be related to drinking polluted water.[242] As part of a country-wide program, a health worker employed by the government comes to the community several times a year to distribute vitamins for children. He thinks that children in particular are at risk of contracting mining-related diseases because they bathe and drink water from the rivers and are specifically vulnerable to water-borne diseases or toxic substances that might be in the water. He also observed that many children have skin rashes. “They look like chicken pox, but it is something else. Some of them are from the sun, for others I don’t know. Small children here are coughing a lot.”[243]

Caregivers—most often women—of children, older people, and people with disabilities told Human Rights Watch that health risks in their communities made their care work more burdensome and time-consuming and increased their worry about loved ones.

One woman explained that she takes care of her husband and her child who have both fallen sick with asthma and need additional care.[244]

Another woman who lives in Kayelekera told Human Rights Watch that her husband became ill with a bad cough when he worked at the coal mine. In order to sustain her family of 13 she sells vitumbuwa, traditional Malawian donuts, at the local market. When she is not at the market, she needs to take care of the fields where she grows maize, sorghum, groundnuts, and cassava. “I am responsible for everything,” she said. “If I get sick, my children have to take care of the house. They can’t go to school then.”[245]

Impacts on Food and Livelihoods

Since the mining came we have had many problems. The coal is in our gardens and running into our fields. The way the crops look, you would think that someone had poured petrol on them.[246]

—Resident of Mwabulambo, Mwabulambo, March 2016

Community members voiced concern that mining is damaging their food and livelihoods.

Some villagers at Mwabulambo said they had noticed a significant decrease in the productivity of their fields. They believe this is related to the fact that Eland uses coal to patch up potholes on the road, which then would wash into their land during the rainy season. A 58-year-old widow, mother of 12 children, said:

The produce is not the same any more. The coal is all over the fields. Where I am staying now the fields are very close from the mine. The coal mine is uphill and enters into the field with the rains. When the coal flows into the fields the rice and maize look like they burnt. The crops don’t grow well.[247]

One of the traditional leaders in Mwabulambo said the mining company also damaged the culverts, tunnels that allowed the water to pass under the road from the rice fields.[248] As a result, the irrigation system for the rice fields is not functioning properly, adversely affecting rice production. A member of the village mining committee, a group of villagers who represent the community vis-à-vis the company and government, also said that the mining company cut down trees, reducing the amount of firewood available to the community.[249]

Changing weather conditions and water pollution may also be contributing to less productive harvests.[250] One community member said:

We grow rice and maize here, but it has become more difficult to do so with the poor rains in recent years. Last year we had 32 bags of rice, this year only 8. We think that the bad rice harvest also has to do with the contamination of the water.[251]

Danny Simbeye, who works with a local civil society organization in Karonga, thinks that climate change also contributes to the water scarcity. “Now, animals, and women they are fighting for water so it's a big problem,” he said.[252] Fear of environmental pollution has caused some people to change their diet and spend additional money buying food. One 36-year-old woman from Mwabulambo said: “I don’t eat fish anymore because I am afraid. We used to eat a lot of fish from the river. Now we have to buy usipa [regional type of fish] from the lake.”[253]

As farmers and caregivers, women in Malawi are often particularly impacted by food shortages and decreased crop productivity, which makes them work even longer hours and worry about producing enough to sustain their family. A 75-year-old woman in Mwabulambo recalled:

I had six acres of land. But because the coal mine had spread some coal on the road to make the road better for their trucks, during the rainy season the coal seeps into my gardens and this has negatively affected my [fruit] crop output…. Why did you destroy our land? They left us behind with nothing. We are suffering from hunger.[254]

After Mine Closure

Regarding environmental protection after mine closure and rehabilitation, the MMA requires a mining license applicant to submit a proposal for “the progressive reclamation and rehabilitation of land disturbed by mining and for the minimization of the effects of mining on surface water and ground water and on adjoining or neighboring lands.” However, enforcement of this provision is at the discretion of the government.[255]

In Mwabulambo, locals said they were not informed about plans to close the mine before the closure in 2015, including how the company intended to mitigate risks stemming from the abandoned mining site.The company left behind several open pits, piles of coal, and deep holes filled with water that were not adequately protected. One woman who lives in the community said: “I believe they left last year … but they didn’t even say goodbye. When we realized they are leaving we told them to clean up. But until this day they have not cleaned up the area.”[256]

With the departure of the mining company people are also worried that the pipes to the seven boreholes would never be replaced. A 58-year-old widow and mother of 12 children in Mwabulambo said: “Before the company leaves they need to do something for us. They broke our pipes and left us without tap water.”[257]

Mining byproducts are capable of contaminating water sources long after a mine closes and need to be managed to prevent future contamination. There are indications that mining waste in Mwabulambo may not have been properly managed by Eland coal mine since it stopped operations in 2015. In particular, the mining company failed to install adequate dams to prevent coal and mining waste from entering the local water sources during its operation, and these contaminants are still threatening the community in Mwabulambo.[258] Without an environmentally and socially conscious closure and rehabilitation plan, mines threaten further chemical leakage into water supplies either from breaches of storage or from further oxidation and acid runoff from exposed rocks.[259]

According to the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water government water testing results from 2015 indicated that the water in the open pits is acidic and therefore harmful for human health.[260] During a Human Rights Watch visit in August 2016 children were swimming in the open pits filled with water.

Government officials from the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining said that the failure of the Eland coal mine to rehabilitate the area after mine closure violated Malawi’s legal regime for mining.[261]The government noted that “the Operator did not adhere to the mine closure and abandonment plans. Worse still, they did not even bother to inform the regulatory Institution (the responsible Ministry [of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining]) of their plan to abandon the site and subsequenttermination of the mining activities.”[262] Ministry officials further indicated that after their monitoring visit in May 2016, the government sent an official letter to the operator asking them to ensure that they follow the applicable laws before leaving the site permanently, including “filling the pits or putting fences around them for safety purposes”.

However, government officials said that the operator of Eland coal mine has not responded to their request.

IV. Reform Efforts

Malawi is poised to enact a revised law to govern mining. In August 2015, the latest draft for a new Mines and Minerals Bill (MM Bill) was forwarded by the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining to the Ministry of Justice for finalization after a consultation period with civil society. The government announced plans to table the bill in Parliament in March, July, and November 2016. However, its adoption looks likely to be delayed until 2017 as civil society and lawmakers have raised concerns about the bill’s content.[263]

While remarkably progressive in some respects, the MM Bill fails to address the some of the core problems described in this report, most importantly the lack of transparency. One of its major weaknesses is a provision that acts to essentially prevent communities from accessing information about the risks related to mining. Section 38 (4), which deals with submission and ownership of mining-related information, contains a restrictive confidentiality provision.[264] It presumes that “any information submitted by a mineral tenement” to the government is confidential until after the license expires and does not provide any relevant exceptions, even in situations where the director and the holder of the mineral right provide consent. Section 233 of the MM Bill addresses inspection results and reports produced by the government.[265] It is unclear whether inspection reports carried out by the government could be made available to communities or workers.

The government has been working on revising other related regulation including the land laws, petroleum law, and the Environmental Management Act (EMA). The government also announced that they are planning to develop a policy drawing on international best practices in the oil and gas sector and then work to revise the 1983 Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act.[266] However, the timeline for the development and adoption of these laws and policies remains unclear. Recent pressure from various civil society organizations urging the Malawian government to review the 33-year-old law have been met with silence.[267]

At the same time, as Malawi revises the legal regime for extractive industries, it is also preparing and negotiating an Access to Information Bill (ATI Bill), which may impact the mining sector in terms of information disclosure and transparency. The ATI Bill and the type of information to be made available and accessible to the public have been the subject of intense debate within and between the Malawi Parliament, executive branch, and civil society over the course of many years.[268] Even though the November 2015 draft of the bill appeared to be acceptable to most stakeholders, the government revised the bill again in February 2016. In its most recent form, the ATI Bill does not provide for the establishment of an independent oversight body; compromises the principle of maximum disclosure by avoiding retroactive application; and gives the minister of information the power to determine “fees payable for processing requests for information.”[269] Members of Parliament have requested more time to review and amend the draft given civil society’s mobilization against this watered-down draft.[270]

Government officials who spoke to Human Rights Watch in March 2016 seemed optimistic that the proposed ATI bill would be adopted by the end of 2016 and would make it easier for communities to access environmental health information.[271] Asked about the changes made by the government to restrict the scope of the ATI bill to exclude information predating the bill, then-Minister of Information Jappie Mhango, said: “We don’t want to open a lot of books. Every government has something to hide, and applying the law retroactively would create a lot of problems.”[272]

In an interview with Human Rights Watch, the former minister also said that their own ministry should act as the oversight body because the Malawi Human Rights Commission, which the previous draft named as the designated oversight body, did not have the capacity to fill that role.[273]

Another major initiative aimed at improving transparency in mining governance is Malawi’s steps to become a compliant country with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).[274] EITI promotes good governance in resource-rich countries by fostering open public debate about how oil, gas, and mining revenues are used and setting a global standard for the governance of these resources.[275] 51 countries currently implement the EITI and 31 countries are fully compliant with the EITI requirements. Malawi was admitted as an EITI member candidate in October 2015 and is currently undergoing a validation process within two and a half years of admittance. After validation, the EITI Board will give final approval of acceptance.[276]

At the regional level Malawi is also aiming toalign its mining policy to the Africa Mining Vision (AMV).[277] The Africa Mining Vision was adopted by Heads of State at the February 2009 AU summit and has been presented as “Africa’s own response to tackling the paradox of great mineral wealth existing side by side with pervasive poverty.[278] It contains a roadmap to “transparent, equitable and optimal exploitation of mineral resources” to support sustainable growth and socio-economic development in Africa.[279]

V. Government and Company Response

Malawi’s government has acknowledged the impact that mining can have on the health and livelihoods of nearby communities.[280] The minister of health said that their ministry was not proactive regarding health monitoring in mining areas.[281] Government officials at the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining were also aware of the weaknesses of the regulatory system and said that authorities sometimes fail to adequately protect environmental health and monitor pollution, creating health risks for communities.[282] Specifically, ministry officials admitted that, while inspections are carried out for occupational health and safety issues for workers, the government has failed to monitor health impacts of mining on nearby communities.[283]

Ministry officials described capacity problems, such as the lack of facilities equipped to perform water testing.[284] The government also acknowledged that there is a lack of coordination among the different ministries and levels of government to carry out effective monitoring.[285]

Asked about plans for how to address these challenges, the government said that every mining community should have a health facility for local residents and also committed to including social issues in EIA guidelines.[286] The government further highlighted that the MM Bill contains a provision making community development agreements mandatory for future mining licenses.[287] In a meeting with Human Rights Watch in March and August 2016, officials at the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining further announced intentions to visit each mine once per month and to implement the new communications strategy.[288] Ministry officials also said that they were working with the company in Mwabulambo to set up a rehabilitation plan to ensure the safety of the residents.[289] However, at time of writing the situation at Eland coal mine site has not changed.

In a letter to Human Rights Watch, Paladin explained that the company maintains safety, health, radiation, and environmental management programs. Paladin also pointed to the company’s Human Rights Policy, highlighting the company’s commitment to respecting human rights. However, in an interview with Human Rights Watch, Paladin Malawi admitted that the company does not disclose monitoring results regarding water testing or other potential environmental impacts. Paladin had yet to reply to Human Rights Watch’s questions regarding the situation in Kayelekera at time of writing.

Malcoal stated in an email to Human Rights Watch that they “strive to help the government to reduce rural poverty by providing employment while at the same time taking care of our communities and the environment”.[290] Malcoal disputed that any resettlements had taken place in Kayelekera but did not comment on any of the other issues raised in this report.

Representatives of Eland informed Human Rights Watch in writing and by phone that the company has suspended operations at Mwabulambo.[291] They had yet to reply at time of writing to Human Rights Watch’s request for comment on the substantive issues raised in this report.

VI. Regional and International Legal Obligations

Malawi’s government is obliged under international and regional law to protect the rights of people who live in mining communities, including their rights to access information and to water, health and a healthy environment, food, housing, and nondiscrimination.

At the international level, Malawi is a party to core human rights treaties, which provide for the protection of basic civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. These include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).[292]

At the regional level, Malawi is party to several relevant treaties, including the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Charter) and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the Maputo Protocol).[293]

The 2012 Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, which are global policy guidelines focused specifically on the human rights of people living in poverty, state that governments “should take into account their international human rights obligations when designing and implementing all policies, including international trade, taxation, fiscal, monetary, environmental and investment policies.”[294] These guidelines also elaborate:

States have a duty, in accordance with their international obligations, to prevent and protect against human rights abuse committed by non-State actors, including business enterprises, which they are in a position to regulate. Where transnational corporations are involved, all relevant States should cooperate to ensure that businesses respect human rights abroad, including the human rights of persons and communities living in poverty.[295]

Right of Access to Information

Information is a prerequisite for the exercise of various other rights, including the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, the right to food, the right to safe drinking water and sanitation, the right to a healthy environment, the right to self-determination, and the right to life.

The right of access to information is enshrined in international and regional instruments.

The UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 34 expressly articulates a right for citizen access to information held by public bodies as such access relates to Article 19 of the ICCPR.[296]The Human Rights Committee stated that in order to “give effect to the right of access to information, States parties should proactively put in the public domain government information of public interest,” ensuring access is easy, prompt, effective, and practical.[297] Malawi is also a party to the African Charter, which, in Article 9, states “every individual shall have the right to receive information” and “every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions within the law.”[298] The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has further developed an African Model Law on Access to Information “to give effect to the right of access to information as guaranteed by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.”[299]

In 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development specifically recognized access to environmental information, public participation in decision-making over natural resources, and access to justice as important pillars of sustainable development.

Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development emphasizes that “each individual should have appropriate access to information concerning the environment … including information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities.”[300] The 2010 voluntary Bali Guidelines developed the concept further and proposed steps for effective national legislation with regard to access to environmental information.[301]

The right of access to environmental information is also recognized under international human rights law. As Fatma Zohra Ksentini, special rapporteur to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, noted as early as 1994: “The right to information includes the right to be informed, even without a specific request, of any matter having a negative or potentially negative impact on the environment.”[302]

Several UN human rights treaty bodies have further explained the link between access to information and other substantive rights. In its General Comment 15 on the Right to Water, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) noted that a core obligation of states under the right to water is that individuals have the right to seek, receive, and impart information concerning water issues.[303] In General Comment 14 on the Right to Health, the CESCR further stated that a “core obligation” of states is to “provide education and access to information concerning the main health problems in the community, including methods of preventing and controlling them.”[304]

According to the UN Special Rapporteur on the implications for human rights of the environmentally sound management and disposal of hazardous substances and wastes, a lack of information, particularly as it relates to factors affecting the environment or health, prevents free, active, and meaningful public participation, decision-making.[305]

Information that is related to the environment or that may have an effect on any individual’s health must be available, accessible, and functional.[306] In order for information to be available, it must be current, reliable, and generated and collected in a manner that adequately assesses all potential negative impacts on human rights.[307] In order for information to be accessible, everyone must be able to seek, obtain, receive, and hold available information, subject only to an overriding, legitimate public-interest justification for non-disclosure, discussed further below.[308]

In order for information to be functional it must be fit for its intended use, which, in the case of hazardous substances, is to prevent harm, to enable informed decision-making, and to ensure accountability, access to justice, and an effective remedy. In addition, the information must be scientifically accessible, meaning that where information is highly technical, it must be translated into a language that will enable individuals to understand the information so that they may make informed choices.[309]

The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights has also interpreted the African Charter to protect the right of access to environment information.[310]Specifically, the commission found in 2001 that governments have the following obligations: to order or at least permit independent scientific monitoring of threatened environments; to publicize environmental and social impact studies prior to any major industrial development; to undertake appropriate monitoring; to provide information to those communities that were exposed to hazardous materials and activities; and to provide meaningful opportunities for individuals to be heard and to participate in the development decisions affecting their communities.[311]

The African Ministerial Conference on the Environment and regional bodies have also repeatedly recognized the importance of access to information in environmental decision-making.[312]

Right to Water

The human right to water entitles everyone, without discrimination, “to have access to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic use.”[313] Various resolutions from the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council affirm that the human right to safe drinking water is derived from the right to an adequate standard of living.[314] The right to an adequate standard of living is enshrined in human rights instruments ratified by Malawi, such as the ICESCR, CEDAW, and the CRC. The Maputo Protocol explicitly references the government’s obligation to “provide women with access to clean drinking water.”[315]

The CESCR, in General Comment 15 on the Right to Water, noted that an aspect of the core content of the right to water is that water required for personal or domestic use must be safe. This means it must be free from microbes and parasites, chemical substances, and radiological hazards that constitute a threat to a person’s health.[316]

The special rapporteur on water and sanitation has stated in the context of service provision by non-state actors: “Given that intrinsic link to the fulfilment of human rights, exercising due diligence to become aware of and address potential negative impacts is particularly important.”[317] She continues:

To meet [their] responsibility, service providers should take certain measures, such as ensuring that the water they provide is of safe quality, ensuring the regularity of supply, not discriminating in their operations, adopting fair procedures in cases of disconnections due to non-payment and refraining from disconnections when people are unable to pay and the disconnection would leave them without access to minimum essential levels of water.[318]

Right to Health and Right to a Healthy Environment

The right to highest attainable standard of health is found in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and in international and regional treaties binding upon Malawi, including the ICESCR and the CRC.[319]

The CESCR, in its General Comment 14 on the Right to Health, has interpreted the ICESCR to include:

[T]he requirement to ensure an adequate supply of safe and potable water and basic sanitation [and] the prevention and reduction of the population’s exposure to harmful substances such as radiation and harmful chemicals or other detrimental environmental conditions that directly or indirectly impact upon human health.[320]

The Committee on the Rights of the Child, in its General Comment 15 on children’s right to health, asserts:

States should regulate and monitor the environmental impact of business activities that may compromise children's right to health, food security and access to safe drinking water and to sanitation.[321]

The Maputo Protocol specifically obliges governments to “provide adequate, affordable and accessible health services, including information, education and communication programmes to women especially those in rural areas.”[322]

It is well established that the right to health encompasses the right to healthy natural environments.[323] Article 12 of the ICESCR obliges states parties to improve "all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene" in order to prevent, treat, and control "epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases." The CESCR has clarified that this right imposes on states "the requirement to ensure an adequate supply of safe and potable water and basic sanitation; the prevention and reduction of the population's exposure to harmful substances such as radiation and harmful chemicals or other detrimental environmental conditions that directly or indirectly impact upon human health."[324]

Relevant regional human rights instruments—such as the African Charter, and its Additional Protocol on the Rights of Women—also recognize a right to a healthy environment.[325] The Maputo Protocol stipulates that states parties shall take all appropriate measures to “ensure greater participation of women in the planning, management and preservation of the environment and the sustainable use of natural resources at all levels.”

Right to Food

The right to adequate food is enshrined in international and regional instruments. Pursuant to Article 11(1) of the ICESCR, states parties pledge to use available resources to progressively realize "the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions." As with all socioeconomic rights, theright to adequate foodwill have to be pursued in a non-discriminatory manner. The Maputo Protocol specifically requires that states parties provide “women with access to clean drinking water, sources of domestic fuel, land, and the means of producing nutritious food.”

Right to Housing

The right to housing is enshrined in Article 25 of the UDHR, as a part of the right to an adequate standard of living, and in international and regional treaties binding upon Malawi.[326] Article 19 of the Maputo Protocol also promotes women’s access to and control over productive resources such as land and guarantees their right to property.

The CESCR, in its General Comment 4 on the Right to Adequate Housing, has interpreted the right to include:

[C]ertain facilities essential for health, security, comfort and nutrition. All beneficiaries of the right to adequate housing should have sustainable access to natural and common resources, safe drinking water, energy for cooking, heating and lighting, sanitation and washing facilities, means of food storage, refuse disposal, site drainage and emergency.[327]

International human rights law recognizes that evictions are legitimate in some circumstances but prohibits resort to forced evictions. Under international law a “forced eviction” is the permanent or temporary removal against the will of individuals, families, or communities from the homes or land which they occupy, without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection.[328] Governments are prohibited from conducting forced evictions themselves, and are obligated to ensure through law and regulation that other parties do not carry out forced evictions. These obligations apply regardless of whether residents are legally entitled to reside on the land they occupy.

The UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement, drafted by the UN expert on housing rights, set out the human rights framework under which states may, in exceptional circumstances, resort to involuntary resettlements.[329]

Any such involuntary resettlement must be properly provided for in, and comply with, domestic law as well as be in compliance with international human rights law. Those subject to involuntary resettlement should not suffer regression in the enjoyment of their rights due to the resettlement, nor bear any undue burden that undermines their right to maintain and improve a standard of living that is equal or better to the one they previously enjoyed.[330]

Those subject to involuntary resettlements “have the right to relevant information, full consultation and participation throughout the entire process,” as well as to just compensation in accordance with human rights standards. Compensation should cover both material losses and lost opportunities including employment, business losses, lost crops, livestock, and lost income. Where resettled people have lost land, the guidelines clearly state:

Cash compensation should under no circumstances replace real compensation in the form of land and common property resources. Where land has been taken, the evicted should be compensated with land commensurate in quality, size and value, or better.[331]

The guidelines also provide special protections to women, children, and marginalized members of society and call for states to give special assistance to these groups when carrying out development projects.[332]

Right to Nondiscrimination

Core international and regional human rights treatiesexpresslyprohibitdiscrimination, and require the parties to these conventionstotakemeasures to eradicate all forms of discrimination against individuals.

The CESCR, in General Comment 20 on non-discrimination in economic, social, and cultural rights, recommended that states parties adopt “specific legislation that prohibits discrimination in the field of economic, social and cultural rights. Such laws should aim at eliminating formal and substantive discrimination, attribute obligations to public and private actors and cover the prohibited grounds discussed above. Other laws should be regularly reviewed and, where necessary, amended in order to ensure that they do not discriminate or lead to discrimination, whether formally or substantively, in relation to the exercise and enjoyment of Covenant rights.”[333]

Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights

In 2008, then-Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Business and Human Rights John Ruggie elaborated the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework for business and human rights, which were further supplemented by a set of “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights” (Guiding Principles) endorsed by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2011.[334] The Guiding Principles set out 1) the state’s duty to protect human rights, 2) the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, and 3) the need for a remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuses.[335] The Guiding Principles detail basic steps companies should take to respect human rights, including conducting due diligence to avoid causing or contributing to human rights abuses through their operations; avoiding complicity in abuses; and taking steps to mitigate them if they occur.

Ruggie’s framework outlines integral components of human rights due diligence that businesses should undertake, including assessment of potential human rights impacts with explicit reference to internationally-recognized human rights; integration of respect for human rights throughout the company; and monitoring as well as communicating performance.[336]

VII. Recommendations

To the Government of Malawi

  • Amend the draft Mines and Minerals Bill to include provisions that ensure robust environmental health monitoring at all stages of the mining process. In particular, amend the bill to require that impact assessments and regular inspections detail the potential impacts that exploration, active mining, and abandoned mines may have on affected communities and their rights; steps the government and companies will take to continually inform and communicate with affected communities; and ways in which adverse rights impacts will be mitigated or avoided. Include a provision to require that impacts on marginalized populations such as women and children are specifically monitored and addressed.
  • Amend the draft Mines and Minerals Bill to ensure it has provisions that guarantee access to information. In particular, replace any provisions that limit access to mining-related information and ensure that communities receive information on all adverse environmental and social impacts. Include provisions to ensure that environmental impact assessments, environmental monitoring reports, and resettlement plans are easily available and accessible to the public.
  • Revise the draft Access to Information Bill to ensure that minimum requirements for access to information follow international best practices and are in line with the model law by the African Union.
  • Develop, through broad consultation, a policy for corporate social responsibility in the extractive industry that meets the international human rights standards laid out in the “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” framework. Make a strong human rights due diligence procedure a legal requirement for all companies extracting minerals in Malawi and monitor company compliance.
  • Ensure coordination between different ministries and national, regional and district government bodies involved in mining governance and oversight. Provide written information to government officials about the different responsibilities with regard to mining, making clear who bears each responsibility. Hold regular coordination meetings across ministries and government levels to ensure that information is exchanged and disseminated to community members. Consider creating positions for district mining officers who can communicate and coordinate at the local level.
  • Participate in partnerships and informational exchanges with other governments and institutions with relevant experience in ensuring human rights safeguards in managing natural resource booms, including institutions able to provide independent monitoring.

To the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining

  • Ensure that impact assessments and regular inspections contain relevant details, including: the potential impacts that exploration, active mining, and abandoned mines may have on communities and their rights; steps the government and companies will take to continually inform and communicate with affected communities; and ways in which adverse impacts will be mitigated or avoided.
  • Ensure impacts on marginalized populations, such as women and children, are monitored and addressed. Such monitoring should cover the cumulative impacts on the environment and livelihoods, including impacts resulting from extractive industries, social changes, and climate change.
  • Regularly communicate environmental information to affected communities and detail the potential impacts that exploration, active mining and abandoned mines may have on affected communities and their rights; steps the government and companies will take to continually inform and communicate with affected communities; and ways in which adverse impacts will be mitigated or avoided.
  • Ensure that outcomes of environmental assessments, periodic environmental monitoring reports, resettlement action plans, and updates on implementation are easily and readily accessible and include short summaries in non-technical language. Summaries and full reports should be translated into local languages, available on the internet, posted in public buildings, including at sub-county headquarters and local schools in directly affected communities. Government authorities should not only make the information accessible upon request, but also proactively disseminate information that is relevant to the protection of rights of affected communities.
  • Require companies that prepare environmental impact assessments, environmental monitoring reports, and resettlement plans to make them easily available and accessible to the public, including to women and other marginalized groups.
  • Amend the draft Communications Strategy for Malawi’s Mineral Sector to ensure that mining communities receive regular and updated information about the results of environmental monitoring.
  • Promptly fill all vacancies for inspectors at the Ministry of Mining and at the district level including the vacant district environmental officer position in Karonga district.
  • Increase the number and capacity of trained staff to analyze environmental impact assessments (including resettlement action plans), monitor compliance reports, and form inspection teams to verify that companies adhere fully to their commitments. Empower and instruct ministry staff to carry out more thorough and proactive monitoring and oversight of existing mining projects, including by providing the staff and other resources necessary to fulfill this role effectively.
  • Approve proposed extractive industries projects only after duly assessing human rights and environmental risks, particularly in areas such as land and labor rights.
  • Identify measures to avoid or mitigate risks of adverse impacts.
  • Implement mechanisms that enable continual analysis of developing human rights and environmental risks and that ensure adequate supervision.

To the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development

  • Provide a process for fair compensation and remedy negative human rights impacts of relocation in mining communities including the payment of compensation for losses that have already occurred. Pay special attention to impacts on women and ensure they are appropriately compensated for their losses.
  • Develop a national resettlement policy in line with international human rights standards. In the meantime, international best practice should guide displacement, resettlement, and compensation and be used as a basis for educating communities in negotiating resettlement arrangements.
  • Ensure regular, broad, and meaningful public consultation and participation at all stages of resettlement, including through meaningful consultation in the design, implementation, and post-move phases of resettlement.
  • Promote women’s equal rights and access to land in rural areas including joint registration of customary land. Ensure that women are appointed to land committees in accordance with the Customary Land Bill and support their meaningful participation on an equal basis with men.

To the Ministry of Health

  • Actively monitor health indicators and disease patterns in mining communities and ensure that results are easily available and accessible to the public.
  • Develop a national strategy to improve health in mining communities and increase access to healthcare in mining areas, taking into account the increased health risks for marginalized populations. Include in the strategy measures to support family caregivers, especially women.
  • Ensure that commitments by extractive industries to build additional health facilities in mining communities are implemented.
  • Devise a comprehensive public health strategy to tackle the health problems of residents in mining communities.

To the Ministry of Information

  • Increase mining communities’ knowledge of the impacts of mining on community health and global climate change.

To the Ministry of Agriculture,Irrigation and Water Development

  • Map out the boundaries of watersheds potentially impacted by mining operations and actively monitor water throughout watersheds under the influence of mining to identify potential contamination, including monitoring waste water discharges, ground and surface water sources, and drinking water in mining communities on an ongoing basis. Ensure that results are easily available and accessible to the public.
  • Actively monitor boreholes, shallow wells, and rivers in mining communities on an ongoing basis and ensure that results are easily available and accessible to the public.

  • Monitor fisheries within mining-affected watersheds for unsafe levels of heavy metal contamination. 

To the Ministry of Justice

  • Work with the Ministry of Information to ensure that the draft Access to Information Bill follows international best practices and are in line with the model law by the African Union.

To the Ministry of Gender

  • Work with Ministry of Mining to ensure that impacts of mining on marginalized populations such as women and children are specifically monitored and addressed.
  • Work with Ministry of Mining to implement dedicated measures that facilitate access to information about mining for groups that may face specific impacts or that are marginalized, such as women, children, older people, people with disabilities, and minorities.

  • Work with Ministry of Mining to ensure regular, broad, and meaningful consultation with, and participation of, women in affected communities with respect to large extractive industries projects.

To the Mzuzu Regional Office of Mines and to the Karonga District Commissioner

  • Ensure that environmental monitoring reports are easily available and accessible to the public in northern region, including by providing short summaries in non-technical language; translating the summaries and the full reports into local languages; posting them online; providing copies in public buildings such as local schools; and holding information sessions in directly affected communities. Implement dedicated measures that facilitate access for groups that may face specific impacts or that are marginalized, such as women, children, older people with disabilities, and minorities.

To the Water Department in Karonga

  • Ensure that water testing reports are easily available and accessible to the public in Karonga district, including by providing short summaries in non-technical language; translating the summaries and the full reports into local languages; posting them on the internet; providing copies in public buildings such as local schools; and holding information sessions in directly affected communities. Implement dedicated measures that facilitate access for groups that may face specific impacts or that are marginalized, such as women, children, older people, people with disabilities, and minorities. 

To the Parliament of Malawi

  • Work with the government to ensure that the draft Mines and Minerals Bill provides robust environmental and health monitoring in the extractive industries.
  • Work with the government to ensure that the draft Access to Information Bill includes minimum requirements for access to information that follow international best practices and are in line with the model law by the African Union.

To Companies Extracting Minerals in Malawi

  • Improve public access to information and be more transparent by strengthening communication with local and national civil society and with affected community members. Make information available to both literate and non-literate community members. Outcomes of environmental assessments, periodic environmental monitoring reports, resettlement action plans, and updates on implementation should be easily accessible and include short summaries in non-technical language. Summaries and full reports should be translated into local languages, made available online, and posted in public buildings, including at sub-county headquarters and local schools in directly affected communities of Malawi.
  • Establish a thorough due diligence process, including regular monitoring, to ensure that the rights of affected communities. Monitors should be independent and the results of monitoring should be published. If there are reports of human rights violations companies should specifically investigate these reports. The due diligence, process should also include procedures to address adverse human rights impacts.
  • Provide a process for fair compensation and remedy negative human rights impacts of relocation in mining communities, including the payment of compensation for losses that have already occurred. Pay special attention to impacts on women, and ensure they are appropriately compensated for their losses.
  • Establish effective grievance mechanisms—in line with good international practice—so that individuals affected by mining projects can complain directly to companies in addition to the government.

To the Governments of Australia, Cyprus, and Other Home Governments of Mining Firms Operating in Malawi

  • Take steps to regulate and monitor the human rights conduct of domestic companies operating abroad, such as requiring companies to carry out and publicly report on human rights due diligence activity.

To UNESCO

  • Work with the government of Malawi to ensure robust environmental and health monitoring in the extractive industries, including at the UNESCO world heritage site at Lake Malawi.
  • Work with extractive industries operating within or in the vicinity of the world heritage site to minimize the impacts of its operations on the world heritage site.

To the Donor Community

  • Work with the government of Malawi to ensure robust environmental and health monitoring in the extractive industries. Support the government to ensure that environmental impact assessments, environmental monitoring reports, and resettlement plans are easily available and accessible to the public.

Acknowledgments

This report was researched and written by Katharina Rall, researcher in the Health and Human Rights division, with research support from Joe Amon, former director of the Health and Human Rights Division, Babatunde Olugboji, deputy program director, and a consultant to the Women’s Rights Division of Human Rights Watch.

It was edited by Diederik Lohman, director of the Health and Human Rights Division, and Danielle Haas, senior editor in the program office. The report was reviewed by Janet Walsh, deputy director; Juliana Nnoko-Mewanu, researcher on women and land; and Amanda Klasing, senior researcher in the Women’s Rights Division; Arvind Ganesan, director of the Business and Human Rights Division; Dewa Mavhinga, senior researcher; and Felix Horne, senior researcher in the Africa division; and Margaret Wurth, researcher in the Children’s Rights Division. Aisling Reidy, senior legal advisor; and Babatunde Olugboji, deputy program director, provided legal and program reviews.

Meg Msyczo and Matthew Parsons, associates in the Health and Human Rights division, provided production assistance and support. Layout and production were undertaken by Grace Choi, publications director; Olivia Hunter, photo and publications associate; and Fitzroy Hepkins, production manager. Farah Alhaddad, Brooke Guven, Jennifer Glaudemans, Oliver Mendelin, Camryn Pearson, and Katherine D’Onfro, interns in the Health and Human Rights division, provided research assistance.

We would like to thank all the Malawian organizations and individuals that provided invaluable assistance in compiling information for this report, notably the members of the Natural Resources Justice Network.

We are also grateful for very helpful advice and comments from Ramin Pejan, staff attorney at Earthjustice, USA; Michael Karanicolas, senior legal officer at the Center for Law and Democracy, Canada; Tracy Lynn Hubby, professor at the University of Witswatersrand, South Africa; Hanri Mostert, professor at the University of Cape Town, South Africa; and Claret Vargas of DeJusticia, Colombia.

Most of all, we would like to thank the community members and women in Karonga who generously shared their stories.

 

[1]The Prime Minister’s Speech at Chileka on the 8th July, 1964 before His Departure to England,” Press Release No. 1049/64, appears in Malawi Independence Celebrations 4th– 7th July 1964, Principal Speeches, prepared by The Press Division, Ministry of Information, p. 2, on file at Human Rights Watch courtesy of H. K. Banda Archive, African Studies Collection, Herman B Wells Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, USA; See also Hastings Kamuzu Banda, quoted in Peter Wellman, “Malawi Performs an African Miracle, Feeding Itself from Its ‘Gold Mine’: The Soil,” Associated Press, July 6, 1986, http://articles.latimes.com/1986-07-06/news/mn-23061_1_malawi-miracle (accessed July 5, 2016).

[2] Coal reserves are estimated to amount up to 800 million tons. There is currently no estimate of the amount of precious stones in Malawi, but concentrations of ruby and sapphire have been identified in the south of Malawi. Several rare earths deposits have been identified in southern Malawi. For details, see Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, “Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment of the Minerals Sector, Final Report,” February 2016, pp. 22-25, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[3] Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, “Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment of the Minerals Sector, Final Report,” pp. 22-25, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[4] As far as Human Rights Watch is aware it is not clear why President Banda took this position.

[5] Malawi Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (MWEITI), “Scoping Study (Minerals, Oil, Gas, Forestry),” January 28, 2016, https://mininginmalawi.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/160208_mweiti_scoping... (accessed April 28, 2016), p. 16.

[6] Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, “Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment of the Minerals Sector, Final Report,” p. 113, on file with Human Rights Watch; Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, “Annual Economic Report 2015,” 2015, p. 9, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[7] Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, “Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment of the Minerals Sector, Final Report,” p. 113, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[8] Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, “Annual Economic Report 2015,” on file with Human Rights Watch.

[9] Ibid.

[10] MWEITI, “Scoping Study (Minerals, Oil, Gas, Forestry),” https://mininginmalawi.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/160208_mweiti_scoping..., p. 16.

[11] MWEITI, “Scoping Study (Minerals, Oil, Gas, Forestry),” https://mininginmalawi.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/160208_mweiti_scoping... p. 16.

[12] The exact amount of yellowcake deposits varies across sources. On their website, Paladin puts them at 9,654 tons, see “Geology & Resources,” Paladin Energy, accessed on July 7, 2016 http://www.paladinenergy.com.au/paladin-africa-geology-resources; A government report counts 11,600 tons, see Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, “Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment of the Minerals Sector, Final Report,” p. 22, on file with Human Rights Watch; For projected capacity, see Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, “Annual Economic Report 2015,” p. 56, on file with Human Rights Watch; USGS, “2013 Minerals Yearbook, Malawi [Advance Release],” 2013, http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2013/myb3-2013-mi.pdf (accessed September 14, 2016), p.29.2.

[13] Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, “Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment of the Minerals Sector, Final Report,” p. 29, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[14] Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, “Annual Economic Report 2015,” p. 52, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[15] Ibid., p. 52.

[16] Ibid., pp. 52, 54.

[17] Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, “Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment of the Minerals Sector, Final Report,” p. 29, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[18] Ibid., pp. 29, 30. On file with Human Rights Watch.

[19]“Chinese investors to establish coal plant in Malawi: Meet Mutharika,” Nyasa Times, August 10, 2015, http://www.nyasatimes.com/chinese-investors-to-establish-coal-plant-in-m... (accessed April 26, 2016).

[20] Gospel Mwalwanda, “Malawi in coal-fired power plant MOU with China group: To boost economy,” Nyasa Times, December 3, 2015 http://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-in-coal-fired-power-plant-mou-with-chin... (accessed July 1, 2016); Chinese involvement in Malawi is also likely to increase in the future. For example, the president received over 100 Chinese investors at the 2016 Malawi-China investment forum, encouraging them to contribute to Malawi’s economic diversification, see Mapenzi Banda, “Mutharika advances industrialization drive for economic emancipation at Malawi-China Investment Forum,” Nyasa Times, June 21, 2016 http://www.nyasatimes.com/mutharika-advances-industralization-drive-econ... (accessed July 7, 2016) and Christopher Jimu, “Mutharika lures Chinese investors,” The Nation, June 22, 2016 http://mwnation.com/mutharika-lures-chinese-investors/ (accessed July 7, 2016).

[21] MWEITI, “Scoping Study (Minerals, Oil, Gas, Forestry),” https://mininginmalawi.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/160208_mweiti_scoping... p. 17.

[22]See Citizens for Justice, “A Report about Oil Exploration and Production in Malawi,” September 2014, http://cfjmalawi.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/CFJ-September-2014-Oil-P... (accessed April 26, 2016); see also Publish What You Pay, “Five Unanswered Questions on Exploration of Oil & Gas in Malawi’s Lake and Land, February 18, 2016,” https://mininginmalawi.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/2016-02-pwyp-press-re... (accessed September 14, 2016).

[23] UNESCO and IUCN, “Reactive Monitoring Mission to Lake Malawi National Park (Malawi) - 30 March to 4 April 2014,” May 2014, http://whc.unesco.org/en/documents/129870 (accessed April 26, 2016).

[24] Ibid.

[25] UNESCO World Heritage Committee, Lake Malawi National Park (Malawi) (N289), Decision 38, COM 7B.92, 2014, http://whc.unesco.org/en/decisions/6078/ (accessed June 30, 2016);

[26] UNESCO, Decision: Lake Malawi National Park (Malawi (N 289), 40 COM 7B.81, July 10-20, 2016, http://whc.unesco.org/en/decisions/6746 (accessed September 14, 2016).

[27] Luke Bisani, “Hunger to hit hard Malawi economy – World Bank,” Malawi24, July 19, 2016, https://malawi24.com/2016/07/19/hunger-hit-hard-malawi-economy-world-bank/ (accessed July 19, 2016); “World Bank Urges Malawi to Invest in Agricultural Resilience to Spur Economic Growth in 2017,” The World Bank, June 29, 2016, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/06/29/world-bank-urg... (accessed July 19, 2016).

[28]“IMF Extends Malawi Loan Program, Adds $80M for Drought,” Reuters, June 20, 2016, http://www.voanews.com/content/imf-extends-malawi-loan-program-adds-80-m... (accessed July 19, 2016); “IMF Survey: Malawi: Tackling Inflation Key to Sustainable Growth,” International Monetary Fund, January 6, 2016, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2016/car010616a.htm (accessed July 19, 2016).

[29]“Malawi declares state of emergency over drought,” Al Jazeera, April 14, 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/malawi-declares-state-emergency-dr... (accessed July 19, 2016).

[30]“IMF extends Malawi loan program, adds $80 million for drought measures,” Reuters, June 20, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/r-imf-extends-malawi-loan-program-adds-80... (accessed July 19, 2016).

[31] IPCC, “Africa,” in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part B: Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. Barros et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg2/WGIIAR5-Chap22_FINAL.pdf (accessed May 13, 2016), pp. 1199-1265.

[32]Christoph Müller et al., “Hotspots of climate change impacts in sub-Saharan Africa and implications for adaptation and development,” Global Change Biology, vol. 20(8) (2014), p. 2505–2517.

[33]“CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita),” World Bank, last modified 2011, accessed June 28, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC?year_high_desc=true.

[34]See, for example, Paul R. Epstein et al., “Full cost accounting for the life cycle of coal,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, vol. 1219 (2011), pp. 73.98. See also Dejusticia and Business and Human Rights Resource Center, “Digging Deeper: The Human Rights Impacts of Coal in the Global South,” November 2015, http://media.wix.com/ugd/c04a21_55722707895847839433655205a851ff.pdf (accessed December 5, 2015).

[35] For other case studies on human rights impacts of coal in countries of the Global South see Dejusticia and Business and Human Rights Resource Center, “Digging Deeper: The Human Rights Impacts of Coal in the Global South,” http://media.wix.com/ugd/c04a21_55722707895847839433655205a851ff.pdf.

[36] Human Rights Watch interview with Malawi civil society groups, Lilongwe, March 17,2016. 

[37]For detailed discussion see Human Rights Watch, Out of Control: Mining, Regulatory Failure, and Human Rights in India, June 2012, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/06/14/out-control.

[38] Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development and Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD), “Managing Environmental and Health Impacts of Uranium Mining,” NEA No. 7062, 2014, https://www.oecd-nea.org/ndd/pubs/2014/7062-mehium.pdf (accessed September 14, 2016 ) p. 18; Sharon Paulka, “Introduction to Radiation: Regional Training Course RAF 3007-1,” slides, International Atomic Energy Association, August 2009; See also OECD, “Managing Environmental and Health Impacts of Uranium Mining, https://www.oecd-nea.org/ndd/pubs/2014/7062-mehium.pdf pp. 36-37; and Bruno Chareyron, et al., “Uranium Mining: Unveiling the impacts of the nuclear industry,” EJOLT, No. 15 (2014), pp. 15-17.

[39] Doug Brugge and Virginia Buchner, “Health Effects of Uranium: New Research Findings,” Reviews on Environmental Health, vol. 26(4) (2011), pp. 235-8; WHO, “Uranium in Drinking-water: Background document for development of WHO Guidelines for Drinking-water Quality,” WHO/SDE/WHS/03.04/118/Rev/1, 2004; “Uranium Health Effects,” US Department of Energy, Depleted UF6 Management Information Network, accessed September 14, 2016, http://web.ead.anl.gov/uranium/guide/ucompound/health/index.cfm.

[40] Brugge and Buchner, Health Effects of Uranium: New Research Findings, pp. 235-8.

[41] Exposure to high doses of radioactive material can be lethal in a matter of days, but with regard to the dosages associated with mining activities, the effects can be delayed over a period of years. “Late (Delayed) Effects of Radiation,” US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, October 25, 2010, http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1122/ML11229A694.pdf (accessed September, 14, 2016), p. 9.

[42] Kentucky Environmental Foundation, “Health Impact Assessment of Coal and Clean Energy Options in Kentucky,” 2011, p. 5; Michael Hendryx and Melissa M. Ahern, “Relations Between Health Indicators and Residential Proximity to Coal Mining in West Virginia,” American Journal of Public Health, (2008) pp. 670; Laura Kurth et al., “Atmospheric particulate matter in proximity to mountaintop coal mines: sources and potential environmental and human health impacts,Environmental Geochemistry and Health, vol. 37 (2015),pp. 529-544; Michal Hendryx, “Mortality from Heart, Respiratory, and Kidney Disease in Coal Mining Areas of Appalachia,” International Archives of Occupational Environment and Health, vol. 82 (2009), p. 247.

[43] Travis L. Knuckles, et al., “Air Pollution Particulate Matter Collected from an Appalachian Mountaintop Mining Site Induces Microvascular Dysfunction,” Microcirculation, vol. 20 (2013), p. 159.

[44] Kentucky Environmental Foundation, “Health Impact Assessment of Coal and Clean Energy Options in Kentucky,” p. 6; Physicians for Social Responsibility, “Coal’s Assault on Human Health,” November 2009, http://www.psr.org/assets/pdfs/psr-coal-fullreport.pdf (accessed September 14, 2016), p. vi.

[45] Bernard Brabin, et. al, “Respiratory Morbidity in Merseyside Schoolchildren Exposed to Coal Dust and Air Pollution,” Archives of Disease in Childhood, vol. 70 (1994), pp. 305-12; JMF Temple and AM Sykes, “Asthma and Open Cast Mining,” British Medical Journal, vol. 305(6858) (1992), pp. 396-7; Environmental Monitoring Group, “The Social and Environmental Consequences of Coal Mining in South Africa,” 2010, p. 12.

[46] Tracy Lynn Hubby, “Mining and Climate Change,” in Climate Change Law and Governance in South Africa, ed. T. Humby et al., (Juta: 2016), forthcoming.

[47]For a detailed analysis of legal standards see this report’s section on Malawi’s Regional and International Legal Obligations. The following discussion is adapted from United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the implications for human rights of the environmentally sound management and disposal of hazardous substances and wastes, Başkut Tuncak, A/HCR/30/40, July 8, 2015. See also Handbook by the Special Rapporteur on the right of safe drinking water and sanitation, Catarina de Albuquerque, “Realising the human rights to water and sanitation: Monitoring compliance with the human rights to water and sanitation,” 2014, http://www.righttowater.info/wp-content/uploads/BOOK-5-MONITORING-22FEB.pdf (accessed February 20, 2016).

[48] Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development emphasizes that “each individual should have appropriate access to information concerning the environment…including information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities”. See further discussion below under Malawi’s Regional and International Legal Obligations.

[49] See, for example, the Standards for Responsible Mining that contain robust monitoring obligations, developed by the Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance, “IRMA Standards Draft v.2.0,” Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance, accessed June 15, 2016, http://www.responsiblemining.net/irma-standard/irma-standard-draft-v2.0/... The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) provides a global standard for sustainability reporting on economic, social, and environmental impacts, see “Global Reporting Initiative,” accessed June 15, 2016, https://www.globalreporting.org/Pages/default.aspx; The ICMM has also developed an overarching Sustainable Development Framework, consisting of 10 principles related to governance, sustainable development, human rights, environmental performance, and community engagement, see “ICMM 10 Principles,” International Council on Mines & Metals (ICMM), accessed June 15, 2016, http://www.icmm.com/en-gb/about-us/member-commitments/icmm-10-principles....

[50] Laws of Malawi, Mines and Minerals, Cap. 61:01 of 1981, part VII.

[51] Section 37 (3)(h) does, however, require the applicant for a mining license to submit information about potential environmental risks and mitigation measures. Ibid., sec. 37 (3)(h).

[52] Section 24 EMA. In 1997 the government developed a set of general EIA Guidelines to strengthen environmental protection, see “Environmental Impact Assessment Guidelines,” accessed May 6, 2016 http://www.sdnp.org.mw/enviro/eia/foreword.html; Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, “Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment of the Minerals Sector, Final Report,” p. 102, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[53] The guidelines state that the principal requirements are:

2.4.1 Developers are required to conduct public consultation during the development of the project brief and the EIA Report;

2.4.2 the Director of Environmental Affairs may, on the advice of the Technical Committee on the Environment, conduct his or her own public consultation to verify or extend the work of a developer. “Environmental Impact Assessment Guidelines,” http://www.sdnp.org.mw/enviro/eia/foreword.htm.

[54] Section 94 of the MMA requires the minister to “take into account” the need to conserve natural resources when deciding whether to grant a mineral right or issue a prospecting license.

[55]Environmental Management Act, Parliament of Malawi, No. 23 of 1996, sec. 27(1).

[56]Advice and guidance for the examples compiled in this section of the report was obtained from Hanri Mostert, professor at the University of Cape Town, and Boni Luhende, Bernard Kengni, and Godknows Mudimu, Ph.D. students at the University of Cape Town.

[57] The Mines and Minerals Development Act, 2015, Parliament of Zambia, No. 11 of 2015.

[58] Ibid., sec. 80(1).

[59] Inga Winkler, “The Mining Industry and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH): Impacts, Roles, and Challenges in the Context of Water Quality, Availability and Service Provision,” forthcoming.

[60] Nina Collins and Alan Woodley, “Social water assessment protocol: a step towards connecting mining, water and human rights,” Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, vol. 31(2) (2013).

[61]Anastasia N Danoucaras et al., “A pilot study of the Social Water Assessment Protocol in a mining region of Ghana,” Water International, vol. 41(3) (2016).

[62] AngloAmerican, SEAT Toolbox: Socio-Economic Assessment Toolbox, Version 3, (London: 2012).

[63] Section 37 of the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi sets out the right to information which stipulates that “subject to Any Act of Parliament, every person shall have the right of access to information held by the State or any of its organs at any level of the Government in so far as such information is required for the exercise of such rights”. The constitution also provides for rights to freedom of assembly, freedom of opinion and expression and the right to political participation, see Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, sec. 34-38, ch. 4.

[64]Section 7 of the MMA reads as follows:

(1) Subject to subsection (2), no information furnished, or information in a report submitted, pursuant to Section 66 by the holder of a Mineral Right, shall, for as long as the Mineral Right has effect, be disclosed, except with the consent of the holder of the Mineral Right.

(2) Nothing in subsection (1) operates to prevent the disclosure of information where the disclosure is made—

(a) for or in connection with the administration of this Act;

(b) for the purpose of any legal proceedings;

(c) for the purpose of any investigation or inquiry conducted under this Act;

(d) to any consultant to the Government, or to any public officer, who is approved by the Commissioner as a proper person to receive the information.

(3) Any person who contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine of one thousand Kwacha or to imprisonment for a term of two years, or to both.

MMA, Cap. 61:01 of 1981, sec. 7.

[65] Section 52 of the EMA reads as follows:

(1) Subject to subsection (3), every person shall have access to any information submitted to the Director or any lead agency /relating to the implementation of the provisions of this Act or any other law relating to the protection and management of the environment and to the conservation and sustainable utilization of natural resources.

(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), no person shall be entitled to have access to proprietary information (to which the Trade Mark Act or the Patents Act applies) submitted to or received by the Director under this Act unless with the prior written consent of the owner of the proprietary information.

(3) No person shall, without the consent of the Director, publish or disclose to any person, otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the contents of any document, communication or information which relates to and which has come to his knowledge in the course of his duties under this Act.

(4) Any person who contravenes subsection (3) shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable, upon conviction, to a fine of not less than K2,000 and not more than K100,000, and to imprisonment for twelve months.

EMA, No. 23 of 1996, sec. 52.

[66]Advice and guidance for the examples compiled in this section of the report was obtained from Hanri Mostert, professor at the University of Cape Town, and Boni Luhende, Bernard Kengni, and Godknows Mudimu, Ph.D. students at the University of Cape Town.

[67]See “Zimbabwe,” Environmental Democracy Index, accessed September 14, 2016, http://www.environmentaldemocracyindex.org/country/ZWE; Environmental Management Act, Government of Zimbabwe, Cap. 20:27 of 2003, sec. 62.

[68] Environmental Management Act, secs. 62, 67, and 108; Environment Management (Hazardous Waste Management) Regulations, Statutory Instrument 10 of 2007, sec. 10 (1) (b); Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, Government of Zimbabwe, Cap. 10:27 of 2002, sec. 28 (1) (b).

[69] Environmental Management Act, Government of Tanzania, No. 20 of 2004, secs. 171(1) and 171(3).

[70] Extractive Industries (Transparency and Accountability) Act, Government of Tanzania, 2015, secs. 16 (a-b) and 27 (1-2).

[71] Kendyl Salcito et al., “Assessing Human Rights Impacts in Corporate Development Projects,” Environmental Impact Assessment Review, vol. 42 (2013), p.7.

[72] Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, “Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment of the Minerals Sector, Final Report,” pp. 25-26, 177, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[73] 0.946t in 2011 (Paladin, “Annual Report,” 2011, p. 23), 1,124t in 2012 (Paladin, “Annual Report,” 2012, p. 20), 1,344t in 2013 (Paladin, “Annual Report,” 2013, p. 16) and 1,066t in 2014 (Paladin, “Annual Report,” 2014, p. 15); For all annual reports, see “Financial Reports,” Paladin Energy Ltd., Accessed July 5, 2016, http://www.paladinenergy.com.au/financial-reports.

[74] Paladin, “Annual Report,” 2015, http://ir.paladinenergy.com.au/FormBuilder/DocumentDownload.ashx?item=5p... (accessed July 5, 2016), pp. 43-44. The last population and housing census was conducted in 2008, see “2008 Population and Housing Census,” National Statistical Office, accessed August 25, 2016, http://www.nsomalawi.mw/2008-population-and-housing-census.html.

[75] Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, “Annual Economic Report 2015,” pp. 52, 54, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[76]“Australian firm acquires more coal mining licenses in Malawi,” Nyasa Times, March 19, 2013, http://www.nyasatimes.com/2013/03/19/australian-firm-acquires-more-coal-mining-licenses-in-malawi/ (accessed September 14, 2016 ); see also “Projects Overview,” Intra Energy, accessed July 7, 2016, http://www.intraenergycorp.com.au/irm/content/projects-overview.aspx?RID....

[77]Intra Energy Corporation Limited, “30 June 2015 Annual Report,” 2015, http://www.intraenergycorp.com.au/IRM/Company/ShowPage.aspx/PDFs/1882-10000000/2015AnnualReport (accessed July 27, 2016), p. 57.

[78] See reporting in Mining and Trade Review, March 2016, https://mininginmalawi.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/mining-trade-review-m... (accessed July 4, 2016); Human Rights Watch visit on site in March 2016.

[79]Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, “Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment of the Minerals Sector, Final Report,” pp. 29/30, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[80]Independent Oil & Resources PLC, “Financial Statements, December 31, 2015,” 2015, http://independentresources.eu/source/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/FS-31.1... (accessed July 5, 2016), p. 19,.

[81] Independent Oil & Resources PLC, “Consolidated financial statement,” December 31, 2015, p 24; At least 75 percent are held by Berge Gerdt Larsen or his son, Brede Bjovad Larsen. See Arne Thommessen, “Kontrolløren,” Kapital, nr. 22/2008, http://www.stocktalk.no/Upload/%7B63199%7D-2208%20-%20Kontroll%C3%B8ren%... (accessed July 4, 2016), p. 12-13.

[82] Email to Human Rights Watch, June 30, 2015.

[83] Human Rights Watch interview with Archibald Mwakasungla, Karonga, August 19, 2015.

[84] The Uraha Foundation funds research and cultural exchange projects in Africa. In Malawi, the foundation set up a cultural center and museum in Karonga. For more information about the foundation, see “Uraha Foundation Germany E.V.,” accessed August 23, 2016, http://uraha.de/de/?lang=en.

[85] Human Rights Watch interview with Esnala N., Mwabulambo, March 7, 2016.

[86] Human Rights Watch interview with Beatrice N., Mwabulambo, March 8, 2016.

[87]Human Rights Watch interview with Frola N., Mwabulambo, March 6, 2016.

[88]Eland Coal Mine Company Limited, “Environmental Impact Assessment for Eland Coal Mine Company Limited,” October 2007, p. 14, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[89]H.W. Investment Ltd and Consolidated Mining Industries Ltd., “The Nkhachira Coal Mine, Environmental Impact Assessment Report, 2006,” June 2006, pp. 31-46, on file with Human Rights Watch. The report states that “no perennial watercourse will be effected during the mining,” but runoff of “fines and suspended solids” may occur during rainy seasons. However, mitigation for surface water is aimed only at avoiding oil spills related to the use of mining equipment. The mitigation proposal does not include strategies on how to prevent runoff of “fines and suspended solids” into watercourses.

[90]Human Rights Watch interview with Nagomba E., March 7, 2016; Human Rights Watch interview with Frola N., Mwabulambo, March 6, 2016; Human Rights Watch interview with Esnala N., Mwabulambo, March 7, 2016; Human Rights Watch interview with Beatrice N., Mwabulambo, March 8, 2016.

[91] Human Rights Watch interview with Bright Msaka, minister of natural resources, energy and mining, Lilongwe, March 16, 2016.

[92] See generally, UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the implications for human rights of the environmentally sound management and disposal of hazardous substances and wastes, Başkut Tuncak, July, 8 2015, para. 20.

[93] Human Rights Watch meeting with government officials at the Ministry of Natural Resources, Evergy and Mining, Lilongwe, March 15,2016.

[94] H.W. Investment Ltd and Consolidated Mining Industries Ltd., “The Nkhachira Coal Mine, Environmental Impact Assessment Report, 2006,” pp. 31-46, on file with Human Rights Watch. The report states that “no perennial watercourse will be effected during the mining,” but runoff of “fines and suspended solids” may occur during rainy seasons. However, mitigation for surface water is aimed only at avoiding oil spills related to the use of mining equipment. The mitigation proposal does not include strategies on how to prevent runoff of “fines and suspended solids” into watercourses.

[95]H.W. Investment Ltd and Consolidated Mining Industries Ltd., “The Nkhachira Coal Mine, Environmental Impact Assessment Report, 2006,” p. 47, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[96] Eland Coal Mine Company Limited, “Environmental Impact Assessment for Eland Coal Mine Company Limited,” p.58, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[97] Eland Coal Mine Company Limited, “Environmental Impact Assessment for Eland Coal Mine Company Limited,” p. 67 on file with Human Rights Watch.

[98] Gavin M. Mudd and Howard D. Smith, “Comments on the Proposed Kayelekera Uranium Project Environmental Impact Assessment Report,” November 2006, http://users.monash.edu.au/~gmudd/files/Comments-Kayelekera-EIS-Draft-v3... (accessed May 10, 2106).

[99] Knight Piésold Consulting, “Paladin (Africa) Limited: Kayelekera Uranium Project, Final Environmental Impact Assessment,” 2006, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[100] Human Rights Watch interview with Sinya M., Mwabulambo, March 8, 2016.

[101] Section 27(1) of the Land Act states: “Wherever it appears to the Minister that any customary land is needed for a public purpose, that is to say a purpose which is for the benefit, of the community, he may declare such land public.” Laws of Malawi, Land, Cap. 57:01 of 1965, sec. 27(1), http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/mlw41845.pdf (accessed July 19,2016). Section 44(4) of Malawi’s Constitution reads: “Expropriation of property shall be permissible only when done for public utility and only when there has been adequate notification and appropriate compensation,” Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, sec. 44(4). According to the Mines and Minerals Act, “where the president considers that any land is required to secure the development or utilization of mineral resources, he may direct that land to be compulsorily acquired,” Laws of Malawi, Mines and Minerals, Cap. 61:01 of 1981, sec. 120. http://archive.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/The%20Mines%20... (accessed September 14, 2016)..

[102] Constitution of the Republic of Malawi

[103] Laws of Malawi, Land, sec. 28.

[104] Laws of Malawi, Mines and Minerals, sec. 105.

[105] Human Rights Watch interview with Ivy Jullie Luhanga, principal secretary, Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, Lilongwe, August 2, 2016.

[106] Catholic Commission on Justice and Peace, “Land Displacement, Involuntary Settlement and Compensation Practice in the Mining Sector. A Comparative Analysis of Legal and Policy Frameworks in Southern Africa,” August 2014.

[107] Ibid.

[108] According to Section 2 of the Land Act “customary land means all land which is held, occupied or used under customary law, but does not include any public land …private land means all land which is owned, held or occupied under a freehold title, or a leasehold title, or a Certificate of Claim or which is registered as private land under the Registered Land Act…public land means all land which is occupied, used or acquired by the Government and any other land, not being customary land or private land,” Laws of Malawi, Land, sec. 2.

[109]Various newspapers have reported on the Land Bill. See, for example, Lloyd Mbwana, “Petitions to govt. from Chiefs and tea estate owners may delay passing of land bill says Landnet Malawi,” the Maravi Post, May 18, 2016, http://www.maravipost.com/2016/05/18/petitions-govt-chiefs-tea-estate-owners-may-delay-passing-land-bill-says-landnet-malawi (accessed July 8, 2016); Suzgo Khunga, “14 reform bills ready,” the Nation, June 20, 2016, http://mwnation.com/14-reform-bills-ready/ (accessed July 8, 2016).

[110] Under Malawian law, public land is owned by the president. According to Section 2 of the Mines and Minerals Act, ownership of all mineral resources and the land lies with the president on behalf of the Malawian people.

[111] Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, “Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment of the Minerals Sector, Final Report,” p. 72, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[112] Government of Malawi National Statistical Office, National Census of Agriculture and Livestock 2006/07, April 2010, http://www.nsomalawi.mw/images/stories/data_on_line/agriculture/NACAL/Na... (accessed July 19, 2016), p. 12.

[113] Ibid., p. 12.

[114] Ibid., p. 129.

[115] Ibid., p. 34.

[116] Human Rights Watch interview with Ivy Jullie Luhanga, August 2, 2016.

[117] Mines & Minerals Policy of Malawi, Ministry of Energy and Mines, 2007, sec. 6.1.1(vii), http://www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/Mines%20&%20Minera... (accessed September 14, 2016).

[118] Malawi National Land Policy, Ministry of Lands, Housing and Surveys, 2002, sec. 9.11, http://www.lands.gov.mw/phocadownload/land_policies_plans/national%20lan... (accessed September 14, 2016).

[119] Ibid., sec. 4.16.1.

[120] As far as Human Rights Watch is aware, none of the companies described in this report have financing from international financial institutions with policies on involuntary resettlement.

[121] Human Rights Watch interview with Rosemary Moyo, Karonga district commissioner, Karonga, August 2, 2016.

[122] Human Rights Watch interview with Ivy Jullie Luhanga, August 2, 2016.

[123] Laws of Malawi, Land, sec. 26.

[124]See most recently Lloyd Mbwana, “Chiefs and DC’s perpetuating land grabbing in rural Malawi,” the Maravi Post, May 31, 2016, http://www.maravipost.com/2016/05/31/chiefs-dcs-perpetuating-land-grabbing-rural-malawi/ (accessed July 20, 2016); George Bulombola, “Malawi: Local Govt Ministry Concerned With Chiefs' Corrupt Practices,” AllAfrica, December 20, 2014, http://allafrica.com/stories/201412200303.html (accessed July 20, 2016).

[125] Human Rights Watch interview with Rosemary Moyo, August 2, 2016.

[126]Human Rights Watch group interview with women, Mwabulambo, March 6, 2015; Human Rights Watch group interview with women, Kayelekera, March 9, 2016.

[127] Interview with Chief Kayelekera, Kayelekera, August 20, 2015.

[128] Human Rights Watch group interview with women, Kayelekera, March 9, 2016.

[129] Human Rights Watch interview with Ana Gondwe, Kayelekera, March 10, 2016.

[130] Human Rights Watch interview with O. N., Kayelekera, March 10, 2016.

[131] Human Rights Watch interview with N. L., Kayelekera, March 9, 2016.

[132] Human Rights Watch interview with N. L., Kayelekera, March 9, 2016.

[133]Email from Hastings Jere, director of Malcoal, to Human Rights Watch, July 21, 2016.

[134] Human Rights Watch interview with Rojaina N., Mwabulambo, March 7, 2016; Human Rights Watch interview with Nagomba E., March 7, 2016; Human Rights Watch interview with Sinya M., Mwabulambo, March 8, 2016; Human Rights Watch interview with Beatrice N., Mwabulambo, March 8, 2016.

[135] Human Rights Watch interview with Rojaina N., March 7, 2016; Human Rights Watch interview with Nagomba E., March 7, 2016; Human Rights Watch interview with Sinya M., Mwabulambo, March 8, 2016; Human Rights Watch interview with Beatrice N., Mwabulambo, March 8, 2016.

[136] Human Rights Watch interview with Rojaina N., March 7, 2016.

[137] Human Rights Watch interview with O. N., Kayelekera, March 10, 2016.

[138] Human Rights Watch interview with N. L., Kayelekera, March 9, 2016.

[139] Human Rights Watch interview with V.H. Messiah, Mwabulambo, August 21, 2015.

[140] Human Rights Watch interview with Justice M., Mwabulambo, March 8, 2015.

[141]Human Rights Watch interview with Sydney Mwakaswaya, CCJP, Karonga, August 18, 2015.

[142] Human Rights Watch interview with Rojaina N., March 7, 2016.

[143] Human Rights Watch interview with Nagomba E., March 7, 2016.

[144] Human Rights Watch interview with Sinya M., Mwabulambo, March 8, 2016.

[145] Human Rights Watch interview with N. N., Kayelekera, March 10, 2016.

[146] Human Rights Watch interview with Sinya M., Mwabulambo, March 8, 2016. Different toxic pollutants that typically emerge from coal mines can potentially harm crops. See, for example, Greenpeace, “Revealed: Coal Mine Polluting South Kalimantan’s Water,” December, 2014, http://www.greenpeace.org/seasia/id/PageFiles/645408/FULL%20REPORT%20Coa... (accessed August 24, 2016).

[147]Human Rights Watch interview with Rojaina N., March 7, 2016.

[148] Human Rights Watch interview with Ivy Jullie Luhanga, August 2, 2016.

[149] Human Rights Watch interview with Rosbelle K., Mwabulambo, March 8, 2016; Human Rights Watch interview with Sinya M., Mwabulambo, March 8, 2016; Human Rights Watch interview with Modester M., Mwabulambo, March 7, 2016.

[150] Human Rights Watch interview with Sinya M., Mwabulambo, March 8, 2016.

[151] Human Rights Watch interview with Ivy Jullie Luhanga, August 2, 2016.

[152] Human Rights Watch interview with Peter Kawale, minister of health, Lilongwe, March 16, 2016.

[153] Human Rights Watch meetings with government officials at the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, Lilongwe, March 15, 2016 and August 2, 2016.

[154] Inspection dates: January 30 – February 2, 2004, August 15-20, 2004, June 15-16, 2006, November 27 – December 2, 2006, November 13-16, 2007, February 19-21, 2008, August 17-19, 2009, October 4-5, 2010, September 12-14, 2012, February 17, 2014 (only two sites), August 19-21, 2014. The introduction of the “Report on the Brief Inspection to Some Coal Mines in Rumphi District held on 17th February, 2014,” dated February 25, 2015 states: “[I]t was planned to visit all coal mines in Rumphi and Karonga. It was however changed due to: the poor performance of the vehicle which could not pull well in muddy road conditions; and inadequate fuel that could not to cover the whole field programme-to distances such as Karonga.” Copies of inspection reports on file with Human Rights Watch.

[155] Human Rights Watch interview with George Maneya, chief mining engineer at the Regional Mining Office, Mzuzu, August 26, 2016.

[156] Regional Mines Office, Mzuzu, Report of the First Quarter Coal Mines and Quarry Inspection Held in the Northern Region Held from 18-22 to 29 August, 2014, August, 31 2014, para. 5. The report goes on to state that “The proposed inspections should be properly organized and coordinated between Mines Department-Headoffice and the respective regional offices.”

[157] Ibid.

[158] Human Rights Watch interview with Aaron Chaponda, director of the Water Department, Karonga, July 29, 2016.

[159] Human Rights Watch meetings with officials of the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, Lilongwe, March 15, 2016.

[160] Human Rights Watch interview with Rosemary Moyo, March 11, 2016.

[161] Copies of inspection reports on file with Human Rights Watch.

[162] Human Rights Watch meetings with government officials at the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, March 15, 2016 and August 2, 2016.

[163] Human Rights Watch meetings with Peaches Phiri, deputy director for water quality, Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water, Lilongwe, August 3, 2016.

[164]Human Rights Watch interview with Charles Kaphwiyo, director of the Department of Mines, Lilongwe, March 17, 2016.

[165] Human Rights Watch interview with Aaron Chaponda, July 29, 2016.

[166] Human Rights Watch interview with James Namalima, deputy project coordinator, mining governance and growth support project, Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, Lilongwe, March 15, 2016.

[167] Human Rights Watch interview with Rosemary Moyo, March 11, 2016. After the change to a multiparty system in 1994, the new government undertook a number of studies on decentralization, culminating in the implementation of the National Decentralisation Policy in 1996, giving local governments more power and emphasizing the role of District Assemblies. See National Decentralisation Policy, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, 1996, http://www.300in6.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/1.-National-Decentralis... (accessed September 14, 2016).

[168] Human Rights Watch interview with Harry Hardson Mwanyembe, chairman for health and environment on Karonga’s District Council, Karonga, August 22, 2016.

[169] Ibid.

[170] Human Rights Watch interview with Patrick Kishombe, chairman of the District Council, Karonga, August 22, 2016.

[171]Human Rights Watch interview with James Ali, principal secretary for energy affairs, Lilongwe, March 17, 2016.

[172] Human Rights Watch interview with Charles Kaphwiyo, March 17, 2016.

[173] Human Rights Watch interview with Greg Walker, managing director, Paladin Africa Limited, Lilongwe, August 17, 2015; Email from Hastings Jere, director of Malcoal, to Human Rights Watch, July 22, 2016.

[174] Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Ted Bandawe, Karonga, March 11, 2016.

[175] Human Rights Watch interview with J. L., Kayelekera, March 10, 2016.

[176]Human Rights Watch interview with Christina M., Kayelekera, March 10, 2016.

[177] Human Rights Watch interview with GVH Mwangomba, Mwabulambo, August 21, 2015.

[178] Human Rights Watch interview with Samson Mkwezalamba, Mwabulambo, March 7, 2016.

[179]Last confirmed during a visit by Human Rights Watch in March 2016.

[180]Development Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Malawi, Paladian (Africa) Limited, and Paladin Energy Minerals NL on the Kayelekera Uranium Project,” 2007, para 20.1 (b), on file with Human Rights Watch.

[181]Human Rights Watch interview with Schubert M., Kayelekera, August 20, 2015.

[182] Human Rights Watch interview with Collias M., Mwabulambo, August 21, 2015.

[183]Human Rights Watch interview with Peter Kawale, March 16, 2016.

[184]Human Rights Watch interview with Officials at the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, March 17, 2016.

[185] Human Rights Watch interview with Lucia K., Kayelekera, March 2016.

[186] Human Rights Watch interview with Rosbelle K., Mwabulambo, March 8, 2016.

[187] Human Rights Watch interview with R. H., Kayelekera, March 9, 2016.

[188] Human Rights Watch interview with Samson M., March 7, 2016.

[189] Human Rights Watch interview with Ana Gondwe, Kayelekera, March 10, 2016.

[190] Human Rights Watch interview with Paramount Chief Kyungu, Karonga, July 31, 2016.

[191] Human Rights Watch interview with Danny Simbeye, Uraha Foundation, Karonga, July 31, 2016.

[192] Human Rights Watch interview with Rachel Etter-Phoya, Lilongwe, July 27, 2016.

[193] Human Rights Watch meeting with government officials at the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, Lilongwe, March 15, 2016.

[194] Government of Malawi, “Communications Strategy for Malawi’s Mineral Sector, Final Draft,” November 2015, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[195] Ibid., p. 6.

[196] Ibid., p.11.

[197] Human Rights Watch meeting with government officials at the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, Lilongwe, August 2, 2016.

[198] See “Malawi Mining Cadastre Portal,” accessed August 24, 2016, http://portals.flexicadastre.com/malawi/.

[199] Human Rights Watch interview with Rosemary Moyo, March 11, 2016.

[200]Kendyl Salcito et al., “Assessing corporate project impacts in changeable contexts: A human rights perspective,” Environmental Impact Assessment Review, vol. 47 (2014), p. 43.

[201] Human Rights Watch interview with Greg Walker, August 17, 2015.

[202] Ibid.

[203]Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, art. 24. For an in-depth discussion of the current framework see Human Rights Watch, "I’ve never experienced happiness”: Child Marriage in Malawi, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/03/06/ive-never-experienced-happiness/ch.... Malawi Human Rights Commission (MHRC), “Cultural Practices and their Impact on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, Particularly the Rights of Women and Children in Malawi,” 2005, http://www.medcol.mw/commhealth/publications/cultural_practices_report.pdf (accessed May 3, 2016); The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights noted in 2015 that the ”harmful cultural practices continue to restrict women in Malawi from fully enjoying their rights, and are often the cause of several human rights violations against them,” African Union, African Commission on Human & Peoples’ Rights, “Concluding Observations and Recommendations on the Initial and Combined Periodic Report of the Republic of Malawi on the Implementation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1995 –2013),” November 4-18, 2015, www.achpr.org/files/sessions/57th/conc-obs/1-1995-2013/concluding_observ... (accessed May 3, 2016), para. 57.

[204] Karonga district is one of the few patrilineal districts in Malawi, see Erling Bergea et al., “Lineage and land reforms in

Malawi: Do matrilineal and patrilineal landholding systems represent a problem for land reforms in Malawi?” Land Use Policy, vol. 41 (2014), p. 64. For a general discussion of the impacts on women in Malawi, see Women’s Legal Resource Center, “Women’s access to land and household bargaining power: a comparative action-research project in patrilineal and matrilineal societies in Malawi,” March 2011, http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/documents/resources/WLR... (accessed May 13, 2016).

[205] Human Rights Watch interview with Lucia K., Kayelekera, March 9, 2016.

[206] Human Rights Watch interview with Modester M., Mwabulambo, March 7, 2016 and Rosbelle K., Mwabulambo, March 8, 2016.

[207] Human Rights Watch interview with Modester M., March 7, 2016.

[208] Human Rights Watch interview with Nagomba E., March 7, 2016

[209]“Principle 3,” ICMM, accessed Septmeber 14, 2016, https://www.icmm.com/en-gb/about-us/member-commitments/icmm-10-principle... (accessed September, 14, 2016); ICMM, “2014 ICMM Stakeholder Perception Study: Tracking Progress, Final Report,” 2014, http://www.icmm.com/publications/pdfs/8615.pdf (accessed September 14, 2016; Marta Miranda and Amanda Sauer, “Mine the Gap: Connecting Water Risks and Discolsure in the Mining Sector,” September 2010, http://pdf.wri.org/working_papers/mine_the_gap.pdf (accessed September 14, 2016) p. 3; UN Human Rights Council, Report of Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, Extractive industries operating within or near indigenous territories, A/HRC/18/35, July 11, 2011, para. 30; UN Human Rights Council, Report of Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation, Catarina de Albuquerque, mission to the United States of America, A/HRC/18/33/Add.4, August 2, 2011, para. 69.

[210] For a comprehensive overview of scientific articles, company sustainability reports and community perspectives focused on eight developing countries that is more strongly focused on the environmental dimension of water, see International Mining for Development Center, “Water issues associated with mining in developing countries Centre for Water in the Mineral Industry,” August 2012, http://im4dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Water-Issues-Associated-with... (accessed September 14, 2016), p. 8.

[211] Kentucky Environmental Foundation, “Health Impact Assessment of Coal and Clean Energy Options in Kentucky,” 2011, p. 6. See also James Sams III and Kevin Beer, “Effects of Coal-Mine Drainage on Stream Water Quality in the Allegheny and Monongahela River Basins—Sulfate Transport and Trends,” USGS National Water-Quality Program, 2000, pp. 3-5.

[212] Kentucky Environmental Foundation, “Health Impact Assessment of Coal and Clean Energy Options in Kentucky,” 2011, p. 15; Physicians for Social Responsibility, “Coal’s Assault on Human Health,” November 2009, http://www.psr.org/assets/pdfs/psr-coal-fullreport.pdf (accessed September 14, 2016), p. 7.

[213] OECD and NEA, “Managing Environmental and Health Impacts of Uranium Mining,” 2014, https://www.oecd-nea.org/ndd/pubs/2014/7062-mehium.pdf pp. 22, 79.

[214] Ibid., p. 91.

[215] Ibid., pp. 79-80; And examples of past failures in Germany and Canada are documented in Ibid., pp. 83-89.

[216] Human Rights Watch interview with Lucia K., March 9, 2016.

[217] Human Rights Watch interview with Christina M., March 10, 2016.

[218] Human Rights Watch interview with Lucia K., March 9, 2016.

[219] Human Rights Watch interview with Schubert M., August 20, 2015.

[220] This was confirmed during Human Rights Watch site visits in August 2015 and July 2016.

[221] Regional Office of Mines, “Inspection report,” August 19, 2014, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[222] Human Rights Watch interview with site administrator, Kayelekera, August 20, 2016. Email from Hastings Jere, July 23, 2016.

[223] Bruno Chareyon, “Impact of the Kayelekera uranium mine, Malawi”, EJOLT, No. 21 (2015), http://www.ejolt.org/2015/02/impact-kayelekera-uranium-mine-malawi/ (accessed July 21, 2015), p. 62.

[224] Letter from Paladin to Human Rights Watch, July 29, 2015.

[225] Human Rights Watch interview with Greg Walker, August 17, 2016.

[226] Ibid.

[227] Human Rights Watch interview with R. H., Kayelekera, March 9, 2016.

[228] Human Rights Watch interview with Aaron Chaponda, July 29, 2016.

[229] Ibid.; Human Rights Watch group interview with women, Mwabulambo, March 6, 2015.

[230] Human Rights Watch interview with Nagomba E., March 7, 2016.

[231] Human Rights Watch interview with Mikinara N., Mwabulambo, March 7, 2016.

[232] Dataset from 2014, see National Statistical Office of Malawi, “Monitoring the situation of children and women, Malawi MDG Endline Survey 2014,” June 2015, http://www.nsomalawi.mw/images/stories/data_on_line/demography/MDG%20End....

[233] National Statistical Office of Malawi, “Welfare Monitoring Survey 2014,” October 2015, http://www.nsomalawi.mw/images/stories/data_on_line/agriculture/wms_2014..., p. 77.

[234] Human Rights Watch interview with Anamaria M., Mwabulambo, August 21, 2015.

[235] Human Rights Watch interview with Alice N., Mwabulambo, March 7, 2016.

[236] Human Rights Watch interview with Nagomba E., March 7, 2016.

[237] Human Rights Watch group interview with women, Mwabulambo, March 6, 2015; Human Rights Watch group interview with women, Kayelekera, March 9, 2016.

[238] See Human Rights Concerns section in Background, pp. 22-24.

[239] While the number of trucks varies depending on the season and the activities at the mines, Human Rights Watch was able to document that trucks were passing about 10 times per day in mid-March 2016.

[240] Human Rights Watch interview with Kettie M., Kayelekera, March 10, 2016.

[241] Human Rights Watch group interview with women, Mwabulambo, March 6, 2015.

[242] Human Rights Watch interview with Mikinara N., March 7, 2016.

[243] Human Rights Watch interview with Samson Mkwezalamba, March 7, 2016.

[244] Human Rights Watch interview with J. L., Kayelekera, March 10, 2016.

[245] Ibid.

[246] Human Rights Watch group interview with women, Mwabulambo, March 6, 2016.

[247] Human Rights Watch interview with Rojaina N., March 7, 2016.

[248] Human Rights Watch interview with V.H. Messiah, August 21, 2015.

[249] Human Rights Watch interview with Edward M., Mwabulambo, August 21, 2015.

[250] Different toxic pollutants, which typically emerge from coal mines, can potentially harm crops. See for example, Greenpeace, “Coal Mine Polluting South Kalimantan’s Water,” October 2014, http://www.greenpeace.org/seasia/id/PageFiles/645408/FULL%20REPORT%20Coa... (accessed August 24, 2016); The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the leading international body for the assessment of scientific, technical, and socio-economic information on climate change established in 1988, found that increasing temperatures and changes in precipitation in Africa will amplify existing stress on water availability and are very likely to reduce cereal crop productivity with strong adverse effects on food security, see IPCC, “Africa,” http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg2/WGIIAR5-Chap22_FINAL.pdf (accessed May 13, 2016), p. 1202.

[251] Human Rights Watch interview with GVH Mwangomba, Mwabulambo, August 21, 2015.

[252] Human Rights Watch interview with Danny Simbeye, Uraha Foundation, Karonga, July 31, 2016.

[253] Human Rights Watch interview with Enara M., Mwabulambo, March 7, 2016.

[254] Human Rights Watch interview with Nagomba E., March 8, 2016.

[255] Section 96 of the MMA permits, but does not require, the government to include in the prospecting or mining license conditions related to mine closure and rehabilitation.

[256] Human Rights Watch group interview with women, Mwabulambo, March 6, 2015.

[257] Human Rights Watch interview with Rojaina N., March 7, 2016.

[258] This was confirmed during Human Rights Watch site visits in August 2015, March 2016, and August 2016.

[259] Physicians for Social Responsibility, “Coal’s Assault on Human Health,” November 2009, http://www.psr.org/assets/pdfs/psr-coal-fullreport.pdf, pp. vi and 7.

[260] Human Rights Watch interview with Peaches Phiri, August 3, 2016.

[261] Human Rights Watch meetings with government officials at the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, March 15, 2016 and August 2, 2016.

[262] Government officials at the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, email to Human Rights Watch, July 27, 2016.

[263] See for example, Werani Chilenga, “Committee threatens to reject mining bill,” MW Nation, January 21, 2016, http://mwnation.com/committee-threatens-to-reject-mining-bill/ (accessed July 5, 2016).

[264]Sections 38(3) and (4) of the draft Mines and Minerals Bill read as follows:

(3) Notwithstanding that the Government may be the owner of reports, data and information submitted by a mineral tenement holder, the Government shall be restricted in the use of such reports, data or information where such reports, data or information are to be treated on a confidential basis as provided in this Act.

(4) Unless otherwise specified in this Act, any information submitted by a mineral tenement holder shall remain confidential for as long as the license is valid and two years after the expiry or termination of the license.

Revised Mines and Minerals Bill, Parliament of Malawi, August 2015, secs. 38(3) and 38(4).

[265]MM Bill Section 233 reads as follows:

(1) An Authorized Officer shall document the results of an inspection in a report, which the Officer shall submit to the Commissioner, within thirty (30) calendar days of the inspection.

(2) The Commissioner shall make inspection reports available to the person to whom the inspection report relates and any other entities as required or useful.

Revised Mines and Minerals Bill, sec. 233.

[266] Collins Mtika, “Lets woo investors, revise laws later- Malawi Mining Official,” Nyasa Times, January 23, 2016, http://www.nyasatimes.com/lets-woo-investors-revise-laws-later-malawi-mining-official/#sthash.xChqXGYS.dpuf (accessed July 6, 2016).

[267] Rachel Etter-Phoya, “Unanswered Questions Remain Unanswered on Oil and Gas Exploration In Malawi’s Lake and Land (PWYD Malawi Press Release, 24 June 2016),” post to “Mining in Malawi” (blog), June 29 2016, https://mininginmalawi.com/2016/06/29/unanswered-questions-remain-unanswered-on-oil-and-gas-exploration-in-malawis-lake-and-land-pwyp-malawi-press-release-24-june-2016/ (accessed July 8, 2016).

[268] For a detailed analysis of the November 2015 draft, see Center for Law and Democracy, “Malawi, Analysis of the Access to Information Bill, 2015,” February 2016, http://www.law-democracy.org/live/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Malawi.RTI_... (accessed March 1, 2016).

[269] Access to Information Bill, Parliament of Malawi, 2016, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[270]“Malawi Civil Society, Media Accuse, Mutharika of Butchering ATI Bill, Bill Rejected,” Afriem, February 25, 2016, http://www.afriem.org/2016/02/malawi-civil-society-media-accuse-mutharik... (accessed March 1, 2016).

[271] Human Rights Watch interview with Charles Kaphwiyo, March 17, 2016.

[272] Human Rights Watch interview with Jappie Mhango, Minister of Information, Lilongwe, March 14, 2016.

[273] Ibid.

[274] For more information, see “The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative,” accessed March 1, 2016, https://eiti.org/.

[275] For a critical review of some of the challenges of EITI see Human Rights Watch, Extractive Industries: A New Accountability Agenda, Human Rights and the Extractive Industries Initiative, May 2013, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/21/extractive-industries-new-accountabi....

[276] To become a compliant member of the EITI, a country must adhere to the EITI Standard, which includes seven specific requirements, such as effective oversight and complete government disclosure of extractive industry revenues and payments made to the government by extractive industry companies.

[277]“Malawi aligns its mining policy to the Africa Mining Vision,” United Nations Economic Commission for Africa press release, August 12, 2016 http://www.uneca.org/stories/malawi-aligns-its-mining-policy-africa-mini... (accessed September 14, 2016).

[278]“About AMV,” Africa Mining Vision, United Nations Economic Comission for Africa, accessed September 14, 2016, http://www.africaminingvision.org/about.html.

[279] Ibid.

[280] Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, “Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment of the Minerals Sector, Final Report,” pp. 86, on file with Human Rights Watch; Human Rights Watch interview with Bright Msaka, March 16, 2016.

[281] Human Rights Watch interview with Peter Kawale, March 16, 2016.

[282] Human Rights Watch interview with government officials at the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, Lilongwe, March 17, 2016.

[283] Human Rights Watch interview with government officials at the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, August 2, 2016.

[284] Human Rights Watch interview with government officials at the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, March 15, 2016.

[285] Ibid.

[286] Human Rights Watch interview with government officials at the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, August 2, 2016.

[287] Human Rights Watch interview with government officials at the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, March 17, 2016.

[288] The draft of the strategy from November 2015 acknowledges that significant knowledge gaps exist on some key issues relating to the sector. It seeks to improve and increase direct communication with community members about “health issues; protection of vulnerable groups, including women and children; …relocation; resettlement; and land ownership.” However, the strategy fails to ensure that mining-affected communities receive regular and updated information about the results of environmental monitoring. Government of Malawi, “Communications Strategy for Malawi’s Mineral Sector, Final Draft,” November 2015, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[289] Human Rights Watch interview with government officials at the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, March 17, 2016.

[290] Email from Hastings Jere, director of Malcoal, to Human Rights Watch, July 21, 2016.

[291] Jan Egil Moe, chairman of the board of Independent Oil and Resources PLC, informed Human Rights Watch via email on July 30, 2015 that “Eland Coal Mine has suspended operations as the operations were not sustainable, and is in the process of being liquidated.” This was confirmed on a phone call on July 20, 2016.

[292] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S.171, entered into force March 23, 1976, ratified by Malawi on December 22, 1993; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted December 16, 1966, G.A. Res.2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force January 3, 1976, ratified by Malawi on December 22, 1993; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted December 18, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, entered into force September 3, 1981, ratified by Malawi on March 12, 1987; Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted November 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force September 2, 1990, ratified by Malawi January 2, 1991.

[293] African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force October 21, 1986, ratified by Malawi on November 11, 1989; Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on The Rights of Women in Africa (the Maputo Protocol), adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, Maputo, September 13, 2000, CAB/LEG/66.6, entered into force November 2005, ratified by Malawi on May 20, 2005.

[294] UN Human Rights Council, Final draft of the guiding principles on extreme poverty and human rights, submitted by the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, A/HRC/21/39, July 18, 2012, http://daccessdds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G12/154/60/PDF/G1215460.pdf?Op... (accessed April 22, 2013), art. 61.

[295] Ibid., art. 99.

[296] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, Right of Access to Information, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011), paras. 18-19. The Human Rights Committee also pointed out that the right to information is addressed in other articles of the ICCPR, including arts. 17, 14, 2, and Art. 10.

[297] Ibid.

[298] ACHPR, art. 9.

[299] Model Law on Access to Information for Africa, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, http://www.achpr.org/files/news/2013/04/d84/model_law.pdf (accessed July 31, 2016).

[300] Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted June 14, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I), 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992), http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm (accessed March 18, 2016).

[301]UNEP, “Guidelines for the Implementation of National Legislation on Access to Information, Public Participation and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters,” UNEP/GCSS.XI/11, Decision SS.XI/5 Part A, adopted by Governing council of UNEP February 26, 2010, http://www.unep.org/civil-society/Portals/24105/documents/Guidelines/GUI... (accessed March 18, 2016).

[302]UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Prevention and Discrimination of Minorities, Fatma Zohra Ksentini, Review of Further Developments in Fields with Which the Sub-Commission Has Been Concerned, Human Rights and the Environment, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9, July 6, 1994 https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/demo/HRandEnvironment_Ksentini.pdf (accessed March 17, 2016).

[303] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15, The Right to Water, E/C.12/2002/11 (2002), para. 12(c). The CESCR has also noted that “[i]ndividuals and groups should be given full and equal access to information concerning water, water services and the environment, held by public authorities or third parties.” CESCR, General Comment No. 15, para 48.

[304]CESCR, General Comment No. 14, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, E/C.12/2000/4 (2000), para. 44(d).

[305] UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the implications for human rights of the environmentally sound management and disposal of hazardous substances and wastes, Başkut Tuncak, July, 8 2015, para. 24.

[306] Ibid., paras. 32-36. The Aarhus Convention, to which Malawi is not a[n eligible] party, requires states parties to ensure that, “in the event of any imminent threat to human health or the environment, whether caused by human activities or due to natural causes, all information which could enable the public to take measures to prevent or mitigate harm arising from the threat and is held by a public authority is disseminated immediately and without delay to members of the public who may be affected.” Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the “Aarhus Convention”), 2161 U.N.T.S, 447, 38 I.L.M.514 (1999), entered into force October 30, 2010, art. 5(1)(c).

[307] Information related to hazardous substances must include intrinsic properties that can cause harm. It must also include details about the presence or potential presence of substances in both people and in their environment, including, where relevant, in the water, air, soil, and food. Finally, it must also include details about protective measures.

[308]The public must be made aware that information is available, and the information must be physically available in a timely manner. Further, information must be economically accessible and costs must be kept at a minimum.

[309] UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the implications for human rights of the environmentally sound management and disposal of hazardous substances and wastes, Başkut Tuncak, July, 8 2015, para. 36.

[310]Banjul Charter, para. 45(3); African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v. Nigeria, judgement of October 37, 2001, 155/96.

[311]UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the implications for human rights of the environmentally sound management and disposal of hazardous substances and wastes, Başkut Tuncak, July, 8 2015. Notably, the European Court of Human Rights held, in Guerra and Others v. Italy that Italy had breached its duty to provide essential information that would have enabled the nearby community to assess risks to which they were exposed if they continued to live in a town that was exposed to danger in the event of an accident at a chemical factory. Guerra and Others v. Italy, [14967/89], judgement of February 19, 1998.

[312] Benson Owuor Ochieng, “Implementing Principle 10 and the Bali Guidelines in Africa,” UNEP Perspectives, Issue No. 16 (2015), http://www.unep.org/civil-society/Portals/24105/documents/perspectives/E... (accessed May 31, 2016).

[313] United Nations General Assembly, “The human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation,” Resolution 70/169 (2015), U.N. Doc. A/RES/70/169.

[314] Ibid.; See also, UN Human Rights Council resolutions 15/9 of September 2010, 16/2 of March 2011, 18/1 of September 2011, and 21/2 of September 2012.

[315]Maputo Protocol, Article 15 a.

[316] The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is the U.N. body responsible for monitoring compliance with the ICESCR. CESCR, General Comment No. 15, para. 12(b).

[317] UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the independent expert on the issue of human rights obligations related to access to safe drinking water and sanitation, Catarina de Albuquerque, A/HRC/15/31, June 29, 2010, para. 42.

[318] Ibid., 49.

[319] Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted December 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948), art. 25; ICESCR, art. 12; CRC, art. 24; Banjul Charter, art. 16; Maputo Protocol, art. 14.

[320] CESCR, General Comment No. 14, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000), para. 15.

[321]UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 15, The Right of the Child to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 24), (Sixty-second session, 2013), U.N. Doc. CRC/C/CG/15, para. 49; CESCR, General Comment No. 14, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, para. 15.

[322] Maputo Protocol, art. 14(2).

[323] ICESCR, art. 12; CESCR, General Comment No. 14, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, para 15.

[324]CESCR, General Comment No. 14, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health.

[325] Banjul Charter, art. 24; Maputo Protocol, art. 18.

[326] UDHR, art. 25; ICESCR, art. 11(1); Maputo Protocol, art. 16.

[327] CESCR, General Comment No. 4, The Right to the Adequate Housing, U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (1992), para. 8(b).

[328] CESCR, General Comment No. 7, Forced Evictions and the Right to Adequate Housing, U.N. Doc E/1998/22 (1997), Annex IV.

[329] UN Human Rights Council, Annex 1 of the Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, Miloon Kothari Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/18, February 7, 2007, para. 6.

[330]Ibid., para. 56(d).

[331]Ibid., para. 61.

[332]Ibid., paras. 29, 37, 39, and 57.

[333]CESCR, “Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (art. 2, para. 2),” General Comment No. 20, The Right to Non-Discrimination, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/20 (2009), para. 37.

[334] UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, Annex, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, A/HRC/17/31, March 21, 2011, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/A-HRC-17-31_AEV.pdf (accessed December 10, 2012).

[335]Ibid.

[336] Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, A/HRC/8/5, April 7, 2008.

Harassed, Imprisoned, Exiled

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Summary

The government of Azerbaijan continues to wage a vicious crackdown on critics and dissenting voices. The space for independent activism, critical journalism, and opposition political activity has been virtually extinguished by the arrests and convictions of many activists, human rights defenders, and journalists, as well as by laws and regulations restricting the activities of independent groups and their ability to secure funding. Independent civil society in Azerbaijan is struggling to survive.

In late 2015 and early 2016 the authorities conditionally released or pardoned a number of individuals previously convicted on politically motivated charges, including several high-profile figures whose arrests and convictions had drawn vocal criticism from governments, intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental groups (NGOs). Many have sought to frame the releases as an indication of a shift in the government’s punitive attitude towards independent civil society activists and groups.

The Azerbaijani government has renewed its vicious crackdown on critics and independent groups. 

However, even as the government released some activists, bloggers, and journalists, authorities have arrested many others on spurious criminal and administrative charges to prevent them from carrying out their legitimate work. None of those released had their convictions vacated, several face travel restrictions, others left the country fearing further politically motivated persecution, or had to halt their work due to almost insurmountable bureaucratic hurdles hampering their access to funding. Authorities have also harassed the relatives of those attempting to carry out their activism from abroad, in some cases by bringing criminal charges against them. Numerous lawyers representing government critics in legal proceedings have been disbarred on questionable grounds, apparently to prevent them from carrying out their work.

New government rules break the link between NGOs and foreign donors in Azerbaijan

Based on more than 90 in-depth interviews with lawyers, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), journalists, youth group members, political party activists, and relatives of these people, as well as detailed analysis of numerous laws and regulations pertaining to the work of NGOs, this report documents the government’s concerted efforts to paralyze civil society and punish those who criticize or challenge the government through prosecutions and legal and regulatory restrictions.

Abuse and Imprisonment of Government Critics

Following a well-established pattern from 2013 to 2015, in 2016 Azerbaijani authorities used a range of false, politically motivated criminal charges, including drug possession and illegal business activity to arrest at least 20 political and youth activists. Those detained have often been subject to ill-treatment including torture. For example, youth activists Giyas Ibrahimov, 22, and Bayram Mammadov, 21, are currently in detention awaiting trial on charges of drug possession, having signed false confessions under torture. Baku police detained Ibrahimov and Mammadov on May 10, 2016 after identifying them through CCTV footage as having painted graffiti on a statue of former president Heydar Aliyev, father of the current president. Police ordered the men to publicly apologize, on camera, in front of the monument, in exchange for their release. When they refused, police beat them, forced them to take their pants off, and threatened to rape them with truncheons and bottles. They signed the confessions after this.

In another case, in November 2015, security officials detained 68 people in Nardaran, a Baku suburb known for its Shia religious conservatism and vocal criticism against the government. Among them was Taleh Bagirov, a religious scholar, imam, and leader of the “Muslim Unity” public movement. Bagirov and 17 others are on trial, facing charges of terrorism, attempted coup, illegal weapons possession, and homicide. All the men alleged at trials that police repeatedly beat them to compel confessions and testimony. Authorities denied the allegations and did not investigate.

Since August 2016, the authorities have also accused some activists of possessing banned or potentially illegally imported materials related to Fethullah Gülen, the US-based cleric whom Turkey accused of organizing the failed July 2016 coup attempt there.

The authorities also used detention of up to 30 days to harass political and social media activists, on spurious misdemeanor charges of resisting police orders or petty hooliganism. The authorities used such tactics in particular against those involved in organizing, participating in, or vocally showing support for public protests against a controversial September constitutional referendum to expand presidential powers. Officials also targeted several political opposition activists who had criticized the country’s economic deterioration at the time when protests linked to economic concerns were taking place in several different cities from December 2015 to February 2016.

Numerous activists convicted in politically motivated trials from 2013 to 2015 remain unjustly imprisoned, including Ilgar Mammadov, whom the European Court of Human Rights found in 2014 had been imprisoned in retaliation for his criticism of the government, and whose immediate release has been repeatedly called for by the Committee of Ministers.

Decimating Civil Society

For many years Azerbaijan had a large and vibrant community of nongovernmental organizations devoted to such public policy issues as human rights, corruption, democracy promotion, revenue transparency, the rule of law, ethnic minorities, internally displaced persons, religious freedom, and the like. However, prosecutions of NGO leaders and new draconian laws and regulations have decimated civil society by virtually eliminating the space for the work of critical NGOs, particularly for those working on human rights, transparency, and government accountability.

New rules require both the donor and the grantee to separately obtain government approval of each grant under consideration. Whereas previously, registration of grants essentially served a notification purpose, the Ministry of Justice and other agencies now have broad discretion to deny NGOs requests to register grants. NGOs and their staff risk criminal sanctions, including lengthy prison terms, for failure to abide by the grant registration regime. The government frequently denies registration to NGOs working on human rights, accountability, or similar issues on arbitrary grounds.

The laws also require foreign entities to obtain government permission to act as a donor in Azerbaijan, to register a presence in the country, and to obtain approval for each grant. The rules give the Ministry of Finance broad discretion to reject grants on 10 different grounds including on grounds that the ministry does not consider a grant to be financially “expedient” or that there is sufficient state funding in the grant’s proposed area of activities.

Just prior to the passage of the new restrictive laws, the General Prosecutor’s Office initiated a sweeping criminal investigation involving dozens of international donors operating in Azerbaijan and their grantees. The charges related to unregistered grants, although at the time, there was no criminal penalty for issuing or receiving an unregistered grant. As part of this investigation, the government seized bank accounts of domestic NGOs receiving grants from those donors under investigation. The donors were forced to stop their grant-making activities in Azerbaijan, eliminating key sources of funding for many independent civic groups. The majority of international donor agencies and organizations left Azerbaijan in the wake of the investigation and expanded government regulation. In early 2016 the broad criminal investigation was suspended, but not closed.

With the suspension of the investigation, the government unfroze the bank accounts of many groups. However, the act of unfreezing the accounts has not made it easier for the groups to operate, due to the obstacles to securing independent funding, as well as, in many cases, exorbitant tax fines.

Given the extent to which many local groups are dependent on international donor organizations for funding and other support, the cumulative effects of the government policy have been devastating. Anar Mammadli, director of the Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Center, sentenced in 2015 on spurious charges related to economic crimes and released under a presidential discretion in March 2016, grimly summarized the situation for his work: “So, yes, we are free, but what can we do?! The only space for us now is on social media…or else, leave the country,” he told Human Rights Watch in September 2016.

Harassing Family Members and Targeting Lawyers

The Azerbaijani authorities have also arrested, prosecuted, and harassed activists’ family members with the apparent aim of compelling the activists to stop their work. The authorities have often targeted the relatives of outspoken journalists and activists who have fled abroad out of fear of persecution and continued their vocal activism in exile. In some cases, relatives in Azerbaijan have publicly disowned or renounced their relationships with their close relatives abroad, possibly as a means to avoid retaliation by the authorities for their relatives’ vocal criticism.

Among those facing retaliatory harassment is photo and video journalist Mehman Huseynov. Mehman’s brother Emin Huseynov, director of the media rights group, Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety, sought shelter in the Swiss embassy after his group’s offices were sealed shut by the authorities in August 2014. Later Swiss officials flew him out to Switzerland. Azerbaijani authorities have kept open a spurious criminal investigation against Mehman since 2012, cancelled his identification card and passport, preventing him from travelling abroad, and repeatedly question him about his work and about his brother Emin.

In recent years, the authorities have also targeted the few lawyers prepared to defend government critics in politically motivated trials, through arrests and prosecutions, investigations into lawyers’ organizations, travel bans, and questionable disciplinary proceedings which resulted in disbarments or threats of disbarment. Once disbarred, lawyers cannot represent clients in criminal proceedings. Travel bans prevent lawyers from representing clients at the European Court of Human Rights, receiving further education or training abroad, and participating in international events.

What Should Be Done?

Under international law, and as a state party to both the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Azerbaijani government has specific legal obligations to protect the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and association. International human rights law recognizes those freedoms as fundamental human rights, essential for both the effective functioning of a democratic society and the protection of individual dignity. Any limitations to those rights must be narrowly defined to serve a legitimate purpose and must be demonstrably necessary in a democratic society. Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights has consistently made clear, including through five rulings against the government of Azerbaijan, that the right “to form a legal entity in order to act collectively in a field of mutual interest is one of the most important aspects of the right to freedom of association, without which that right would be deprived of any meaning.”

In line with its international commitments, the government of Azerbaijan should take immediate steps to ensure the unconditional release of political and civic activists, journalists, and human rights defenders held on politically motivated charges and end the use of trumped-up or spurious charges to prosecute government critics. It should also end harassment of activists and their family members.

The authorities should also immediately end the crackdown on civil society, including by ending undue interference with the freedom of the Azerbaijani people to form associations. The authorities should immediately revise the NGO law in line with the recommendations made by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, particularly ensuring that overly complicated registration requirements do not create undue obstacles to freedom of association. The government should also repeal regulations that prevent independent nongovernmental organizations from accessing non-state funding and present excessive obstacles to international donor organizations’ grant-making in Azerbaijan.

While many of Azerbaijan’s international partners have been critical of Baku’s serious failures to meet its human rights commitments, the criticism appears to have had little impact on these actors’ relationships with the government. Many actors appear to have prioritized the country’s geostrategic importance and hydrocarbon resources and have sought to deepen relationships and cooperation without insisting on clear human rights improvements. The European Union and the United States should impose visa bans on senior government officials such as ministry of interior officers and prosecutors responsible for the unjustified criminal prosecutions of human rights defenders, journalists and activists in retaliation for their peaceful exercise of their rights.

Azerbaijan’s international partners should also take a comprehensive and coordinated response to the government’s crackdown on independent voices and use their significant leverage, both bilaterally and through multilateral–including financial–institutions, to convince the government to reverse the crackdown. This should include clear benchmarks for human rights improvements and concrete policy consequences should those expectations not be met.

The government of Azerbaijan relies heavily on oil and natural gas export revenues, but the resource price slump in 2015 prompted the government to seek significant support from the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the European Investment Bank, creating a key moment at which external influence could help to improve the human rights situation. In continuing to finance development projects that are clearly designed to advance the social and economic needs of the people, these institutions should not provide direct budget support until the government ceases its attack on civil society organizations and activists. Financial institutions should refrain from financing oil and gas projects until the government implements the corrective actions outlined by the board of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)–a prominent international multi-stakeholder initiative that promotes government openness in natural resource management– particularly ensuring NGOs can receive funding from non-Azerbaijani government sources and an environment that enables public debate on the government’s economic and other policies.

Recommendations

To the Government of Azerbaijan

  • Immediately and unconditionally release wrongfully imprisoned human rights defenders, journalists, civil society and political activists, including Ilgar Mammadov.
  • Vacate convictions against those released and remove restrictions on freedom of movement.
  • End harassment and threats against civil society and media workers.
  • End harassment of the family members of activists, journalists, and others whom the authorities have placed under criminal investigation because of the exercise of political rights.
  • End the politically motivated prosecutions of lawyers involved in the defense of government critics.
  • Ensure that independent civil society groups can operate without undue hindrance or fear of reprisals and persecution.
  • Remove undue restrictions to accessing foreign grants and amend legislation on NGOs in accordance with the recommendations of regional and international human rights institutions, particularly regarding the registration, operation, and funding of NGOs.
  • Drop all tax-related cases against NGOs and their leaders and drop fines that relate to unregistered grants.

To the European Union and European Member States

  • Ensure that public human rights benchmarks are an integral part of the negotiation of a new Partnership Agreement with Azerbaijan, clearly spelling out in any draft agreement the specific steps Azerbaijan should take in order to address concerns in these areas, and consider delaying the start of negotiations until Azerbaijan takes such steps. These should include, but are not limited to:
    • Reform of laws and regulations governing nongovernmental organizations and their funding;
    • Ensuring that the EU can without undue hindrance fund independent civil society organizations;
    • Compliance with the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers calling for the release of Ilgar Mammadov.
  • Impose visa bans on officials responsible for the ill-treatment of detainees, including unjustly imprisoned human rights defenders, journalists, and activists; also impose visa bans on senior government officials such as ministry of interior officials and prosecutors responsible for the unjustified criminal prosecutions ofhuman rights defenders, journalists and activists in retaliation for their peaceful exercise of their rights.
  • Publicly and in all diplomatic engagement raise human rights concerns and call on the Azerbaijani government to take the specific steps listed above and more generally foster an environment in which political and civil society activists can express dissenting opinions freely, including through organizations, without fear of retribution.

To the United States

  • Impose visa bans on officials responsible for the ill-treatment of detainees, including unjustly imprisoned human rights defenders, journalists, and activists; also impose visa bans on senior government officials such as ministry of interior officials and prosecutors responsible for the unjustified criminal prosecutions ofhuman rights defenders, journalists and activists in retaliation for their peaceful exercise of their rights.
  • Publicly and in all diplomatic engagement raise human rights concerns and call on the Azerbaijani government to take the specific steps listed above and more generally foster an environment in which political and civil society activists can express dissenting opinions freely, including through organizations, without fear of retribution.

To Multilateral Development Banks

  • Through diplomatic engagement with the Azerbaijani government and in public statements, raise concerns on the continued crackdown, emphasizing how the crackdown undermines civic participation, social accountability, and public debate, and the importance of an enabling environment for civil society for sustainable development.
  • Refrain from providing countercyclical support or policy-based loans to the government until the government has taken the necessary steps to allow independent individuals and groups to participate in the crafting of the country’s development agenda and freely share their views about public affairs.
  • Refrain from providing additional financing for extractive industries projects, like the Shah Deniz Gas Field Expansion, until the government is again compliant with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). This will help ensure there is a framework within which natural resource revenues can genuinely contribute to inclusive development.

United Nations

  • Ensure meaningful follow up to the visits of the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders and the Working Group on arbitrary detention.
  • The UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment should request to visit Azerbaijan to examine the situation with torture and ill-treatment in custody and formulate detailed recommendations for steps to address problems identified.
  • UN member states should monitor the implementation of the detailed recommendations made by the special rapporteurs on human rights defenders and on arbitrary detentions, as well as the concluding observations and recommendations made by the UN Human Rights Committee review of Azerbaijan in October 2016.
  • Members of the Human Rights Council should follow up on their June 2015 joint statement on the situation of human rights defenders in Azerbaijan and call for the release of those still detained on politically motivated grounds and for the revision of legislations affecting NGO activities and access to foreign funding.

Council of Europe

  • Secretary General of the Council of Europe Thorbjørn Jagland should continue his inquiry into Azerbaijan’s implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights, and insist on the Azerbaijani government’s full cooperation in the process.
  • The Committee of Ministers should continue to closely monitor the implementation of the European Court of Human Rights’ decision on Ilgar Mammadov and ensure its full implementation.
  • The Committee of Ministers should urge the Azerbaijani authorities to implement the recommendations made by the Commissioner for Human Rights Nils Muižnieks.
  • The Parliamentary Assembly’s monitoring procedure on the honoring of obligations and commitments by Azerbaijan should continue to place strong emphasis on the monitoring and reporting of undue restrictions placed on the work of civil society groups in the country, making detailed recommendations on the steps the Azerbaijani government needs to take to address these concerns.
  • Assist the Azerbaijani authorities in bringing its laws and rules regulating the work of civil society groups in line with Azerbaijan’s international obligations and recommendations made by the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission).

Methodology

Research for this report was conducted by Human Rights Watch researchers in interviews and document reviews conducted between March and September 2016. Researchers conducted over 90 interviews with lawyers, staff, and leaders of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), journalists, youth group members, and political party members and activists, and their relatives.

Human Rights Watch researchers also reviewed laws, including legislative amendments, adopted since 2014, including to the Law on Grants, the Law on NGOs, and Code of Administrative Offenses, also relevant regulations and rules pertaining to the work of domestic and international nongovernmental groups. Researchers also obtained and analyzed copies of documents relevant to specific cases, including indictments of persons convicted on politically motivated charges and court judgments.

Human Rights Watch also conducted research into the engagement of multilateral development banks and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) with Azerbaijan. We met with staff and board members of several multilateral development banks. Researchers also reviewed public statements by the European Union, various United Nations agencies, the United States government, and the Council of Europe, in response to Azerbaijan’s crackdown on civil society.

Many interviews were conducted in English and Russian by Human Rights Watch researchers who are fluent in both languages. Numerous interviews were conducted in Azeri by a Human Rights Watch research assistant who is a native speaker of Azeri. In a few instances the names of interviewees have been withheld at their request and out of concern for their security. Researchers explained to each interviewee the purpose of the interview and how the information gathered would be used. No compensation was offered or paid for any interview.

Most interviews were conducted by telephone or via internet communication. Human Rights Watch also interviewed NGO and youth activists, lawyers, political activists, and their relatives residing or traveling outside of Azerbaijan, including in Germany, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Poland, and Georgia.

The scope of this research was necessarily limited by constraints imposed by the Azerbaijani government, which is hostile to international scrutiny by human rights organizations. Human Rights Watch does not have direct access to Azerbaijan, after authorities prevented the organization’s researcher for Azerbaijan from travelling to the country in March 2015. Prior to this, Human Rights Watch researchers regularly traveled to Azerbaijan to conduct research and meet with government officials.

Since 2013, Human Rights Watch has closely monitored developments in Azerbaijan and issued numerous news releases, other publications, and videos, urging the authorities to end the crackdown and release human rights defenders, journalists, social media and youth activists imprisoned on politically motivated charges. We have called on the authorities to repeal regressive amendments and allow the unimpeded work of independent nongovernmental groups in accordance to Azerbaijan’s international commitments to uphold freedom of expression and assembly. We have also called on Azerbaijan’s international partners to play a positive role in ensuring the government protects fundamental human rights in Azerbaijan.

Some of the research presented in this report was published in Human Rights Watch news releases and other public documents from 2013 to 2016. The analysis of Azerbaijan’s legal obligations concerning of freedom of expression, assembly, and association has been largely reprinted from Human Rights Watch’s September 2013 report “Tightening the Screws: Azerbaijan’s Crackdown on Civil Society and Dissent.”

Human Rights Watch also reviewed media interviews with government officials and official statements related to the findings of this report.

In September 2016, Human Rights Watch sent letters to the Azerbaijani Minister of Justice and General Prosecutor to obtain their response to the findings documented in this report, including their responses to allegations of torture and ill-treatment in custody, politically motivated prosecutions, excessive use of pretrial detention, arbitrary restrictions on freedom of movement, as well as the steps planned to bring legislation and regulations regarding NGOs into line with Azerbaijan’s international commitments, and to implement the Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan European Court of Human Rights judgment. Human Rights Watch did not receive any response to the letters.

I. Arrests and Convictions of Activists, Journalists, and Others

Throughout 2016, Azerbaijani authorities arrested numerous political and other activists, and bloggers, particularly in August and September, ahead of the September 26 constitutional referendum which expanded presidential powers. The authorities used a range of false, politically motivated criminal charges, including drug possession and illegal business activity. The authorities have also accused some activists of possessing banned or potentially illegally imported materials related to Fethullah Gülen, the US-based cleric whom Turkey accused of organizing the failed July 2016 coup attempt there.

The authorities also harass political activists, including those vocal on social media, through administrative or misdemeanor charges, which carry sentences from 15 to 90 days’ detention. The authorities targeted those involved in criticizing the September 2016 constitutional referendum or organizing or supporting public protests against the referendum, as well as those criticizing the country’s economic deterioration coinciding with protests across the country from December 2015 to February 2016.

The arrests follow a pattern well-established by the government in 2013 to 2015 when authorities arrested or convicted numerous human rights defenders, lawyers, and journalists on politically motivated criminal charges in retaliation for their activism, including at least 40 people in 2014 alone. Many were sentenced to long prison terms in deeply flawed trials. From late 2015 through May 2016 the government released a number of these individuals, including several whose cases had received international attention.

However, many others convicted in 2014 and 2015 in politically motivated trials remain in prison and have exhausted all domestic appeals. Most of the civic activists, journalists, and others released have been forced to stop their work due to restrictive laws and regulations related to nongovernmental organizations (described in more detail in the next chapter). Some activists have left the country altogether and their organizations have ceased to function.

Arrests and Convictions in 2016

Arrests of Individuals with Alleged Links to Fethullah Gülen

Beginning in August, the authorities targeted some outspoken critics claiming that they had ties to Fethullah Gülen, a US-based cleric whom the Turkish government has publicly blamed for the July 2016 attempted coup in Turkey. On August 15, Azerbaijan’s General Prosecutor’s Office announced that a criminal case had been opened to identify and punish the “Gülenists” in Azerbaijan.[1] In an August meeting with his Turkish counterpart, Azerbaijani Interior Minister Ramil Usubov vowed to take all necessary steps against Gülen supporters in Azerbaijan, stating, according to media reports: “We’ll do whatever we can do to eliminate this problem.”[2]

Fuad Ahmadli

State Security Service officials arrested opposition Azerbaijan Popular Front Party (APFP) member and activist on social media, Fuad Ahmadli, on August 18 in downtown Baku. During a search of Ahmadli’s house soon afterwards, police claimed to have found prohibited religious books and compact discs, and leaflets with Gülen’s speeches.[3]Authorities also accused Ahmadli, who is an operator at a local mobile telephone company call center, of illegally obtaining and sharing personal data and other information of mobile phone subscribers. Three other employees of mobile phone operators were arrested on the same charges.[4] Ahmadli is in pretrial detention on charges of abuse of authority and violating the law on operational search activities [surveillance].

A statement by the General Prosecutor’s Office and the Ministry of Interior about the case describes Ahmadli’s opposition political affiliation and cites the “material evidence attesting to [his] illegal activities” as “religious literature prohibited by law and CDs, printed speeches of Fethullah Gülen, and documents on members of the so-called Gülen community.”[5]On August 23, law enforcement authorities reported the merger of Ahmadli’s case with the case of another activist from the Azerbaijan Popular Front Party, Faig Amirov, also suspected of collaboration with the Gülen organization.[6]

Previously, Baku police detained Ahmadli in December 2015 and a court sentenced him to 10 days’ detention for disobeying police orders. Two days prior to his arrest, police officials invited Ahmadli and warned him about his critical Facebook posts.[7]Ignoring the warning, he posted criticism of the government’s currency devaluation and the economic downturn in the country, and asked whether people were desperate enough to protest publicly against the government’s policies.[8]

Faig Amirov

On August 20, two days after arresting Ahmadli, authorities arrested Faig Amirov, an assistant to the APFP chairman andfinancial director of the leading opposition newspaper Azadlig. During a search of Amirov’s apartment, police took dozens of Azadlig invoices. While searching the apartment and Amirov’s car, police allegedly found books and compact discs about Gülen. According to his lawyer, Amirov denies the books are his and believes police planted them in his car prior to the search. Because the books are imported, Amirov is at risk of charges alleging that the books lacked a special permit required for certain imported goods. The books are not on the list of banned religious literature regulated by the State Committee on Religious Matters.[9]

The statement by the General Prosecutor’s Office claimed that “Amirov, using his position as the financial director of Azadliq newspaper for personal gain, together with like-minded people in the Hizmet [Gülenist] movement is suspected of maintaining connections with people, whose names are on the list of ‘imams of Hizmet.’” The statement also alleges that Amirov distributed Gülenist materials through electronic media.”[10]

Authorities have charged Amirov with “inciting religious hatred” and “infringing the rights of citizens under the pretext of conducting religious rites.” In a public statement, Amirov’s lawyer said the prosecutors allege that Amirov is an imam and delivered sermons that inspired religious animosity.[11]He is in pretrial detention and faces between two and five years in prison if convicted.[12]

Elgiz Gahraman

On August 12, Baku police arrested NIDA youth movement member Elgiz Gahraman on charges of drug possession. NIDA, which is Azeri for exclamation mark, is a youth opposition movement active on social media and highly critical of the government. Police took Gahraman to the Interior Ministry’s Organized Crime Unit. After allegedly discovering 3.315 grams of heroin on him, the authorities charged Gahraman with illegal drug possession in a large quantity with an intention to sell. If convicted, Gahraman faces up to 12 years in prison.[13]On August 13, Baku’s Narimanov District Court authorized Gahraman pretrial detention for four months.

For several days, police did not inform Gahraman’s family of his whereabouts and did not give him access to a lawyer of his choosing; a state-appointed lawyer represented him at the hearing on pretrial measures. Gahraman was only allowed to see his own lawyer on August 19. According to the lawyer, Gahraman said that Organized Crime Unit officers beat him on the head and neck when they first detained him, but later gave him an ointment for his bruises, apparently to fade the marks left by the beating. The lawyer told Human Rights Watch that he saw no visible wounds on Gahraman during the visit.[14]

Gahraman’s lawyer also told Human Rights Watch that Gahraman felt compelled to sign a false statement confessing to drug possession following the beating and after officials also threatened him with sexual humiliation. The officials also made him sign statements about his connection with Fethullah Gülen.[15]Some pro-government media outlets in Azerbaijan had linked Gahraman to Gülen.[16] Gahraman denies any connection to Gülen.[17]On October 7, the Appeals Court dismissed his request to be released to house arrest.[18]

Arrests in Nardaran

Taleh Bagirov

Authorities arrested Taleh Bagirov, a religious scholar, imam, and leader of the “Muslim Unity” public movement, on November 26, 2015 during an operation in Nardaran, a Baku suburb known for its Shia religious conservatism and criticism of government policies.[19]The raid turned violent under unclear and disputed circumstances, with shootings leaving two police and seven civilians dead. Police detained 68 people. Officials have charged Bagirov with a number of grave crimes, including terrorism, attempt to violently seize power, illegal firearms possession, and homicide. In July, Bagirov stated at trial that Ministry of Interior Organized Crime Unit officials beat him repeatedly and injured him, including breaking his nose. The beatings were apparently to compel Bagirov to give testimony against two political opposition leaders as being the masterminds behind the alleged armed uprising.[20] Organized Crime Unit officials kept Bagirov in their custody, rather than transferring him to a pretrial detention facility and did not grant him access to his lawyer until December 29, more than a month after his detention.

Seventeen individuals being tried together with Bagirov also stated that police had beaten them repeatedly to compel confessions and testimony. Authorities denied the allegations but did not thoroughly investigate. Bagirov remains in detention pending trial and faces up to life in prison if convicted.[21]

The authorities had previously targeted Bagirov in politically motivated cases, and he served two years in prison from 2013 to 2015 on spurious drug possession charges. Police had arrested Bagirov in March 2013, one week after he gave a sermon in a mosque sharply criticizing the government.[22]

Fuad Gahramanli

On December 8, 2015, the Azerbaijani authorities detained Deputy APFP Chairman Fuad Gahramanli and charged him with inciting the public to overthrow the government and incitement of national, racial, social or religious hatred.[23] Gahramanli had posted on his Facebook page criticism of the government for the violence during the November 2015 police operation in Nardaran. The prosecutor’s office invited Gahramanli for questioning as a witness in the Nardaran investigation, and when he refused, in the absence of an official warrant, police forcibly took him from his house. The same night, after several hours of interrogation, Baku’s Nasimi District Court ordered him held in pretrial detention. Officials searched Gahramanli’s house and confiscated his computer.[24]The General Prosecutor’s Office accused Gahramanli of “making publications since September 2015 on Facebook, calling citizens to disobey the authorities, [and] carried out activities aimed at inciting religious hatred and animosity between the different currents of Islam.”[25] The trial is ongoing; Gahramanli remains in custody.

Arrests and Convictions of Other Political Activists and Critics

Natig Jafarli

On August 12, authorities arrested Natig Jafarli, a prominent government critic and executive secretary of the opposition Republican Alternative (REAL) movement, interrogated him, and charged him with illegal entrepreneurship and abuse of office. A court sent him to pretrial detention for four months.[26] Officials denied Jafarli access to a lawyer of his choosing during the interrogation and remand hearing. That same night, police searched Jafarli’s house and confiscated two computers and numerous legal documents. On September 9, Baku’s Nasimi District Court released Jafarli on his own recognizance. The criminal investigation against Jafarli is ongoing and he cannot leave Baku. If convicted, Jafarli could face up to eight years’ imprisonment.[27]

The REAL Movement (Republican Alternative), whose leader Ilgar Mammadov is currently in prison on politically motivated charges (see case description below), is a pro-democracy political group seeking the country’s transition from a presidential to a parliamentary republic guaranteeing democratic rights and freedoms.

The charges against Jafarli stem from a criminal case the General Prosecutor’s Office opened against numerous international and domestic nongovernmental groups in 2014 (see below). At the time of his arrest, Jafarli chaired REAL’s Referendum Initiative Group, which campaigned against the September 26 constitutional referendum and the proposed amendments.[28] As a respected economic expert, Jafarli had regularly posted on social media about Azerbaijan’s economic situation and allegations of misappropriation of state funds. Jafarli has come under pressure from the authorities in the past. Officials interrogated him at least 15 times in 2014 and 2015 as part of the General Prosecutor’s large criminal investigation involving dozens of international donors operating in Azerbaijan and their grantees (see below).

Giyas Ibrahimov and Bayram Mammadov

On May 10, 2016, Baku police detained youth activists Giyas Ibrahimov, 22, and Bayram Mammadov, 21, who both face bogus drug possession charges. The two were initially detained because police identified them on CCTV footage as having painted graffiti on a statue of former president Heydar Aliyev, father of the current president.[29] According to the men’s lawyer, Elchin Sadigov, police at Baku’s Narimanov district police station ordered them to publicly apologize, on camera, in front of the monument, in exchange for their release. When Ibrahimov and Mammadov refused, police beat them, forced them to take their pants off, and threatened to rape them with truncheons and bottles. Under duress, the men signed confessions to drug possession. Mammadov is a member of NIDA. Ibrahimov belongs to Solfront, another leftist youth group. Both are students at Baku Slavic University.[30]

Sadigov told Human Rights Watch that he was only able to meet his clients on May 12, after they had signed the forced confessions about drug possession. Sadigov stated that when he was able to meet with his clients, he saw visible bruises on both men, and said they had pain all over their bodies, particularly in their heads and abdomens.[31]

At the May 12 hearing, Ibrahimov and Mammadov retracted their forced confessions and stated that the police had beaten them and threatened them into confessing. They acknowledged to the judge that they had painted the graffiti. The court ordered their pretrial detention for four months. The authorities have failed to conduct an effective investigation into the alleged ill-treatment. The men’s family members allege that the searches of the men’s homes, during which the authorities claim large quantities of narcotics were found, were illegal, and the drugs were planted.[32] In September, Baku’s Khatai District Court extended the pretrial detention of Ibrahimov and Mammadov for another two months. The men remain in pretrial custody at this writing, each facing up to 12 years in prison if convicted.

Tofig Hasanli

On October 12, 2015, authorities arrested Tofig Hasanli, 46, a satirical poet, who often criticized the government in his poems, which he posted online. For five days his family had no knowledge of his whereabouts, and later learned that he was being held in pretrial detention on drug-related charges. Because of financial constraints, his family has not retained a lawyer of their choosing; Hasanli was represented by a state-appointed lawyer at the remand hearing.[33]

Hasanli faces up to 12 years in prison for illegal possession of drugs.[34]Several days prior to his arrest, Hasanli published a poem criticizing senior government officials and members of Azerbaijan’s parliament.[35]In a January 2015 media interview, Hasanli stated that officials in Lenkaran province in southern Azerbaijan had threatend to arrest him if he did not stop writing.[36]He is in detention awaiting trial.

Mammad Ibrahim and Other Activists of the Azerbaijan Popular Front Party

The authorities have also targeted numerous leading and rank-and-file political activists, in particular APFP activists, at least 12 of whom were either on trial or serving prison terms in 2016. For example, in March, a court convicted Mammad Ibrahim, advisor to APFP chairman Ali Kerimli, on spurious hooliganism charges and sentenced him to three years in prison.[37]Other APFP members in prison on politically-motivated charges include Fuad Gahramanli, Seymur Hazi, Faig Amirov, Fuad Ahmadli, Elvin Abdullayev, Jeyhun Isgandarli, Murad Adilov, Zeynalabdin Bagirzade, Mammad Ibrahim, Nazim Mahmudov, and Asif Yusifli.

Use of Administrative Law to Detain Activists

In addition to criminal prosecutions, the authorities have also used the administrative law which covers misdemeanor offenses, such as resisting police or disobeying police orders, to detain activists for up to 90 days. The use of such administrative offences seems to be direct retaliation for their activism, including ahead of the September 26 constitutional referendum and in conjunction with various protests in December 2015 through February 2016 against the country’s economic downturn. Unless otherwise noted, the administrative trials that led to the sentences were perfunctory, rarely lasting longer than 15 minutes, and the judicial decisions on which the detentions are based relied almost exclusively on police testimonies. In all cases documented by Human Rights Watch, the activists could not retain a lawyer of their choosing or mount an effective defense. Human Rights Watch documented 30 cases in which authorities used administrative law offences to jail political and civil activists in 2016.

Detentions in Advance of The September 2016 Constitutional Referendum

September 8-10, 2016

From September 8 to 10, 2016, authorities detained several activists ahead of a September 11 protest in Baku against the constitutional referendum and the economic downturn. The protest had been sanctioned by the city authorities. According to Mehman Huseynov, a 26-year-old well-known blogger, on September 10 plainclothes policemen forced him into a police car and took him to the Baku main police department. He described to Human Rights Watch what happened at the station:

I was taken to the chief, who told me that I should kneel in front of him and that it was the only way for me to talk to him. I said, ‘No.’ Then he tried to kick me and physically force me to kneel. I told him that his actions were illegal and anything he or they would do to harm me, President Aliyev will be held accountable for.

He then retreated and changed his tactics… He was trying to give me “friendly” advice to quit my activism. He said, ‘Aren’t you afraid that someone might kill you? Or throw you out your window?’

Then they changed the tactics again…threatening to rape me, unless I stopped my activism….[38]

After about four or five hours, officials told Huseynov that this was their last warning and that he was free to go home. They encouraged him to write about what happened to him in the police station. “I realized that this was a tactic to intimidate others who were planning to go to the protest [on September 11], so I did not write about what happened, but I told my friends,” he said.[39]

September 16, 2016

In advance of similar protests planned for September 17 and 18, which were officially authorized, police in nine cities detained or issued summons to at least 38 political activists. Most of those detained are from the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan and the youth opposition group, NIDA. One NIDA activist told Human Rights Watch that he went to Baku’s Narimanov district police department on the morning of September 16 at the request of a neighborhood police officer. Police searched him, confiscated his phone and other belongings, kept him for over 12 hours, and threatened him with criminal drug charges if he continued to participate in opposition protests. He explained:

I was taken to the station chief’s room, who told me that I’ll get 10 days of administrative detention for participation in the demonstration. …Then they took me to another room. There were six or seven police officers there, who started calling me Ali Kerimli’s [opposition leader] agent. Then one officer ordered me to do push-ups. I refused. Then they threw me on the floor, punched me several times and forced me to do push-ups.

Then another officer told me, ‘do you see what I have in my pocket?’ He said it was heroin, which could be “discovered” in my pockets if I continued to participate in opposition protests.[40]

He was released around 9 p.m. after giving a statement that he would not participate in the next day’s protest and would appear in the police precinct next morning.

When the September 17 demonstration in Baku ended, police clashed with protesters and detained dozens.[41] Numerous video clips available online show police rounding up the demonstrators, roughing them up, and taking them away. Protesters in videos reviewed by Human Rights Watch were not seen resisting police or using violence.[42]At least 12 activists, mostly APFP members, were sentenced to eight days’ detention on misdemeanor charges of resisting police orders and at least one person was fined.[43]

Detentions in August 2016

Elshan Gasimov and Togrul Ismayilov

On August 15 in Baku, plainclothes policemen detained two REAL youth activists, Elshan Gasimov and Togrul Ismayilov, as they distributed fliers calling for no votes in the constitutional referendum. At Baku’s Sabayil district police station, officials denied them access to a lawyer or to speak to their families. Police questioned them about REAL finances, including the source of the financing for the fliers, as well as REAL movement’s future plans. The next day a court sentenced them each to seven days’ detention, allegedly for disobeying police orders to stop distributing the leaflets.[44]

Mesud Rzali

On August 12, 2016, police detained Mesud Rzali, 36, a member of the Azerbaijan Popular Front Party (APFP) and a social media activist. Rzali actively discussed political issues, including prosecutions of political activists and government corruption on Facebook. He was sentenced to 30 days’ detention on misdemeanor charges of resisting police. During police questioning, he was asked about his Facebook posts and warned to stop his activism. He was released early on August 29 without explanation.[45]

Detentions Related to Economic Protests

Between December 2015 and February 2016, the authorities sentenced numerous political party members and other political activists to detention on questionable misdemeanor charges. In this period people in cities throughout the country organized public protests against the currency devaluation, increased prices for food and other essential goods, and growing unemployment. Protests usually attracted a few hundred people.[46] Police broke up many demonstrations, and arrested some protesters.[47]Though the gatherings were largely peaceful, in some cases protestors clashed with police. For example, demonstrators in Siyazan, a town 115 kilometers north of Baku, clashed with riot police equipped with tear gas and rubber bullets. Police detained 55 people.[48]

Official statements claimed “religious extremists” and political opposition stirred up popular discontent against the government.[49]Opposition parties rejected the allegations and accused the government of using them as scapegoats in the face of broad public anger over government mismanagement of the economy.[50]

Human Rights Watch documented five arrests of political and social media activists in January 2016 after activists denounced the government’s currency devaluation and price increases. None of these individuals participated in the protests. They were each sentenced to detention ranging from 10 to 30 days.[51]Three of these cases are described below.

Turan Ibrahim

Baku police arrested social media activist and APFP member Turan Ibrahim on January 13, 2016. Ibrahim, who is the son of imprisoned opposition politician Mammad Ibrahim (see above), served one week in detention for allegedly “disobeying police.” According to Ibrahim, seven or eight police officers, who appeared to be waiting for him in front of his house, detained him and took him to a local police station.[52] He told Human Rights Watch that police threatened him with serious criminal drug charges if he did not sign a false statement that he had resisted police.[53]

Rail Rustamov

On February 17, 2016, Baku’s Sabirabad District Court sentenced APFP member and Facebook activist Rail Rustamov to 20 days’ detention for resisting police.[54] According to local police, Rustamov was speeding, was a threat to pedestrians, and disobeyed police.[55]

Rustamov’s father, Sahib Rustamov, is a senior member of the APFP leadership council. He told Human Rights Watch that he believes his son’s detention was in retaliation for his public criticism online; police have threatened and harassed the family in the past for their political activism.[56] Sahib Rustamov said:

The same day my son was detained, I was also brought to the Sabirabad police department. The police chief himself threatened and warned me about my Facebook activism. I was released after three hours. But they kept my son, for nothing else but his Facebook posts. We did not know when and how he was tried. We just heard that he is already in the isolator and sentenced for 20 days.[57]

Khalid Khanlarov

Blogger Khalid Khanlarov, 23, frequently criticized the authorities through a satirical Facebook page called “Ditdili” (Mosquito), and in January 2016 actively commented on the economic situation about public protests related to the economy. On January 23, 2016 a Baku court sentenced him to 25 days’ detention for resisting police. Khanlarov told Human Rights Watch:

I was invited to [Baku’s] Binagadi police station about three days before [my] detention, and warned about my activism on social media. For the next three days, I did not access the internet or share anything on Facebook, but [on January 23] I was invited to the Interior Ministry and from there I was taken to a police station and then to court….and I was sent to administrative detention for 25 days. I got to meet my own lawyer only after I was already in detention.[58]

Other Detentions of Political Activists and Critics

Ruslan Garayev

On June 20, 2016 police detained Ruslan Garayev, the head of the APFP youth committee’s Sumgayit branch, in front of his house. He was sentenced to 20 days’ detention on charges of petty hooliganism and resisting police, based on allegations that he had shouted profanities in the street violating public order and did not obey the police order to stop.[59] Garayev frequently writes blogs and social media posts critical of the government.

For two days following his detention, police did not inform Garayev’s family about his location. His lawyer told Human Rights Watch that he could not access his client for five days and was not allowed to represent Garayev at the administrative hearing.[60]Garayev stated that police questioned him about his political and social media activism, including a satirical photo he took of himself holding an energy drink in front of the statue of the late Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev. Garayev was released on August 10.[61]

Relevant Legal Standards

Azerbaijan is a party to both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantee fair trial rights and protection against arbitrary detention.[62] For the purposes of international human rights law, the application of standards for rights protection depends not on whether a defendant is facing charges based in the criminal code or in the administrative code, but rather on the substance of the charge against the defendant and the severity of the punishment faced by the defendant. The European Court of Human Rights has in past years ruled that states with a system where individuals can face sanctions such as detention and heavy fines for administrative offences have an obligation to provide adequate due process and fair trial protections in the administrative proceedings in order to comply with the European Convention of Human Rights.

Activists and Journalists Remaining in Prison

Numerous activists convicted in politically motivated trials from 2013 to 2015 remain unjustly imprisoned, including Ilgar Mammadov, whom the European Court of Human Rights found in 2014 had been imprisoned in retaliation for his criticism of the government, and whose immediate release has been repeatedly called for by the Committee of Ministers. Mammadov and others have alleged physical abuse, arbitrary use of solitary confinement, and other abuses by prison staff. This section details Mammadov’s case and several other cases, but is not exhaustive.

Ilgar Mammadov

Ilgar Mammadov, a prominent political analyst and chairman of the opposition group REAL (Republican Alternative), has been in detention since February 4, 2013. The authorities arrested him on charges stemming from anti-government riots in Ismayilli, 200 kilometers from Baku, in January 2013.[63]He was accused of inciting violence and resisting police arrest, and in March 2014, a court sentenced Mammadov to seven years in prison after a politically motivated trial that violated due process and other fair trial protections.[64] Serious procedural violations during the trial included denying the defence the ability to cross examine, including where contradictory testimony was presented, and the exclusion of exculpatory evidence.

In May 2014, the European Court of Human Rights concluded, in a strongly worded judgment, that the actual purpose of Mammadov’s detention “was to silence or punish [him] for criticizing the Government.”[65]Citing that ruling, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has called for Mammadov’s immediate release nine times, most recently in September 2016, in order for the government to remedy the violation found by the Court.[66]

However, Mammadov remains imprisoned and has repeatedly come under pressure from the authorities to apologize to and pledge support for President Aliyev in exchange for release.[67]Mammadov twice publicly alleged that he had been attacked in prison for refusing to sign a letter of remorse to President Aliyev—once by a cellmate and once by prison officials. On July 29, 2015 Mammadov’s cellmate attacked him, striking him on the head several times. One of Mammadov’s lawyers, Javad Javadov, said that the attack was meant to pressure Mammadov to write an apology letter. In August, prison officials placed Mammadov in solitary confinement, which his lawyer believes was in retaliation for speaking out about the attack.[68]Council of Europe Secretary General Thorbjørn Jagland sent a letter to Azerbaijan’s Minister of Justice urging a thorough investigation of the attacks and pressure on Mammadov.[69]

A few months later, on October 16, 2015, after a meeting with his lawyer, prison officials took Mammadov to the prison’s administration offices. According to Javadov, two deputy prison directors beat Mammadov on the head and chest and then dragged him to the office of the prison director Eyvaz Asgarov, where they also punched and kicked him. Asgarov threatened Mammadov that he would never be released from prison alive.[70]

Mammadov’s lawyer, who was only allowed to see him on October 19, said that there were visible injuries on Mammadov’s neck and head and that he suffered severe headaches after the beating. After the meeting, his lawyer filed written appeals to the Minister of Justice, the General Prosecutor, and the Ombudsman to investigate the incident and Mammadov’s treatment. Soon thereafter, prison officials, without explanation, refused to allow Mammadov to speak with his family or make telephone calls for one month.[71]

A prison doctor only examined Mammadov five days after the beating and has not made his findings available to his family.[72]A representative of the Ombudsman’s office visited Mammadov ten days after the beating and claimed that since he could not see any visible marks on Mammadov he was not beaten.[73] Mammadov’s wife visited him in late October 2015 and said that one of his teeth was broken and that he continued to have persistent pain in his head.[74] The authorities have failed to effectively investigate the alleged ill-treatment. On April 29, 2016 a court rejected Mammdov’s motion for acquittal.[75]Mammadov appealed the decision and the Supreme Court will hear the case on November 18, 2016.

Ilkin Rustamzade

The authorities arrested blogger and member of NIDA youth group Ilkin Rustamzade in May 2013 on hooliganism charges for alleged involvement in filming a comedy video, but later charged him with inciting violence and organizing mass disorder. In 2014 a court sentenced him to eight years in prison.[76] He is currently being held in prison no. 13. Prior to his arrest, Rustamzade frequently posted criticism about alleged government corruption and human rights abuses on social media, including Facebook and Twitter. He had also created online events in Facebook in 2013 calling attention to the deaths of soldiers in non-combat situations and organizing mass protests in Baku.[77]

The December 2014 Appeal Court and October 2015 Supreme Court decisions left Rustamzade’s sentence unchanged. Prison authorities placed Rustamzade in solitary confinement twice in December 2014 as apparent retribution for his letters from prison critical of the government and his statement at the appeal hearing, in which he reported ill-treatment and abuses against other inmates in prison.[78]

Seymur Hazi

Seymur Hazi, a leading columnist with the opposition paper Azadlig (Liberty) and an anchor for the France-based pro-opposition television channel Azerbaijan Saat (Azerbaijan Hour), has been in detention since August 2014 after an unknown man assaulted him near his home. Hazi defended himself by striking the man with the glass bottle he was holding; the bottle did not break. The police quickly appeared and arrested the journalist. He was charged with “hooliganism committed with a weapon or an object used as a weapon.” On January 29, 2015, a court convicted Hazi to five years in prison.[79]He lost all appeals against his conviction.[80]

Faraj and Siraj Karimov

In July 2014 police arrested Faraj Karimov, 29, a well-known blogger and administrator of the “Basta!” (“Enough!”) and “Istefa” (“Resign”) Facebook pages, which had thousands of followers and served as platforms for criticism about human rights violations, social problems, and corruption in Azerbaijan. Police had detained his brother Siraj Karimov, 30, six days earlier. Both were arrested on dubious drug-related charges. Both Faraj Karimov and his father are the members of the opposition Musavat party and prominent political activists. Faraj Karimov also administered the Musavat Party website.

According to the Karimovs’ lawyer, neither brother had access to a lawyer of their choosing for several days following their respective arrests. Siraj Karimov alleged that Ministry of Interior Organized Crime Unit officials pressured him, under threat of physical harm to his family, to sign a confession to drug-related charges and that police questioned him about Faraj’s activities. A court sentenced Siraj to six years’ imprisonment for drug possession in March 2015. His family and lawyer believe that Siraj was targeted for his brother’s political and social media activism.[81] He was released on March 17, 2016 under a presidential pardon.

Faraj Karimov said the police questioned him exclusively about his Facebook posts.[82] Nevertheless, on May 6, 2015 a court sentenced Faraj Karimov to six-and-a-half-years in prison for drug possession. On May 24, 2016, the Supreme Court reduced his sentence to three years.[83] On October 4 Faraj Karimov was released under an amnesty.[84]Amnesty International had deemed the Karimovs “prisoners of conscience.”[85]

II. Restrictions on Non-Governmental Organizations

Numerous amendments to laws and new regulations put into effect in 2014 and 2015 have severely impacted the ability of NGOs to operate independently in Azerbaijan, further constricting what had already been a difficult operational environment for NGOs.[86]Changes to NGO registration requirements in 2013 and frequent and arbitrary denials of registration to NGOs critical of government policies, meant that many groups operated without registration for many years. The more recent changes curtailed the ability of both unregistered and registered NGOs to seek and receive foreign grants, the primary source of funding for many groups. Only registered NGOs may secure grants through a process in which the Ministry of Justice has wide discretion to deny approval.

Requirements on foreign donors to conduct grant-making activity in Azerbaijan also became more stringent, with donors now required to register a presence in Azerbaijan in a complicated procedure and subject to approval by the Ministry of Justice. To fund local groups, a registered foreign donor must apply to the Ministry of Finance for an opinion confirming that each grant is financially and economically “expedient.”

In 2014, the authorities opened a sweeping criminal investigation into several large donors and their grantees and levied tax penalties on unregistered grants, paralyzing the work of many groups for at least a year. Many groups, including numerous leading human rights groups, have not been able to operate since. Most international donor agencies and organizations left Azerbaijan in the wake of the investigation and expanded government regulation.

In 2014, the authorities also criminally prosecuted and sentenced dozens of NGOs and their leaders, including prominent activists, as well as journalists and others. Although many were released in 2016, as noted above, none have been able to fully resume their work due to the restrictive operational environment for NGOs. Some activists face restrictions, including travel bans, as part of their conditional sentences. Others have felt compelled to leave Azerbaijan out of fears of further persecution.

Cumulatively, these changes have criminalized independent, critical civil society and have made it virtually impossible for independent groups to operate freely. The authorities’ wide discretion to deny or approve registration of domestic and foreign groups and all foreign grants allows them to control which groups and individuals can meaningfully exercise their right to freedom of association, in violation of Azerbaijan’s international legal obligations. The legislative environment and prosecutions of activists and groups have been consistently criticized by authoritative international human rights bodies, yet Azerbaijan has taken no steps to amend laws or revise its punitive practices.

Restrictive Legislation and Regulations to Control NGOs

Arbitrary Denial of Registration and Vulnerability of Unregistered NGOs

NGOs in Azerbaijan are required to register as legal entities with the Ministry of Justice in an excessively bureaucratic process with almost unlimited discretion granted to the authorities to deny registration.[87] In some instances, the authorities have denied NGOs registration multiple times, including for minor errors. For example, the Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Center (EMDS) has been unsuccessfully trying to register since 2008 after the authorities liquidated its predecessor.[88] In one instance Ministry of Justice officials denied the registration because the organization’s charter contained a one letter error in the spelling of the NGO law. EMDS unsuccessfully appealed the refusal through the courts and have applied to the European Court of Human Rights.[89]

The EMDS worked without registration from 2008 to 2013. Previously individuals affiliated with EMDS could sign grant agreements with donors, register them with the Ministry of Justice, and pay taxes on them; or EMDS conducted joint projects with a registered organization, and relied on this organization for funding. EMDS monitored elections and produced numerous critical reports from 2008 to 2014.

However, the lack of registration made the EMDS vulnerable. In 2014, the prosecutor’s office deemed all of the group’s activities “illegal entrepreneurship” on grounds the group was unregistered. The group’s director, Anar Mammadli, was convicted of illegal entrepreneurship and other charges in May 2014 and spent almost two years in prison before being pardoned in March 2016.[90]

Mammadli described the EMDS’s current situation:

We can’t work. … Since the government refuses to recognize us as a legal entity, we can’t do anything. We also can’t get any grants or implement any projects without registration, as [the authorities would consider it] “illegal entrepreneurship.” I can’t even speak on behalf of the group, use the NGO name, as that would be illegal, since officially there is no such group for the authorities. I can only speak as an individual.[91]

In addition to initial registration, NGOs are required to register with the Ministry of Justice every change to any founding documents or changes in leadership, and obtain a renewed registration certificate in order to continue operation.[92] Registration renewal is required within 40 days for changes of address, number of members, phone numbers, chairperson, and other minor changes. Only after confirmation of the ministry’s registration of changes, can an NGO continue enjoying the benefits of legal entities, like the use of bank accounts or concluding grant agreements. Failure to register such minor organizational changes may result in administrative fines or be the basis for criminal charges of “illegal entrepreneurship.”

In one case the Ministry of Justice refused to register changes to its founding documents requested by the Public Association for Assistance to Free Economy (PAAFE) seven times over eight months in 2014. According to PAAFE’s director, Zohrab Ismayil, the ministry claimed that the request to register the change was erroneously signed by the founder of the organization rather than by the chairperson. The ministry refused to recognize the power of attorney given to the founder. This absence of registration prevents Ismayil from using the group’s bank accounts, forcing PAAFE to stop their work.[93] (See more on PAAFE below).

Intrusive Investigations and Disproportionate Penalties for Registered NGOs

Amendments from 2014 to the Law on Grants, the Law on NGOs, and Code of Administrative Offenses expanded the authorities’ legal grounds to prosecute nongovernmental groups, including registered groups, and provided for higher financial and criminal penalties for minor infractions. The 2014 amendments gave extensive powers to the Ministry of Justice to monitor an NGO’s compliance with the law and impose harsh penalties for any breaches, including a power to petition a court to close down an NGO following two warnings by the ministry within any given year.

In December 2015 the Ministry of Justice adopted new rules on studying the activities of NGOs, which went into force in February 2016.[94]These rules grant the ministry broad powers to conduct intrusive “regular” as well as “extraordinary” inspections on NGOs for up to two months, with very few guarantees for protecting the rights of NGOs.[95] The rules do not set any restrictions on the frequency of inspections or the total number annually.[96] The ministry may conduct inspections to assess the compliance of the NGO’s activities with its own charter and Azerbaijani law. During the inspection it can require the NGO to submit a wide range of documents, including financial documents, budgets, and official correspondence. Failure to cooperate or provision of incorrect information could result in prohibitive fines.[97]

Control Over Resources

The 2014 legislative amendments to the Law on Grants and subsequent government regulations, building on restrictions introduced in 2013 and coupled with strict regulation of foreign donors (described below), have virtually eliminated possibilities for NGOs to receive grants from foreign donors, the only source of funding for most human rights and other NGOs frequently critical of government policies.[98] NGOs and individuals must register all grants with the Ministry of Justice in an onerous process, requiring groups to prepare and submit extensive documentation. The rules on grants provide the authorities 10 different grounds on which they can refuse to register grants.[99] An NGO cannot access funds or implement the grant until it receives notification of grant registration from the ministry.[100] Using funds without the ministry’s approval constitutes illegal entrepreneurship, a criminal offense. Banks cannot release funds to an NGO without a formal letter of registration of the grant funds from the Ministry of Justice. Without access to funds, many NGOs have been forced to suspend activities, dismiss staff, move abroad, or even close.[101]

Legal changes implemented in 2014 also require NGOs to report to the authorities all donations of any amount and the identity of the donor. Cash donations over 200 Azerbaijani manat (US$125) are prohibited and can only be completed by a bank transfer.[102]Failure to report a donation could result in a fine, ranging from 5,000 to 8,000 manat ($3,000 to $5,000).[103] All consultancy or service contracts must also be registered with the Ministry of Justice in onerous process.[104]

These limitations prevent groups like EMDS, which cannot secure foreign funding, from seeking funds from alternative donors. EMDS Director Anar Mammadli told Human Rights Watch that the requirement to notify the authorities of small donors could put those donors in danger, as it could lead to their harassment by the authorities. “For example,” he said, “I could easily crowd source few hundred manat to hold a workshop or roundtable, just by posting a request on social media, but I’ll have to report every small donation and that could put people in harm’s way.”[105]

Mammadli also explained other obstacles the law has brought to EMDS’s work, such as the inability to engage volunteers. “Another impediment to doing any work is that I can’t even have volunteers. As an election monitoring organization, we depended on volunteers. Now, after the changes in the law, [EMDS] needs to sign individual contracts with each volunteer and in order to be able to do that [EMDS] need to be registered.”[106]

Nigar N., whose organization was investigated in 2015 and 2016 (see below), explained that her organization cannot receive or register grants due to the new restrictive registration requirements, forcing the group to severely curtail its work. In a September 2016 interview with Human Rights Watch Nigar N. explained that the organization previously had 10 full-time and over 30 part-time employees. Currently the organization has only four full-time and six part-time staff. Nigar N. said, “Our NGO shrunk more than four times in a bit over a year. Prior to the crackdown our budget was about $300,000 a year. Now, zero. Not $10,000 or 5,000, but zero.”[107]

Nigar N. further described the precariousness of her group’s situation and the vulnerability of NGOs should they not meet all the demanding technical requirements in the reporting. “It’s impossible to plan anything as you never know what will happen tomorrow,” she said. “There’s so much gratuitous paperwork needed for the extensive reporting to the authorities. We are all stressed and afraid of making mistakes [vis-à-vis the authorities].”[108]

Nigar N.’s experience is not unique. About one-third of active civil society organizations in Azerbaijan suspended their activities in 2015, as they were unable to maintain their staff and offices, while another third had to close their offices and work from the homes of their staff. Significant time and resources were spent fulfilling state requirements on registration, operation, and reporting, as well as addressing inspections and inquiries from state agencies.[109]

Restrictions on Foreign Donors

The 2014 laws and subsequent regulations also dramatically increased government control over foreign organizations’ ability to give grants to NGOs in Azerbaijan. All potential foreign donors must register a branch or office in the country and then receive permission from the Ministry of Justice to act as a grant maker for a specific period of time.[110] Even after meeting these requirements, a donor must seek an opinion from the Ministry of Finance on the “financial-economic expediency” of each grant.[111]The rules on foreign donors also give the Ministry of Finance broad discretion, including nine different grounds, to deny grants, including on the grounds that there is “sufficient state funding” for an issue.[112]

The regulations do not provide for an appeals process in the event the ministry denies registration of a donation, grant, or service contract, except in cases of procedural violations, which can be administratively appealed.[113]The Ministry of Justice registered few grants in 2015. The list of approvals is not made public.[114]

Criminal Investigation into Foreign Donors and their Local Partners

In April 2014, the General Prosecutor’s Office initiated criminal investigations against several major international donors, including the National Endowment for Democracy, the Open Society Foundations, Oxfam, the European Endowment for Democracy, and others operating in Azerbaijan on charges of abuse of power and service forgery.[115]In October the investigation expanded into the activities of dozens of individuals and NGOs who had received grants from these donors, leading to repeated interrogation of NGO leaders and staff, prosecutions of some NGO leaders, and seizure of their bank accounts. In the course of 2015 the authorities froze the bank accounts of over 29 NGOs and numerous NGO leaders’ accounts.[116]The authorities also conducted extensive tax inspections into those NGOs, imposed travel bans on some individuals, and subjected some to intrusive physical checks at borders. The authorities suspended but did not close the investigations in early 2016.

Most large international donor organizations and agencies left Azerbaijan following the criminal investigation or because they have been unable to register in the country (see below), further obstructing opportunities for NGOs to engage with potential donors and secure funding. According to Mammadli of the EMDS, “We can’t access donor funds, as all donors working on sensitive issues, like good governance or rule of law, left the country.”[117]

IRFS

One of the organizations that was forced to close in the wake of the investigation was the Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety (IRFS), an NGO registered in 2006 and dedicated to monitoring and promoting media rights and freedom of expression in Azerbaijan. By 2014, IRFS had 35 full-time staff members, five volunteers and two offices in Baku. IRFS documented and exposed violations of freedom of expression and access to information and produced the online TV channel Objective TV dedicated to providing an alternative news source “to counter the increasing government control of traditional news sources.”[118]

According to IRFS Director Emin Huseynov, “Our offices were sealed shut in August 2014, and everything, including our equipment, documents, and all we had, was sealed with it. We had multimedia equipment valued at about $200,000. Our bank accounts were also frozen with about $40,000 in them and they remain frozen until now.”[119]Fearing politically motivated arrest in conjunction with the investigation, Huseynov sought shelter in Baku’s Swiss embassy. He remained at the embassy for 10 months, until the Swiss foreign minister flew him out of the country in June 2015. As described below, Huseynov’s brother remains in Baku and faces harassment and criminal prosecution.[120]

Public Association for Assistance to Free Economy

Another organization forced to cease its activities as a result of the investigation was the Public Association for Assistance to Free Economy (PAAFE). Registered in 2006, the group promoted transparency, accountability, property rights, and good governance, including through publishing research and strategic litigation before the European Court. According to the group’s director, Zohrab Ismayil, by 2014 the organization had 25 staff members including permanent employees and those on short contracts, with an annual budget of about $200,000. The group has been a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) since its founding. Ismayil was chairperson and then coordinator of Azerbaijan’s EITI civil society platform.[121]

In July 2014, the authorities froze all of the organization’s and Ismayil’s personal bank accounts. The authorities repeatedly interrogated Ismayil and other employees. Ismayil believes he and his organization were targeted in part because he serves on the board of REAL. Ismayil fled the country on August 14, 2014 fearing arrest. In September 2014 the prosecutor’s office opened a criminal investigation against him on charges of illegal entrepreneurship, tax evasion, and abuse of office, and issued a warrant for his immediate detention. Despite Ismayil’s numerous requests, the prosecutor’s office has refused to confirm in writing whether the investigation remains ongoing.[122]

Nigar N.’s Organization

One activist remaining in Baku, Nigar N., told Human Rights Watch that from August 2015 to January 2016 the prosecutor’s office conducted an investigation into the registered organization she directs on charges of illegal entrepreneurship and tax evasion. While the investigation and audit were ongoing, Nigar N.’s personal bank account and the NGO’s accounts were frozen and she faced a travel ban. Nigar N. told Human Rights Watch, “During those four months of investigation, they took our computer and all documents. I was under a travel ban. They interrogated everyone who had anything to do with our organization. They even questioned a [colleague at a partner organization]. I felt really bad, as our partners should not have been harassed in such a way.”[123]

Inability to Access Existing Funds

In April 2016, following the suspension of the criminal investigation into numerous foreign donors and their grantees, the authorities released bank accounts of several NGOs and their leaders. However, at least several of these groups are unable to use the funds in their accounts because they cannot register the grants connected to these funds. In several cases this is because investigative authorities seized documents required for grant registration during inspections and criminal investigations, and have not returned them, or because of punishing tax fines.[124]

According to the CSO Sustainability Index, in 2015, following lengthy audits, the Azerbaijani tax authorities levied disproportionate and paralyzing penalties against NGOs working on—and engaged in international advocacy on—topics such as human rights, the rule of law, transparency, and other issues. According to one report, tax authorities issued financial penalties against at least 31 organizations ranging from 70 manat to 797,000 manat ($47 to $531,000).[125]In some cases NGOs could not access grant funds in unfrozen bank accounts because tax authorities automatically confiscated the unfrozen funds in payment for alleged tax penalties.

For example, in August 2014, in conjunction with the investigation into international donors and their grantees, the authorities froze the bank accounts of the Economic Research Centre (ERC) and its director, Gubad Ibadoghlu. ERC is a think tank that conducts research on economic policy, including public finance management, good governance, and budget transparency at national and local levels. In March 2016, a court ruled to unblock the group’s bank accounts. However, the government’s refusal to register a grant the ERC received in 2014 has paralyzed the organization’s work. Ibadoghlu told Human Rights Watch that he has twice attempted to register the grant, but that the Ministry of Justice refused, claiming that a requirement of the grant contract signed with the donor—that unused portions of the grant should be returned to the donor—was not consistent with Azerbaijani legislation.[126]

Since the grant is not registered, the authorities consider the funds taxable income, and in August 2015 levied a fine of 134,960.22 manat ($82,284) against the ERC. According to the Tax Code, interest accrues at a daily rate of 0.1 percent, in this case by 134.90 manat ($82). As of September 27, 2016 the outstanding fine was 171,077 manat ($106,925).[127]

When the ERC bank account was unfrozen, 7,121 manat ($4,341) remained in the account related to an ERC project that concluded in 2014. Because the grant period had ended, the ERC planned to return the funds to two donors: the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), a German government donor agency. However, the tax authorities withdrew the funds to pay the tax fine as soon as the bank account was unfrozen. According to Ibadoghlu, the authorities did not inform him of the withdrawal, despite a legal obligation to do so.[128]

Ibadoghlu explained that in addition to the restrictive rules regarding registering grants and seeking foreign funding, “The tax fines create problems with other donors. We have this huge tax fine to pay. Any grant funding we get can be seized to pay the tax penalty.”[129]

The unpaid tax penalty poses further threats to the ERC and Ibadoghlu as ERC director. In the absence of payment, the authorities can seize the organization’s property or Ibadoghlu’s property and place a travel ban on him. A court could sentence him for two to seven years’ imprisonment for non-payment. Ibadoghlu concluded, “Our future is gloomy. Largely because of the tax fines.”[130]

In conjunction with criminal investigations into the Public Association for Assistance to Free Economy and its director Zohrab Ismayil, in October 2014 tax authorities alleged the organization owed 16,300 manat ($9,755) in tax arrears. The bank accounts were unfrozen on April 14, 2016. Four days later, the tax authorities seized 11,097 manat ($6,765), all of the funds remaining in the group’s manat account, to pay a portion of the alleged arrears.

In addition, because the Ministry of Justice refuses to confirm the changes in the group’s registration documents, the organization cannot conduct bank operations and access its remaining grant funds. Thus, despite the fact that the organization's accounts were unfrozen, the organization cannot operate. Ismayil told Human Rights Watch:

We can’t use the funds remaining in the organization’s account. Since we could not work anymore, we officially suspended the work of the NGO indefinitely. Otherwise, we still had to submit quarterly reports to the authorities, even if we can’t get funding and operate in the country.[131]

State Financial Support for NGOs

In parallel with concerted government efforts to restrict foreign funding, the authorities invested in strengthening the State Council for Support to NGOs under the Auspices of the President of Azerbaijan, established in 2007 to provide a domestic source of financial assistance to NGOs.[132]However, many NGOs have not applied for grants from this body because they say receiving government funding would undermine their independence. Gubad Ibadoghlu, director of the Economic Research Centre, which cannot secure foreign grants, as described above, told Human Rights Watch, “There is only access to state funding. We have not applied because we don’t want to be a 100 percent state funded organization. This will damage our reputation and independence.”[133]

Other state supported funding sources include the National Fund for Science, the Youth Fund, and several ministries, who disburse grants to finance projects related to art and culture, development of entrepreneurship, sports, and environment.[134]

Prosecution and Releases of NGO Leaders

In 2014 the authorities convicted a number of human rights defenders, NGO leaders, political activists, and critical journalists on bogus criminal charges, including for alleged illegal entrepreneurship, tax evasion, other economic crimes, and abuse of authority. Among those prosecuted were: Intigam Aliyev of the Legal Education Society, Rasul Jafarov from the Human Rights Club, prominent investigative journalist Khadija Ismayilova, veteran human rights defender Leyla Yunus and her husband Arif Yunus, and election monitor Anar Mammadli. Many other activists fled the country fearing prosecution.

Although Azerbaijani authorities released these and other human rights defenders and activists in late 2015 and early 2016, they have not quashed their convictions, and some face travel bans and impediments to continue their work. Two of those released, Intigam Aliyev and Khadija Ismayilova, cannot travel outside of the country under the terms of their conditional release.[135] The authorities allowed Leyla and Arif Yunus to leave Azerbaijan in April 2016 to seek medical assistance after their health significantly deteriorated in prison.[136]

Those NGO leaders released but remaining in the country, such as Aliyev, Jafarov, and Mammadli have been unable to fully resume their work. Prosecutors have not unsealed the office of Aliyev’s Legal Education Society or returned most of the organization’s legal case files confiscated during the investigation into the group. (see Investigations into Litigation Organizations below). The Ministry of Justice refused to register Jafarov’s Human Rights Club and Mammadli’s Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Center, thus depriving the center of even a theoretical chance to seek funding and sign a grant agreement.

Several NGO leaders also stressed their inability to hold public events in conference spaces without the prior consent of the authorities. Although it is an unwritten ban, it is strictly implemented, and severely hinders the constituency-building efforts of NGOs.[137]“I can’t even find a place to hold a meeting,” Anar Mammadli explained to Human Rights Watch. “In April and then in June we tried to hold a meeting of former political prisoners, but no hotel would rent us space.”[138]

Mammadli grimly summarized the situation for his work since his release under a presidential pardon in March 2016: “So, yes, we are free, but what can we do?! The only space for us now is on social media, Facebook or Twitter, or else, leave the country.”[139] Zohrab Ismayil, director of the Public Association for Assistance to Free Economy, who fled Azerbaijan in 2014, expressed his pessimism about the ability of his organization to work without interference in the future, given the criminal prosecutions and heavy tax fines they have faced in recent years. “Even if we were to start operating tomorrow, there’s no guarantee that we won’t be harassed again,” he told Human Rights Watch.[140]

Human Rights Bodies’ Criticism of Restrictions on NGOs

Several authoritative international human rights bodies criticized and condemned Azerbaijani authorities for their concerted efforts to silence critical NGO leaders. For example, in its March 2016 judgement, the European Court of Human Rights found Rasul Jafarov’s conviction on illegal entrepreneurship and tax evasion charges were in violation of Article 18 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and that “the actual purpose of the impugned measures was to silence and punish the applicant for his activities in the area of human rights.”

The Court also highlighted the context of Jafarov’s conviction:

[T]he Court agrees that in recent years the legislative environment regarding the operation of non-governmental, non-commercial organisations, including the regulation of matters relating to their State registration, funding and reporting requirements, has grown increasingly harsh and restrictive. A number of recent amendments to various legislative instruments introduced additional registration and reporting procedures and heavy penalties. There have been long-standing problems with the State registration of NGOs in Azerbaijan.[141]

In a report adopted in December 2014 the Venice Commission, the Council of Europe’s expert body on constitutional matters, stated: “The amendments raise barriers to the establishment of NGOs; introduce additional administrative requirements and increased checks as well as more problematic registration procedures; raise barriers to activities and operations; and restrict access to resources. More severe sanctions and penalties are also introduced for those acting in contravention of such or other legal obligations. … [T]he procedure of registration of NGOs in Azerbaijan has been criticised for its lengthy and cumbersome nature.”[142]

During his September 2016 visit to Azerbaijan, UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders Michel Forst found that “over the last two [to] three years, the civil society in Azerbaijan has faced the worst situation since the independence of the country,” and noted many of the same concerns identified in this report including: “the drastic impediments to the right to freedom of association, caused by the 2013-2015 legislative amendments to laws regulating civil society operations;” and the “persecution of human rights defenders through administrative and legal persecution.” Forst also noted that numerous other international organizations had made “the same assessment of the worsening situation of human rights defenders in Azerbaijan,” but that “most if not all of the recommendations by the international and regional mechanisms have yet to be implemented.[143]

Following a May 2016 visit by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, its chairperson concluded: “While fully taking into account the pardon decree signed by the President of Azerbaijan on 17 March 2016 which resulted in the release of political prisoners and prisoners of conscious, the Working Group was unable to observe any significant change in the country with respect to this situation regarding other persons deprived of liberty for apparently the same reasons. The Working Group holds the view that human rights defenders, journalists, political and religious leaders continue to be detained under criminal or administrative charges as a way to impair the exercise of their basic human rights and fundamental freedoms and to silence them.”[144]

Azerbaijan’s Legal Obligations on Freedom of Association

As a member of the Council of Europe since 2001 and party to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) since 2002, Azerbaijan has strict and clear obligations to respect freedoms of association and expression, obligations that it seems to be selectively disregarding in its current strategy towards human rights NGOs and social activists. Article 11 of the ECHR states that everyone has the right to freedom of association. The only permissible restrictions to this right are those that are “prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”[145]

The European Court of Human Rights has consistently made clear that the right “to form a legal entity in order to act collectively in a field of mutual interest is one of the most important aspects of the right to freedom of association, without which that right would be deprived of any meaning.”[146]While a state has a right to regulate an association’s aims and activities, it must do so in a manner compatible with its obligations under the Convention.[147]This includes an obligation to recognize the legal status of associations, and not to impose unnecessary delays or administrative burdens on any registration procedure in a way that would interfere with the right of association.[148]

Azerbaijan has already been found to have violated the right to freedom of association in five cases since its ratification of the ECHR in 2002.[149] In its 2007 judgment Ramazanova v. Azerbaijan, the European Court concluded that “the significant delays in its state registration, which resulted in its prolonged inability to acquire the status of a legal entity, amounted to an interference by the authorities with the applicant’s exercise of their right to freedom of association.”[150]The court also noted that even if the association had a theoretical right to exist without the state registration, the domestic legal regulation, which prevented the association from receiving any “grants” or financial donations, has effectively prevented the association from performing its work, thus interfering with the right to association.[151]The court also stressed that “significant delays in the registration procedure, if attributable to the Ministry of Justice, amounted to an interference with the right of the association’s founders to freedom of association.”[152]

The punitive and invasive elements of the existing NGO law in Azerbaijan, as well as the recent amendments adopted by the parliament, are contradictory to Azerbaijan’s obligations under international and regional law to respect freedom of expression and association, and have a choking effect on the exercise of those rights.

III. Harassment of Activists’ and Journalists’ Family Members

In addition to using criminal and administrative sanctions against human rights defenders, journalists, and activists, the Azerbaijani authorities have also subjected activists’ family members to arrest, prosecution, and harassment, with the apparent aim of compelling the activists to stop their work. As the cases documented here reflect, the authorities have targeted the relatives of outspoken journalists and activists who have fled abroad out of fear of persecution and continued their vocal activism in exile. In some cases, relatives in Azerbaijan have publicly disowned or renounced their relationships with their close relatives abroad, possibly as a means to avoid retaliation by the authorities for their relatives’ vocal criticism.

Emin Milli

Emin Milli is a dissident and exiled journalist, who is the founder and the director of Meydan TV, based in Berlin. Operating since 2013, Meydan TV is one of Azerbaijan's last surviving independent media outlets and is only able to operate out of Germany, cooperating with freelance journalists based in Azerbaijan and neighboring countries. Meydan TV carries material critical of the Azerbaijani government and its policies related to human rights, corruption, and similar issues. Several journalists cooperating with Meydan TV have faced criminal investigations.[153]

Milli was imprisoned in 2009 for two-and-a-half years on criminal hooliganism charges, in retaliation for his criticism of the government.[154]In June 2015, authorities arrested Milli’s brother-in-law, Nazim Agabeyov, on drug charges. In April 2016 a court sentenced Agabeyov to a three-year suspended sentence, which includes a travel ban. Milli considers the charges against Agabeyov to be “bogus and absurd,” intended to punish his relatives for his critical reporting.[155] A week after Agabeyov’s arrest, 23 of Milli’s relatives sent a letter to President Aliyev calling Milli a traitor, hostile to Azerbaijan’s “great success, development, prosperity, and integration with foreign countries.”[156]

On April 20, 2016, the Azerbaijani authorities launched a criminal investigation into “alleged illegal practice and profit-making in an especially large amount, large-scale tax evasion and abuse of power resulting in falsification of elections and/or referendum results” involving 15 journalists who cooperate with Meydan TV.[157] The journalists are all at liberty pending the investigation, but at least seven of them face travel bans.[158]

The authorities began questioning several freelance journalists cooperating with Meydan TV in September 2015, after the journalists had reported on large-scale protests in Azerbaijan’s fourth largest city, Mingechevir, where a young man died in police custody in August 2015, allegedly from ill-treatment by police.[159]Officials invited the journalists for questioning, claiming to be investigating the Mingechevir incidents. However, the questions related almost exclusively to Meydan TV, its payroll practices, staff, and funding. The authorities placed a number of the journalists under travel bans.[160]

Mehman Huseynov

Mehman Huseynov is a photo and video journalist and social media activist, who police have been harassing since 2012, when he photographed and publicized police violence as Azerbaijan prepared to host the Eurovision Song Contest.[161]Huseynov is the brother of Emin Huseynov, director of the Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety, who now resides in Switzerland since his offices were sealed shut by the authorities in 2014, as described above.[162]

The authorities initiated a criminal case against Mehman Huseynov in June 2012, detained him for a day, charged him with hooliganism “committed with resistance to a representative of the authority”, and released him on his own recognizance, but the criminal investigation is ongoing. Huseynov told Human Rights Watch that there have not been any significant developments in the investigation in the past three years, but the case is still pending. Police detained and interrogated him on numerous occasions since then.[163]

According to Huseynov, after his brother Emin left the country, the investigator has not hidden from him the motives for keeping the 2012 criminal investigation open. Huseynov told Human Rights Watch:

The investigator said, ‘We could not arrest your brother, but we control whatever happens to you and your family.’ They cancelled my ID card and passport and I cannot get new ones, and couldn’t travel anywhere, even if I wanted. I received response this week about my most recent request to travel abroad. They say that I am not allowed, claiming there is a risk that I would abscond because of pending criminal investigation.[164]

Officials have never questioned Huseynov about the incident with the police officer and he is not aware of any meaningful investigative steps. Without identification documents, Huseynov cannot authorize power of attorney to a legal representative and thus is also not able to file a lawsuit against any official actions. The absence of identification also prohibits him from formal employment and education.”[165]

Ganimat Zahidov

Ganimat Zahidov is the editor-in-chief of the major opposition daily newspaper Azadlig and the pro-opposition television program Azerbaijan Saat [Azerbaijan Hour] which is broadcast by satellite for a few hours every week from abroad. The authorities have often jammed transmission and removed the channel from satellite broadcasts, but Azerbaijan Saat has continued to broadcast by frequently identifying new host channels.[166] Arrested after publishing articles critical of the government, Zahidov was sentenced to four years in prison in 2008 on dubious hooliganism charges. He was released under a 2010 presidential pardon, but in 2011 fled to France after officials threated him and his family.[167]

Zahidov told Human Rights Watch that several of his family members remaining in Azerbaijan have been targeted in retaliation for his continued critical journalism.[168]The authorities detained two of Zahidov’s nephews as well as a cousin in June 2015. A court sentenced the nephews to detention for allegedly disobeying police orders, and immediately brought criminal drug charges against the cousin, Rovshan Zahidov. One nephew was released after serving his sentence, but the authorities brought drug charges against the other nephew, Rufat Zahidov. Both Rovshan Zahidov and Rufat Zahidov were convicted in 2016 on criminal drug charges and are serving six-year prison terms. Both had spent nearly a year in pretrial detention prior to their convictions.[169]Both have denied the charges and said they never used drugs. Forensic exams also could not prove any drug history.[170]

In recent years, the authorities have also targeted other journalists affiliated with Azerbaijan Saat. Its anchor, the well-known journalist Seymur Hazi was arrested in August 2014.[171]On the same month, the brother of the program’s other anchor, Natig Adilov, was arrested on trumped-up drug charges, which Adilov said was in retaliation for his own journalism.[172] Their colleague Khalid Garayev was arrested in late October 2014, when police accused him of hooliganism for “swearing in public,” after which he was sentenced to one month in detention.[173]

Tural Sadigli

Tural Sadigli, a blogger and political activist fled Azerbaijan in January 2013 fearing arrest. He continued to author the popular pro-opposition “Azad Soz” website and Facebook page, where he often posts articles and videos on political prisoners and corruption. In January 2015, Sadigli participated in a protest outside the offices of German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin, during a visit by President Aliyev. Sadigli told Human Rights Watch that his Berlin protest prompted authorities in Azerbaijan to retaliate against his family members.[174]

On February 13, 2015 police in Baku detained Sadigli’s brother, Elgiz Sadigli, on spurious drug charges. According to Tural Sadigli, his brother alleged that police planted drugs on him in the police station and in his car. He was initially held in pretrial detention for two months on charges of allegedly possessing 1.5 kilograms of marijuana, but then released to house arrest. In November 2015 an Azerbaijani court convicted Elgiz Sadigli, sentenced him to two years’ probation, and banned him from traveling outside of the country. He was interrogated twice during the seven-month investigation into the drug charges, but police focused questions on Tural’s activities in Germany.[175] He appealed the conviction but in January 2016, the appeals court left the verdict standing.

Also on February 13, 2015 police called in Sadigli’s father for questioning and held him overnight on allegations of swearing in public. Tural Sadigli told Human Rights Watch that the police informed his father that his and Elgiz’s detentions were in response to his son’s political activities in Berlin.[176]

The relatives of at least three other exiled activists who joined the Berlin protest had also been called in for questioning, according to information gathered by Sadigli. Police in Sumgayit and Baku had invited their relatives to the police station, kept them for several hours, and questioned them about their relatives’ political activities and who organized the Berlin protest. In one case, police showed one of the relatives a picture of the Berlin protest. Police warned them that they would be in trouble if their relatives in Germany continue their anti-government activities. In two cases relatives lost their jobs apparently as retaliation.[177]

Rasul Murselov

Rasul Murselov is an activist with the opposition APFP and is active on social media. In August 2014, Murselov participated in a workshop in Georgia, which included participants from Armenia, a neighboring country locked in a protracted conflict with Azerbaijan. Upon return to Azerbaijan, authorities questioned Murselov about his contact with Armenians. Fearing arrest Murselov fled and sought asylum in a European country.[178]

In September 2015, Murselov’s parents and five other relatives renounced all connections to Murselov in an appeal to President Aliyev and several government agencies.[179]Murselov told Human Rights Watch about the authorities’ pressure on parents in retaliation for his work:

My parents were repeatedly summoned to the police station and questioned about my activities. They were under pressure and threatened with dismissals from their jobs. Their decision to disown me was the only way for them to deflect the constant harassment from the police and other officials.[180]

IV. Proceedings Against Independent Lawyers

Azerbaijan has a small number of lawyers prepared to defend government critics in politically motivated trials. In recent years, the authorities have targeted these lawyers in a number of ways. These include arrests and prosecutions, investigations into lawyers’ organizations, imposition of travel bans, and questionable disciplinary proceedings which resulted in disbarments or threats of disbarment. Once disbarred, lawyers cannot represent clients in criminal proceedings. Travel bans prevent lawyers from representing clients at the European Court of Human Rights, receiving further education or training abroad, and participating in international events.

Investigations into Litigation Organizations

Intigam Aliyev

Intigam Aliyev, a leading human rights lawyer and head of the Legal Education Society (LES), was arrested in August 2014 under the joint criminal case against domestic and international NGOs described above and in April 2015 sentenced to seven and a half years’ imprisonment on charges of tax evasion, illegal entrepreneurship, and other crimes. In March 2016, the Supreme Court ordered Aliyev’s conditional release from prison. Aliyev faces travel restrictions for five years and cannot travel abroad without special permission. He is prohibited from holding public office for three years and his conviction has not been quashed.[181]

From 1999, the LES conducted strategic litigation, supported lawyers involved in strategic litigation, wrote reports related to different human rights issues, submitted complaints to the European Court of Human Rights, and organized trainings for lawyers, human rights defenders, youth activists, journalists, and others. As of this writing, the authorities have not returned the equipment and documents seized from LES following Aliyev’s arrest, including numerous case files, which Aliyev told Human Rights Watch compromises lawyer-client confidentiality and prevents continuing litigation on those cases. The materials still seized by the authorities include over 100 cases which Aliyev had submitted on behalf of applicants to the European Court of Human Rights. The criminal investigation into the Legal Education Society has been suspended but has not been closed, and Aliyev’s personal and the LES’s bank accounts remain frozen and the office sealed. Aliyev’s own case is pending before the European Court of Human Rights.[182]

Asabali Mustafayev

In 2014 the authorities opened an investigation into the Resource Center for Democracy and Human Rights, headed by lawyer Asabali Mustafayev. In conjunction with the investigation, the organization’s bank accounts were frozen, impeding the group’s work, and Mustafayev remains under a travel ban. Mustafayev does remain a member of the Bar Association and represents several individuals facing politically motivated charges, as well as at least numerous cases before the European Court of Human Rights.[183]

Annagi Hajibeyli

Annagi Hajibeyli, head of the Azerbaijan Lawyers’ Association, a nongovernmental human rights organization which worked on strategic litigation, lawyers’ training and human rights education, told Human Rights Watch that his personal bank account and the organization’s bank account were seized by the authorities in July 2014, in conjunction with the large criminal investigation into international and domestic NGOs. Officials interrogated Hajibeyli several times as part of the investigation. Although the prosecutor’s office told Hajibeyli in October 2015 that his bank accounts would be unfrozen and the travel ban lifted, when Hajibeyli attempted to travel later that year for urgent medical treatment that he could only receive abroad, border officials told him he was under a travel ban. Hajibeyli’s travel ban was lifted in August 2016 and he received the medical treatment. The organization’s bank accounts remain frozen, inhibiting their work.[184]

Other lawyers

Yalchin Imanov

Yalchin Imanov, 43, is a practicing lawyer and a member of the Collegium of Advocates, Azerbaijan’s bar association, since 2007. In recent years Imanov represented several prominent government critics including investigative journalist Khadija Ismayilova, political opposition members Mammad Ibrahim and Fuad Gahramanli, and others. On February 12, 2016 a judge of Baku’s Narimanov District Court filed a complaint with the Collegium of Advocates requesting disciplinary action against Imanov for his “unethical behaviour” towards the court. According to Imanov, in his statements during the trial of opposition politician Mammad Ibrahim he referred to “the judge’s negligent approach to the [defense] motions,” and “non-objective consideration of motions,” which the judge considered impolite and disrespectful, prompting the complaint.[185] The Collegium of Advocates’ Disciplinary Committee is expected to launch a review of Imanov’s conduct. At this writing, the committee has not set a date for the review. Imanov continues to practice.

Khalid Bagirov

In September 2014 an appeals court judge wrote to the Collegium of Advocates, asking it to take appropriate disciplinary measures against Khalid Bagirov, after he had a brief argument with the judge who upheld the first instance court decision not to release Ilgar Mammadov. In the course of the argument Bagirov questioned the independence of Azerbaijan’s judiciary, which the judge claimed was an insult the court, and alleged that Bagirov acted “as if he were above the law,” and that he did not show the court due respect, for example by standing up only reluctantly while addressing the court and failing to wear a professional gown.[186]

Bagirov’s license to practice law was suspended on December 10, 2014 and he was unable to continue his practice. The Collegium of Advocates successfully appealed to court with a request to disbar him. Bagirov has taken his case to the European Court of Human Rights. In addition to Mammadov, Bagirov had represented human rights defender Leyla Yunus and several NIDA movement youth activists in politically motivated cases.

Bahruz Bayramov and Elchin Sadigov

In April, the Collegium of Advocates took disciplinary action against two lawyers, Bahruz Bayramov and Elchin Sadigov, who were representing the journalist Parvis Hashimli. Hashimli had been sentenced in 2014 on trumped-up, politically motivated charges of possessing and smuggling firearms, and was pardoned in mid-March 2016. Before Hashimli’s pardon, at his Supreme Court appeal hearing in November 2015, the judge declined to release him on appeal. In a media interview shortly thereafter, Bayramov criticized the judge’s decision, saying he believed that the Ministry of National Security, who had detained Hashimli, had influenced the decision.

The judge filed a complaint with the Collegium in November 2015 asking for disciplinary measures against both Bayramov and Sadigov. The judge claimed that Bayramov had used abusive language about him in media interviews and that both lawyers had failed to provide a quality defense for Hashimli. Bayramov defended himself saying that he never made any personal verbal attacks on the judge, but rather criticized the decision to uphold the verdict against Hashimli.[187]The Collegium’s Disciplinary Committee questioned both lawyers in late 2015 and recommended that the Bar Association debar them.

On April 1, 2016, the Bar Association reprimanded Bayramov and warned Sadigov. Both lawyers told Human Rights Watch that neither the reprimand nor warning affects their professional activities. However, they believe the punishment creates ground for easy dismissal anytime.[188]

Alaif Hasanov

Lawyer Alaif Hasanov represented a veteran human rights defender Leyla Yunus who was arrested in July 2014 and convicted in August 2015 to eight-and-a-half years on bogus tax-related offences. In September 2014, he publicized a complaint by Yunus about harassment and pressure put on her by one of her cellmates. In response to the accusations, the cellmate filed a criminal defamation lawsuit against Hasanov, claiming he insulted her when he called her “a criminal and a recidivist” in an interview with Azadlig newspaper.[189] In November 2014, a court found Hasanov guilty of insult and sentenced him to 240 hours of public service.[190] On July 3, 2015 in connection with the defamation conviction, the Collegium of Advocates disbarred Hasanov, but did not inform him of the hearing.[191]In September 2016, the Baku appeals court rejected Hasanov’s appeal against the decision.[192] Hasanov is prohibited from practicing criminal law.

Relevant International Legal Standards

Malicious prosecution or disbarment of an attorney threatens the independence of the legal profession and thereby undermines the right to counsel as set forth in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Azerbaijan is party to both treaties.

The United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, adopted in 1990, provide guarantees for the unimpeded functioning of lawyers. Principle 16 states:

Governments shall ensure that lawyers (a) are able to perform all of their professional functions without intimidations, hindrance, harassment or improper interference; (b) are able to travel and consult with their clients freely both within their own country and abroad; and (c) shall not suffer, or be threatened with, prosecution or administrative, economic or other sanctions for any action taken in accordance with recognized professional duties, standards and ethics.[193]

V. International Response to Azerbaijan’s Civil Society Crackdown

In recent years, the international community has responded to Azerbaijan’s lack of respect for human rights in a disjointed and inconsistent manner, hindering the possibility of a clear, unified policy response to the civil society crackdown. Throughout 2015 and 2016 the European Union (EU), the United States (US), and Azerbaijan’s other bilateral and multilateral partners have issued statements deploring the arrests and convictions of activists and journalists and welcoming releases, but failed to impose consequences for Azerbaijan’s human rights crackdown.

The only clear setback for Baku came in April 2015, when the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a prominent international multi-stakeholder initiative that promotes government openness in natural resource management, downgraded Azerbaijan’s status in the group due to the government’s failure to adhere to EITI standards on civil society.

The severe drop in global oil prices in 2015 took a significant toll on Azerbaijan’s petroleum export-dependent economy. Low economic performance and depletion of oil revenue reserves prompted Azerbaijani leadership to seek loans from multilateral development banks.[194]This provides additional opportunities for these institutions to insist on institutional reforms, including fostering an enabling environment for civil society as a precondition for certain assistance.

The EU and Azerbaijan are about to embark on negotiating a new framework document to replace the 1999 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which provided the legal framework for EU-Azerbaijan bilateral relations in the areas of political dialogue, trade, investment, and economic, legislative, and cultural cooperation. The new agreement is designed to foster closer political and economic ties between Brussels and Baku, but the lengthy talks on the new partnership will also provide the EU with an invaluable opportunity to press Azerbaijan for concrete improvements in the area of human rights.

Azerbaijan’s other international partners, including the Council of Europe, the UN, and the US should also continue to use bilateral and multilateral engagement to raise human rights concerns, including those described in this report. Efforts should include urging the authorities to release journalists, political activists, and human rights defenders imprisoned on bogus charges; to stop the harassment of journalists, activists, and other government critics, as well as independent lawyers; to end the crackdown on civil society; and to bring legislation related to freedom of association into line with international norms.

Economic Downturn and the Role of Multilateral Development Banks

The economic downturn following the 2015 global oil price drop prompted the government to devalue the national currency, the manat, in February and December 2015, resulting in significant price increases.[195] By mid-January 2016, the price of some food items had doubled.[196] Protests against price hikes and high unemployment took place across Azerbaijan.[197]Even as energy prices rebounded by mid-2016, the manat remained weak. More than two-thirds of the country’s currency reserves had been depleted by July.[198]In response, the government has more actively sought financing from multilateral development banks, including the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank.

Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)

Azerbaijan was the first state to become compliant in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a multi-stakeholder effort to promote better governance of resource-rich countries by fostering open public debate about how oil, gas, and mining revenues are used.[199]In April 2015, the EITI board voted to downgrade Azerbaijan’s status from a compliant to a candidate country recognizing that the government’s crackdown on civil society contravened the EITI civil society protocol.[200] The protocol requires governments to ensure “an enabling environment for civil society participation with regard to relevant laws, regulations, and administrative rules as well as actual practice in implementation of the EITI” and “refrain from actions which result in narrowing or restricting public debate in relation to implementation of the EITI.”[201] This was the first instance in which EITI downgraded a country’s status for non-compliance with the civil society protocol.

The EITI board issued a list of corrective measures that the Azerbaijani government must take in order to regain its compliant status, including that “civil society substantively engaged in the EITI process are able to freely access and use funding to carry out their activities.” Civil society organizations must also be able “to access their bank accounts and register new grants for the purpose of activities related to the EITI process and natural resource governance.” These corrective measures also require that “civil society representatives substantively engaged in the EITI process are able to speak freely about the EITI process and express views on natural resource governance without fear or threat of reprisal or harassment.”[202]

During its October 2016 board meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan, the EITI will assess Azerbaijan’s actions to meet the remedial actions prescribed a year-and-a-half earlier.

Multilateral Development Banks

As noted above, Azerbaijan was hard hit by the fall in oil prices. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) anticipates that Azerbaijan’s economy will contract by 3 percent in 2016, its weakest performance in more than two decades.[203]Low economic performance and depletion of its oil revenue reserves prompted Azerbaijani leadership to seek loans from several multilateral development banks.[204] The government is pinning its hopes on gas as its main source of steady income in the future and seeks international financial support for its extractive industries.

The two largest proposed projects requiring financing are the expansion of the Shah Deniz Gas Field and the development of the Southern Gas Corridor. The Shah Deniz Gas Field entails the construction of 26 subsea wells and two offshore platforms, expansion of the Sangachal Oil and Gas Terminal, and connection to the South Caucasus Pipeline.[205]The Southern Gas Corridor is a series of projects and pipelines designed to deliver natural gas from the Caspian Sea and the Middle East to Europe, each pipeline segment partially owned by the government of Azerbaijan either directly or through the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) or its subsidiary.[206]

To meet the needs for new pipeline construction, and partly to offset its budget deficit, Azerbaijan and the co-owners of the pipeline, including Turkey, are seeking loans from the World Bank (WB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).The EBRD, EIB, and the World Bank are financing or considering financing the Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) in Turkey from the Georgian border to Greece, and the EBRD, EIB, and the International Financial Corporation (the private sector lending arm of the World Bank Group) are financing or considering financing the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) through Albania and Italy.[207]Azerbaijan has received financing from the ADB and EBRD for the Shah Deniz Gas Field and is seeking additional financing from these institutions for its expansion.[208]

Independent groups have raised significant concerns about the environmental and human rights impact of these projects.[209]Extractives projects only advance the social and economic situations of ordinary people when governments receive revenue from these projects and invest this money in addressing social and economic needs. Multilateral development banks have emphasized transparency of revenue and expenditures and avenues for people to hold the government accountable for spending decisions as essential to sustainable, inclusive development.[210]In addition to their own commitments to transparency and accountability, the multilateral development banks have each endorsed EITI.[211]

As outlined above, through its broad crackdown on civil society, the government has largely eliminated avenues for independent groups and activists to hold it accountable. Development banks should therefore only invest in projects that benefit Azerbaijan’s extractive industries once the government both guarantees that civil society can function without undue hindrance and fully implements the corrective measures required by the EITI board.

Azerbaijan is also seeking direct budget financing from the multilateral development banks, particularly the ADB, which has the least stringent requirements for disbursing such funds.[212]In light of the crucial role that independent civil society plays in exposing corruption and holding the government accountable for its spending decisions, multilateral development banks should not provide direct budget support until the government allows civil society to operate freely. Instead, these banks should finance projects that go directly toward meeting the urgent social and economic needs of the people of Azerbaijan and supporting programs that strengthen the link between the government’s allocation of available resources and progressive realization of economic and social rights.

The EBRD is the only multilateral development bank that has a political mandate. Its Articles of Agreement provide:

…the purpose of the Bank shall be to foster the transition towards open market-oriented economies and to promote private and entrepreneurial initiative in the Central and Eastern European countries committed to and applying the principles of multiparty democracy, pluralism and market economics.[213]

The EBRD understands “multiparty democracy and pluralism” to embrace civil and political rights. In line with this mandate, the EBRD should establish benchmarks that the government of Azerbaijan must meet to show it is committed to adhering to these principles. The degree to which the government meets these benchmarks should have a direct correlation with the EBRD’s operations within the country, with any public lending or lending benefiting the extractives industry prohibited until the government has met these benchmarks. The EBRD has limited its lending in this way in Belarus and Turkmenistan, under what it calls a “calibrated approach.”[214] It should also apply this approach in Azerbaijan, in light of the severe crackdown.

Seeking International Recognition and Strategic Partnerships

Azerbaijan has been working to establish itself as a credible player in the international arena, seeking strategic partnerships and leadership roles in various international and regional bodies. It won a nonpermanent seat on the UN Security Council in late 2011, held rotational chairmanship of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers in 2014, and hosted numerous international mega events, including the Eurovision Song Contest in May 2012, the inaugural European Games in June 2015, and the Formula 1 Grand Prix in June 2016.

Azerbaijan’s international partners should use bilateral and multilateral frameworks of engagement to raise human rights concerns, including those described in this report. Sustained pressure and clear benchmarks for remedying human rights violations are needed if the international community is to succeed in persuading the Azerbaijani government to respect fundamental rights and liberties.

European Union

Cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan in the energy field has flourished over the years, leading to closer economic and political ties between Baku and Brussels but not to improved governance or human rights in Azerbaijan. In September 2015, the Azerbaijani authorities almost entirely disengaged from political dialogue with the EU, in response to a critical European Parliament resolution on Azerbaijan.[215]

In February 2016, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission Federica Mogherini visited Azerbaijan and met with President Aliyev and Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov. They reaffirmed cooperation via the Eastern Partnership, a joint initiative comprised of the EU, its member states, and a number of regional governments, including Azerbaijan, and pledged to look ahead to a potential new bilateral agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan.[216]

The negotiations for the new bilateral agreement are expected to start by the end of 2016 and may take years to finalize. As the European Commission and Azerbaijan embark on negotiating a new partnership agreement, the EU and its member states should make sure that any framework for relations between the EU and Azerbaijan has a strong human rights component. As a minimum requirement for successful talks, the EU should insist on Azerbaijan’s implementation of the European Court of Human Rights decision on Ilgar Mammadov and urge the authorities to allow civil society groups to operate without fear of retribution, including by allowing the EU to disburse grants to local groups.

United States

The US and Azerbaijan have emphasized their shared interests in the energy and natural resources sectors, as well as regional security, given Azerbaijan’s strategic location relative to Iran, Russia, and other countries. The US and Azerbaijan have a trade agreement and an investment treaty.[217]On several occasions, the US State Department urged the release of people imprisoned on politically motivated charges and, in an April 2015 a press release, acknowledged “a broad crackdown on human rights activists” in Azerbaijan.[218]

In late March 2016, President Aliyev visited Washington, DC, to attend the Nuclear Security Summit and met bilaterally with US Secretary of State John Kerry. Shortly before the trip, Aliyev announced a pardon that included a number of activists imprisoned on politically motivated charges, as described above. A State Department press release about the Aliyev-Kerry meeting indicated that Secretary Kerry welcomed the releases and urged further progress on human rights.[219]

In late 2015, bipartisan legislation was introduced in the US House of Representatives entitled “The Azerbaijan Democracy Act of 2015,” which threatened sanctions against Azerbaijani officials if political prisoners were not released.[220]

Council of Europe

A June 2015 resolution from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe noted a broad “crackdown on human rights in Azerbaijan,” and condemned the “systemic repression” of those critical of the government. In December 2015 Council of Europe Secretary General Thorbjørn Jagland launched an official inquiry into the implementation of the European Convention of Human Rights in Azerbaijan, with specific reference to Azerbaijan’s failure to release Ilgar Mammadov.[221] This procedure had only been used by the Secretary General’s office in a few instances in the past. However, Jagland’s special representative could not carry out a visit to Azerbaijan in 2016, apparently due to the government’s failure to arrange the meetings that would allow the representative to fulfill his mandate.
 

The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Nils Muižnieks, has repeatedly spoken out about the poor human rights situation in Azerbaijan and intervened several times before the European Court of Human Rights on cases brought against Azerbaijan.[222]

The European Court of Human Rights found violations in numerous cases involving human rights defenders and activists in Azerbaijan, including Ilgar Mammadov,[223] Tofig Yagublu,[224]and Rasul Jafarov.[225]Other cases are pending.

United Nations

In September 2016, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders, Michel Forst visited Azerbaijan. In addition to Forst’s findings related to control over nongovernmental organizations and prosecutions of human rights defenders noted above, Forst condemned the Azerbaijani government’s “targeting of independent journalists, newspapers, media outlets and retaliation for views expressed on the Internet,” as well as the use of “criminal prosecutions, disciplinary action, and other administrative measures against lawyers.”[226]

Following his May 2016 visit, the Special Rapporteur on arbitrary detention Sètondji Adjovi condemned prosecutions of human rights defenders and activists, as noted above. He also criticized authorities’ refusal to grant some detainees a lawyer of their choosing and the arrest of persons for administrative offenses and their subsequent investigation under criminal charges. Adjovi also criticized “administrative offences defined in broad and imprecise terms which lead to deprivation of liberty on unreasonable grounds” such as hooliganism and refusal to obey public authorities.[227] Other special rapporteurs have visited Azerbaijan in recent years and Azerbaijan has accepted a request for an invitation from the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association.[228]

In June 2015, 25 states issued a joint statement at the UN Human Rights Council condemning the “systematic silencing of critical voices” in Azerbaijan. It was the first time that states had issued such a statement on Azerbaijan at the Human Rights Council.[229] In September 2015 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein issued a statement deploring the “continuing civil society crackdown in Azerbaijan.”[230] A key concern in both statements was the detention of those expressing independent and critical views.[231]

 

Acknowledgements

This report was researched and written by Giorgi Gogia, South Caucasus director at Human Rights Watch, Vugar Gojayev, research assistant at Human Rights Watch, and Jane Buchanan, associate Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch. Research support was provided by Kathryn Zehr, associate in the Europe and Central Asia division, and Neil Miller, intern in the Europe and Central Asia division, and Emily Gabor and Ishita Petkar, interns in the Business and Human Rights division of Human Rights Watch. Kathryn Zehr and Neil Miller also contributed to the chapter on international responses.

The report was edited by Jane Buchanan. Rachel Denber, deputy director for the Europe and Central Asia division, Aisling Reidy, senior legal advisor, and Tom Porteous, deputy program director, of Human Rights Watch reviewed the report. Phillippe Dam, advocacy director with the Europe and Central Asia division, reviewed the chapter on international actors and the recommendations; Jessica Evans, senior researcher with the Business and Human Rights division of Human Rights Watch wrote portions of and reviewed the section on multilateral development banks and the recommendations; Claire Ivers, senior EU advocate at Human Rights Watch, reviewed the recommendations and text concerning the EU; and Sarah Margon, Washington director at Human Rights Watch, reviewed the recommendations and text concerning the US.

Production assistance was provided by Kathryn Zehr and Amelia Neumayer, Business and Human Rights associate, Olivia Hunter, photo and publications associate, Rafael Jimenez, graphic designer, Fitzroy Hepkins, administrative manager, and José Martínez, senior coordinator.

Human Rights Watch expresses its sincere thanks to the human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists, political activists, and their family members who shared their experiences with us and provided invaluable support for this research.

 

[1]“Gülen supporters to be prosecuted in Azerbaijan,” News.Az, August 15, 2016, http://news.az/articles/politics/111743 (accessed August 17, 2016).

[2]“Ramil Usubov: Against the FETO movement’s supporters in Azerbaijan” [in Azeri], Azadlig Radiosu, August 31, 2016, http://www.azadliq.org/a/ramil-usubov-Gülen -herekat/27957708.html (accessed September 21, 2016); and “Ramil Usubov promised the Turks to fight against FETO in Azerbaijan,Turan News Agency, August 31, 2016, http://contact.az/docs/2016/Politics/083100167328en.htm#.V-I6ePB94hc (accessed September 2, 2016).

[3]Institute for Reporter Freedom and Safety (IRFS), “Official Statement Issued on Opposition Party Activist’s Arrest,” August 19, 2016, https://www.irfs.org/news-feed/official-statement-issued-on-opposition-p... (accessed August 26, 2016); and “Persons involved in illegal investigation detained in Azerbaijan,” Trend News Agency, August 19, 2016,http://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/2650897.html (accessed August 20, 2016).

[4] They are charged with violating legislation on operative-investigative activity and abuse of office, Criminal Code of Azerbaijan, arts. 308.1 and 302.1. IRFS, “Official Statement Issued on Opposition Party Activist’s Arrest.”

[5] Ibid.

[6]Criminal Code of Azerbaijan, arts. 302 and 308. Human Rights Watch telephone interview with lawyer Asabali Mustafayev, September 23, 2016.

[7] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Fuad Ahmadli, April 10, 2016.

[8]“Azerbaijan Arrests another Blogger,” Meydan TV, January 25, 2016, https://www.meydan.tv/en/site/news/11389/Azerbaijan-Arrests-Another-Blog... (accessed September 2, 2016); “In Azerbaijan, advocate claims police pressure on Khalid Khanlarov,” Caucasian Knot, February 4, 2016, http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/34497/ (accessed September 2, 2016).

[9] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with lawyer Agil Lahij, September 22, 2016.

[10]“Azerbaijan blames party leader’s aide for distributing Gülen’s ideas,” Ann.az, August 24, 2016, http://ann.az/en/azerbaijan-blames-party-leaders-aide-for-distributing-Gülen s-ideas/#.V91CXJh96Cg (accessed September2, 2016); and Reporters Without Borders, “Turkey-style pretext used to arrest critic in Azerbaijan,” August 24, 2016, https://rsf.org/en/news/turkey-style-pretext-used-arrest-critic-azerbaijan (accessed September 2, 2016).

[11]“Lawyer: The investigation called Faig Amirov Imam of Gulen supporters (UPDATED),” Contact.az, August 22, 2016, http://www.contact.az/docs/2016/Politics/082000166221en.htm#.V-ySZ_krLIV (accessed September 29, 2016).

[12] Criminal Code of Azerbaijan, arts. 283.2.2 (inciting national, racial or religious hatred) and 168.1 (infringement of the rights of citizens under the pretext of performing religious rites). Human Rights Watch telephone interview with lawyer Agil Lahij, September 22, 2016.

[13]Criminal Code of Azerbaijan, art. 234.4.3. See also: “Activist Arrested, Held Incommunicado,” Human Rights Watch news release, August 19, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/08/19/azerbaijan-activist-arrested-held-in....

[14] Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with lawyers Fariz Namazli and Nemat Karimli, August 17 and 19, 2016.

[15] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with lawyer Nemet Karimli, August 18, 2016.

[16] Ibid.; and Eynulla Fatulaev, “Ali Kerimli and Fethullah Gülen’s residency [АлиКеримлиирезидентураФетхуллахаГюлена],” Haqqin.az, August 15, 2016, http://haqqin.az/news/77712 (accessed September 10, 2016).

[17] Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with lawyer Nemet Karimli, August 17 and 18, 2016.

[18] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with lawyer Nemet Karimli, October 7, 2016.

[19] Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with lawyer Javad Javadov, August 12 and September 15, 2016; see also: Liz Fuller, “Azerbaijani theologian is said to have been plotting coup,” RFE/RL, November 27, 2015, http://www.rferl.org/content/caucasus-report-azerbaijan-theologian-plott... (accessed August 29, 2016).

[20] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with lawyer Javad Javadov, August 12, 2016; see also: “Taleh Bagirov: At the Organized Crimes Unit I faced Incredible Torture” [in Azeri], July 19, 2016, Azadlig Radiosu, http://www.azadliq.org/a/27866707.html (accessed September 27, 2016).

[21] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with lawyer Javad Javadov, September 16, 2016.

[22] Human Rights Watch, Tightening the Screws (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/09/01/tightening-screws/azerbaijans-crac...

[23]Human Rights Watch telephone interview with lawyer Nemat Karimli, August 13, 2016.

[24] IRFS, “APFP deputy chairman Fuad Gahramanli detained,” December 8, 2015, https://www.irfs.org/news-feed/apfp-deputy-chairman-fuad-gahramanli-deta... (accessed September 22, 2016).

[25]“Azerbaijan Prosecutor General’s Office Issues Statement on Arrest of APFP Deputy Chairman,” Eurasia Diary, December 9, 2015, http://eurasiadiary.com/news/human-rights/1397-azerbaijani-prosecutor-ge... (accessed July 14, 2016).

[26] Criminal Code of Azerbaijan, arts. 192.1 (illegal business) and 308.2 (abuse of official powers–when such actions lead to heavy consequences or are committed with the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election (referendum)). Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with lawyer Javad Javadov, August 4 and 16, 2016.

[27] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with lawyer Javad Javadov, September 16, 2016.

[28] Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with senior members of the REAL Movement, names withheld, August 14 and 16, 2016. The September 2016 constitutional referendum abolished minimum age requirements for presidential and parliamentary candidates, extended the presidential term of office from five to seven years, and expanded the power of the president to dissolve parliament. “Azerbaijan calls September referendum on greater presidential powers,” EurActiv, July 26, 2016, https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/azerbaijan-calls-sep... (accessed August 26, 2016).

[29] Human Rights Watch telephone phone interview with lawyer Elchin Sadigov, May 13, 2016. See also “Azerbaijan: Activists Face Bogus Drug Charges,” Human Rights Watch news release, May 13, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/13/azerbaijan-activists-face-bogus-drug....

[30] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with lawyer Elchin Sadigov, May 13, 2016.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Police did not allow Mammadov’s family members to be present during the search, and Ibrahimov’s mother alleges she saw police plant drugs in her home. Human Rights Watch telephone interview with lawyer Elchin Sadigov, May 13, 2016.

[33] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Tofig Hasanli’s brother Faig Hasanov, April 9, 2016.

[34]Criminal Code of Azerbaijan, art. 234.4.3.

[35]“Kidnapped satirical poet Tofig Hasanli,” Human Rights Freedoms, October 16, 2015, http://hrf.report/kidnapped-satirical-poet-tofig-hasanli/ (accessed August 29, 2016).

[36]Satirist Tofig Hasanli Says He is Being Threatened” [in Azeri], Radio Azadliq, January 1, 2015, http://www.azadliq.org/ content/article/26983149.html (accessed September 1, 2016).

[37]“Azerbaijani Opposition Figure Gets Three Years in Prison,” Radio Azadliq, March 15, 2016, http://www.rferl.org/content/ azerbaijan-opposition-figure-three-years-in-prison/27612365.html (accessed July 14, 2016).

[38] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Mehman Huseynov, September 16, 2016.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with activist, name withheld, September 17, 2016.

[41]“Azerbaijani Police Clash with Activists after Baku Rally,” RFE/RL, September 17, 2016, http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan-opposition-rally-baku-aliyev/279... (accessed September 21, 2016).

[42] Ibid.

[43] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with APFP members, names withheld, September 22, 2016.

[44] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Elshan Gasimov, September 17, 2016.

[45] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with lawyer Natig Adilov, September 16, 2016.

[46] Protests of a few hundred people gathered throughout the country, including in Siyazan, Lankaran, Fizuli, Ajabedi, Agsu, Mingechevir and other towns and districts. “Azerbaijan Blames Protests on Everything but Economy,” EurasiaNet.org, January 14, 2016, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/76831 (accessed September 27, 2016).

[47]ЖителирегионовАзербайджанапротестуют (Видеоифото) [Residents in Azerbaijan’s regions are protesting (Video and photos)],” Radio Azadliq, January 14, 2016, http://www.radioazadlyg.org/a/aksiya-blgeler-rayonlar-bahalasma-polis/27... (accessed August 15, 2016).

[48]“Official information released on protests in Siyazan and other districts,” APA News Agency, January 13, 2016, http://en.apa.az/azerbaijani-news/developments/official-information-rele... (accessed August 15, 2016).

[49] Ibid.

[50]“Authorities in Azerbaijan crackdown on protests, arrested 200 people,” Human Rights Freedoms, January 15, 2016, http://hrf.report/authorities-in-azerbaijan-crack-down-on-protests/ (accessed August 15, 2016).

[51] The activists were Yusif Latifov (20 days), Mammad Balamammadov (10 days), Shahin Alizade (30 days), Imanverdi Aliyev (30 days), and Nazim Hasanli (30 days). Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Natig Adilov, September 16, 2016.

[52]“The court arrested the son of oppositioner for seven days (UPDATED),” Contact.az, January 14, 2016, http://www.contact.az/docs/2016/Social/011300143354en.htm#.VwY1jfl9600 (accessed August 30, 2016).

[53] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Turan Ibrahim, August 10, 2016.

[54]“PFPA Activist Arrested in Sabirabad,” Contact.az, February 17, 2016, http://69.195.75.124/docs/2016/Social/021700147143en.htm#.Vt0z2fkrK00 (accessed August 30, 2016).

[55]“Sabirabad district police hunting Facebookers” [in Azeri], Europe Without Political Prisoners, February 22, 2016, http://nopoliticalprisoners.org/az/hesabat-v-x-b-rl-r/x-b-r/628-sabiraba... (accessed August 30, 2016).

[56] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Sahib Rustamli, April 9, 2016.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Khalid Khanlarov, April 10, 2016.

[59] Code of Administrative Offenses of Azerbaijan, arts. 510 (minor hooliganism) and 535 (resisting police). Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Asabali Mustafayev, August 11, 2016.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Ruslan Garayev, August 12, 2016.

[62] European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force September 3, 1953, as amended by Protocols No. 3, 5, 8, and 11 which entered into force on September 21, 1970, December 20, 1971, January 1, 1990, and November 1, 1998, respectively, arts. 5, 6, 9, and 14.

[63]“Azerbaijan: Government Detains Outspoken Critics,” Human Rights Watch news release, February 6, 2013, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/06/azerbaijan-government-detains-outspo....

[64]Human Rights Watch, “Dispatches: Azerbaijan’s Too Predictable Crackdown,” March 18, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/ news/2014/03/18/dispatches-azerbaijans-too-predictable-crackdown.

[65]Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, Judgement of May 22, 2014, para. 143.

[66] Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Supervision of the execution of the Court’s judgments, September 22, 2016, https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=09000016806... (accessed September 26, 2016).

[67] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with lawyer Javad Javadov, April 2, 2016. See also: “Azerbaijan: Release Outspoken Critics,” Human Rights Watch news release, November 4, 2013, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/04/ azerbaijan-release-outspoken-critics.

[68]“Ilgar Mamedov Put in Punishment Cell (UPDATED),” Contact.az, August 14, 2015, http://contact.az/docs/2015/Social/081400126241en.htm#.VwDhYvl9600 (accessed August 26, 2016).

[69] Council of Europe, Letter from Thorbjørn Jagland, Council of Europe Secretary General, to Azerbaijani Minister of Justice Mr. Fikrat Mammadov, August 3, 2015, https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent? documentId=090000168045f816 (accessed August 24, 2016).

[70] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with lawyer Javad Javadov, April 9, 2016.

[71] Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with lawyer Javad Javadov, April 9 and 12, 2016.

[72] Ibid.

[73]“They Met with Ilgar Mammadov” [in Azeri], Azadliq Radiosu, October 27, 2016, http://www.azadliq.org/a/27329348.html (accessed September 20, 2016).

[74]“Submission to the UN Committee Against Torture on Azerbaijan,” Human Rights Watch submission, November 2, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/02/hrw-submission-un-committee-against-....

[75]“Court Rejects Petition for Ilgar Mammadov’s Release,” APA News Agency, April 29, 2016, http://en.apa.az/azerbaijani-news/social-news/court-rejects-petition-for... (accessed August 19, 2016).

[76]“Azerbaijan: Government Repression Tarnishes Chairmanship,” Human Rights Watch news release, September 29, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/29/azerbaijan-government-repression-tar...

[77]“Harlem Shakedown in Azerbaijan,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), May 22, 2013, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/harlem-shakedown-azerbaijan (accessed August 30, 2016).

[78] Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with lawyers Fariz Namazli and Nemet Karimli, April 5, 2016. See also: “Ilkin Rustamzade put into dungeon of Baku SIZO for second time within month,” Caucasian Knot, December 20, 2014, http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/30299/ (accessed August 19, 2016); “With love from Kurdekhani to the Working Group,” [in Azeri], Meydan TV, November 25, 2014, https://www.meydan.tv/az/site/authors/3816/%C4%B0%C5%9F%C3%A7i-qrupuna-K... (accessed August 19, 2016); and “Ilkin Rustamzade has again been placed in solitary confinement,” [in Azeri], Meydan TV, December 19, 2014, https://www.meydan.tv/az/site/politics/4104/ (accessed August 30, 2016).

[79] Human Rights Watch, “Dispatch: Jail Beckons for Azerbaijani Journalist,” January 30, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/30/dispatches-jail-beckons-azerbaijani-... (accessed July 11, 2016).

[80]“The Court of Appeal upheld the arrest of the journalist Seymour Hazy,” Contact.az, September 29, 2015, http://www.contact.az/docs/2015/Social/092900131107en.htm#.VwExH_l9600 (accessed August 12, 2016).

[81] Azerbaijan’s Supreme Court reduced the charge from Criminal Code art. 234.4.3 (illegal manufacture, production, acquisition and possession of drugs) to a lesser charge under article 234.1 (illegal purchaseor possession of drugs for personal consumption). Azerbaijan Free Expression Platform, http://azerbaijanfreexpression.org/campaigns/impunity/imprisoned-2015-si... (accessed August 16, 2016).

[82] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Nemet Karimli, April 9, 2016.

[83] Human Rights House Foundation, “Supreme Court Commuted Faraj Karimli,” May 24, 2016, http://hrf.report/supreme-court-commuted-faraj-karimli/ (accessed August 16, 2016).

[84]“Deputy Chairman of Musavat Faraj Kerimli Released,” Contact.az, October 4, 2016, http://contact.az/docs/2016/Politics/100400170576en.htm#.V_j6LPl96Um (accessed October 8, 2016).

[85] Amnesty International, “Azerbaijan: Jail sentence for brother of opposition politician ‘another nail in the coffin of freedom of expression’,” March 17, 2015, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/azerbaijan-jail-sentence-broth... (accessed September 20, 2016).

[86] See: “Tightening the Screws.”

[87] The Ministry of Justice often imposes arbitrary requirements, some of which can be difficult to meet. For example, officials often ask for a letter of recommendation from a relevant state agency. See: USAID Bureau for Europe and Eurasia, “The 2015 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia,” https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/1861/Europe_Eurasia_CSOSIReport_2015_Update8-29-16.pdf (accessed October 6, 2016). Published since 1997, the CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia studies the sustainability of SCO sector in 27 countries in the region and assesses the following seven dimensions: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, infrastructure, and public image.

[88] The Election Monitoring Center, founded in 2001. Human Rights Watch interview with Anar Mammadli, Warsaw, September 18, 2016.

[89] Ibid.

[90] Together with Mammadli, the court convicted Bashir Suleymanli, executive director of EMDS, and Elnur Mammadov, head of a partner group, International Organization of Volunteers, which EMDS partnered with in joint projects. Mammadli and Suleymanli were sentenced to five years and six months and three years and six months, respectively, while Mammadov was sentenced to two years on probation. “Dispatch: High Price of Activism in Azerbaijan,” Human Rights Watch, May 27, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/27/dispatches-high-price-activism-azerb.... Anar Mammadli is the winner of the 2014 Vaclav Havel Human Rights Prize awarded by the Council of Europe.

[91] Human Rights Watch interview with Anar Mammadli, Warsaw, September 18, 2016.

[92] Law on State Registration and State Registry of Legal Entities, as amended on December 17, 2013, arts. 9.3 and 9.4.

[93] Human Rights Watch interview with Zohrab Ismayil, Warsaw, September 18, 2016.

[94]“Rules on Studying the Activities of Non-Governmental Organizations, Branches or Representative Offices of Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations,” adopted by the Ministry of Justice on December 28, 2015, signed into the law on February 13, 2016.

[95] The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), “Civic Freedom Monitor: Azerbaijan,” updated August 24, 2016, http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/azerbaijan.html (accessed September 9, 2016).

[96] Human Rights Watch interview with an Azerbaijani NGO activist, name withheld, Warsaw, September 18, 2016.

[97] ICNL, “Civic Freedom Monitor: Azerbaijan,” updated, August 24, 2016. For example, the government can impose fines from 2,500 AZN to 15,000 AZN (US$1,600 to $10,000). See also: “The 2015 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia.”

[98] On February 15, 2013, the Azerbaijani parliament adopted a set of amendments to the Law on Grants, the Law on Nongovernmental Organizations, and the Code of Administrative Offenses, introducing stiffer administrative sanctions for NGOs that accept financial or other material assistance without a formal grant agreement with the donor. The amendments significantly increased fines for failure to file a proper grant agreement with the Ministry of Justice, which could also lead to confiscation of property. In addition, the amendments established prohibitive fines for giving and accepting cash donations higher than 200 AZN. Human Rights Watch, “Tightening the Screws.”

[99]“Rules on Registration of Grant Agreements,” adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers, June 5, 2015, arts. 3.1.1. through 3.1.10. If in the past filing a notarized copy of a grant agreement was sufficient, the new regulations require a person or NGO to submit the following documents: a copy of an original agreement, copy of the ID of a person acting as a donor, copy of the charter and registration certificate of a legal entity, copy of a power of attorney if the agreement is signed by a person other than a legal representative, copy of a document confirming a foreign donors’ authorization to issue grants in Azerbaijan, and a document confirming that the NGO or a branch or a representative office of a foreign NGO has submitted a financial statement to the Ministry of Finance.

[100] Although the requirement to register grants with the Ministry of Justice has been in place since 2009, it was largely a formality and had mostly a notification character until 2014. NGOs could access the grants even prior to the Ministry’s formal approval of the grant. For its September 2013 report, “Tightening the Screws,” Human Rights Watch was not aware of any instances in which the ministry refused to register an NGO grant agreement. In an official reply to Human Rights Watch’s inquiry, dated by August 27, 2013, the ministry responded that “during the whole period of application of the law there has been no rejection of registration [of a grant agreement].”

[101] According to the 2015 CSO Sustainability Index, over 50 large domestic NGOs and a number of international organizations, including OSCE, Oxfam, Counterpart International, World Vision, and Save the Children, were forced to completely stop their work in Azerbaijan in 2015. “The 2015 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia.”

[102]“Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Nongovermental Organizations, Public Unions and Foundations,” as amended October 17, 2014, art. 24.

[103]“The 2015 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia.”

[104] Cabinet of Ministers Decree “On Registration of Contract on Provision of Services and Works at the Expense of Foreign Financial Sources by Non-Governmental Organizations, as well as Branched or Representative Offices of Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations,” adopted on October 21, 2015. Rules on registration of grant agreements (decisions), 2015, on file with Human Rights Watch. See also, ICNL, “Civic Freedom Monitor: Azerbaijan,” updated August 24, 2016, http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/azerbaijan.html (accessed September 9, 2016).

[105] Human Rights Watch interview with Anar Mammadli, Warsaw, September 18, 2016.

[106] Ibid.

[107] Human Rights Watch interview with Nigar N. (pseudonym), location withheld for security reasons, September 18, 2016.

[108] Ibid.

[109]“The 2015 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia.”

[110]“Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Grants,” as amended October 17, 2014, art. 2; and “Resolution No. 339 of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Approval of the Procedure for Foreign Donors to Obtain the Right for Provision of Grants in the Territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan,” December 4, 2015.

[111]“Cabinet of Ministers of Azerbaijan Resolution 339,” and “Rules on obtaining the right to provide grants in the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan by foreign donors,” October 22, 2015. Obtaining a Ministry of Finance opinion is a complicated process and requires a donor to submit a grant agreement, the project duration, information about the recipient, financial and economic rationale for the grant, founding documents of the foreign donor, including translated, notarized, and legalized copies of its founding statute and registration. A donor must go through this complex process for each grant it wishes to issue.

[112] Cabinet of Ministers of Azerbaijan Resolution No. 339, art. 3.3.

[113]“The 2015 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia.”

[114] Ibid.

[115] Criminal Code of Azerbaijan, arts. 308.1 (abuse of power), and 313 (service forgery).

[116] Zohrab Ismayil and Ramute Remezaite, independent experts, “Shrinking Space for Civil Society in Azerbaijan,” June 2016, Annex 1.

[117] Human Rights Watch interview with Anar Mammadli, Warsaw, September 18, 2016.

[118] Human Rights Watch interview with Emin Huseynov, Warsaw, September 18, 2016. See also: www.irfs.org.

[119] Ibid.

[120] Rasim Aliyev, 30, a journalist and human rights activist replaced Emin as chairman of IRFS. Aliyev died on August 9, 2015 after being attacked the day before following his criticism of a famous Azerbaijani football player. In May 2016, five people were convicted in relation to the death, and received lengthy prison sentences. IRFS stated that Aliyev had received threats in the past and believes that the attack on Aliyev was in retaliation for his activism. Human Rights Watch interview with Emin Huseynov, Warsaw, September 18, 2016, and IRFS, “The Unsolved Murder of Rasim Aliyev,” August 2016, https://www.irfs.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/The-Unsolved-Murder-of-R... (accessed September 28, 2016).

[121] Human Rights Watch interview with Zohrab Ismayil, Warsaw, September 18, 2016.

[122] Ibid.

[123] Human Rights Watch interview with Nigar N. (pseudonym), location withheld for security reasons, September 18, 2016.

[124]“Background Briefing: Closing Civic Space in Azerbaijan,” prepared by Publish What You Pay, CIVICUS, and ARTICLE 19 and submitted to the Open Governance Partnership Steering Committee, March 2, 2015.

[125]“The 2015 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia.”

[126]Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Gubad Ibadoghlu, July 18, 2016.

[127] Human Rights Watch email correspondence with Gubad Ibadoghlu, October 10, 2016.

[128]About 5,000 manat is owed to USAID and about 2,000 manat to GIZ. Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Gubad Ibadoghlu, July 18, 2016.

[129]Ibid.

[130]Ibid.

[131] Human Rights Watch interview with Zohrab Ismayil, Warsaw, September 18, 2016.

[132] The Council on State Support to NGOs under the Auspices of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2016, http://www.cssn.gov.az/en/ (accessed September 9, 2016).

[133]Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Gubad Ibadoghlu, July 18, 2016.

[134]“The 2015 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia.”

[135] The authorities allowed Intigam Aliyev to travel for a short visit to Strasbourg, France, at the invitation of the Council of Europe, but have refused to lift the ban, even temporarily, for Khadija Ismayilova.

[136]“Dispatches: Free from Baku’s Grip, Reunited with Family,” Human Rights Watch, April 19, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/19/dispatches-free-bakus-grip-reunited-....

[137]“The 2015 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia.”

[138] Human Rights Watch interview with Anar Mammadli, Warsaw, September 18, 2016.

[139] Ibid.

[140] Human Rights Watch interview with Zohrab Ismayil, Warsaw, September 18, 2016.

[141] European Court of Human Rights, RasulJafarov v. Azerbaijan, Judgment of March 17, 2016.

[142] European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), “Opinion On the Law On Non-Governmental Organizations (Public Associations and Funds) as Amended of the Republic of Azerbaijan,” adopted at its 101 Plenary Session, Venice, December 12-13, 2014, http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2014)043-e (accessed September 9, 2016).

[143] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “End of mission statement by Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders: Visit to Azerbaijan,” September 22, 2016, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20544&LangID=E (accessed September 22, 2016).

[144]“Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Statement upon the Conclusion of its Visit to Azerbaijan, May 16-25, 2016,” http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20021&L... (accessed September 26, 2016).

[145] ECHR, art. 11. Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also sets out that the only restrictions permissible on freedom of association are those “which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

[146]See for example, Sidiropoulos and Others v. Greece, Judgment of July 10, 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-IV, para. 40; Gorzelik and Others v.Poland [GC], Judgment of February 17, 2004; and most recently Ramazanova and Others v.Azerbaijan, Judgment of February 1, 2007, para. 54, Zhechev v. Bulgaria, Judgment of June 21, 2007, para. 34, and Ismayilov v. Azerbaijan, Judgment of January 17, 2008.

[147] Ibid.

[148] For example, Tsonev v. Bulgaria, Judgment of April 13, 2006, para. 55.

[149]Tebieti Muhafize Cemiyyeti and Israfilov v. Azerbaijan, Judgment of October 8, 2009; Aliyev and others v. Azerbaijan, Judgment of December 18, 2008; Ismailov v. Azerbaijan, Judgment of January 17, 2008; Nasibova v. Azerbaijan, Judgment of October 18, 2007; and Ramazanova and Others v. Azerbaijan, Judgment of February 1, 2007.

[150] Ramazanova and Others v. Azerbaijan, Judgment of February 1, 2007, para. 59. In April 2001, four Azerbaijani residents founded a public association “Assistance to the Human Rights Protection of the Homeless and Vulnerable Residents of Baku,” a non-profit group aimed at providing aid to the homeless and defending their interests. Between April 2001 and July 2002 the founders submitted four unsuccessful applications to the Ministry of Justice. The ministry returned the application documents four times without registering the group, each time claiming the group’s charter did not comply with the requirements of domestic law.

[151] Ibid.

[152] Ibid, paras 54-60.

[153] Afgan Mukhtarli, “Azerbaijan: Campaign against Meydan TV Continues,” IWPR, November 3, 2015, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/azerbaijan-campaign-against-meydan-tv (accessed August 26, 2016).

[154] For more on Milli’s detention and conviction in 2010, see: “Azerbaijan: Young Bloggers Jailed,” Human Rights Watch news release, November 12, 2009, https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/11/12/azerbaijan-young-bloggers-jailed; and “Azerbaijan: Appeal Court Leaves Bloggers in Jail,” Human Rights Watch news release, March 10, 2010, https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/03/10/azerbaijan-appeal-court-leaves-blogg...

[155] Milli published this statement on July 27, 2015: https://www.facebook.com/emin.milli.3/posts/795862850533139?fref=nf&pnre... (accessed July 15, 2016).

[156]“Relatives disown Emin Milli,” Meydan TV, July 31, 2015, https://www.meydan.tv/en/site/news/7234/Relatives-disown-Emin-Milli.htm (accessed July 15, 2016).

[157]“Meydan TV under criminal investigation,” Meydan TV, April 20, 2016, https://www.meydan.tv/en/site/news/13800/(accessed September 20, 2016).

[158] Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with lawyer Elchin Sadigov, August 14 and 17, 2016.

[159]“Street Protest After Death in Azerbaijan Police Custody,” IWPR, August 27, 2015, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/street-protest-after-death-azerbaijan-police (accessed September 20, 2016).

[160] Human Rights Watch interviews with lawyer Elchin Sadigov, August 14 and 17, 2016.

[161]“Azerbaijan: Retribution Against Photographer,” Human Rights Watch news release, June 14, 2012, https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/14/azerbaijan-retribution-against-photographer

[162]“Swiss fly out opposition journalist hiding at its embassy,” The Guardian, June 14, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/14/swiss-fly-out-opposition-journalist-hiding-at-its-azerbaijan-embassy (accessed August 29, 2016).

[163] Criminal Code of Azerbaijan, art. 221.2.2. Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Mehman Huseynov, September 16, 2016.

[164] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Mehman Huseynov, September 16, 2016.

[165] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Mehman Huseynov, April 10, 2016.

[166] Reporters Without Borders, “Ganimat Zahid,” 2016, https://rsf.org/en/hero/ganimat-zahid (accessed September 20, 2016).

[167] Frontline Defenders, “Case history of Ganimat Zahidov,” 2016, https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/case-history-ganimat-zahidov (accessed September 21, 2016).

[168] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Ganimat Zahidov, April 11, 2016.

[169] IRFS, “Critical journalist Ganimat Zahid’s relatives sentenced to 6 years in prison,” June 28, 2016, https://www.irfs.org/news-feed/critical-journalist-ganimat-zahids-relati... (accessed September 21, 2016).

[170] Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with Ganimat Zahidov and Natig Adilov, April 10 and 11, 2016.

[171]“Azerbaijan sentences opposition journalist to 5 years in jail,” Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-azerbaijan-journalist-prison-idUSKBN0L... (accessed September 20, 2016).

[172] IRFS, “Opposition activist Murod Adilov sentenced to 6 years in prison,” May 16, 2015, https://www.irfs.org/news-feed/opposition-activist-murad-adilov-sentence... (accessed September 20, 2016).

[173]“Journalist Khalid Garayev arrested for 25 days (UPDATED),” Contact.az, October 30, 2014, http://www.contact.az/docs/2014/Social/102900094881en.htm (accessed September 20, 2016).

[174]“Dispatches: Jailed in Azerbaijan for Protest in Berlin,” Human Rights Watch, February 17, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/17/dispatches-jailed-azerbaijan-protest....

[175] Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with Sadigli’s family members, names withheld, and Tural Sadigli, September 15, 2016.

[176] Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with Tural Sadigli, April 24 and 27, 2016.

[177] Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with Tural Sadigli and protest participants, names withheld, August 16, 2016.

[178] Details withheld for security reasons. Human Rights Watch interviews with Rasul Murselov, April 8 and 9, 2016.

[179]“Parents disown their political prisoner son,” Musavat Daily, September 9, 2015, http://musavat.com/news/son-xeber/valideynleri-azerbaycanli-siyasi-mehbu... (accessed September 21, 2016).

[180] Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with Rasul Murselov, April 8 and 9, 2016.

[181] Human Rights Watch email correspondence with Intigam Aliyev, September 23, 2016. See also, “Azerbaijan: Human Rights Lawyer Convicted,” Human Rights Watch news release, April 22, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/22/azerbaijan-human-rights-lawyer-convicted; and “Dispatches: Top Rights Lawyer Freed in Azerbaijan,” Human Rights Watch, March 28, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/28/dispatches-top-rights-lawyer-freed-a....

[182] Human Rights Watch email correspondence with Intigam Aliyev, September 23, 2016.

[183] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Asabali Mustafayev, August 12, 2016.

[184] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Annagi Hajibeyli, April 19, 2016.

[185] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Yalchin Imanov, April 16 and August 9, 2016.

[186] Human Rights Watch letter to Azer Tagiev, Chairman, Collegium of Advocates, January 27, 2015; and Human Rights Watch interview with Khalid Bagirov, Tbilisi, April 8, 2016.

[187] Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with Bahruz Bayramov and Elchin Sadigov, September 22, 2016.

[188] Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with Bahruz Bayramov and Elchin Sadigov, April 16, 2016.

[189]“Azerbaijan: Leyla Yunus’ Cellmate Demands to Punish Leyla’s Advocate,” Caucasian Knot, September 30, 2014, http://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/29488/ (accessed September 27, 2016).

[190]“Azerbaijan: Alif Hasanov, Leyla Yunus’ Advocate, Sentenced to Public Works,” Caucasian Knot, November 6, 2014, http://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/29855/ (accessed September 27, 2016).

[191]“Azerbaijani Bar Association Suspends Powers of Alaif Hasanov,” Caucasian Knot, July 4, 2015, http://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/32253/ (accessed September 27, 2016).

[192]“Azerbaijan court rejects lawyer Alaif Hasanov’s appeal against disbarment,” Human Rights House Network, September 7, 2016, http://humanrightshouse.org/Articles/21864.html (accessed September 27, 2016).

[193] Although the Basic Principles are not, in themselves, legally binding instruments, they contain certain principles and rights that are based on human rights standards enshrined in the ICCPR and ECHR.

[194] Jack Farchy, “IMF, World Bank Move to Forestall Oil-Led Defaults,” Financial Times, January 30, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/9759f42a-c51b-11e5-b3b1-7b2481276e45 (accessed October 12, 2016).

[195] From a peak above $100 per barrel in mid-2014, global oil prices fell as low as $30 per barrel near the end of 2015. Ninety percent of Azerbaijan’s exports in 2014 consisted of petroleum, and the oil sector comprised 37 percent of the country’s GDP. Ivana Kottasova and John Defterios, “This oil producing country may need a bailout,” CNN Money, January 28, 2016, http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/28/news/economy/oil-default-azerbaijan-bail... (accessed September 14, 2016).

[196] Arzu Geybullayeva and Tony Wesolowsky, “Azerbaijan Suffers From Currency Crash, Low Oil Prices,” RFE/RL, January 10, 2016, http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan-suffers-currency-crash-oil-price... (accessed September 14, 2016).

[197] Zulfugar Agayev, “Azeris Protest Price Increases as Currency Slumps to Record,” Bloomberg, January 13, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-13/azeris-protest-against... (accessed January 13, 2016).

[198] Zulfugar, Agayev, “Oil Currency Breaks Ranks as Azeris Can’t Quench Dollar Need,” Bloomberg, July 7, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-07/oil-currency-breaks-ra... (accessed September 14, 2016).

[199] Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 2016, https://eiti.org/about/who-we-are (accessed September 13, 2016).

[200] EITI International Secretariat, “29th EITI Board Meeting Minutes,” April 27, 2015, https://eiti.org/sites/default/ files/documents/BP/Minutes-from-the-29th-EITI-Board-meeting-Congo.pdf (accessed September 14, 2016).

[201] EITI, “EITI Civil Society Protocol,” January 2015, https://eiti.org/node/4865 (accessed September 14, 2016).

[202] EITI International Secretariat, “29th EITI Board Meeting Minutes.”

[203] Jack Farchy, “Azerbaijan: Aiming to Please,” Financial Times, August 28, 2016, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d89d55ae-6b73-11e6-a0b1-d87a9fea034f.html?site... (accessed September 27, 2016).

[204] Jack Farchy, “IMF, World Bank Move to Forestall Oil-Led Defaults.”

[205] ADB, “Azerbaijan: Shah Deniz Gas Field Expansion Project,” April 22, 2016, https://www.adb.org/projects/50117-001/main#project-overview (accessed September 16, 2016).

[206] The Southern Gas Corridor includes: (i) the existing South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), which will be expanded with a new parallel pipeline across Azerbaijan and Georgia; (ii) the Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), which will transport Shah Deniz gas across Turkey; and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which will take gas through Greece and Albania into Italy. BP Azerbaijan, “Southern Gas Corridor,” 2016, http://www.bp.com/en_az/caspian/operationsprojects/Shahdeniz/ SouthernCorridor.html (accessed September 28, 2016); Trans Adriatic Pipeline, “Southern Gas Corridor,” 2016, http://www.tap-ag.com/the-pipeline/the-big-picture/southern-gas-corridor (accessed September 16, 2016). SOCAR owns 10 percent of the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) through its subsidiary, Azerbaijan South Caucasus Pipeline Ltd. (AzSCP). BP Azerbaijan, “South Caucasus Pipeline,” 2016, http://www.bp.com/en_az/caspian/operationsprojects/pipelines/SCP.html (accessed September 28, 2016). The government of Azerbaijan and SOCAR own 58 percent of TANAP as shareholders of the Southern Gas Corridor Closed Joint Stock Company. State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), “Financing the Share of the Republic of Azerbaijan in ‘South Gas Corridor’ CJSC Statutory Capital,” undated, http://www.oilfund.az/en_US/layiheler/tanap-project.asp (accessed September 28, 2016); Moody’s Investors Service, “Rating Action: Moody’s Assigns (P)Ba1 Rating to the Upcoming SGC Notes Guaranteed by the Republic of Azerbaijan; Rating Under Review for Downgrade,” March 18, 2016, https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-assigns-PBa1-rating-to-the-upcomi... (accessed September 28, 2016); SOCAR, “TANAP Shareholder Agreement Signed in Ankara,” March 16, 2016, http://www.socar.az/socar/en/news-and-media/news-archives/news-archives/... (accessed September 28, 2016); TANAP, “Major Shareholder in the Project of the Century!” undated, http://www.tanap.com/media/press-releases/major-shareholder-in-the-proje... (accessed September 28, 2016). The government of Azerbaijan in partnership with its state-owned company, SOCAR, owns 20 percent of the TAP. TAP, “TAP’s Shareholders,” 2016, http://www.tap-ag.com/about-us/our-shareholders (accessed September 28, 2016).

[207]“EBRD in Talks with Azerbaijan, Turkey on Funding Gas Pipeline;” and Natural Gas World, “EBRD Mulls SGC Loan,” May 26, 2016, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/ebrd-is-considering-providing-a-syndicat... (accessed September 28, 2016). The World Bank is considering providing direct financial assistance to the Southern Gas Corridor through a $500 million loan. World Bank, “Combined Project Information Documents/Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet (PID/ISDS) Concept Stage,” January 11, 2016, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/975071468102266266/pdf/PIDISDS-CON-Print-P157416-02-26-2016-1456494884810.pdf (accessed September 28, 2016), pg. 2; Kallanish Energy, “World Bank to Issue $500M Loan to Fund SGC Pipeline Project,” June 3, 2016, http://www.kallanishenergy.com/2016/06/03/world-bank-loan-southern-gas-corridor-pipeline-project/ (accessed September 28, 2016); “World Bank Says to Lend $500 Mln to Azerbaijan for Gas Pipeline Project,” Reuters, June 1, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/azerbaijan-worldbank-loans-idUSR4N18O00G (accessed September 28, 2016). The World Bank is also proposing to finance TANAP through a $1 billion investment in BOTAS, Turkey’s state-owned oil and gas company. Financing of $1.12 billion is being proposed by the EIB for the same project. World Bank, “Combined Project Information Documents/Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet (PID/ISDS) Concept Stage,” January 11, 2016, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/975071468102266266/pdf/PIDISDS-CON-Print-P157416-02-26-2016-1456494884810.pdf (accessed September 28, 2016), pg. 1; EIB, “TANAP Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline,” March 23, 2016, http://www.eib.org/projects/pipeline/2015/20150676.htm (accessed September 28, 2016). The EIB is independently proposing to finance TAP through a €2 billion construction project. EIB, “Trans Adriatic Pipeline,” August 13, 2015, http://www.eib.org/projects/pipeline/2014/20140596.htm (accessed September 29, 2016). The International Financial Corporation has committed $60 million to finance TAP ($50 million loan and $10 million risk management). IFC, “Transatlantic,” April 23, 2014, http://ifcextapps.ifc.org/ifcext/spiwebsite1. nsf/78e3b305216fcdba85257a8b0075079d/7968406bbae7ee4685257c920054d48c?opendocument (accessed September 29, 2016).

[208] The EBRD is financing or proposing to finance Lukoil through a $110 million senior partially syndicated loan signed on May 27, 2005, the extension of the first stage of the Shah Gas Field Development through a $200 million loan signed on November 8, 2013, and Lukoil’s share in the second stage development through a $500 million loan signed on October 6, 2014. EBRD, “Lukoil Shah Deniz Stage II,” undated, http://www.ebrd.com/work-with-us/projects/psd/lukoil-shah-deniz-stage-ii... (accessed September 29, 2016); EBRD, “Lukoil Overseas: Shah Deniz Gas Condensate Field Develop. II,” undated, http://www.ebrd.com/work-with-us/projects/psd/lukoil-overseas-shah-deniz... (accessed September 29, 2016); and EBRD, “Lukoil Overseas: Shah Deniz Gas Condensate Field Development,” undated, http://www.ebrd.com/work-with-us/projects/psd/lukoil-overseas-shah-deniz... (accessed September 29, 2016). The ADB has provided a $1 million loan (approved April 26, 2016) to prepare their proposed construction loan to Lukoil of $250 million for the second stage expansion of the Shah Deniz Gas Field, approved August 5, 2016. ADB, “Azerbaijan: Shah Deniz Stage II Investment Plan,” 2016, https://www.adb.org/projects/49451-001/main#project-pds (accessed September 29, 2016); and ADB, “Azerbaijan: Shah Deniz Stage II Gas Field Expansion Project,” 2015, https://www.adb.org/projects/48330-001/main#project-pds (accessed September 29, 2016). Additionally, the ADB has proposed to provide a $500 million loan to SOCAR and the Ministry of Economy and Industry for the expansion of the gas field, and another $500 million loan for the second stage development to the Southern Gas Corridor Joint-Stock Company. ADB, “Azerbaijan: Shah Deniz Gas Field Expansion Project,” 2016, https://www.adb.org/projects/50117-001/main#project-pds (accessed September 29, 2016); and ADB, “Azerbaijan: Shah Deniz Gas Field Expansion Project (Phase 1),” 2016, https://www.adb.org/projects/49451-002/main#project-pds (accessed September 29, 2016). According to news reports, SOCAR is seeking ADB financing to expand the Shah Deniz Gas Field. Natural Gas World, “SOCAR Seeks Shah Deniz 2 Loan,” March 28, 2016, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/socar-seeks-loan-for-shah-deniz-2-28822 (accessed September 29, 2016).

[209] Rights groups have also voiced concerns about government repression of civil society in Azerbaijan. See Fidanka Bacheva-McGrath, “Europe’s Caspian Gas Dreams—A Nightmare Come True for Human Rights in Azerbaijan,” Bankwatch, May 14, 2015, https://bankwatch.blogactiv.eu/2015/05/14/europes-caspian-gas-dreams-a-n... (accessed September 29, 2016); Platform London, “EBRD Plan Azerbaijan Loan as Regime’s Fiercest Critic is Imprisoned,” December 11, 2014, http://platformlondon.org/p-pressreleases/ebrd-plan-azerbaijan-loan-as-r... (accessed September 29, 2016); Jessica Evans, “EBRD: A Bank’s Mission Gone Awry,” Policy Review, April 2016, http://www.policyreview.eu/ebrd-a-banks-mission-gone-awry/ (accessed September 29, 2016); International Media Support, “Human Rights Coalition Urges Rejection of Russia-Azerbaijan Loan,” July 20, 2015, https://www.mediasupport.org/human-rights-coalition-urges-rejection-russ... (accessed September 29, 2016); Xavier Sol, “World Bank to Fund Southern Gas Corridor Mega-Pipeline in Azerbaijan & Turkey Despite Civil Society’s Environmental & “Controversial Regimes” Concerns,” Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, July 4, 2016, https://business-humanrights.org/en/world-bank-to-fund-southern-gas-corr... (accessed September 29, 2016); and Jessica Evans (Human Rights Watch), “Asian Development Bank’s Money vs. Its Mouth” commentary, Huffington Post, May 13, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jessica-evans/asian-development-banks-m_b_... (accessed October 12, 2016).

[210] World Bank, “Bank Policy: Access to Information,” 2015, https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/Forms/DispPage.aspx?docid=3693

(accessed September 29, 2016); EIB, “EIB Group Transparency Policy,” March 10, 2015, http://www.eib.org/infocentre/publications/all/eib-group-transparency-po... (accessed September 29, 2016); ADB, “Access to Information,” undated, https://www.adb.org/site/disclosure/overview (accessed September 29, 2016); EBRD, “Transparency and Accountability,” undated, http://www.ebrd.com/ebrd-transparency-and-accountability.html (accessed September 29, 2016); and IFC, “Transparency and Accountability,” undated, http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/Topics_Ext_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/IFC+Sustainability/Our+Approach/Transparency+and+Accountability/ (accessed September 29, 2016).

[211] World Bank, “Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative: Results Profile,” April 15, 2013, http://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2013/04/15/extractive-industries-tra... (accessed September 29, 2016); EIB, “EIB Support for the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative,” February 28, 2008, http://www.eib.org/infocentre/press/news/all/eib-support-for-the-extract... (accessed September 29, 2016); ADB, “ADB Backs Initiative to Get Countries to Disclose Resource Revenues,” February 29, 2008, https://www.adb.org/news/adb-backs-initiative-get-countries-disclose-res... (accessed September 29, 2016); and EBRD, “Promoting Transparency,” undated, http://www.ebrd.com/cs/Satellite?c=Content&cid=1395236704433&pagename=EBRD-DE%2 FContent%2FHublet (accessed September 29. 2016).

[212] ADB, “Projects in Azerbaijan,” 2016, https://www.adb.org/projects/azerbaijan (accessed September 29, 2016); EBRD, “Project Summary Documents,” undated, http://www.ebrd.com/work-with-us/project-finance/project-summary-documen... (accessed September 29, 2016); and World Bank, “All Projects,” undated, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/azerbaijan/projects/all?qterm=&lang_... (accessed September 29, 2016).

[213] EBRD, Articles of Agreement, art. 1, signed May 29, 1990, entered into force March 28, 1991, http://www.ebrd.com/news/publications/institutional-documents/basic-docu... (accessed October 12, 2016).

[214] EBRD, “EBRD adopts new three-year strategy for Belarus, March 13, 2013, http://www.ebrd.com/news/2013/ebrd-adopts-new-three-year-strategy-for-be... (accessed October 12, 2016); and EBRD, “Strategy For Turkmenistan,” May 7, 2014, http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/country/strategy/turkmenistan.pdf (accessed October 12, 2016).

[215]“European Parliament Resolution on Azerbaijan,” adopted on September 10, 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P8-TA-2015-0316 (accessed September 27, 2016)

[216] European Union External Action Service (EEAS), “Federica Mogherini visits Azerbaijan,” March 1, 2016, http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/content/20160313172652/http:/... (accessed September 13, 2016).

[217] From 1993 and 1997, respectively. US Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, “U.S. Relations with Azerbaijan,” June 9, 2016, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2909.htm (accessed October 12, 2016); US Department of State, “U.S.-Azerbaijan Relations,” September 28, 2009, http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2009a/129375.htm (accessed April 10, 2015); Trade Compliance Center, “Azerbaijan Trade Relations Agreement,” April 12, 1993, http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_002775.asp (accessed September 15, 2016); and US Department of State, “Azerbaijan Bilateral Investment Treaty,” signed August 1, 1997 and entered into force August 2, 2001, Treaty Doc. 106-47, http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/43478.pdf (accessed September 15, 2016).

[218]“The United States Welcomes the Release of Natig Jafarli,” US Department of State press release, September 10, 2016, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/09/261725.htm (accessed September 14, 2016). See also: “Conviction of Azerbaijani Human Rights Activist Rasul Jafarov,” US Department of State press release, April 16, 2015, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/04/240765.htm (accessed September 15, 2016).

[219]“Secretary Kerry’s Meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev,” US Department of State press release, March 30, 2016, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/03/255351.htm (accessed September 13, 2016).

[220] The bill was referred to committees but has not been considered for a vote. H.R.4268 – Azerbaijan Democracy Act of 2015, 114th Congress (2015-2016), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/4264/text (accessed September 27, 2016).

[221] Council of Europe (CoE), “Azerbaijan human rights inquiry,” December 16, 2015, https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/secretary-general-launches-inquiry-i... (accessed September 14, 2016).

[222] CoE, “Third party intervention by the Commissioner for Human Rights,” undated, http://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/third-party-interventions (accessed October 12, 2016). On April 20, 2015, the Human Rights Commissioner filed four similar submissions, including regarding Rasul Jafarov, Anar Mammadli, and Leyla and Arif Yunus. See also: CoE, “Country Monitoring: Azerbaijan,” 2016, http://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/country-monitoring-azerbaijan (accessed September 21, 2016).

[223] CoE, Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (Application No. 15172/13, Supervision of the Execution of the European Court’s judgments,” September 20-21, 2016, https://search.coe.int/cm/pages/result_details.aspx?objectid=09000016806... (accessed October 12, 2016).

[224] European Court of Human Rights, Yagublu v. Azerbaijan, (31709/13), judgment of November 5, 2015.

[225] European Court of Human Rights, Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, (69981/14), judgment of March 17, 2016. See also, European Human Rights Advocacy Centre, “European Court: Rasul Jafarov’s arrest and detention were politically-motivated,” March 17, 2016, http://ehrac.org.uk/news/european-court-rasul-jafarovs-arrest-and-detent... (accessed September 15, 2016).

[226]“End of Mission Statement by Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders,” Visit to Azerbaijan, September 22, 2016, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20544&L... (accessed October 13, 2016).

[227] OHCHR, “Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Statement upon the Conclusion of its Visit to Azerbaijan, May 16-25, 2016,” 2016, http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20021&L... (accessed 12 October 2016).

[228] OHCHR, “Country visits of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council since 1998: Azerbaijan,” http://spinternet.ohchr.org/_Layouts/SpecialProceduresInternet/ViewCount... (accessed September 26, 2016).

[229] Giorgi Gogia, “Dispatches: In Azerbaijan, Enough is Enough!” Human Rights Watch, June 24, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/24/dispatches-azerbaijan-enough-enough

[230] UN News Centre, “UN human rights chief deplores continuing civil society crackdown in Azerbaijan,” September 8, 2015, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsId=51823#.V9h4_igrKUk (accessed September 13, 2016).

[231] OHCHR, “The Human Rights Council holds general debate on human rights situations requiring its attention,” June 24, 2015, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16140&L... (accessed September 14, 2016) and OHCHR, “Zeid condemns civil society crackdown in Azerbaijan,” September 8, 2015, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16393&LangID=E (accessed September 14, 2016).

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Submission on the FMO's Proposed Sustainability Policy and Human Rights Position Statement

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Comments on FMO’s Proposed Sustainability Policy

and Human Rights Position Statement

November 15, 2016

The Coalition for Human Rights in Development is a global coalition of over 65 social movements, civil society organizations and community groups working to ensure that all development finance institutions respect, protect, and fulfill human rights[1]. We welcome this opportunity to comment on the Dutch Development Bank (FMO)’s draft Sustainability Policy and Human Rights Position Statement. Our members include both Dutch organizations active in FMO reforms as well as groups impacted directly by FMO investments around the world.

We welcome FMO’s adoption of the Dutch Banking Sector Agreement on international responsible business conduct regarding human rights[2], which sets out important benchmarks for the financial sector in the areas of human rights and human rights due diligence. As a coalition we have been developing human rights due diligence methodologies for the development finance context and are eager to work with FMO to strengthen policy and practice in this critical area.

Our comments are focused on the Sustainability Policy (“Policy”) and the Human Rights Position Statement (“Position Statement”).

1. Strengthen the Commitment to Human Rights

FMO’s commitment to human rights is stated as follows – “FMO respects human rights and acknowledges the responsibility of its clients to do the same. This means to avoid infringing on the human rights of others and to address adverse impacts business may cause or contribute to” (Position Statement 33-36). We suggest revising and enhancing this provision to instead read: “FMO respects human rights and acknowledges the responsibility of its clients to do the same. FMO and its clients will not support or undertake any activities that will cause, contribute to, or exacerbate human rights violations. In order to achieve this, FMO and its clients will undertake human rights due diligence to identify and avoid potential adverse human rights impacts. Should adverse impacts still occur, FMO and its clients will promptly and effectively remedy them.”

2. Adopt a commitment to Non-Discrimination

While the Policy states that FMO actively seeks to achieve inclusive development, this ambition is not operationalized within the Policy. The Policy should include a commitment to substantive equality and to avoid prejudice or discrimination (whether formal or informal, direct or indirect), particularly toward disadvantaged or marginalized groups, within FMO-financed activities, including in the distribution of adverse impacts or in access to development resources and project benefits.

3. Incorporate the Full Body of Human Rights Standards

The draft Sustainability Policy states that FMO requires, as a minimum, that all clients meet national environmental, social and human rights legislation in their home and host countries (Policy 83-84). Additionally, the Position Statement states that FMO upholds several international standards, identified in a list of nine standards, and that these standards will be utilized to identify and agree on mitigants for human rights impacts that may go beyond the International Finance Corporation (IFC) Performance Standards (Policy 84-108).

The Policy should further require that FMO and its clients comply with applicable international human rights law. When identifying applicable law, FMO clients and staff should consider not only the International Bill of Human Rights identified in the draft Policy, but additionally the nine core international human rights treaties, applicable regional treaties, and other key human rights instruments such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).[3] While some of these instruments may be of more relevance than others to the conduct of business, none can be categorically excluded as irrelevant.

4. Establish a Clear Benchmark and Process for Human Rights Due Diligence

Neither the Sustainability Policy nor the Human Rights Position Statement establish a clear benchmark or process for human rights due diligence. The Policy states that “The IFC Performance Standards guide FMO’s human rights due diligence with respect to clients” (Policy 102), while the Position Statement provides that “FMO’s human rights due diligence with respect to clients is guided by the IFC Performance Standards and other applicable international standards such as the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights” (Position Statement 52-54).

Effective human rights due diligence requires measures beyond the IFC’s Performance Standards. The IFC Performance Standards set out requirements for environmental and social assessment and management, not human rights due diligence. While the Performance Standards note that in certain high risk situations, human rights due diligence may be required, they do not actually identify what human rights due diligence entails.[4] The Dutch Banking Sector Agreement acknowledges this when calling for the establishment of a human rights due diligence procedure in addition to application of the IFC Performance Standards.

The UK’s development finance institution, CDC Group plc, recently adopted new Human Rights Guidance identifying several main challenges with the Performance Standards[5]:

  1. Due diligence processes, and the expertise deployed in their implementation, are often more developed in assessing and addressing environmental issues than social issues.
  2. Traditional environmental and social due diligence may not use international human rights standards as a reference point, and therefore may not correctly identify the severity of an impact nor what is required as a remedy under international human rights standards.
  3. Social due diligence often focuses on the specific impacts highlighted in Performance Standards 2 through 7, and may therefore miss other potential human rights impacts that are not explicitly mentioned.

Overlooked human rights impacts may include gender impacts, impacts on persons with disabilities, impacts related to privacy or freedom of assembly, impacts related to conflict and reprisals, and many more.

Finally, while the Performance Standards rely heavily on the existence of a client’s social and environmental management system, they do not adequately address the following critical elements: 1) the client’s active due diligence throughout the project cycle, 2) contextual and third-party risk, 3) the bank’s active due diligence to screen project risks, monitor implementation, and supervise the project and plans to mitigate risks, and 4) accountability for impacts and results.

As compared to the IFC Performance Standards, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines) and UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) provide more in-depth guidance on human rights due diligence for companies, and therefore these resources should be given greater weight.

5. Clarify FMO’s Due Diligence Obligations

In addition to the due diligence obligations of its clients, FMO as a national development bank has its own human rights obligations and due diligence responsibilities well established in human rights law. These are echoed in the UNGPs, which stress that both State agencies and the business enterprises and projects they support, should be required to undertake human rights due diligence.[6]

In FMO’s Human Rights Position Statement, while the client’s due diligence requirements are discussed, FMO’s due diligence obligations are reduced to “undertak[ing] due diligence of the risk and impact assessment process carried out by (prospective) clients” (Position Statement 57-65). FMO’s due diligence role should be made more explicit in the Policy, and this role must be understood to extend beyond risk and impact assessment to include screening, monitoring, supervision and remedy.

Norway’s export credit agency, GIEK, offers in their policy a useful outline of due diligence obligations[7]:

GIEK’s due diligence process is based on (1) identifying actual or potential environmental and human rights impacts, (2) assessing actual or potential negative impacts, (3) acting to seek to prevent, mitigate and remediate those impacts through the appropriate exercise of leverage, (4) accounting for how those impacts are addressed through follow-up and monitoring, and (5) communicating with and disclosure to relevant stakeholders on the management of impacts.

FMO should include in its Policy, as that is the binding instrument, a clear outline of its due diligence process. The Dutch Banking Sector Agreement provides a useful discussion of due diligence elements. We additionally highlight the following critical elements:

  • Screening projects to ensure that they do not present an unacceptable level of risk. Reviewing and verifying the information provided by the client relating to the project’s risks and impacts, in consultation with affected communities, and requesting additional and relevant information or conducting additional research where necessary for FMO to complete its human rights due diligence;
  • Reviewing the applicable national and international legal framework, and the implementation practices, track record and the commitment and capacity of the client;
  • Providing guidance to assist the client in developing appropriate measures to address environmental and social risks and impacts in accordance with the Policy and in compliance with applicable law with input from affected communities.
  • Requiring and verifying meaningful consultation for all projects and free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) where required;
  • Performing necessary site visits and employing relevant specialists to monitor project implementation, mitigation and social impacts, including through use of participatory and third-party monitoring;
  • In situations of significant human rights risk, enacting loan covenant provisions to ensure that human rights abuses are prevented, such as covenants on the use of force by security personnel, enhanced monitoring and supervision measures, and response protocols to deal with risks, including third party risks, should they materialize.

For due diligence to be effective, FMO must be able to support its clients with necessary and relevant expertise on social, environmental and human rights issues. FMO’s engagement of dedicated Environmental Social and Governance (ESG) specialists should therefore not be limited to projects categorized as B+ and A, but should be extended to category B projects, as these projects are defined to entail potential adverse risks or impacts that are beyond the site boundaries and largely irreversible. FMO additionally should develop more detailed human rights due diligence procedures, as required in the recent Dutch Banking Sector Agreement on international responsible business conduct regarding human rights, as well as risk assessment and management tools to support staff and clients.[8]

6. Ensure Proper Risk Categorization

As due diligence is triggered according to a project’s risk categorization, the categorization process is critical for preventing adverse human rights impacts. Low risk (Category C) investments should not be exempt from the ESG standards, rather the level of due diligence should be adjusted commensurate with the level of risk/severity of the impacts (Policy 148-150). Similarly, the proposed due diligence exemptions for financial intermediary projects are unwarranted. It does not make sense to hold FI Category B+ projects to merely the client’s “best effort” and to exempt FI Category B projects entirely (Policy 151-154). Recent investigations into IFC’s own financial intermediary portfolio have revealed shocking levels of exposure to risk.[9] 

7. Strengthen Transparency and Community Engagement

It should be stressed that the accurate identification of human rights risks and potential impacts requires rigorous consultation and meaningful engagement with potentially affected communities. Some of the greatest human rights challenges and conflicts derive from projects imposed on local communities without their input or consent. It is not sufficient to consult communities merely on the risks, impacts, and mitigation measures of a pre-determined activity (Policy 61, 62). If FMO is committed to human rights and to sustainable, inclusive development, local communities need to have a role in determining development priorities and inputting into project design. Similarly, assessment and monitoring processes should be participatory. Additionally, Line 79 of the Sustainability Policy should be changed to read “affected communities and civil society organizations” not only “civil society organizations.”

8.Utilize Leverage to Prevent Harm

Where human rights risks materialize within the context of an FMO operation, FMO should act strategically and decisively first to ensure that its financing is not causing, contributing to, or exacerbating human rights abuses, and secondly to prevent and remedy harm. This is the case even if risks come from outside the immediate project area and area of influence – be that the country or sector context or business relationships with third parties. FMO should develop a toolbox of potential options utilizing a range of compliance remedies, technical expertise, relationships with various stakeholders, financial leverage, and diplomatic and business relationships, which can be drawn upon in a situation where human rights are at immediate risk or have been violated, in order to address risk and prevent future harm. In particular, FMO should develop protocols for identifying and addressing risks to human rights and environmental defenders, including intimidation, threats and violent reprisals against those who seek to participate in or speak out about development projects. For specific recommendations regarding human rights defenders, we wish to highlight the joint civil society statement on that topic.[10]

9. Ensure Accountability for Outcomes

According to the Policy, FMO states a commitment to sustainable development and commissions evaluations to assess the development impact of its investments. However, it is not a given that investments lead to sustainable development outcomes. In fact, investments can often have the opposite effect, especially where human rights are not respected. FMO should therefore screen projects based on anticipated development impact, and work with affected communities to track, evaluate, report, and hold itself and its clients accountable for development outcomes. In this effort, human rights norms provide useful metrics.

We recognize the FMO’s requirement to have clients set up the appropriate mechanisms and procedures to address grievances and complaints at project level. We would highlight that at a minimum, these grievance mechanisms should also be built on the “effectiveness criteria” set forth in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Finally, the Independent Complaints Mechanism cannot provide accountability or remedy if communities do not know it is available. It is therefore critical that FMO require project proponents to inform potentially affected communities of the existence of the ICM and how it can be accessed.


[1] More information at www.rightsindevelopment.org.

[2] Dutch Banking Sector Agreement on international responsible business conduct regarding human rights, 2016, http://www.ser.nl/%7E/media/files/internet/publicaties/overige/2010_2019....

[3] The nine core international human rights conventions are: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Convention on the Rights of the Child, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, and Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Applicable regional treaties will include, for example, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights.

[4] For one idea for what human rights due diligence in this context could look like, see Shift Project, “Human Rights Due Diligence in High Risk Circumstances” March 2015,
http://www.shiftproject.org/resources/publications/human-rights-due-dili...

[5] See CDC Group, ESG Toolkit for Fund Managers, “Human Rights Briefing Note,” http://toolkit.cdcgroup.com/e-and-s-briefing-notes/human-rights.

[8] See for instance Danish Institute for Human Rights Impact Assessment and Guidance at http://www.humanrights.dk/business/tools/human-rights-impact-assessment-guidance-and-toolbox; Coalition for Human Rights in Development Social Risk Analysis Tool (forthcoming at www.rightsindevelopment.org/HRDD).

[9] See “Outsourcing Development: Lifting the Veil on the IFC’s Harmful Private-Sector Lending,” Inclusive Development International et al, 2016, www.inclusivedevelopment.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Outsourcing-Developmnet-Introduction.pdf.

[10] See civil society sign-on letter, “FMO Should Protect Human Rights Defenders,” November 2016, http://rightsindevelopment.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/CSO-statement-to-FMO-on-HRDs-Nov-2016.pdf.

Human Rights Watch Recommendations on the Implementation of Human Rights Council Resolution 31/36 Business Activities in Israeli Settlements

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Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein
High Commissioner
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

Subject: Human Rights Watch Recommendations on the Implementation of Human Rights Council Resolution 31/36 Business Activities in Israeli Settlements

Dear Commissioner Al Hussein,

Human Rights Watch is pleased to submit recommendations to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) as it compiles a database of business enterprises involved in the activities listed in paragraph 96 of the Human Rights Council Resolution 31/36,“Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan” (“the Resolution”).

In January 2016, Human Rights Watch issued a report, Occupation, Inc., analyzing the activities of companies doing business in or with Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem. We concluded that such business activity contributes to the serious violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law inherent in the settlement enterprise. We recommended that businesses end all settlement-related activities.

To assist the Office of the High Commissioner in implementing the Resolution, we offer three recommendations. First, we outline the kind of business activities that we believe meet three of the criteria outlined in the Resolution. Second, we describe the kind of institutions that, if found to engage in the above-stated activities, should be eligible to be listed in the database. Third, we recommend that three institutions, whose settlement activities Human Rights Watch has researched, be among those included in the database.  Our recommendations are limited to settlements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.

  1. Business Activities in or with Settlements

Human Rights Watch offers recommendations for determining the kind of business activities that would fall within three of the criteria outlined by the Resolution, namely:

  • “The provision of services and utilities supporting the maintenance and existence of settlements, including transport
  • Banking and financial operations helping to develop, expand or maintain settlements and their activities, including loans for housing and the development of businesses
  • The use of natural resources, in particular water and land, for business purposes”

For decades, Human Rights Watch and numerous other Palestinian, Israeli, and international human rights organizations have documented the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law inherent to Israeli settlements in the West Bank. That research forms the basis of our conclusion that doing business in or with settlements contradicts the human rights responsibilities that businesses have under the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP). Business activities in and with settlements help support, develop, and maintain settlements, which inherently contribute to abuses such as restrictions on freedom of movement, unlawful seizure of land, unlawful exploitation of natural resources, discrimination, and restrictions on economic and educational development.

Settlement businesses contribute to and underwrite the abusive settlement system, including by:

  • helping finance, develop, and market settlements, building settlement properties on unlawfully confiscated land, and trading in settlement-produced products;
  • helping make settlements sustainable by providing services and employment to settlers and paying taxes to settlement municipalities;
  • using their privileged access to Israeli-issued construction permits and licenses to extract natural resources that rightfully belong to Palestinians but that Israel all but denies Palestinians; and
  • often taking advantage of a lack of government regulatory oversight to discriminate against Palestinian workers.

Business activities located in settlements inherently provide services that support the maintenance and existence of settlements, as per the Resolution, because they provide jobs and services in the settlements, which make them more attractive and sustainable, and they may pay taxes to settlement municipalities. They often use natural resources, including water, which is allocated more generously to settlers than to Palestinian residents of the West Bank, and they may be situated on land that has been unlawfully seized from Palestinians.

We consider settlement-related business activities to include locating or carrying out activities inside settlements and financing, administering, or otherwise supporting settlements or settlement-related activities and infrastructure, including by contracting to purchase settlement-manufactured goods or agricultural produce. We believe that these activities are within the ambit of the HRC Resolution, especially within the language quoted above. We recommend that the OHCHR consider including in its database institutions that carry out these activities.

Such activities would include but are not limited to providing waste-management services to settlements, financing construction or other projects in the settlements, marking homes in the settlements, quarrying in Area C, with the profits going to the Israeli Civil Administration, organizing professional or semi-professional sports or other recreational activities in the settlements, buying goods made or grown partially or entirely in the settlements or including components produced or grown in the settlements and providing goods or services to businesses located in the settlements.

  1. Institutions Bound by the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights

While most of the business activity in the settlements is conducted by for-profit companies, we call your attention to the fact that other institutions, such as nonprofit organizations, also have responsibilities under the UNGP, where they engage in significant commercial activity. The UNGP would apply, for example, if an entity is involved in commercial activities, independently of its legal form or sector of activity, as John Ruggie, the author of the UNGP, has said. In determining that the world football association, FIFA, is subject to the UNGP, Ruggie noted that it conducts “significant levels of commercial activity,” including procurement, branding, licensing, and sponsorship activities, relationships with commercial subsidiaries and organization of large scale events such as international tournaments.

Human Rights Watch recommends that the OHCHR consider all enterprises conducting business activities in the settlements as candidates to be added to the database, regardless of their formal organizational structure. This would include nonprofit organizations engaging in significant commercial activity, sports associations like FIFA, and other enterprises doing business in or with settlements.

  1. Recommendations for Selected Institutions

Based on our research and documentation, and applying the criteria outlined above, Human Rights Watch recommends that OHCHR include in its database the three institutions listed below. In making this recommendation, Human Rights Watch in no way implies that the activities of these institutions are particularly severe or abusive, relative to other institutions doing business in or with settlements. They are simply the institutions whose settlement business activities we have researched thoroughly and have verified that they operated in settlements. They are examples of the wide range of business activities taking place in settlements. We also encourage OHCHR to confirm that these entities continue to operate in settlements prior to inclusion in this database since these entities may have changed their practices by the time the database is finalized.

  1. Heidelberg Cement.

Through its subsidiary, Hanson, the German multinational Heidelberg Cement owns the Nahal Raba quarry, on the western edge of the West Bank, across from the Israeli city of Rosh Ha'ayin. Israel declared the land on which the Nahal Raba quarry sits as “state land” through its aggressive interpretation of an Ottoman law whereby land, even if privately owned, reverts to the state if not cultivated or otherwise used for three consecutive years. Israel built its separation barrier to encompass the quarry from the east, unlawfully diverting the route of the barrier into occupied territory from the pre-1967 armistice line. The barrier seamlessly connects the quarry to Israeli territory and separates the nearby Palestinian village of Zawiyah from its lands. Hanson also owns concrete plants in two other settlements, Modi’in Ilit and Atarot.

Hanson pays royalties to the Israeli Civil Administration, the branch of the military that governs the West Bank, and municipal taxes to the settlement Samaria Regional Council. As an Israeli-administered quarry, the Nahal Raba quarry is one of 11 settlement quarries that benefits from Israel’s discriminatory allocation of permits. The Israeli civil administration has not issued a single new license to a Palestinian quarry in Area C since 1994 and often conducts raids on unlicensed Palestinian quarries, confiscating equipment and disrupting operations.

Article 55 of The Hague Regulations of 1907 subjects the resources of occupied territory to the laws of usufruct, which limits an occupying power to using such resources for its military needs or for the benefit of the occupied people. In violation of this obligation, the Israeli authorities collect royalties and municipal taxes from settlement quarries, which transfer 94 percent of their product to the Israeli market, providing around one-quarter of the total consumption of quarrying materials for the Israeli economy. Settlement quarries like Nahal Raba also allow Israel to externalize the environmental impact of extraction.

In a letter to Human Rights Watch, Heidelberg defended its activities as fully complying with international law since the land was not privately owned and emphasized that the royalties it pays Israel are transferred to the Civil Administration “for the benefit of residents of Area C.” It also noted that it employs 36 Palestinian residents of the West Bank who receive the same benefits and salaries as their Israeli counterparts and that another 25 Palestinians work on the site daily through a sub-contractor. At its annual shareholders meeting in May 2016, the CEO of Heidelberg Cement, Bernd Scheifele, reportedly told shareholders: "The mining permit [for the Nahal Raba quarry] expires next year and we are endeavouring at the moment to find an alternative solution."

Human Rights Watch is not aware of any changes in the ownership or operation of the Nahal Raba quarry to date.

More information is available in Occupation, Inc., pages 42-53 (case study), pages 121-122, and pages 129-136 (correspondence between Human Rights Watch and Heidelberg Cement and Hanson).

  1. RE/MAX and RE/MAX, LLC.

RE/MAX is a US-based international real-estate brokerage franchise. RE/MAX, LLC is the owner of the global franchise network. Its Israeli franchise, RE/MAX Israel, has a branch in the settlement of Ma’aleh Adumim and markets or has marketed homes in at least 17 additional settlements. All settlements are built on land that Israel seized and currently uses in violation of international humanitarian law. Israel also effectively bars Palestinians in the West Bank from buying or renting in settlements, even in cases where Israel confiscated their land to build a settlement.

Given the character of settlements as almost exclusively Jewish and the rules that effectively bar Palestinian residents of the West Bank from living in them, agents selling settlement properties effectively contribute to discrimination against Palestinians. By advertising, selling, and renting homes in settlements, both the Israeli franchise of RE/MAX and RE/MAX LLC, the owner of the global franchise network, facilitate the transfer of Israeli civilians into occupied territory and the associated human rights abuses.

In a press release responding to a campaign by CODEPINK, an anti-settlement advocacy group that criticized RE/MAX’s sales in occupied territory, the company’s headquarters clarified that it sold the franchise rights for Europe, which included Israel, in 1995. However, RE/MAX retains control over any franchisee operating under the RE/MAX brand. Given such influence, RE/MAX should conduct human rights due diligence throughout its supply chain, including by examining the activities of its franchises regardless of whether it has a broader contractual relationship with them.

In June 2016, RE/MAX, LLC Chief Executive Officer Dave Liniger told the Presbyterian Church (USA) in a letter that it had recently taken action to ensure that it “will no longer receive any income from the sale of Jewish-settlement properties in the West Bank.” Requests for clarification from Human Rights Watch went unanswered. In any event, Re/MAX, LLC continues to allow its Israeli franchise to use its brand name to market properties in the settlements.

More information is available in Occupation, Inc., pages 65-70 (case study), pages 137-144, and pages 161-162 (letters from Human Rights Watch to RE/MAX Israel and RE/MAX Holdings and letter from RE/MAX, LLC to Code Pink).

  1. FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association).

Through its affiliate, the Israel Football Association (IFA), FIFA is organizing matches in Israeli settlements in the West Bank on land that has been unlawfully seized from Palestinians. FIFA is sponsoring the matches by allowing six semi-professional clubs in the IFA to hold their official home matches on fields located in Israeli settlements. By allowing the IFA to organize games inside settlements, FIFA is engaging in business activity that supports Israeli settlements, contrary to the human rights commitments it recently affirmed. An April 2016 report, commissioned by FIFA and written by John Ruggie, the author of the UNGP, makes specific recommendations for FIFA to implement the UNGP throughout its activities. FIFA, a nonprofit association registered in Switzerland, engages in significant commercial activity; global professional football revenues are estimated to be $33 billion annually.

First, the settlement playing grounds, including one indoor (futsal) hall, are built on land that has been unlawfully taken from Palestinians, mostly by seizing land belonging to Palestinian individuals or Palestinian villages, declaring it state land, and then designating it for exclusive Israeli civilian use. The field in the Givat Ze’ev settlement is owned by two Palestinian families from the nearby town of Beitunia who have been unable to access their land for decades, since the settlement was built. They were offered no compensation and did not give permission to anyone, including FIFA and the IFA, to use their land.

Second, financial documents that Human Rights Watch has reviewed show that the IFA is engaging in business activity that supports the settlements. Settlement football clubs provide part-time employment and recreational services to settlers, making the settlements more sustainable, thus propping up a system that exists through serious human rights violations.

Third, the clubs provide services to Israelis but do not and cannot provide them to West Bank Palestinians, who are not allowed to enter settlements except as laborers bearing special permits. Because of this, football teams, for example, operating in the settlements, are available to Israelis only, and West Bank Palestinians may not participate, play on the teams or even attend games as spectators. In most cases, the clubs receive a majority of their funding from the settlement municipalities and regional councils, which essentially pay them to organize sports and recreational services for Israelis only.

The IFA told Human Rights Watch in a letter that it would not discriminate against clubs playing in areas subject to Israeli authority and that the issue was a political issue to be determined by future negotiations. FIFA Secretary General Fatma Samoura said in an October 28 letter to Human Rights Watch that it was committed to implementing its human rights responsibilities and that a monitoring committee “is working intensely on this matter” and that FIFA would allow this process to follow its course. The mandate of the monitoring committee expires in May 2017.

More information, including links to responses from settlement clubs and the Israel Football Association, are available in Human Rights Watch’s short publication, “Israel/Palestine: FIFA Sponsoring Games on Seized Land,” published on September 25, 2016. In that publication, we recommend that FIFA require the IFA to relocate the home games of the settlement clubs to inside Israel or, if they continue to play in settlements, exclude them from the IFA.

Thank you for your cooperation and please do not hesitate to contact me. 

Sincerely,

Sari Bashi
Israel/Palestine Advocacy Director
Middle East and North Africa
Human Rights Watch

Kazakhstan: Workers’ Rights Violated, Restricted

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(Almaty) – Kazakhstan’s new trade union law, adopted after unresolved labor strikes in 2011, has made it more difficult to organize independent unions in the country, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. Changes to the labor and criminal codes have contributed to an environment hostile to worker activism.

The 69-page report, “‘We Are Not The Enemy’: Violations of Workers’ Rights in Kazakhstan,” details the significant legal and practical obstacles workers in Kazakhstan must overcome to organize and defend their interests in the workplace. Human Rights Watch interviewed more than 50 trade union leaders, labor activists, and workers in key industries across Kazakhstan, and documented harassment, surveillance, and, in some cases, spurious legal prosecution or dismissals in apparent retaliation for labor activism. The Kazakh government should take immediate steps to lift restrictions on workers’ rights and the ability to organize.

“Robust trade unions are a trademark of a democratic society based on respect for human rights, and essential to the defense of workers’ rights and interests in the workplace,” said Mihra Rittmann, Europe and Central Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Kazakhstan’s 2014 trade union law is a deliberate attempt to curtail independent trade union activism and restrict workers’ rights to organize.”

Kazakhstan is cultivating an image of a regional power and has sought opportunities to bring itself into the international spotlight. In June 2016, Kazakhstan won a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, beginning on January 1, 2017. It is also a major regional hub for foreign investment in the oil industry and other sectors.

Ensuring international standards on labor rights, in particular the rights of workers to freedom of association and to organize, should be an integral part of Kazakhstan’s approach, Human Rights Watch said.

Workers at the ArcelorMittal steel plant in Temirtau, June 13, 2012.

Workers at the ArcelorMittal steel plant in Temirtau, June 13, 2012.
 

Following unresolved labor strikes in western Kazakhstan, which ended in clashes that killed at least a dozen people in the oil town of Zhanaozen in December 2011, the government announced it would improve labor relations and “modernize trade union institutions.”

Rather than improve labor relations, a new trade union law has imposed burdensome registration requirements on trade unions in Kazakhstan and a mandatory affiliation requirement with higher-tier unions that are at stark odds with internationally protected workers’ rights to freely organize. The government also adopted a new labor code in 2015, which restricts workers’ rights to collective bargaining, as well as their fundamental right to strike.

Erlan Baltabai, an oil worker trade union leader in Shymkent, southern Kazakhstan, told Human Rights Watch that in his workplace pressure started on trade union members in January 2012, soon after he was elected chairman: “Foremen began to scare workers, pressuring them saying ‘don’t join that trade union, or you’ll have problems. We can fire you, or find something against you,’” he said.

A number of labor activists and workers said they had been monitored by the security services for normal union activities.

Larisa Kharkova, president of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of the Republic of Kazakhstan (KNPRK), said she has faced surveillance by the authorities, including during a trip to western Kazakhstan in March 2016. “I was surrounded in Aktau – day and night [by security services],” she said. “I went to meet the [union] guys – we were sitting there, talking, and we could see how [the security agents] drove up and photographed us.”

A Human Rights Watch researcher similarly faced surveillance while doing research for this report.

Robust trade unions are a trademark of a democratic society based on respect for human rights, and essential to the defense of workers’ rights and interests in the workplace. Kazakhstan’s 2014 trade union law is a deliberate attempt to curtail independent trade union activism and restrict workers’ rights to organize.

Mihra Rittmann

Europe and Central Asia researcher

“Dosym D.” a worker activist in central Kazakhstan whose real name is not being used to protect him from retaliation, said that the police summoned him and tried to intimidate him by showing him an open file about him. “What surprised me is that the police are from the [department] combating extremism,” he said. “Show me where in my actions I display extremist behavior!”

Kazakhstan is a state party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which protects the right to strike as well as to form and join trade unions and national and international confederations.

Kazakhstan is also a member of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and has ratified all of its eight fundamental conventions, including Convention 87 of 1948 on freedom of association and Convention 98 of 1949 on the right to organize. Convention 87 states that workers have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, to join organizations of their own choosing without previous authorization.

In 2015 and 2016, Kazakhstan was strongly criticized for its restrictions in the Trade Union Law by the International Labour Conference, the highest-level decision-making body of the ILO. In June 2015, the ILO’s Committee on the Application of Standards called on Kazakhstan to “amend the provisions of the Trade Union Law of 2014 consistent with the Convention.” Kazakhstan has not amended the law.

The government of Kazakhstan should take immediate steps to amend the trade union law, as well as labor and criminal codes, to bring them in compliance with ILO conventions and international human rights standards. Companies operating in Kazakhstan and authorities should ensure that employees do not face retaliation or harassment for trade union activism.

Kazakhstan’s key economic partners, especially the European Union, EU members, and the United States, should press the government to carry out labor reforms as part of their dialogues with the Kazakh government.

“Workers in Kazakhstan are entitled to organize and defend their interests without fear of harassment and reprisal,” Rittmann said. “If Kazakhstan wants to be global player it should take heed of the conclusions of the ILO, uphold its international obligations to respect human rights, and amend rights-violating laws and practice without delay.”

“We Are Not the Enemy”

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Summary

The government of Kazakhstan fails to guarantee workers’ rights to freedom of association and to fully protect their interests in the workplace. Workers must overcome significant obstacles established in law and in practice to organize in Kazakhstan. Legislative changes in recent years have made it more difficult for workers to freely form unions and bargain collectively, and have introduced criminal sanctions for leading or participating in illegal strikes. Outspoken trade leaders and worker activists face harassment, surveillance, and in some cases dismissal because of their labor activism.

This report–based on interviews with over 50 trade union leaders, labor activists, and workers in key industries across Kazakhstan–documents retaliatory company action against workers and state and company harassment of labor rights activists. It identifies key labor rights concerns voiced by workers and activists, and details the restrictive labor and trade union legislation that makes it difficult to independently organize and defend workers’ rights in Kazakhstan. Human Rights Watch also sought the views and perspectives of the Ministry of Healthcare and Social Protection, as well as those of companies named in the report.

There is limited space for dissent in Kazakhstan, the largest country by land mass in Central Asia with a workforce of approximately 8.9 million people. Kazakh authorities tolerate little public criticism of the government or its record. The government’s hostility towards activists inhibits the defense of workers’ rights in Kazakhstan. While the government of Kazakhstan has long restricted the right to freedom of association and the right to carry out peaceful dissent, in recent years the government has further tightened controls over trade unions and civil society groups.

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Cities and towns where Human Rights Watch conducted research on labor rights for this report.

From May to December 2011, thousands of workers employed in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sector undertook separate labor strikes at companies operating in the petroleum sector in western Kazakhstan. On December 16, 2011, violent clashes broke out in the central square of Zhanaozen, where one of the strikes had been ongoing for months, with law enforcement officers opening fire on workers and others, killing at least 12 people.

In July 2012, following those extended and unresolved labor strikes in western Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan’s president, Nursultan Nazarbaev, called for better regulations of employer-employee relations. Following his directive, the government adopted a new trade union law in June 2014 and a new Labor Code in November 2015. However, legislators ignored key recommendations by trade unions and the International Labour Organization, which provided technical expert analysis of the bills. Neither law fully complies with international standards on workers’ rights.

As Kazakhstan’s economic growth has slowed in recent years due to the significant drop in the global price of crude oil, and the country’s national currency, the tenge, has lost value, the government has grown even more wary of possible unrest. In May 2016, for example, authorities took quick and decisive action against gatherings opposing land code reforms, detaining hundreds of protesters and bringing politically motivated criminal charges against peaceful activists.

The current economic downturn has the potential to affect thousands of workers employed in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas and mining industries. It could also exacerbate social tensions in the country and lead to a further deterioration of the rights situation in the workplace. As such, now is an important time to take stock of where practice and legislation fall short of international standards on the protection of workers’ rights, and for the government to take heed of workers’ grievances and implement much-needed legislative amendments and reforms.

Workers in Kazakhstan interviewed for this report described the significant difficulties they have faced trying to organize and defend their interests in the workplace, as well as efforts by independent trade unions to comply with new labor and trade union legislation, which restricts their rights to freedom of association, collective bargaining, and to strike.

Some trade union leaders described to Human Rights Watch how their efforts to organize workers into active unions led to pressure by company management on trade union members to leave the union, sometimes under threat of dismissal, as well as about cases of retaliatory firings and spurious criminal investigations against workers, in apparent retribution for their labor activism. The report documents undue government surveillance of several trade union activists and how security officials contacted labor activists who spoke to Human Rights Watch in the context of research for this report. Safeguards to protect workers’ rights are inadequate to protect workers from abuses perpetrated either by employers or by the state.

The report assesses the Law on Professional Unions of the Republic of Kazakhstan (“Trade Union Law”), adopted in 2014, and the Labor Code, adopted in 2015, as well as amendments to the Criminal Code, all of which have further tightened controls over civil society activists, including trade union leaders, and have introduced criminal sanctions for leading or participating in illegal strikes. These laws fail to meet international standards regulating freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike. Although Kazakhstan was publicly and firmly admonished in both 2015 and 2016 over restrictions in the Trade Union Law at the International Labour Conference, the highest-level decision-making body of the International Labour Organiation (ILO), as of this writing, no amendments to either law have been introduced.

The report also examines the right to strike in Kazakhstan and how the legislative framework effectively prohibits some workers from exercising that right, except in limited circumstances, and analyzes the consequences for carrying out industrial action that has been found illegal by Kazakh courts. Workers interviewed for the report noted that in some instances, particularly in those cases where industrial disputes spilled over into spontaneous industrial action, authorities at a local and regional level played a positive role in helping to mediate a resolution. However, Human Rights Watch documented cases in which workers were charged by the authorities or dismissed from their jobs for participating in illegal strikes.

Workers' rights to organize and to associate are well-established under international human rights law. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), ratified by and legally binding on Kazakhstan, states that “everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.” The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which Kazakhstan has also ratified, similarly recognizes “[t]he right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his choice.”

The International Labour Organization (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (ILO Declaration) lists freedom of association as one of the “fundamental rights,” which all ILO members have an obligation to protect. ILO Convention 87 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise and ILO Convention 98 concerning the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining, both of which Kazakhstan has ratified, elaborate on this right.

While the government of Kazakhstan has the primary responsibility to promote and ensure respect for human rights, and in particular to guarantee workers’ rights to form unions and protect their interests in the workplace, companies too have internationally recognized responsibilities to protect the rights of workers. The United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which the UN Human Rights Council endorsed in 2011, recognize that all companies should respect human rights, avoid complicity in abuses, and ensure that any abuses that occur in spite of these efforts are adequately remedied.

The government of Kazakhstan should amend its trade union and labor laws, while companies operating in Kazakhstan should ensure that employees do not face retaliation or harassment for their trade union activism. The failure to do so is incompatible with applicable international standards, violates constitutional norms in Kazakhstan, and denies workers the capacity to organize in the protection of their interests at this especially critical time of economic downturn.

Kazakhstan should take immediate steps to fulfill the recommendations of the ILO to amend the Trade Union Law, and foster a better environment for trade union activism.

Kazakhstan’s key economic partners, especially the European Union and the United States, should press the government to take immediate steps to implement labor reforms as part of their respective dialogues with the Kazakh government on the country’s economic development and on Kazakhstan’s respect for human rights and rule of law. At a minimum, this should happen in the context of the EU’s enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and the United States’ Annual Bilateral Consultations with Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan’s international partners should stress that ensuring international standards on labor rights, in particular the right of workers to association and to organize, should be an integral part of Kazakhstan’s approach as it aspires to play a more important global role.

Recommendations

To the Government of Kazakhstan

  • Respect the rights of workers to associate, organize, and form unions, and to peaceful assembly with others in accordance with international human and labor rights law.
  • Foster an environment that protects, not punishes, labor rights activists for defending workers’ rights in Kazakhstan.
  • Respect and promote freedom of association and the rights of workers to form independent labor unions, bargain collectively, and conduct strikes, in accordance with Kazakhstan’s obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and ILO Conventions 87 and 98.
  • Review, in consultation with independent unions in Kazakhstan, international trade union bodies, and the ILO, all union registration procedures with a view to bringing the 2014 Trade Union Law into full conformity with ILO Conventions 87 and 98, eliminating unnecessarily burdensome two-step registration requirements and the mandatory affiliation requirement. In the interim, accept and promptly grant pending applications for union registration, and ensure that workers are able to register unions without undue difficulty or delay.
  • Amend the 2015 Labor Code to bring it fully into conformity with ILO Conventions 87 and 98 by a) lifting broad restrictions and prohibitions on the right to strike, in particular the ban on strikes in “hazardous production facilities,” except in limited cases where a strike would “endanger the life, safety or health of the whole or part of the population;” and b) clearly define provisions for collective bargaining so that workers, employers, and intermediaries can easily understand and follow provisions in the law, including by lessening the threshold for workers to initiate procedures for going on strike.
  • Cease unfounded government surveillance of trade union activists, which constitutes a breach of their privacy and right to freedom of association.
  • Ensure that trade union leaders and worker activists do not face retaliation for their labor activism. In cases where workers allege retaliatory dismissal or other forms of punitive actions on the part of their employer, including allegations of criminal wrongdoing, promptly investigate the workers’ claims.
  • Amend Criminal Code articles 174 “inciting social, national, clan, racial, class, or religious discord” and 402 “calling on workers to participate in a strike that has been found illegal by a court,” as they are incompatible with freedom of association, the right to organize, and the right to strike. Ensure that the definition of “inciting social, national, clan, racial, class, or religious discord” complies with the international legal principles of legal certainty and predictability and cannot be invoked against persons for the legitimate exercise of their basic rights to freedom of opinion, expression or assembly.
  • Allow workers to exercise their internationally protected right to peaceful assembly. Immediately amend the law on public assemblies so that any restrictions on this freedom are based on rule of law, absolutely necessary for public order and safety, and not applied in a discriminatory manner.
  • Effectively investigate allegations of excessive use of force in connection with the Zhanaozen violence and of torture and ill-treatment in the wake of the events, with a view to holding the perpetrators to account, and given the widespread allegations by defendants at trial that they were subjected to ill-treatment and torture, review all June 2012 Zhanaozen-related convictions and ensure effective redress for those who were wrongfully imprisoned.
  • Implement the recommendations of the UN Human Rights Committee, following its review of Kazakhstan’s compliance with the ICCPR in July 2016, in particular the recommendation that “the State party should bring its regulations and practice governing the registration and functioning of political parties and NGOs, as well as the legal frameworks regulating strikes and trade unions, into full compliance with the provisions of articles 19, 22 and 25 of the Covenant.”
  • Implement in full the recommendations issued by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association in June 2015, following his visit to Kazakhstan, in particular the recommendation calling on Kazakh authorities “to ensure individuals can form and join trade unions of their choice, including by eliminating compulsory state registration.”

To the Ministry of Healthcare and Social Protection

  • Take steps to ensure that all privately owned, state-owned, and foreign-invested companies and enterprises in Kazakhstan respect international labor standards.
  • Improve labor inspection methods, including by strengthening oversight mechanisms for checking on company compliance with trade union and labor law, and pay special attention to complaints of discrimination against union leaders filed by registered unions and newly formed unions, or company interference in collective bargaining negotiations.
  • Publicly and regularly disclose the companies inspected, key labor rights violations found, and enforcement actions taken, and ensure adequate resources in this regard.
  • Urge all businesses and companies operating in Kazakhstan to educate employees about their rights, including their right to join a trade union and the right to file a complaint if there is retaliation.

To National and Foreign Companies Operating in Kazakhstan

  • Respect the rights of employees to join trade unions of their choosing, or to form new trade unions, without interference by company management.
  • Ensure that all employees are fully informed and trained about their rights and how to exercise them, making information about labor rights easily accessible, for example by publicly posting them at the work place.
  • Develop or revise existing internal codes, for example, on corporate social responsibility, to include the protection of labor and other rights of workers employed by the company and their subcontractors, subsidiaries, and other agents.
  • Promptly respond to worker or trade union requests to engage in collective bargaining, to adopt or amend collective agreements, or to resolve collective disputes, and negotiate in good faith, in accordance with international law.

To the EU, EU member states, US, and Kazakhstan’s Other Key International Partners

  • Consistently raise concerns, publicly and at the highest level, as well as in the context of multilateral institutions, about violations of labor rights in Kazakhstan, including the need to amend the Trade Union Law, the Labor Code, and the Criminal Code.
  • Call on the government of Kazakhstan to fully protect in law and in practice internationally recognized workers’ rights, including the right to freedom of association, the right to organize, and the right to strike.
  • The EU should meaningfully and unequivocally signal to Kazakhstan that it has to respect the terms of the enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, in which, under Article 231, point I, the parties agree to work together towards “improving the quality of the labour law and ensuring a better protection for workers;” and Article 235, in which the parties “attach particular importance to…respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.” The EU should raise the concerns included in this report in its Cooperation Council meetings and Human Rights Dialogues with Kazakhstan and monitor progress on the rights of workers to associate, organize, and form unions.
  • The US should maintain pressure by consistently raising concerns about worker rights violations in the context of discussions with the Kazakh government on the Generalized System of Preferences and ongoing regional dialogues, such as the Annual Bilateral Consultations.

To the International Labour Organization

  • Follow up with the government of Kazakhstan on fulfilling the Committee of Experts’ conclusions issued in June 2015 and again in June 2016, including seeking a time-bound reform program for amending the Trade Union Law and Labor Code to bring them into compliance with ILO Conventions 87 and 98, and monitor the implementation of the recommendations of the ILO Committee on the Application of Standards.
  • Follow up on the Committee of Freedom of Association conclusions issued in response to a complaint filed in 1995 by the Independent Trade Union Center of Kazakhstan calling on the Kazakh government to “take steps to amend…article 5 of the new Constitution so as to lift the prohibition on the acceptance by national trade unions… of financial assistance from international organizations of workers.”

To the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

  • Engage with the government of Kazakhstan, which has worked to advance its relationship with the OECD in recent years, including to sign the OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which requires countries to “respect the right of workers employed by the multinational enterprise to establish or join trade unions and representative organizations of their own choosing.”

Methodology

This report is based on research conducted in Kazakhstan between September 2014 and June 2016. Interviews took place in nine cities in five of Kazakhstan’s fourteen regions: Almaty, Aktau, Karaganda, Kokshetau, Satpaev, Shakhtinsk, Shymkent, Zhezkazgan, and in the country’s capital, Astana. One interview was conducted by phone with a former trade union activist located outside Kazakhstan at the time of the interview.

Human Rights Watch interviewed 55 trade union leaders, labor activists, and workers who are employed in various sectors of Kazakhstan’s economy. Most interviews were on an individual basis, although some took place in small groups. Human Rights Watch also interviewed five representatives of local human rights groups, with specialized trade union or freedom of association knowledge, and one lawyer with expertise in Kazakh labor legislation.

Follow up interviews were conducted in person, by telephone, or over email between April 2015 and November 2016. Human Rights Watch interviewed some trade union representatives multiple times.

Human Rights Watch also attended two roundtables hosted by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) on the topic of Kazakhstan’s new Trade Union Law and its effect on trade unions in Kazakhstan. The roundtables took place in Almaty in October 2014 and in Astana in May 2015.

Interviews were conducted in Russian by a Russian-speaking researcher. A handful of interviews were conducted in Kazakh with the assistance of a consultant to Human Rights Watch fluent in Russian and Kazakh.

Other materials, for example, copies of court documents and trade union letters to companies, were provided to Human Rights Watch by interviewees. A Human Rights Watch consultant translated relevant Kazakh-language documents into Russian. Human Rights Watch also reviewed relevant laws and regulations.

Human Rights Watch informed all those interviewed of the purpose of the interview, its voluntary and confidential nature, and the ways in which the information would be used. Each person orally consented to be interviewed. Interviewees were informed that they could discontinue the interview at any time or decline to answer questions. No incentives were offered or provided to the interviewees.

Human Rights Watch has provided anonymity for a number of the interviewees referred to in this report to protect their identity and to prevent possible retaliation against them, as indicated in the relevant citations. Where pseudonyms are used, they appear as a first name and an initial of the same letter. Real names have been used with permission from the interviewee, or where the incidents described have already appeared in the media.

In September 2016, Human Rights Watch sent letters to eight companies named in this report with specific questions about the violations we documented in order to provide each company the opportunity to respond to the allegations. By publication only one company had provided a written response. The company’s views are reflected in the report and a copy of its response is included in the annex of this report. Some company names have been withheld to minimize the risk to the trade union activists Human Rights Watch interviewed and are identified as “Company” followed by a capital letter from the alphabet, e.g. “Company A.”

In June 2016, Human Rights Watch met with the Deputy Minister of Healthcare and Social Development at the International Labour Conference (ILC) in Geneva on Kazakhstan’s reporting before the International Labour Organization. In August 2016, Human Rights Watch sent a letter to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Healthcare and Social Development outlining the findings of this report and seeking a written response. In mid-October, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a short response suggesting Human Rights Watch should resend its letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, requesting its assistance in forwarding the letter to the Ministry of Healthcare and Social Development. This response is included in the annex of the report. On October 21, Human Rights Watch resent the letter. However, by publication, Human Rights Watch had not received a response.

Surveillance by the Authorities

During research in the cities of Aktau and Karaganda and in nearby towns in April 2015, authorities surveilled a Human Rights Watch researcher and consultant. Surveillance included being followed by car and on foot by men Human Rights Watch staff believed to be plainclothes officers.

Human Rights Watch’s researcher was also surveilled in Aktau and Shymkent in September 2015. In one instance, a representative of the Committee on National Security identified himself to reception staff at the hotel where the researcher was staying, showed the receptionist a current photograph of the researcher, and requested information about her.

On subsequent research trips to Aktau in September 2015 and June 2016, trade union activists who had previously spoken to Human Rights Watch’s researcher stated that security officials had spoken to them by telephone or summoned them for a talk. Officials warned the activists against meeting and sharing information with Human Rights Watch.

I.   Background

Economy Before Political Reform

During his 25-year tenure as Kazakhstan’s leader, President Nursultan Nazarbaev has pushed a policy of economic development over political reform. In recent years his stated aim has been to make Kazakhstan one of the top 30 most developed countries globally by 2050.[1]From 1995 to 2015, Kazakhstan experienced an average annual economic growth rate of about 5 percent, fueled almost entirely by the country’s petroleum industry.[2] Yet, in the same period, experts say that the government has not managed to diversify its economy or bring about meaningful institutional reforms that would help the country weather economic downturns, such as the one Kazakhstan is currently experiencing as a result of the drop in oil prices beginning in 2014.[3]Most recently protests in April and May 2016 over proposed land reforms have highlighted the strains in the government’s “economy first” approach.

The global price of oil fell from its peak at US$112/barrel in June 2014 to under US$46/barrel in July 2016.[4] In 2015, the government floated the national currency, the tenge, causing it to lose half its value against the dollar. President Nazarbaev called snap presidential elections in 2015 and snap parliamentary elections in 2016, steps that experts see as the leadership’s attempt to rally popular political support before a full economic crisis threatened to hit Kazakhstan’s economy.

Internationally, Kazakhstan is deeply invested in cultivating an image of a regional power and has sought opportunities to bring itself into the global spotlight as a key means of garnering global recognition. It became the first Central Asian state to serve as chair of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2010. It was elected to the UN Human Rights Council in 2012. “Expo 2017,” a three-month international exposition focusing on energy, is scheduled to take place in Astana starting in June 2017 and is being branded as an opportunity for investors to participate in the “energy of the future.” Kazakhstan vied for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council for 2017-2018 and won.[5] In 2015, Almaty was a final contender against Beijing to host the 2022 Winter Olympic Games, but lost.[6]

In early 2015, Kazakhstan signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on implementing Kazakhstan’s Country Programme of Cooperation for 2015 and 2016.[7] In November 2015, Kazakhstan became the 162nd member of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Despite Kazakhstan’s global aspirations and the country’s sustained economic growth over the last decade, Kazakhstan has not taken meaningful steps to introduce much-needed human rights reforms domestically, leaving a country experiencing serious and long-term human rights violations during a serious economic downturn.

Violence in Zhanaozen, Subsequent Crackdown, Legislative Initiatives

In 2011, workers’ rights–and grievances–were brought to the forefront of Kazakhstan’s domestic affairs when workers in the oil and gas sector in western Kazakhstan went on strike in May demanding better pay. Workers stayed on strike for seven months in the port city of Aktau and in Zhanaozen, an oil town in Kazakhstan’s western Mangistau region, but their grievances went unresolved.

On December 16, 2011 clashes broke out on the central square of Zhanaozen, the site of the workers’ strike and of Independence Day celebrations. Police and government forces opened fire on oil workers and others who had gathered there. Over the course of the day, law enforcement officers killed at least 12 and wounded dozens of others, according to official figures.[8]

A concerted government crackdown on dissent followed in the months after the Zhanaozen violence. Authorities arrested and prosecuted outspoken oil workers and government critics, almost all of whom were convicted despite serious allegations of torture, and shut down independent and opposition media, a practice that continues to date. In October 2012, a court sentenced Vladimir Kozlov, the leader of the unregistered opposition party Alga!, to seven-and-a-half years in prison on vague charges in an unfair trial for his alleged role in stoking unrest in western Kazakhstan in 2011.[9]

Against the backdrop of this unrest and subsequent crackdown on its critics, the government began to tighten controls over workers and trade unions as well, as part of its broader efforts to quash dissent.

In July 2012, President Nazarbaev issued a social policy program entitled “The Social Modernization of Kazakhstan: Twenty Steps to a Society of Universal Labor,” which stressed the need to overhaul legislation regulating labor relations–viewed in part as a response to the strikes and protests in western Kazakhstan of the previous year and the ensuing violent clashes.[10]

President Nazarbaev stated that Kazakhstan’s 1993 Law on Trade Unions had become outdated and suggested that “in Kazakhstan today, the mechanisms for regulating, preventing, and settling labor disputes and conflicts are underdeveloped” and that “it is not surprising that trade unions are not always able to play the role of an effective tool for the prevention and settlement of labor disputes.”[11] In public comments on July 3, Kazakhstan’s Day of Industrialization, he had called on legislators to draft a new trade union law by the end of 2012, and to introduce greater sanctions for individuals he termed “provocateurs and parasites,” who provoke social and labor conflicts.[12]

The government adopted the new Trade Union Law in June 2014. In 2013, the minister of labor and social protection claimed that the law would “consolidate the right of trade unions to represent the interests of workers and negotiate on their behalf.”[13]Instead, the law has served to enable greater influence by the authorities over the trade union movement, limit the rights of workers, and make it more difficult for workers to freely organize into trade union structures of their choosing. This is discussed in more detail below.

In January 2015, a new criminal code came into effect that tightens controls over civil society. In particular it identifies “leaders of public associations” as a separate category of individuals who can be subject to increased criminal sanctions. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association found that such a formulation in law “appears simply to be a way to instil fear in civil society leaders who consider criticizing the government or its policies.”[14] The criminal code also increased criminal sanctions for “illegal interference by members of public associations in government activities,” a vague formulation that gives authorities wide leeway to take action against civil society activists.[15]Since the adoption of the new Criminal Code, courts have increasingly applied article 50 of the Criminal Code in their rulings, under which a defendant may be restricted from practicing civic or professional activities, including trade union activities, for up to ten years.

Trade Union Movement Since Independence

Kazakhstan’s independent trade union movement developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s around the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Yevgeniy Zhovtis, director of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, who in the early 1990s served as the vice president of the Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Kazakhstan, described how trade unions in the Soviet period differed from robust independent trade unions: “trade unions were a part of the [Soviet] system, from an ideological and organizational point of view…and were always heavily controlled and maximally centralized.”[16]

Three national trade union federations and confederations have emerged in independent Kazakhstan: the Federation of Trade Unions of Kazakhstan (FPRK), an organization that grew out of the Kazakh Soviet Council of Trade Unions (KazSovProf); the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of the Kazakh Republic (KNPKR; formerly the Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Kazakhstan, or KSPK), which evolved from the Independent Trade Union Center of Kazakhstan (ITUCK) after the fall of the Soviet Union and large-scale strikes in the mining sector in the late 1980s; and the Kazakhstan Confederation of Labor (KKT; formerly the Confederation of Labor of Kazakhstan), which broke off from KSPK in 2004. A fourth trade union group, known as Zhanartu, has since 2010 repeatedly tried to register as a national-tier trade union, but the Ministry of Justice has denied it registration.[17]

Kazakhstan’s labor movement remains weak. The legacy of state-controlled trade unions of the Soviet period coupled with today’s highly controlled environment for worker organizing has meant that many established unions do not effectively represent workers’ interests. The Kazakh government claims that about 54 percent of Kazakhstan’s labor force is unionized.[18]

I.Restrictions on Freedom of Association and Right to Organize

The authorities heavily control the space for worker organizing and freedom of association. Company officials and the authorities engage in a range of tactics to limit the rights of or retaliate against trade union leaders and worker activists who are outspoken in defense of their rights.

The section below details apparent reprisals against trade union leaders, labor activists, and workers, including threats of or actual dismissal from places of employment and government surveillance of activists. Human Rights Watch also documented a few instances in which authorities took legal action against trade union leaders, in apparent retaliation for their labor rights activism, including by bringing criminal charges.

In order to reflect the perspectives of the companies implicated in workers’ rights abuses, Human Rights Watch sent letters to the five companies named in this section of the report. They are: TOO Altyntau Kokshetau, Petro Kazakhstan Oil Products, KM Tranco, ArcelorMittal Temirtau and TOO Oil Construction Company. Out of the five companies Human Rights Watch contacted, however, none had responded by publication.

Threats and Reprisals Against Worker Rights Activists

Leading independent trade union and worker activists in all the locations where Human Rights Watch carried out research for this report described how restrictive laws, as well as incidents of interference, harassment, and intimidation by company officials and government authorities contribute to a restrictive environment for trade union activism in Kazakhstan.

Trade union leaders interviewed for this report described how their efforts to organize workers into active unions led to pressure by company management on trade union members to leave the union, sometimes under threat of dismissal, and how, in some cases, companies took punitive action against more outspoken activists. In a handful of cases, trade union leaders and worker activists told Human Rights Watch that the authorities have threatened them with criminal charges, apparently in retaliation for their activism. In addition, trade union leaders in Aktau and Shymkent told Human Rights Watch that government officials surveilled them, and how in Aktau, officials contacted them before or after meeting with a Human Rights Watch researcher.

Under international labor and human rights law, workers should be free to defend their economic and social interests, form unions, and bargain for better protections of their rights without fear of retaliation. Those standards provide that employers are prohibited from mounting anti-union campaigns that interfere with worker organizing, or retaliating against workers for supporting a union. Any retaliation by the authorities or by companies for engaging in legitimate labor activities is a violation of workers’ rights.

International law requires countries to outlaw such conduct, sanction perpetrators with meaningful and deterrent penalties, and enforce the prohibitions. These standards are enshrined in International Labour Convention 87, or the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, and International Labour Convention 98, or the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, as well as the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Kazakhstan’s labor laws and practice do not meet these international norms.

Dismissals or Threats of Dismissal Apparently Linked to Union Activity

Independent trade union leaders in five of the cities where Human Rights Watch conducted research for this report said that managers, or management-level employees, pressured workers to leave trade unions, sometimes under threat of dismissal. Human Rights Watch also documented some instances in which companies dismissed employees following their union-related activities or worker activism.

Kazakhstan’s law on trade unions prohibits discrimination and retaliation against trade union members for labor activism.[19] International labor and human rights laws, including International Labour Organization conventions that Kazakhstan has ratified, similarly prohibit such actions. ILO Convention 98 explains: “Workers shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of anti-union discrimination in respect of their employment…. Such protection shall apply more particularly in respect of acts calculated to…(b) [c]ause the dismissal of or otherwise prejudice a worker by reason of union membership or because of participation in union activities.[20]

In one case, Nikolay N., a trade union member at TOO AltynTau Kokshetau, a gold mining company in northern Kazakhstan, told Human Rights Watch that in June 2014 after workers notified their employer that they had organized an independent trade union “Zarya,” management pressured workers not to join the union. “Lots [of people] joined initially, but as soon as [Zarya] formally informed the company, that’s when [pressure] started – they carried out individual conversations and then people dropped out.”[21]

Another trade union member, Boris B., told Human Rights Watch that the day after the trade union informed company management about their trade union, their response was “harsh.”[22] Management called a general meeting of workers the very next day and announced openly that if anyone joins the union, they would be fired, Boris B. said.[23]

Nikolay N. corroborated this account. “There were threats that people would get fired if they joined the union – it was psychological pressure,” he said.[24] Nikolay N. told Human Rights Watch that initially the threats worked to prevent people from organizing, since “people just want to keep their jobs.”[25]

In the months following the creation of trade union “Zarya,” Altyntau Kokshetau also took disciplinary action against one of the union’s founding members, Sergei Buntakov, for allegedly violating safety procedures at work, and penalized him by thrice refusing to pay his bonuses. Nikolay N., who worked with Buntakov, explained, “There wasn’t actually a violation [of safety rules]; there was no justified reason to limit his bonus. The employer first paid [Buntakov], but then took it back, so Buntakov filed a complaint against them.”[26]

Buntakov said in a media interview in November 2014 that he had sued his employers “in connection with violations of my legal rights and the illegal disciplinary action which we connect with our trade union activities.”[27]On December 15, 2014, a court ruled in Buntakov’s favor, and the company paid his bonus. But when Buntakov’s contract had come up for renewal on December 9, 2014, management declined to renew it.[28]

In another case from western Kazakhstan Company C, a company in the oil sector in Mangistau region, suspended one of its employees, Bakyt B., after he tried to organize his colleagues into a union in May 2014. In response to the workers’ efforts to organize, company management “choked the life out of” the union by summoning the members and pressuring them to quit it, Sultan S., a trade union leader in the oil industry who assisted Bakyt B. in his attempt to organize a trade union, told Human Rights Watch.[29] Bakyt B. confirmed that after he tried to organize a trade union, the company wanted to fire him, and that “he had to resign” in a telephone interview with Human Rights Watch.[30]

Human Rights Watch interviewed other trade union leaders in Aktau, Shymkent, Zhezkazgan, and Karaganda region about responses in recent years to workers’ efforts to organize. They said management-level employees at various companies had used similar tactics against union activism, including threats of dismissal.

Erlan Baltabai, an oil worker trade union leader in Shymkent who represents workers employed at Petro Kazakhstan Oil Products (PKOP), an oil company, told Human Rights Watch that the pressure started in January 2012, soon after he was elected chairman and workers had started to join his union. “Foremen began to scare workers pressuring them saying ‘don’t join that trade union or you’ll have problems, we can fire you, or find something against you,’” he said.[31] Baltabai explained that he encouraged workers to file a complaint about the threats, but that “the workers didn’t want to write [a complaint]—they’re worried about being fired. In Kazakhstan there aren’t any jobs. Everyone just ends up working at the bazaar. Our company is one of the few places to work here.”[32]

A worker activist in Zhezkazgan, Erlan Tabylov, told Human Rights Watch that KM Tranco, the copper mining service company where he worked, dismissed him because “I was always very active [and] spoke up before the [workers’] collective, supported them,” including in social media.[33]

Tabylov told Human Rights Watch that company management summoned him on Saturday, August 16, 2014 to tell him that if he did not resign, they would fire him.”[34] Tabylov contested his dismissal in court. In December 2014, a Zhezkazgan court found his dismissal unlawful, ruling the company had to reinstate him and pay his withheld wages.[35]The service company contested the court’s decision. In March 2015, the appeals court overturned the decision and required Tabylov to return the compensation money he had been paid. At the time of the appeal, Tabylov and other worker activists were in the process of trying to register a trade union in Zhezkazgan.[36]

Tabylov contested the appeal’s ruling. In April 2015 the Karaganda court of cassation upheld the first instance decision reinstating Tabylov at work. However, two months later, in June, when Tabylov’s contract concluded, the company let him go. Tabylov told Human Rights Watch that “fifteen people were laid off, but the company hired 40 new employees.”[37]

Marat Mirgayazov, chairman of the industrial coal miners’ union Korgau in Karaganda, told Human Rights Watch that in late 2013 members of his trade union were pressured, some under threat of dismissal, to leave trade union Korgau and join a second trade union, Birlik, seen by Mirgayazov as loyal to the company.[38]

Mirgayazov told Human Rights Watch that Korgau repeatedly appealed to the regional prosecutor’s office in letters requesting that the authorities take “prosecutorial action” against ArcelorMittal Temirtau in connection with its efforts to “transfer” mine workers from the trade union Korgau to the “administration-created trade union Birlik. While the prosecutor’s office looked into the allegations, he said, it did not take steps to hold anyone at ArcelorMittal Temirtau accountable.[39]

Trade Union Harassment and Retaliatory Dismissal of Trade Union Leader

In April 2012, ten employees of Company A, a small construction and infrastructure company in Kazakhstan, formed a trade union. In response to the workers’ attempts to organize, company management carried out a campaign of harassment, threats, and intimidation against union members and in particular against the trade union chairperson, Asel A., whom the company ultimately fired in retribution for her activism.

Asel A. described to Human Rights Watch how from the very start of the workers’ attempt to organize, management undermined their efforts.

People expressed their interest [in organizing a union]… I walked up to the manager and approached him with the proposal - that people want to form a union - and [asked if he] could provide a space to hold a meeting. He refused. So we had to hold our first meeting in the private home of one of the workers, in [her] private residence. About 30 people participated in that first meeting. We filled the room.[40]

The trade union of Company A workers was registered by the authorities in September 2012. Asel A. told Human Rights Watch that it took a bit of time to register the union because the general manager of Company A refused to let the union use the company’s physical address in their application and because it was some distance from the company to the Ministry of Justice offices, where they needed to file their paperwork.[41]

Immediately after the union was registered, Asel A. informed company management of their new union. She explained:

I took a copy of the charter and registration and went to our manager, to let him know about the trade union, and that employees at Company A were part of the union. The office manager refused to accept my letter, so I took it to [the director] myself… He looked at the papers, and then threw my papers back in my face...I collected the papers, and left. I had to send the notice by registered mail.[42]

In response, Company A declined to recognize the union and told Asel A. that she had to provide the company the names of everyone who had joined. “When we created [the union] people joined en masse. In just two days, 120 people joined. They started to submit their notices [to join], and the company got scared,” Asel A. said. “They [management] tried to find out who was a member of the trade union.”

Within a week, however, Company A informed Asel A. that she had been made redundant. “[The company] started to threaten me, saying if I don’t quit on my own, then two of my colleagues would be fired, and that it would be on my conscience.”[43] Company A also issued an order that no employee should approach Asel A. and to report any “unlawful actions, disrespectful treatment, threats or intimidation” by Asel A. to management.[44]

Asel A. described how difficult it was for her. “I survived all of that, and [now]… to remember it all, I started to feel badly. I hid it away [what happened to me], to tell you the truth, so as to not remember. It was a kind of war, and in the end, they fired me.”

Asel A. fought her dismissal in court, but local courts upheld her dismissal, she said.

Government Surveillance and Intimidation

Several independent trade union leaders and workers in western and southern Kazakhstan, regions with strategically important industries, such as the oil and gas sector, reported that government authorities surveilled them and in some instances personnel from the Committee on National Security (KNB) questioned them about their legitimate trade union activities.

Several activists said that they were concerned about speaking openly to Human Rights Watch about their trade union activities and requested anonymity in the report for fear of possible retribution. In the words of Maks M., one trade union activist in Mangistau oblast, “if you include this [information], they’ll immediately figure out who I am, and I don’t know what will happen to me.”[45]

Under international law and labor standards union leaders and members should be free to carry out legitimate trade union activities without fear of intimidation by government officials. Unlawful surveillance of trade union activists, including threats by security personnel, or unscheduled and intimidating visits by the KNB to trade union members’ places of work or their homes constitutes a violation of privacy, and violates Kazakhstan’s Trade Union Law and international labor conventions to which Kazakhstan is party.

Three independent trade union leaders in Aktau separately told Human Rights Watch that people they identified as security officials contacted them in regards to meeting with a Human Rights Watch researcher. Two trade union activists were summoned after meeting with Human Rights Watch in April 2014 and in one case, told not to get “too friendly.”[46] A security officer contacted the third by phone in September 2015 and warned him against meeting with a Human Rights Watch researcher who was visiting Aktau at the time.[47] In addition to interfering with their ability to speak freely about issues of concern to the activists, these actions strongly indicate that the authorities are monitoring these trade union leaders’ communications.[48]

In another case, Larisa Kharkova, president of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of the Republic of Kazakhstan (KNPRK), told Human Rights Watch that during a trip to Aktau in March 2016, she was unable to meet with trade union leaders affiliated with KNPRK without what she believed to be government surveillance, since the men were taking pictures of the activists and followed Kharkova from her hotel. She said: “I was surrounded in Aktau–day and night [by security services]… I went to meet the [union] guys–two trade unions joined [KNPRK]–one of the trade unions just can’t get registered… we were sitting there, talking, and we could see how [the security agents] drove up and photographed us.”[49]

The chairman of an independent trade union representing workers in the oil industry in Aktau, western Kazakhstan told Human Rights Watch that members of his trade union told him that KNB officers had approached them for questioning or visited them at their homes in 2015 and the first half of 2016 in regards to their trade union activism.[50]He told Human Rights Watch that about ten trade union members had complained about such harassment.

For example, Orman O., an oil worker, told Human Rights Watch that in the summer of 2015, a KNB officer came to his place of work and questioned him for about half an hour about whether he was preparing to go on strike, and warned him about creating instability in the workplace. Orman O. explained to Human Rights Watch that he thought the reason he was singled out was because “I argued [with my manager] about the volume of work we were told to fulfill.”[51]

Another oil worker, Timur T., said that a KNB officer came to his home in the early evening in mid-June 2016. Timur T. told Human Rights Watch that the officer, who introduced himself as from the KNB, wanted information about the activities of the trade union, including how many workers were members of the trade union. The officer also accused the trade union leaders of stirring up unrest amongst workers and asked Timur T. whether the union chairman was involved in any kind of religious extremism. Timur T. told Human Rights Watch that the KNB officer warned him not to tell anyone about his visit.[52]

Legal Action Against Trade Union Leaders

Human Rights Watch documented a handful of cases in which authorities in western and southern Kazakhstan initiated criminal investigations, or used the threat of criminal sanctions, to apparently target outspoken or active independent trade union leaders.[53]Authorities have the right to pursue legitimate criminal investigations and hold anyone who has committed a crime accountable under the law. Under international labor law, however, governments should not “use legitimate trade union activities as a pretext for arbitrary arrest or detention or criminal charges.”[54]

Amin Eleusinov was elected chairman of the Union of TOO Oil Construction Company (OCC) in Aktau in April 2011. In early 2013, the Aktau financial police opened a criminal investigation against Eleusinov on suspicion of “misappropriation of funds” after they had received a complaint from several trade union members about accounting for the trade union’s funds. Nurbek Kushakbaev, the OCC trade union’s safety inspector, told Human Rights Watch that the authorities “took all our documents to check them, [and] held on to them for four months. But they didn’t find anything and closed the case. We wrote to the prosecutor’s office and received a response that there was no evidence of a crime.”[55]

Two years later, in January 2015, local authorities reinitiated the previously closed investigation against Eleusinov. On February 3, 2015, the authorities, including armed riot police (OMON) officers, carried out a search of the trade union’s office, confiscating documents and the union’s computer.[56] As of August 2016, the authorities had still not returned the documents to the OCC trade union.

The move to reopen the case came around the same time the OCC trade union had filed their own complaint against their accountant, whom they discovered, through an independent audit of their finances, had fraudulently used trade union funds.[57]

Eleusinov denies he has done anything wrong and told Human Rights Watch he believes the authorities have targeted him because of his trade union activism.[58] Kushakbaev pointed out that Eleusinov still has the trust of his trade union:

Trade union funds belong to the workers, so if there are any grievances, they’ll come from the workers, not the prosecutor’s office. But this time it’s the prosecutor’s office that [reinitiated] the case [against Eleusinov]. What’s it to the prosecutor’s office? The workers [trade union members] wrote a letter to the local police station and to the prosecutor general’s office saying they don’t have any grievances against Eleusinov, that they’re aware of the trade union’s funds. They requested that the authorities drop the case.[59]

On April 9, 2016, the trade union re-elected Eleusinov as chairman for a five-year term.[60]

A trade union leader in western Kazakhstan told Human Rights Watch that the authorities opened a criminal case in December 2014 implicating him and another union member of “large-scale theft.” At the time both he and his colleague were involved in mediation negotiations in a labor dispute at their company. They deny any wrongdoing.

The union leader told Human Rights Watch that police summoned him several times for questioning, including at exact times he was scheduled to take part in mediation discussions and in the middle of the night.[61] He believed that investigators deliberately sought to interfere with the mediation process. “I have a meeting at the akimat [mayor’s office], and at exactly that time, they summon me to the investigator,” he told Human Rights Watch.[62]

In August 2015, the authorities told the trade union leader the case was closed, but despite his requests to see the case closure order in writing, the authorities have not provided him a copy.[63]

Following trade union leader Asel A.’s attempt to organize a trade union at her company, Company A, she was dismissed from her job (see case box above), and was then twice prosecuted on questionable criminal charges of “defamation,” which she believes to be in retribution for her trade union activism.[64]

In early 2013, one of the company employees filed a complaint against her, alleging that Asel A. abused her position in the company to force her and her husband to join the trade union. They claimed that Asel A. threatened them into signing papers but did not know their content. The case was heard in court, and in May 2013, the court acquitted her. Asel A. told Human Rights Watch that the employee apologized to her and told her that the company forced her to file the complaint.[65]

However, the same day the court rendered a not guilty verdict the judge informed Asel A. that another employee at Company A had filed a separate complaint against her, again accusing her of criminal “defamation,” and that the court had accepted the complaint for consideration.[66]

Asel A. described how during the hearing, Company A “brought out people in busses, approximately 20 or 30 people,” to the courthouse to testify against her, and that she noticed that one of the key witnesses was driven to court in a company car.

The court case lasted several months, and in September 2013, Asel A. was acquitted. An appeal’s court upheld the verdict. Asel A. noted that at the appeals’ hearing, neither the alleged victim nor her lawyer bothered to appear in court.

In another instance, Larisa Kharkova, president of the national-tier Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of the Republic of Kazakhstan (KNPKR), told Human Rights Watch that Petro Kazakhstan Oil Products (PKOP), an oil company in Shymkent, southern Kazakhstan, filed a complaint in December 2013 against Erlan Baltabai, chairman of Dostoinii Trud, the KNPRK-affiliate union in Shymkent for allegedly unlawful activities, including “inciting social discord.”[67]

Kharkova explained that for several months the prosecutor’s office investigated the complaint, but ultimately dropped the case when they could not find evidence of a crime. “We were summoned to the prosecutor’s office, but they didn’t find anything,” she said, “not the prosecutor’s office or the commission that was set up by the prosecutor’s office, and the case was closed.”[68]

In Zhezkazgan, a city in another industrial region in central Kazakhstan, Dosym D., a worker activist employed in Company B, in the mining industry, told Human Rights Watch that local authorities retaliated against him for his activism in 2014. “I supported some construction workers through an internet video appeal… the company, which hadn’t paid their workers in four months, tried to get the prosecutor’s office to open a criminal case against me,” Dosym D. told Human Rights Watch.

Dosym D. said that after posting online his video appeal calling on the company to pay the workers’ salaries, “law enforcement came to my door with a summons for the next morning. It was about 11 p.m. and I had already prepared for bed.”[69]Dosym D. told Human Rights Watch that the police showed him an open case file at the police station.

What surprised me is that the police [working my case], are from the [department] combating extremism. Show me where in my actions I display extremist behavior! They told me I had to write an explanatory note. I asked ‘on what grounds - for helping those guys [the unpaid workers]?’ I refused.[70]

In the end, the police did not press formal charges. “I consider it intimidation,” Dosym D. told Human Rights Watch.

A Restrictive New Trade Union Law

According to article 14 of the new [Trade Union] law, if we don’t affiliate with an industrial union, the prosecutorial authorities can destroy us. How is that voluntary? Where is our independence? The trade union law doesn’t afford us either.[71]

Kazakhstan’s Trade Union Law, adopted in June 2014, imposes serious restrictions on workers’ rights to freedom of association and the right to organize.[72] The law imposes a burdensome two-step registration process that has resulted in some trade unions in Kazakhstan unable to meet re-registration requirements, or re-register only with serious delays, or be denied registration on spurious grounds. The law also obliges trade unions to affiliate with higher-tier unions, which undermines their right to freely determine their structures. Although the Trade Union Law retains some important elements, such as non-interference in the creation of trade unions and the non-discrimination principle, the trade union law is incompatible with international labor rights and human rights standards, as detailed below.

Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Healthcare and Social Development has stated publicly that the Trade Union Law was adopted with the aim of better regulating employee-employer relations and to modernize trade unions in Kazakhstan.[73]The Federation of Trade Unions of Kazakhstan (FPRK), the largest trade union federation in Kazakhstan, has spoken out in favor of the law as well. Its chair, Abelgazy Kusainov said “…the new legislative base marshals anew the work of trade unions and makes them stronger.”[74]

But even before its adoption, the law came under concerted criticism by local and global trade unions, as well as international bodies.[75] Independent trade union leaders in Kazakhstan spoke out against the adoption of the bill and called on President Nazarbaev to veto it.[76] In the words of one Almaty-based trade union chairman:

I spoke out against the law because they’re trying to create unions from the top down. My position is that building unions should start from the bottom and work up – the reason being that the foundation of a union is its members.[77]

The ILO’s Committee on the Application of Standards concluded two years in a row, in 2015 and 2016, that Kazakhstan must take steps to “amend the provisions of the Trade Union Law of 2014 consistent with the Convention.”[78]The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan in an October 2016 letter to Human Rights Watch noted that ILO’s Committee on the Application of Standards “provided a number of observations to the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the implementation of the Convention 87 provisions, concerning the aspects of state regulation of the trade unions and employees’ associations work in Kazakhstan,” and said that “The Kazakhstan government is committed to follow up the observations made by the ILO Committee.”[79] No further details were provided in the letter, and as of this writing, Kazakhstan has not introduced any changes to the Trade Union Law to bring it in line with ILO and international standards.

Kazakhstan’s Trade Union Law envisages a three-tier trade union structure with national trade union associations at the highest level, industrial trade unions a tier lower, and local trade unions at the company level (see text box below). Local unions represent workers employed at a single company or multiple companies in the same industry. Industrial unions represent workers employed in the same industry, while national tier trade unions represent workers at the national level, and are comprised of industrial trade unions. Territorial associations group together industrial or local trade unions in the same region. An “initiative group” of three workers or more can organize, but are not a legal entity.

Trade Union Structures in Kazakhstan

National trade union associations. These represent workers at the national level, including in social partnership agreements with the national government. They are comprised of industrial trade unions, with “member organizations,” which can be lower-tier trade unions, or “initiative groups” of workers, in over half of Kazakhstan’s 14 regions, as well as in Astana and Almaty.

Industrial trade unions (also translated as ‘sector-based trade unions’). These represent workers at the industrial level, including in social partnership agreements pertaining to Kazakhstan’s industries. They are comprised of either over half the total number of workers working in that industry or related industries, or of “member organizations,” which can be local trade unions, or “initiative groups” of workers, in that industry in more than half of Kazakhstan’s 14 regions, as well as in Astana and Almaty. By law, industrial trade unions must become affiliate members of a higher-tier national trade union association, and may not remain autonomous.

Local trade unions. These represent workers employed at a single company or multiple companies in the same industry. They may conclude collective agreements at the company level. Local trade unions can range in size from 10 to several thousand workers. By law, local trade unions must become an affiliate member of a higher-tier industrial trade union, and may not remain autonomous.

“Initiative groups” of workers. These are groups of three or more workers in a single company. They do not have legal status, but serve as sub-divisional units of a local or industrial trade union for the purposes of confirming their status.

Territorial associations of trade unions. These represent workers and trade unions at the regional level, including in social partnership agreements with regional authorities. A territorial association must affiliate with a national trade union.

Burdensome Registration and Mandatory Affiliation Requirements

Under the new Trade Union Law, trade unions are required to fulfill a burdensome two-step registration process. To form a trade union, a group of at least ten workers must hold a congress and adopt a charter and form a trade union body.[80] The trade union becomes a legal entity upon registration with the Ministry of Justice. Once a trade union registers with the Ministry of Justice, it must within six months confirm its status by proving its membership base and affiliation to a higher-tier union.[81] If a union does not confirm its status within six months, it remains in legal limbo, and the Ministry of Justice can move to strip the union of its registration.[82]

The mandatory affiliation requirement does not give local and industrial trade unions the option of remaining independent of a higher-tier trade union, a requirement in law which seriously undermines their right to freely choose their structures. The law also creates burdensome obstacles to the creation of industrial and national level trade unions by introducing requirements regarding the geographic location of affiliated unions or workers’ groups.

As such, Kazakhstan’s Trade Union Law violates the principle of freedom of association enshrined in ILO Conventions 87 and 98, and the UN’s ICESCR and ICCPR.[83] The ILO has repeatedly expressed concern about the registration and mandatory affiliation requirements in Kazakhstan’s Trade Union Law, including before the law’s adoption in its 2013 technical comments.[84]

In its 2013 comments on the draft law, the ILO noted that requirements to confirm one’s status as an industrial union “imposes a trade union monopoly at the sectoral [industrial] level” whereby a majority of employees in the sector are required to affiliate into one trade union body, and could “further result in a de facto trade union monopoly at the enterprise [company] level.”[85] The ILO recommended that the section be amended “to guarantee the right of workers to form and join organizations of their own choosing.”[86]

The ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR), in its 2015 Observation, repeated these concerns about burdensome registration requirements and mandatory affiliation requirements, in particular “the requirement of excessively high thresholds [of workers] and to establish a higher-level organization (e.g. a sector-based trade union) conflicts with Article 5 of the Convention [No. 87],” and “the mandatory affiliation of sector-based, territorial and local trade unions to a national trade union association within six months following their registration.”[87] The ILO’s CEACR urged “the Government to take the necessary measures in order to amend the abovementioned legislative provisions accordingly.”[88]

The UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association raised similar concerns and recommended the government to“revise the new law on trade unions to bring it in line with international standards as highlighted by the International Labour Office in its memorandum of technical comments on the draft law on trade unions of Kazakhstan.”[89]

Some independent trade union leaders reported they felt they did not have any real choice about trade union affiliation, since the Federation of Trade Unions of Kazakhstan (FPRK) was their only viable option at the time they were required to undergo re-registration, in the year following the adoption of the Trade Union Law.[90]

Nurbek Kushakbaev, a safety inspector at a local trade union in western Kazakhstan, expressed concern about the union losing its ability to make independent decisions because of the mandatory affiliation requirement. He told Human Rights Watch: “The rest of the trade unions [in Mangistau region] all are members of the Federation [of Trade Unions of Kazakhstan]… Local unions are required to follow the decisions of the [industrial] unions. It’s written in their charter. And the law also states it.”[91]

Another trade union activist in the eastern Kazakhstan region, Ivan Bulgakov, the head of the Labor Protection union, described in an online interview the conundrum he and fellow workers were facing:

The only association that my compatriots and I could join is the regional council of trade unions of the FPRK. But we [previously] left that union because it wasn’t doing anything [to protect our rights] and we don’t want to go back to them. It’s a vicious circle. [The authorities] close us down, and we’re unable to [carry out our activities], and even if we join the FPRK-union, we won’t work because we’ll be under control. There is no alternative![92]

Human Rights Watch also documented one case in which a local trade union attempted to affiliate with a higher-tier union in that industry, but was refused.

Vladimir Kurochkin was chairman of the Almaty-based “Rukhaniyat” trade union of culture and sport workers in 2015, when the trade union was required to undergo re-registration as a local union of workers in the sports and arts industry, in accordance with the Trade Union Law. Kurochkin told Human Rights Watch that their option for higher-tier affiliation, the industrial trade union of cultural and sport workers, declined “Rukhaniyat’s” request when he approached them in 2014, as their charter did not account for local trade union affiliates.[93]

“Rukhaniyat” then opted to join the industrial trade union of science and education workers, however, the industrial union did not successfully confirm its status within the stipulated six months, leaving “Rukhaniyat” again without higher-tier affiliation. In February 2016 “Rukhaniyat” finally managed to affiliate fully with another industrial-tier trade union, the Industrial Trade Union of Budgetary Organizations.[94]

Delays and Denials of Registration

Following the introduction of the Trade Union Law in 2014, some registered trade unions in Kazakhstan faced delays and denials in response to their efforts to re-register in accordance with the burdensome demands of the new law. Independent trade union leaders interviewed by Human Rights Watch described the challenges of meeting burdensome registration requirements, and how government officials variously delayed processing or denied re-registration applications despite the unions’ good faith efforts to re-register in compliance with the requirements of the new law.

Existing trade unions were given one year from the adoption of the Trade Union Law, until July 11, 2015, to re-register with the Ministry of Justice.[95] Given that higher-tier trade unions, or industrial and national trade unions, had to bring their charters into compliance with the law, in some cases, restructuring their organizations to meet the law’s representational and geographic requirements, trade unions requested that the Ministry of Justice extend the deadline to re-register. However, their request was not granted.

Despite its efforts to comply with the trade union’s re-registration requirements, the then-Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Kazakhstan (KSPK), an independent national-tier trade union, was unable to meet the geographical and representational requirements of the Trade Union Law and as such was denied re-registration. Larisa Kharkova, KSPK president, told Human Rights Watch that almost without exception, not a single industrial-tier trade union that sought or would have sought affiliation with KSPK, was able to re-register in the stipulated one-year time frame.[96]

KSPK’s first re-registration denial was issued on May 25, 2015, on grounds that the trade union’s application packet did not comply with requirements under the Civil Code, the Law on Public Associations, and the Trade Union Law. In particular, the Ministry of Justice found that KSPK shared whole or a substantive part of its name with another legal entity, a violation of the Civil Code; that it failed to indicate in full the competence of higher organs, a violation of the Law on Non-Commercial Organizations; and that KSPK failed to describe in detail in its charter the procedure for providing its members information about the procedure for collecting dues, as is required by the Trade Union Law.[97] The denial also stated that KSPK needed to concretize the procedures for creating various worker bodies under the trade union.

KSPK addressed the Ministry of Justice’s concerns and re-filed their application for re-registration on June 8, 2015. The Ministry of Justice denied KSPK’s re-registration a second time on grounds that KSPK did not show that it has affiliate industrial unions in over half the regions of Kazakhstan, including in cities of importance and the capital, despite the fact that the union had an additional six months to confirm its status.[98] KSPK tried a third time, but the Ministry of Justice denied the union re-registration on July 21.[99] As the one-year deadline for re-registration had passed on July 11, by which time several of their affiliate industrial unions were similarly unable to re-register, KSPK could no longer meet the requirements of the Trade Union Law, and was left without registration.

The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), of which KSPK is an associate organization, noted in a statement: “The refusal to register the CFTUK [KSPK], based on a number of arguments concerning the charter of the organisation, demonstrated how the legislation can be used to make it difficult for unions to gain recognition, and came at a time when the government’s attitude to the unions was becoming increasingly restrictive.”[100]

Unable to re-register, KSPK began the process of registering anew. In February 2016, the Ministry of Justice finally registered the Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Kazakhstan as a new legal entity with a new name, the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of the Republic of Kazakhstan (KNPRK).

Larisa Kharkova, president of KNPRK, told Human Rights Watch in June 2016 that she feared KNPRK would be unable to confirm their status as a national association due to the challenges of meeting geographic and threshold membership requirements.[101]“It’s so difficult,” she said. “Registering the confederation is itself a lengthy process…, but getting registered is not enough. You also have to confirm your status. And to confirm your status, you have to build this enormous structure. For what? For whom?” Kharkova continued:

If a trade union is created, it should fulfill its role and functions, it should work according to its program… but no, the registration process continues, and as a result, we’re not moving anywhere. We can’t do the work that our trade union affiliates need from us because we devote huge amounts of time and money to register this structure.[102]

As of publication, KNPRK still had not confirmed their status.

One of KNPRK’s local trade union affiliates, the “Dostoinii Trud trade union of oil workers” in Shymkent, in southern Kazakhstan, faced similar difficulties re-registering. Erlan Baltabai, the trade union’s chairman, told Human Rights Watch that he made several attempts to re-register his trade union as a local trade union, but was unsuccessful, in part because of processing delays by the Ministry of Justice.

On one occasion, his union’s application packet was rejected because the citizens’ assistance center, tasked with receiving the application packet and sending it to the Ministry of Justice, had improperly registered the file, Baltabai said: “It’s their fault, but still, they returned it to us. They drag out the time and 15 days later tell us that it turned out we didn’t register it properly, and [that] you need to file again!”[103] Another time the Ministry of Justice returned their application citing an inconsistency in the trade union’s legal address. The trade union corrected the inconsistency, but when the union tried again, it was denied registration on grounds that the one-year timeframe to re-register had run out.[104] Finally in December 2015, after the trade union filed its paperwork under a new name, the Ministry of Justice registered it as the “Local Dostoinii Trud trade union of oil and gas industry workers”.[105]

Nurbek Kushakbaev of the OCC trade union in western Kazakhstan, which intends to affiliate with KNPRK, told Human Rights Watch that the OCC trade union had begun the re-registration process in June 2015 but was denied re-registration on grounds the deadline had passed:

On June 24, we submitted our re-registration documents, and on July 9, they gave us the answer that our [application] doesn’t meet the requirements of the law... they were clearly delaying, and then it was a refusal. We submitted our documents [again] on July 11. They told us that…we had missed the [one year] deadline.[106]

The trade union contested the denial in court in October 2015, but the court ruled in the Ministry’s favor, and upheld the decision on appeal.[107]

Unable to re-register their existing trade union, the Oil Construction Company trade union of workers began the process of registering a new trade union in 2015. Amin Eleusinov, the trade union’s chairman, and Nurbek Kushakbaev told Human Rights Watch that the union has tried to register eight times in the last year, but that each time, the Ministry of Justice finds a new reason to deny the trade union registration.[108]

Some of the reasons given by the Ministry of Justice for denying the OCC trade union registration appear arbitrary and in some cases, outright excuses to deny registration. The reasons for denial include minor inconsistencies in Kazakh and Russian translation; the use of the word “conference” instead of “council” or “congress;” and the indication in the registration packet that the local trade union would affiliate with an international trade union, which the Trade Union Law does not explicitly allow–but neither prohibits. In the denial dated April 29, 2016, one of the reasons cited by the Ministry of Justice was the union’s use of the word “profsoyus,” a short form for the Russian “professionalnii soyus,” (trade union) in its application packet, rather than the full terminology.[109]

Amin Eleusinov told Human Rights Watch that the Ministry of Justice had registered other trade unions using the same template for their charter as the OCC trade union had used, but in their case, the Ministry of Justice refuses to register them:

All of the trade unions that had passed registration, they passed with the same type of documents that we submitted…but now, with the same kind of submitted documents, [the Ministry of Justice] doesn’t allow us to pass [registration]. Instead, they find “mistakes.”[110]

Authorities have also denied registration to workers attempting to organize for the first time. In late 2014, an initiative group of miners in Zhezkazgan began the process of registering a new union. The group of 10 workers held a meeting as required in national law, drafted their charter in consultation with lawyers, and submitted their application for registration as a local trade union under the name “Local trade union of mining, coal, iron and steel industry workers Zhezkazgan.”The Ministry of Justice denied the trade union registration three times between February and March 2015 on technical grounds, including because the trade union had indicated it would open branch offices, which is neither foreseen in nor prohibited by the Trade Union Law, and because one of the initiative members has outstanding debt.[111]

Andrei Prigor, a labor activist who was involved in attempting to register the trade union, told Human Rights Watch that after the workers’ repeat attempts to register, they came to the conclusion that no matter what changes they made to the union’s charter, any further attempts would also be unsuccessful.[112]

Lyudmila Ekzarkhova, a journalist, reported that over a four year period beginning in 2011, she and other journalists attempted 12 times to register a trade union of journalists and media workers.[113] In order to comply with the Ministry of Justice’s various demands, the trade union made repeated changes to their charter, changed the name of the union three times, and revised the list of founders.[114] Ekzarkhova explained to Human Rights Watch:

In Kazakhstan, no organization can work without official registration – and in the last three years, doing so carries criminal sanctions. All the time [we were in the process of registering] we couldn’t begin our work, train journalists, carry out seminars, or defend their labor rights.[115]

After this multiple-year effort that spanned the adoption of the new Trade Union Law, the Ministry of Justice finally registered the Trade Union of Mass Media and Telecommunication Workers as an industrial trade union on December 11, 2015.[116]The trade union had six months, until June 2016, to confirm its status with the Ministry of Justice, or risk closure. By publication of this report, however, the industrial-level Trade Union of Mass Media and Telecommunication Workers was unable to confirm its status with the Ministry of Justice. Furthermore, in mid-October 2016, an Almaty Department of Government Revenue office sent a letter addressed to Ekzharkova “inviting the leaders of trade unions which did not register in a timely manner to determine further actions toward their re-registration or liquidation.”[117]

As a party to the ICESCR, Kazakhstan undertook the binding obligation to “take the necessary steps…to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to” the right to form and join trade unions. Instead, Kazakhstan’s Trade Union Law has been used as a gatekeeper for the government to deny registration to some trade unions. It should be amended as a first step towards meeting international obligations on the right freedom of association.

Restrictions On Who Can Form and Join Trade Unions

In contravention of international norms, Kazakh law bans outright certain categories of workers from forming unions, including judges, firefighters, prison staff, police, and prosecutors.[118]

Although there are some permitted exceptions on workers’ right to organize, any exception must be interpreted narrowly and not infringe on the essence of the right to organize in order to be compatible with international labor and human rights law.[119] The ILO has repeatedly called on Kazakhstan to amend its legislation to allow judges, firefighters, and prison staff the right to join trade unions, including at the International Labour Conference in 2015 and 2016, and in CEACR comments on Kazakhstan.[120]

Restrictions on Cooperation with Global Trade Unions

Under international human rights law, trade unions have the right to join global trade unions of their choosing. While this right is protected in Kazakhstan’s Trade Union Law, and national-tier trade unions in Kazakhstan are full or associate members of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), Kazakh law does not allow trade unions in Kazakhstan to receive any financial support from their international trade union affiliates.[121] In addition, Kazakhstan’s constitution and legislation on public associations prohibit foreign unions from operating in the country.[122]

The ILO’s CEACR has repeatedly stated in its individual observations on Kazakhstan that:

…legislation prohibiting the acceptance by a national trade union of financial assistance from an international organization of workers to which it is affiliated infringes the principles concerning the right to affiliate with international organizations of workers, and that all national organizations of workers and employers should have the right to receive financial assistance from international organizations of workers and employers, respectively, whether they are affiliated or not to the latter.[123]

Kazakhstan was also criticized for banning trade unions from receiving foreign funding at the International Labour Conference in June 2015 and June 2016.

II. Restrictions on Collective Bargaining and Right to Strike

New Labor Code

Kazakhstan’s new Labor Code undermines workers’ right to collective bargaining and restricts the right to strike as it is guaranteed in international human rights law. The law was adopted in November 2015 and has served to undermine the position of trade unions’ bargaining power with employers.[124]

While the government has claimed that the law was adopted with a view to “maintaining an optimal balance between social protection and justice on the one hand, and economic efficiency on the other,” a lawyer specializing in labor relations estimates that it is mostly employers who benefit from the amendments. In her words, “the aim of the code is supposedly to liberalize labor relations, that is, to widen rights and freedoms, but mostly just for employers.”[125]

The government also claimed the law was drafted to “clearly define the limits of state intervention in labor relations,”[126] but workers and a labor lawyer interviewed by Human Rights Watch expressed concern that in reducing the level of social and economic state guarantees, the position of workers vis-à-vis their employers has been weakened.[127]

Trade unions in Kazakhstan, including the Federation of Trade Unions of Kazakhstan (FPRK), the largest trade union in the country, provided critical feedback on drafts of the bill, as did the International Labour Organization, which was requested by the government of Kazakhstan to provide expert comments on the draft Labor Code.[128]The FPRK stated in a news release on its website that “the principles and rules of the redrafted Labor Code strengthen the position of the employer to the detriment to worker's rights.”[129]

Collective bargaining requirements remain overly burdensome on workers and require them to go through lengthy mediation procedures with their employer before they can exercise their constitutionally and internationally protected right to strike.[130]In its September 2015 technical assessment of the draft code, the ILO noted that the proposed changes in the Labor Code to the regulation of a collective labor dispute restricts even more the rights of employees to present demands to employers in relation the application of the labour legislation or to the execution or changes in the provisions of collective agreement.”[131]The new Labor Code also fails to specify in clear language the sectors of the economy in which workers are prohibited from going on strike.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association raised similar concerns and viewed “the legal framework regulating strikes as more focused on limiting strikes than on facilitating the exercise of the right to freedom of association.”[132]

The new Labor Code removed language obliging employers to “provide the conditions necessary for elaborating and concluding the collective bargaining agreement”.[133] It also gives wide discretion to companies to dismiss employees without warning or just cause, prompting fears that union members could be threatened to keep silent or risk losing their job.[134] As Nikolay N., one trade union leader, put it: “With the new Labor Code, unemployment is our biggest fear. We’ll turn into slaves. [Employers] will say, ‘if you want to work, sit down and keep quiet.’”[135] Another trade union leader in western Kazakhstan echoed this sentiment, saying, “If they adopt the new Labor Code, then trade unions aren’t going to be able to help anyone. Everyone will be under threat of getting fired–no one is going to make a peep.”[136]

The ILO made specific recommendations in its September 2015 technical assessment regarding certain definitions of terms in the Labor Code, some of which were not adopted.[137] For example, the ILO recommended Kazakhstan include a definition of “collective bargaining” and “discrimination,” and to amend the term “collective bargaining agreement,” to bring them into compliance with international labor law.[138] The ILO’s technical assessment also raised concern about decreasing the number of entitlements afforded to employees’ representatives.[139]

Collective Bargaining

Collective bargaining, or any negotiations between representatives of an employer and employees, for example relating to the terms of employment or the regulation of an industrial dispute, can take place at the company, industrial, and national level in Kazakhstan.[140] Kazakhstan’s Labor Code and Trade Union Law give trade unions the right to carry out negotiations and to conclude collective bargaining agreements.[141]The Labor Code regulates collective bargaining negotiations, including in the context of a collective dispute, and lays out the content and structure of collective agreements.[142]

Human Rights Watch documented how some independent trade unions that sought to conclude or enter into collective agreements faced undue interference, delays, and restrictions on participating in collective bargaining negotiations. Restrictions on collective bargaining in the context of an industrial dispute are discussed in the following section on the right to strike.

Although the government made claims that the new Labor Code, which limits government regulation of employer-employee relations, would enable trade unions to better defend their interests, labor legislation in Kazakhstan does not provide independent trade unions the necessary conditions to engage in free and voluntary collective bargaining as stipulated in international law.[143]

The basic principle that businesses of all sizes have a responsibility to respect human rights, including workers’ rights, has achieved wide international recognition. When it comes to collective bargaining, the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association has found that “it is important that both employers and trade unions bargain in good faith and make every effort to reach an agreement; moreover, genuine and constructive negotiations are a necessary component to establish and maintain a relationship of confidence between the parties.”[144]

Human Rights Watch documented several cases of company interference in collective bargaining negotiations or excessive delays in concluding collective agreements, including in the cases below.

In Shymkent, in southern Kazakhstan, for example, the Dostoinii Trud union of oil workers fought delays and inaction by company management in response to their efforts to join the company’s existing collective agreement.

In January 2012, Dostoinii Trud union members at TOO PetroKazakhstan Oil Products (PKOP) elected a new chairman, Erlan Baltabai, to lead the union in negotiations to join the company’s collective agreement, which had been negotiated by other unions at the company.[145]On February 3, Baltabai initiated collective bargaining negotiations in a letter to the director of PKOP.[146] Although the Labor Code states that employers have three days to review the demands of workers in the context of a labor dispute—a provision in both the old and new labor codes—after a month, PKOP still had not responded in writing to Dostoinii Trud trade union.

The lack of a response from company management prompted the union to appeal to PKOP’s parent company, KazMunaiGas Exploration Production JSC, and to the regional mayor’s office for assistance.[147] In April, Dostoinii Trud trade union sent another letter to the district prosecutor’s office, about “violations of the legal rights and interests of PKOP workers” in the context of collective bargaining negotiations, in particular that their “efforts to join the collective agreement…went ignored by PKOP company management.”[148]

In July, a representative of KazMunaiGas Exploration Production JSC visited PKOP and agreed to Dostoinii Trud trade union joining the collective agreement, and tasked PKOP management to take steps in this regard.[149] However, PKOP management continued to stall, according to Baltabai. It was only in early September 2012, seven months after Dostoinii Trud initiated negotiations with company management, that PKOP confirmed in writing that Dostoinii Trud trade union’s request to join the collective agreement had been approved.[150]

Soon after, in early 2013, negotiations for a new collective agreement began at PKOP. Trade union representatives from Dostoinii Trud trade union, as well as the oil and gas industry Federation of Trade Unions of Kazakhstan affiliate trade union participated in negotiations. By August, however, Dostoinii Trud and PKOP management still could not come to an agreement on 11 outstanding issues, which included the calculation of wages, personnel security, and social benefits, said Baltabai. PKOP, Dostoinii Trud trade union, and the FPRK affiliate trade union agreed to conclude a collective agreement, along with a disagreement protocol on the outstanding 11 points on which Dostoinii Trud trade union and PKOP management could not agree. The two parties agreed to continue negotiations on these 11 points separately.[151]

According to Baltabai, however, the company did not attempt to resolve the outstanding issues in good faith:

The employer promised to sit down and [resolve the issues], but they didn’t keep their promise. We sat down once [to negotiate], and that was it. The people who make decisions didn’t participate. As a result none of those questions got resolved or were [ever] included in the collective agreement [we had signed onto]. It was a trick, just so that we would agree to conclude the collective agreement.[152]

Human Rights Watch sent a letter to Petro Kazakhstan Oil Products seeking the company’s views on collective bargaining negotiations with the Dostoinii Trud trade union, but did not receive a response by publication.

Kanatbek Murzatov, chairman of the branch affiliate trade union of miners Dostoinii Trud in Satpaev (separate from the Dostoinii Trud trade union of oil workers mentioned above), not far from Zhezkazgan, central Kazakhstan told Human Rights Watch that the Dostoinii Trud miners’ trade union initiated collective bargaining negotiations in April 2012 with TOO EvroTekhService, a mining service company.[153] Valery Chaika, the Karaganda-based chairman of the Dostoinii Trud miners’ union, told Human Rights Watch “EvroTechService workers approached us. They were getting miserly pay. About 100 people joined the trade union and we initiated a collective dispute to raise their pay.”

TOO EvroTechService management repeatedly declined to engage in formal collective bargaining with representatives of Dostoinii Trud miners’ trade union. In a letter dated August 20, 2012, Dostoinii Trud miners’ trade union branch affiliate chairman, Kanatbek Murzatov, wrote the director of the company detailing his concern about the delays in forming a commission to negotiate a collective agreement, and to “again propose that [EvroTekhService] follow the norms of Kazakh legislation and form a commission to carry out collective bargaining negotiations.”[154]

In mid-October, approximately 100 EvroTechService workers, the majority of whom were members of the Dostoinii Trud miners’ trade union, went on a spontaneous strike demanding higher wages. After more than 24 hours, during which time workers remained underground, Murzatov and the director of EvroTechService signed an agreement bringing an end to the industrial action. The agreement, signed on October 16, 2012, contained nine points regarding wages and collective bargaining.[155] Murzatov told Human Rights Watch that although the company signed the agreement, in the end, it failed to fulfill any of the points.[156]

Instead, EvroTechService proceeded by concluding a collective agreement with a second trade union at the company, Trud i Pravo, which was formed around that time, and which was initially comprised of management-level employees.[157] Murzatov told Human Rights Watch that after the industrial action “two days later, the pressure started…[management] started to bully the guys, [in doing so] destroyed our trade union.”[158]

By the end of 2012, all of the Dostoinii Trud trade union members had withdrawn and joined Trud i Pravo.[159] Human Rights Watch was not able to speak to any of the workers who had left Dostoinii Trud about their reasons for joining the other management-led trade union, but Murzatov pointed out to Human Rights Watch that collective bargaining negotiations, which management had been avoiding, came to a halt when all the members of his trade union withdrew their membership.

Every last union member went to the other union. I don’t know what was promised them, but they all left… We couldn’t conclude a collective agreement because not a single person was left in our trade union. Whose interest are we supposed to represent if there isn’t any one?[160]

Right to Strike

The right to strike is guaranteed in Kazakhstan’s constitution and Labor Code.[161] However, “railway transport and civil aviation workers, medical workers, and service providers (including workers in public transport, water supply, electricity, heat, and communications)” are prohibited from going on strike, as are workers at “hazardous production facilities,” and “in other cases envisaged by the laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan.”[162] If a strike falls under any of these categories, a prosecutor can order the strike be suspended until a court ruling on the strike’s legality has been issued.[163]

               

In addition, Kazakhstan’s new Criminal Code, adopted in 2014, introduces a new offense of “actions provoking continued participation in a strike that has been declared illegal by a court,” which carries a maximum prison sentence of three years.[164]

The right to strike is not absolute in international law.[165]It thus may be subject to some restrictions, but penalties must be proportionate to the offense committed, and “the authorities should not have recourse to measures of imprisonment for the mere fact of organizing or participating in a peaceful strike.”[166] The ILO has determined that criminal sanctions for those who participate in peaceful strikes is an excessive punishment.[167]

The ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA), which oversees ILO member’s compliance with applicable international law, has stated that where national legislation has “conciliation and mediation procedures [that] must be exhausted before a strike may be called, ...[s]uch machinery must, however, have the sole purpose of facilitating bargaining: it should not be so complex or slow that a lawful strike becomes impossible in practice or loses its effectiveness.”[168]

Yet cumbersome and lengthy mediation procedures, which must be exhausted in the context of a collective dispute before workers can consider declaring a strike, make it difficult, and in some instances, impossible, for trade union workers in Kazakhstan to hold a legal strike. The ILO’s CEACR recommended in 2014 that Kazakhstan “amend section 289 of the [old] Labour Code,” which details the procedures for initiating a collective labor dispute.[169] However, the new Labor Code, adopted in November 2015, did not address the ILO’s recommendations.

Marat Mirgayazov, chairman of the coal miner’s union Korgau, told Human Rights Watch about a labor dispute with ArcelorMittal Temirtau that had begun in October 2011 when steel and coal workers employed at ArcelorMittal Temirtau requested a 30 percent raise.[170]Mirgayazov explained that the trade union had begun to collect signatures from workers to hold a legal strike under Kazakh law, but could not meet the threshold of workers required in the labor code.

We weren’t able to collect the amount of signatures [to hold a strike] that we needed according to the law, and that’s why we couldn’t hold a strike. …We didn’t collect enough signatures. We are about 18 thousand [employees], so we needed to collect at least nine thousand [signatures]. We only collected seven thousand.[171]

Since the extended labor strikes in Kazakhstan’s Mangistau region five years ago, workers in western, central, and southern Kazakhstan, locations where Human Rights Watch conducted research for this report, staged multiple spontaneous strikes ranging from a few hours to several days. None of the strikes that Human Rights Watch documented were held in compliance with burdensome legal requirements in Kazakh law. Such spontaneous industrial action suggests the failure of burdensome mediation procedures to regulate labor disputes in Kazakhstan, as workers end up striking outside union structures and legal norms, putting them at risk of prosecution by the authorities.

In some cases, local and regional authorities responded quickly to spontaneous industrial action and participated in tripartite negotiations to find a solution to industrial action by workers, and no legal action was taken against workers who participated in the industrial action. Examples include spontaneous industrial action at Burgylau LLP, a well drilling company in Zhanaozen, western Kazakhstan, in October 2016, Kazakhmys (now KazMinerals) in Zhezkazgan, a prominent copper mining company in central Kazakhstan, in May 2012, and at Oil Construction Company in Aktau, in western Kazakhstan, in October 2013.

Nurbek Kushakbaev, a trade union safety inspector with the Oil Construction Company (OCC) workers’ union in western Kazakhstan, told Human Rights Watch that in 2013, after the OCC trade union pushed back against the introduction of a new payment system, OCC management proceeded to introduce a new payment system anyhow but through a second trade union at the company, apparently comprised of management level employees.[172]

When trade union members learned of the payment system agreed with the second union, they staged a spontaneous two-day strike in October 2013 to voice their discontent.[173] Oil Construction Company did not dismiss or take any legal action against the workers who participated in the spontaneous industrial action, and mediation negotiations over the new payment system and other workers demands ensued.

Kushakbaev told Human Rights Watch the mediation negotiations continued for well over a year: “The mediation commission lasted until February [2015]–we dealt with all sorts of issues…but we didn’t complete the process. The company unilaterally drafted a protocol, but we didn’t sign it.”

The trade union of OCC workers appealed to the Mangistau regional department of labor in April 2015 and the prosecutor’s office in July 2015 to take action against the company for what they saw as the management’s unlawful decision to unilaterally end mediation procedures.[174] Kushakbaev told Human Rights Watch that in accordance with national laws, if management had wanted to end mediation negotiations, they should have initiated arbitration, but they did not.[175] Neither the department of labor, nor the prosecutor’s office found any violation, Kushakbaev said.

Human Rights Watch sent a letter to TOO Oil Construction Company seeking the company’s views, but did not receive a response by publication.

In other instances of spontaneous industrial action, however, courts found strikes illegal and local authorities took legal action against workers who participated in the illegal strikes. An illustrative example of how authorities in Kazakhstan use restrictive laws on the right to strike against workers who stage spontaneous, but peaceful strikes, took place in western Kazakhstan, following a protracted labor dispute at TOO TechnoTrading in Aktau. Workers staged several spontaneous strikes between 2014 and 2016 seeking better pay and better social benefits.

Askhat A., a TOO TechnoTrading Trade Union member, told Human Rights Watch that although the union had engaged in collective bargaining negotiations starting in 2014, repeat delays and failure by company management to appear during negotiations led workers to lose patience and spontaneously go on strike in April 2014 and again in May 2015.[176] Another union member explained why workers attempted to negotiate better pay and were prepared to go on strike: “Workers in other organizations like ours get two or three times more pay than we do. We started to write letters [to the company], but didn’t get any response.”[177]

While company management agreed to raise wages by 20 percent after the April 2014 strike, after the May 2015 strike, in which approximately 300 workers participated, management filed a complaint with local authorities seeking to find the strike illegal, although the company had in fact fulfilled some of the workers’ demands. According to a May 29 court decision finding the three day strike illegal, “workers… from 08.00 hours on 18.05.2015 to 17.00 hours 20.05.2015 held an unsanctioned strike in violation of labor legislation and without fulfilling the procedures in accordance with articles 298-299 of the Labor Code.”[178]

The company fired six workers in June 2015 for participating in the illegal strike, accusing them of being away from their work place without legitimate reason for more than three hours.[179]

The six workers contested their dismissals in court, but the court ruled in the company’s favor.[180]

Nurlan N., one of the TOO TechnoTrading workers who was fired after the strike, told Human Rights Watch that he had just returned to work after some days off and only participated in the strike for half a day:

They summoned me to the police station–said that [the company] lost 17-18 million tenge (US$47,000-50,000) because we stood for three days at Zhetibay [the location of the strike]. And they want to hang it on us, six guys… [But] how could they hang 17 million tenge on just us? I was only out there for half a day.[181]

Another worker, Aibek A., who was fired shortly after the strike told Human Rights Watch that he believes he was singled out and fired in retaliation for participating in the mediation commission set up after the strike. Aibek A., who is married with five children, has not been able to find work since his dismissal: “I tried to apply for work [all over], but it’s all the same. [They say] we’re in an economically difficult situation. Companies are firing workers, they’re not hiring.”[182]

Human Rights Watch sent a letter to TOO Techno Trading seeking their views on the labor dispute detailed above, but did not receive a response from the company by publication.

Another spontaneous strike leading to legal action against workers took place in western Kazakhstan in May 2015. Approximately 140 workers at KazStroyService, an engineering, procurement and construction company servicing a gas processing plant at the Chinarevski oil field, about 40 kilometers from Uralsk, downed their tools demanding their shifts be reduced from 30 to 15 days and that an environmental allowance be included in their wages.[183]In a letter to Human Rights Watch, KazStroyService stated that “the employer was open to dialogue, and in response to the demands of the workers, gave a well-founded, exhaustive answer that 30 day shifts do not violate labor legislation, [and] existing shift lengths (of 30 days) were agreed upon in labor and collective agreements, upon hiring each worker.”[184]

According to local media reports, company management, the local labor inspectorate, as well as representatives of the prosecutor’s and mayor’s offices sent their representatives to the site.[185] Workers stayed on strike for three days, after which KazStroyService agreed to raise employees’ wages by 15 percent.[186]

The company also filed a complaint requesting the court to find the workers’ strike unlawful and hold eight of the workers who allegedly participated in the strike accountable for their “unlawful actions,” and suspended three workers, Nurbolat Esmagulov, Salamat Shapai, and Nurlybek Gabdollov, from work without pay pending review of the company’s lawsuit.[187] In its letter, KazStroyService explained “the employer appealed to court to protect its lawful rights, that were violated by the actions of the workers who had signed labor agreements with the employer to fulfill specific work but did not.”[188]

The case went to court, but on July 31, 2015, the court declined to consider the suit against the workers.[189] KazStroyService in its letter to Human Rights Watch clarified that the three workers who had been suspended were reinstated and “were paid full financial compensation” for the duration of their forced suspension.[190]

According to research carried out by the Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Kazakhstan (KSPK, now KNPKR), 28 industrial disputes took place in western Kazakhstan in the first half of 2015, the majority of which were found illegal by courts.[191] The Federation of Trade Unions of Kazakhstan reported that 80 strikes took place between 2012 and 2015.[192]

Under international human rights law, any penalties for participating in an illegal strike should be proportionate to the offense or fault committed. Human Rights Watch considers dismissal for exercising the right to strike a disproportionate disciplinary sanction. The ILO considers sanctions for participating in strikes acceptable only when national law itself is consistent with international standards on freedom of association. The CEACR has stated that “sanctions for strike action, including dismissals, should be possible only where strike prohibitions are in conformity with the principles of freedom of association.”[193]

III.Key Responsibilities of Companies

While governments have the primary responsibility under international law to promote and ensure respect for human rights, companies also have internationally recognized responsibilities regarding human rights, including workers’ rights.

The United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which the UN Human Rights Council endorsed in 2011, recognize that all companies should respect human rights, avoid complicity in abuses, and ensure that any abuses that occur in spite of these efforts are adequately remedied. The Guiding Principles specify that businesses should exercise human rights due diligence to identify human rights risks associated with their operations, take effective steps to prevent or mitigate those risks, and ensure that the victims of any abuses that occur despite those efforts have access to remedies.[194] The Guiding Principles are widely accepted as an authoritative articulation of businesses’ human rights responsibilities.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), with which Kazakhstan is pursuing greater engagement, has set out guidelines for responsible behavior by multinational firms, incorporating the concept of human rights due diligence and the content of International Labour Organization (ILO) core labor standards. The guidelines call on enterprises to “respect human rights, which means they should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved,” including by carrying out human rights due diligence and working to remedy adverse human rights impacts they have caused or to which they have contributed.[195]

The ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles further recommends standards of conduct for multinational corporations and others “in the fields of employment, training, conditions of work and life and industrial relations,” including specific provisions regarding freedom of association and the right to organize as well as collective bargaining.[196] In addition, the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) has stated, “[R]espect for the principle of freedom of association requires that the public authorities exercise great restraint in relation to intervention in the internal affairs of trade unions. It is even more important that employers exercise restraint in the same regard.”[197]

To meet their responsibility to respect human rights, businesses should have policies and processes appropriate to their size and circumstances.[198] In particular, national and international companies operating in Kazakhstan should meet their responsibility to carry out due diligence by identifying potential adverse human rights impacts and ways to prevent them.[199] Human rights due diligence activity should be ongoing and not a one time effort.[200]

Companies should conduct or commission a credible human rights impact assessment that addresses the full scope of potential issues, including risks to workers’ rights, and reflects extensive input from affected individuals and civil society, including trade unions. Businesses also should monitor for human rights abuses through ongoing internal processes and periodic independent reviews, and take action to correct any identified problems. Companies should also vet potential business associates to avoid forming business relationships with individuals or entities that undermine human rights, including workers’ rights, and include enforceable human rights provisions in contracts with parties involved in a relevant business relationship (for example, suppliers, contractors, and business partners).

Additionally, businesses should disclose what they are doing to address human rights by publicly reporting on a regular basis, including with reference to workers’ rights. To the extent that mitigation and remediation efforts fail to adequately address grievances that may arise affecting workers or others, companies should cooperate fully with formally established mechanisms to provide recourse for victims and accountability for violations, including judicial avenues, as appropriate.

IV.Violations of the Right to Freedom of Assembly

Although peaceful assembly is guaranteed in Kazakhstan’s Constitution and is a fundamental right protected under Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Kazakh government places heavy restrictions on the right to peaceful assembly. Those, including workers, who attempt to exercise their right to express dissenting views through peaceful protest encounter interference by law enforcement, and are often prevented from gathering altogether.

In January 2015, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, said after a visit to Kazakhstan that the country had “very limited space for the expression of dissenting views.”[201] Kiai concluded that the “[g]overnment’s approach to regulating assemblies deprives the right of its meaning.”[202] Kazakhstan has ignored repeated calls by UN human rights bodies and others to bring its law regulating peaceful assemblies in line with international standards.

Erlan Baltabai, a union chairman in southern Kazakhstan, told Human Rights Watch that his union wanted to hold a public meeting in September 2013, but they did not receive permission from the local authorities:

We approached the Shymkent city mayor’s office, [but] they told us that we didn’t put together our application correctly. We wanted to hold the protest at the factory, but there are specific places where you can hold a protest. The designated area is far from the factory and that’s not what we want. We want to be seen by management. Why would we hold our meeting so far away?[203]

Baltabai told Human Rights Watch that union members were unable to hold their protest.[204]

In another example, a group of workers who represent half a dozen unions in the Mangistau region of western Kazakhstan applied for permission with the Mangistau regional mayor’s office to hold a peaceful protest against proposed changes to the Labor Code in Zakharov Park in Aktau on August 14, 2015.[205] In response, the mayor’s office denied them permission as they had “not fulfilled the requirement under the law on public assemblies to request permission at least 10 days in advance,” and because “the venue of the meeting with many people can damage Zakharov Park and its nearby territory and can be life-threatening to children who are enrolled in the local school.”[206]

Between June and December 2015, the Oil Construction Company trade union applied for permission with the city mayor’s office at least four times to hold peaceful gatherings in Aktau, on June 26, on November 18, on November 26, and on December 9. The response of the mayor’s office each time was to deny the trade union permission to gather, citing various reasons including that other events were scheduled to take place those days and the city prosecutor’s office ordered a temporary halt to meetings in Aktau.[207] None of the written denials offered the OCC trade union an alternative location or day and time to stage their peaceful protests.

In Karaganda, Marat Mirgayazov, chairman of the trade union of coal miners Korgau, told Human Rights Watch that when his union received notice in February 2014 that ArcelorMittal Temirtau unilaterally decided to end the collective agreement starting on April 1, 2014, the collective decided to hold a peaceful protest.[208]

Korgau applied twice in early 2014 with the local authorities for permission to hold a meeting, in accordance with Kazakh law, ten days in advance, but were denied, Mirgayazov said.

We decided to hold a [public] meeting. Twice we applied for two different dates, and twice [the mayor’s office] didn’t give us permission. [Their explanation was] that they were holding other holiday events. But people were prepared to hold the meeting. We would have presented our position [on the cancellation of the collective agreement].[209]

Previously, Human Rights Watch documented restrictions on the right to peaceful assembly in the context of labor disputes in western Kazakhstan in 2011, including the forcible dispersal of striking oil workers who staged a peaceful march in Aktau, a port city in western Kazakhstan, on June 5, 2011.[210]

The government of Kazakhstan should ensure that workers have the right to express their views peacefully and without undue restrictions or interference, including through peaceful assembly, gatherings, and protests. To that end, the government should take steps to lift undue restrictions and regulations on the right to peaceful assembly, amending the law on public assemblies in accordance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Kazakhstan is a party.

Protection and Redress

The Kazakhstan government has an obligation to uphold national laws and international laws and standards designed to protect workers from abuses. The labor inspectorate under the Ministry of Healthcare and Social Protection is responsible for monitoring employers’ adherence to labor laws, including reviewing complaints submitted to the ministry by workers and employers.[211]

Workers and union leaders may also appeal to law enforcement bodies, such as the prosecutor’s office or the police, or directly to the courts for certain issues, or to local and regional administration offices, or akimats. Workers may also appeal to the human rights ombudsman in Astana, who was quoted in a media interview in March 2014 saying, “We primarily work on the appeals we receive from citizens, including those on labor rights. These materials appear in our annual reports, which we present to the head of state.”[212]

A number of labor union representatives told Human Rights Watch that in response to complaints regarding labor disputes, government bodies had provided inconsistent responses.

Some reported that in response to their appeals to local law enforcement, regional administration offices, or the prosecutor general’s office, these government structures ignored or were ineffective in helping resolve the situation. For example, in October 2013, Sultan S., a trade union chairman in western Kazakhstan, appealed to the regional prosecutor’s office to take measures against the management of the service company where his trade union members worked, for interfering in their trade union activities. Months later, he had still received no response.[213]

In other instances, union leaders told Human Rights Watch that the authorities played a positive role in helping resolving labor disputes. Marat Mirgayazov, chairman of Korgau trade union, told Human Rights Watch that in his experience, the regional mayor’s office has played a positive role in helping resolve labor disputes in the context of the work of a tripartite commission.[214] Another trade union leader, from Aktau, Askhat A., told Human Rights Watch that the mayor’s office in Mangistau region also played a helpful role in the context of a labor dispute at TechnoTrading in mid-2014. After the akimat intervened, the company agreed to raise wages by 20 percent.[215]

[The workers] presented our demands to our employers about receiving higher wages and making changes to the collective agreement to include social benefits. …[T]he reaction of the employers was immediate, but they didn’t really resolve anything. [It only happened] with the interference of the Akim… The akimat is the face of government here, so they have the power to pressure companies.[216]

In March 2014, the office of Kazakhstan’s Ombudsman issued a rare statement of concern about social tensions at the workplace of ArcelorMittal Temirtau, a steel plant, around the time that the company had announced its intention to unilaterally cancel the collective agreement with the trade union of miners Korgau. The Ombudsman’s statement noted many articles in the media “about the unresolved labor relations and discussions about laying off workers” and “the need for further measures to prevent social tensions in the workplace, taking into account the constitutional rights and interests of workers.”[217]Tensions cooled after months of negotiations, and in April 2014, Korgau and ArcelorMittal Temirtau concluded a new collective agreement.

However, the following year ArcelorMittal Temirtau twice issued orders to cut the wages of its local staff by 25 percent.[218] On the first occasion, after ArcelorMittal announced in early February that it intended to cut wages for local staff by 25 percent, trade unions protested, and tripartite negotiations ensued.[219] Then again, in late July, ArcelorMittal Temirtau announced plans to cut wages by 25 percent starting on August 1, again prompting tripartite negotiations.[220]

On both occasions, the Karaganda regional prosecutor’s office and the Ministry of Healthcare and Social Protection’s labor inspectorate responded swiftly to complaints by trade unions representing workers employed at ArcelorMittal Temirtau. The labor inspectorate reviewed ArcelorMittal Temirtau’s compliance with labor laws, following which it instructed the company to withdraw plans to cut wages.[221] Although ArcelorMittal Temirtau initially contested the labor inspectorate’s orders,[222] on both occasions it ultimately scrapped plans to cut wages.[223] Human Rights Watch sent a letter to ArcelorMittal Temirtau seeking the company’s perspectives on actions it took to cut wages in 2015, but did not receive a response by publication.

Acknowledgments

This report was researched and written by Mihra Rittmann, researcher in the Europe and Central Asia Division of Human Rights Watch. A consultant for the Europe and Central Asia Division, whom Human Rights Watch would like to thank but is not naming for security reasons, contributed with research assistance and translation. Neil Miller, intern in the Europe and Central Asia division provided background research and assistance.

Hugh Williamson, director of the Europe and Central Asia Division edited the report. Jane Buchanan, associate director of the Europe and Central Asia Division, reviewed the report and provided valuable feedback. Arvind Ganesan, director of the Business and Human Rights Program, reviewed the report. Philippe Dam, advocacy director in the Europe and Central Asia Division reviewed the report and contributed to the recommendations. Aisling Reidy, senior legal advisor, provided Legal review, and Tom Porteous, deputy program director provided Program review.

Yevgeniy Zhovtis, Director of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, read the report and provided expert feedback.

Kathryn Zehr, associate in the Europe and Central Asia division, provided editorial and production assistance. The report was prepared for publication by Olivia Hunter, publications associate, Fitzroy Hepkins, administrative manager, and Jose Martinez, senior coordinator. Translation of the report was prepared by Igor Gerbich.

Human Rights Watch would like to thank all of the trade union leaders, worker activists, and workers who agreed to speak to us and tell us about their experiences and the challenges of labor activism in Kazakhstan, sometimes at personal risk.

[1]In his November 2014 State of the Union Address, President Nazarbaev introduced the “Nurly Zhol” economic policy as a component of Strategy 2050, or Kazakhstan’s “global step on the path to become one of 30 most developed countries of the world.” See: “The Address of President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.Nazarbayev to the people of Kazakhstan. November 11, 2014” Official Site of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, November 14, 2014, http://www.akorda.kz/en/addresses/the-address-of-president-of-the-republic-of-kazakhstan-nnazarbayev-to-the-people-of-kazakhstan-november-11-2014 (accessed November 11, 2016). See also:“The 100 concrete steps set out by President Nursultan Nazarbayev to implement the five institutional reforms,” Kazakhstan 2050, May 20, 2015, http://strategy2050.kz/en/page/message_text2014 (accessed September 6, 2016). See also: Idrissov, Erlan, “Kazakhstan: 100 Steps Toward a New Nation,” The Diplomat, July 25, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/kazakhstan-100-steps-toward-a-new-nation (accessed September 6, 2016).

[2]The World Bank describes Kazakhstan as an “upper-middle-income country.”

[3]“Stans Undelivered,” The Economist, June 30, 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21701522-five-former-soviet-republics... (accessed September 6, 2016). See also: Farchy, Jack, “Kazakhstan unrest highlights reform conundrum,” Financial Times, June 6, 2016, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/34e688d4-2bbf-11e6-bf8d-26294ad519fc.html#axzz... (accessed September 6, 2016).

[4]Puko, Timothy and Kantchev, Georgi, “Oil Prices Tumble Below $30 a Barrel,” The Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/oil-prices-fall-below-30-a-barrel-1452853918 (accessed September 6, 2016). See also: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, “OPEC, Monthly Oil Market Report,” July 10, 2014, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/public... (accessed September 6, 2016).

[5] Williamson, Hugh and Rittmann, Mihra, “Kazakhstan’s Security Council Bid and Its Troubling Rights Record,” The Diplomat, June 27, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/kazakhstans-security-council-bid-and-its-... (accessed August 10, 2016).

[6]“China/Kazakhstan: 2022 Games Major Test of Olympic Reforms” Human Rights Watch news release, July 21, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/07/21/china/kazakhstan-2022-games-major-te... (accessed August 10, 2016).

[7]“OECD bolsters relationship with Kazakhstan-Signs Kazakhstan Country Program Agreement,” OECD Newsroom, January 21, 2015, http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/oecd-bolsters-relationship-with-kazakhstan-... (accessed August 10, 2016).

[8] Three other individuals died, and dozens of police were wounded in the clashes, according to the Prosecutor General’s office. Additionally, Bazarbai Kenzhebaev, 50, who was arbitrarily detained on December 16, died from internal injuries several days after his release.

[9]“Kazakhstan: Opposition Leader Jailed,” Human Rights Watch news release, October 9, 2012, https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/09/kazakhstan-opposition-leader-jailed (accessed September 6, 2016). On August 19, 2016, Vladimir Kozlov was released on parole after serving four-and-a-half of his seven-and-a-half year sentence.

[10]President Nazarbaev’s social policy program can be accessed here: http://strategy2050.kz/ru/news/189. See for example, commentary by political analyst Daniyar Ashimbaev: http://www.kazbio.info/?S=180.

[11]President Nazarbaev’s social policy program: http://strategy2050.kz/ru/news/189.

[12]“It is necessary to establish legal responsibility for provoking labor conflicts – Nazarbaev” [“Нужно установить правовую ответственность за провоцирование трудовых конфликтов – Назарбаев”]. Zakon.kz, June 3, 2012, http://www.zakon.kz/4500376-nuzhno-ustanovit-pravovuju.html (accessed November 11, 2016).

[13]“Draft “Trade Union law” will solve disparity in workers’ wages” [“Проект закона «О профсоюзах» решит вопрос диспропорции в оплате труда рабочих”], Zakon.kz, November 18, 2013, (accessed November 4, 2016).

[14] Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, A/HRC/29/25/Add.2, June 16, 2015, page 10, point 43, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/ Session29/Documents/A_HRC_29_25_Add.2_E.docx (accessed on August 10, 2016).

[15] Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, No. 226-V, July 3, 2014, art. 403.

[16]Human Rights Watch interview with Yevgeniy Zhovtis, Almaty, April 30, 2015. See also, The Federation of Trade Unions of Kazakhstan’s history page: http://www.fprk.kz/ru/node/3.

[17] Human Rights Watch interview with Andrei Prigor, Kokshetau, November 5, 2014.

[18]Human Rights Watch interview with Deputy Minister Birzhan Nurymbetov, Geneva, June 7, 2016. According to the State Statistics Agency, these unionized workers are predominantly employed in heavy industry sectors, such as oil and gas, and steel and coal mining.

[19] Article 7 of Kazakhstan’s Trade Union Law bans discrimination of workers on grounds of membership in a trade union, in particular in the “hiring, promotion, or termination of a contract…because [the worker] belongs to a union.” Article 26 of the Law on Trade Unions guarantees that that trade union representatives cannot be disciplined or dismissed without reasonable basis, in accordance with the Labor Code of Kazakhstan. Law on Professional Unions of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Trade Union Law), No. 211-V, June 27, 2014, art. 7 and art. 26.

[20] ILO Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

[21]Human Rights Watch interview with Nikolay N., Kokshetau, November 5, 2014.

[22] Human Rights Watch phone interview with Boris B., August 17, 2016.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Human Rights Watch interview with Nikolay N., Kokshetau, April 27, 2015.

[25] Ibid.

[26]Ibid.

[27]“Workers Against TOO Altyntau Kokshetau” in Court” [“Работники против ТОО «Altyntau Kokshetau» в суде”], Kokshetau.asia YouTube channel, November 12, 2014, https://youtu.be/RcHUCGA_0iA?list=UU9kuzvAd8P0-DD3p4u15imw (accessed November 11, 2016). See also: “Pressure on “Zarya” trade union activists grows,” [“Давление на активистов профсоюза «Заря» усиливается!”], Socialismkz.info blog, December 3, 2014, http://socialismkz.info/?p=13266 (accessed September 6, 2016).

[28]“Zarya trade union activist’s suit was granted in court” [“Иск уволенного активиста профсоюза «Заря» был удовлетворён в суде”], Socialismkz.info blog, December 18, 2014, http://socialismkz.info/?p=13453 (accessed September 6, 2016).

[29] Human Rights Watch interview with Sultan S., Aktau, September 18, 2015.

[30]Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Bakyt B., June 15, 2016.

[31] Human Rights Watch interview with Erlan Baltabai, Shymkent, September 25, 2015.

[32]Ibid.

[33]Human Rights Watch interview with Erlan Tabylov, Zhezkazgan, September 23, 2015.

[34] Human Rights Watch interview with Erlan Tabylov, Zhezkazgan, November 2, 2014.

[35] Human Rights Watch interview with Erlan Tabylov, Zhezkazgan, September 23, 2015. Copy of court ruling on file with Human Rights Watch. See also: “Fired worker-activist of Kazakhmys was reinstated at work by the court,” [“Уволенный рабочий-активист «Казахмыса» восстановлен судом на работе”], Socialismkz.info blog, December 23, 2014, http://socialismkz.info/?p=13478 (accessed August 2, 2016).

[36]Human Rights Watch interview with Andrei Prigor, Kokshetau, April 28, 2015.

[37]Human Rights Watch interview with Erlan Tabylov, Zhezkazgan, September 23, 2015.

[38] Human Rights Watch interview with Marat Mirgayazov, Karaganda, November 1, 2014.

[39] Ibid. Copies of letters on file with Human Rights Watch.

[40]Human Rights Watch interview with Asel A., location and date withheld.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid. Copy of the order on file with Human Rights Watch.

[45] Human Rights Watch interview with Maks M., Aktau, June 16, 2016.

[46] Human Rights Watch interview with Saken S. and Askhat A., Aktau, September 18, 2015.

[47]Human Rights Watch interview with Sultan S., Aktau, September 18, 2015.

[48]Human Rights Watch’s observation that the activities of its researcher came under government surveillance is consistent with the reports of surveillance of the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association during his country visit to Kazakhstan in January 2015.

[49] Human Rights Watch phone interview with Larisa Kharkova, April 4, 2016.

[50]Human Rights Watch interview with Amin Eleusinov, Aktau, June 17, 2016.

[51]Human Rights Watch interview with Orman O., Aktau, June 17, 2016.

[52] Human Rights Watch interview with Timur T., Aktau, June 17, 2016.

[53] In addition to the cases described below, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported that in 2013, authorities opened a case against Aktau-based trade union leader Akhmet Suiirkhanov on charges of “squandering funds.” Later the case was dropped and Suiirkhanov stepped down as trade union leader. Human Rights Watch could not independently verify the information. (See: Toiken, Saniya, “Trade union leaders speak of pressure,” [“Лидеры профсоюзов говорят о «давлении»”], Radio Azattyk, October 6, 2015, http://rus.azattyq.org/content/lidery-profsoyuzov-zhaloby-na-davlenie/27... (accessed April 6, 2016).

[54]ILO CEACR observation on Fiji, 2012; see: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:13100:0::NO::P13100_COM... (accessed June 28, 2016). Under international labor law, “the arrest and detention, even for short periods, of trade union leaders and members, engaged in their legitimate trade union activities constitute a grave violation of the principles of freedom of association, see: General Survey of 1994 on freedom of association and collective bargaining, para. 31.

[55]Human Rights Watch interview with Nurbek Kushakbaev, Aktau, September 19, 2015. See also: Toiken, Saniya, “Trade union leader in Mangistau region complains of persecution” [“Лидер профсоюза в Мангистауской области жалуется на гонения”], Radio Azattyk, October 1, 2015, http://rus.azattyq.org/content/eleusinov-profsoyuz-zhaloby-na-gonenia/27... (accessed August 10, 2016).

[56] Human Rights Watch interview with Nurbek Kushakbaev, Aktau, September 19, 2015.

[57]Copy of the order to re-open the investigation on file with Human Rights Watch.

[58] Human Rights Watch interview with Amin Eleusinov, Aktau, June 17, 2016.

[59] Human Rights Watch interview with Nurbek Kushakbaev, Aktau, June 17, 2016.

[60]Human Rights Watch interview with Amin Eleusinov, Aktau, June 17, 2016.

[61] Human Rights Watch interview with [name and location withheld], September 18, 2015.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Human Rights Watch interview with Asel A., location and date withheld.

[65]Ibid.

[66]Ibid.

[67] Human Rights Watch interview with Larisa Kharkova, Almaty, October 28, 2014. See also: “Class conflict: bourgeoisie vs. the proletariat,” [“Классовыйконфликт: буржуазияпротивпролетариата], RadioTochka, December 27, 2013, https://radiotochka.kz/1436-.html (accessed September 29, 2016).

[68]Human Rights Watch Skype interview with Larisa Kharkova, August 19, 2016.

[69]Human Rights Watch interview with Dosym D., Zhezkazgan, November 2, 2014.

[70] Human Rights Watch interview with Dosym D., Zhezkazgan, September 23, 2015.

[71]Human Rights Watch interview with Vladimir Kurochkin, Almaty, April 15, 2015.

[72] Entered into force on July 11, 2014.

[73] See also the government’s June 27, 2014 press release accompanying the adoption of the bill, which states: “the principle of affiliation allows all the unions to systemically participate in forming an action plan at all levels of social partnership, to build a vertical communication link between workers and trade union leaders and their organizations to make decisions on key questions that touch on citizens’ labor and social-economic rights and interests on a consolidated basis.” “Press-release to the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Trade Unions,” [“Пресс-релиз к Закону Республики Казахстан «О профессиональных союзах» от 27 июня 2014 г., July 4, 2014”], Ministry of Healthcare and Social Protection website, http://pda.mzsr.gov.kz/ru/node/310420 (accessed August 25, 2016).

[74]Kusainov, Abelgazy, “Modernizing Trade Unions” [“Модернизация профессиональных союзов”], Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, July 16, 2014, http://www.kazpravda.kz/interviews/view/modernizatsiya-professionalnih-s... (accessed August 25, 2016).

[75]The Labor Confederation of Russia, “ITUC criticizes Kazakhstan’s draft Trade Union Law” [“МКП критикует проект Закона Казахстана «О профсоюзах»”], Labor Confederation of Russia website, February 17, 2014, http://www.ktr.su/content/news/detail.php?ID=1713 (accessed September 6, 2016). See also: IUF, “Two years after Zhanaozen, government of Kazakhstan plans law to bring unions under full state control,” IUF website, December 18, 2013, http://www.iuf.org/w/?q=node/3031 (accessed September 6, 2016).

[76]Independent trade unions call on President Nazarbaev to veto the draft trade union law,” [“Наложитьветонапроектзакона"Опрофсоюзах"просятпрезидентаКазахстананезависимыепрофсоюзы], RadioTochka, June 19, 2014,http://radiotochka.kz/2868-.html (accessed September 29, 2016).

[77]Human Rights Watch interview with Vladimir Kurochkin, Almaty, April 15, 2015.

[78] See, for example: Conference Committee on the Application of Standards, Extracts from the Record of Proceedings, One Hundred and Fourth Session, Geneva, 2015, point 140, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/p... (accessed September 29, 2016). See: Pantland, Walton, Kazakhstan: legal shackles on workers’ movement challenged, Union Solidarity International, June 23, 2015, https://usilive.org/kazakhstan-legal-shackles-on-workers-movement-challe... (accessed September 6, 2016). See also: Hugh Williamson, Dispatches: Kazakhstan Slammed Over Treatment of Workers, June 9, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/09/dispatches-kazakhstan-slammed-over-t... (accessed August 2, 2016).

[79] Letter from J. Omarov, acting executive secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Human Rights Watch, October 19, 2016.

[80]Law on Trade Unions, art. 8.

[81]Law on Trade Unions, art. 10, point 2.

[82] Ibid, point 3.

[83] ILO Convention 87 stipulates laws should not “unduly affect organizational structure and composition of the unions.” ILO Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining Training Sheet (copy on file with Human Rights Watch).

[84]ILO comments to the draft law, June 2013 (copy on file with Human Rights Watch).

[85]Ibid.

[86]Ibid.

[87] Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2015, published 105th ILC session (2016) Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) - Kazakhstan (Ratification: 2000) http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMM...(accessed on August 3, 2016).

[88]Ibid.

[89]Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, OHCHR, January 27, 2015, http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15517&L... (accessed on September 3, 2016).

[90] The Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of the Kazakh Republic was only registered in February 2016 and the Labor Confederation of Kazakhstan, the third national trade union association in Kazakhstan, does not have industrial unions in all sectors of Kazakhstan’s economy.

[91] Human Rights Watch interview with Nurbek Kushakbaev, Aktau, September 19, 2015.

[92]“Kazakhstan intent on closing down all independent trade unions through the courts” [“В Казахстане через суды намерены закрыть все независимые профсоюзы”], KlassProf, June 30, 2015, http://www.klassprof.org/news/248-v-kazahstane-cherez-sudy-namereny-zakr... (accessed September 6, 2016).

[93] Human Rights Watch interview with Vladimir Kurochkin, Almaty, April 15, 2015.

[94]Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Vladimir Kurochkin, November 8, 2016.

[95]Law on Trade Unions, Art. 33.

[96] Human Rights Watch phone interview with Larisa Kharkova, April 6, 2016. See also: “The Deputy Minister of Justice of Kazakhstan de facto closed down independent trade unions in Kazakhstan” [“Заместитель министра юстиции Казахстана де-факто закрыл независимые профсоюзы Казахстана”], RadioTochka, October 29, 2015, http://radiotochka.kz/17706-zamestitel-ministra-yusticii-kazahstana-de-f... (accessed September 29, 2016).

[97]Trade Union Law, art. 9, Subpoints 8 and 9; Civil Code, art. 38, point 2; Law on Public On Associations, art. 39. Order no. 93, copy on file with Human Rights Watch. See also: Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Kazakhstan, “Independent Trade Unions in Kazakhstan under threat” [“Независимые профсоюзы Казахстана под угрозой”], Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law website, July 14, 2015, http://bureau.kz/novosti/iz_drugikh_istochnikov/nezavisimye_profsoyuzy_k... (accessed September 6, 2016).

[98] Copy of denial on file with Human Rights Watch.

[99]KSPK denied a third time on grounds that they did not provide documentation of KSPK-affiliated sectoral unions in more than half the country’s regions, important cities and the capital (copy of the decision on file with Human Rights Watch).

[100] ITUC, Independent Union Denied Registration, Kazakhstan page of ITUC Global Rights Index, May 25, 2015, http://survey.ituc-csi.org/Kazakhstan.html#tabs-3 (accessed August 15, 2016).

[101] Human Rights Watch phone interview with Larisa Kharkova, June 20, 2016.

[102] Human Right Watch Skype interview with Larisa Kharkova, August 19, 2016.

[103]Human Rights Watch interview with Erlan Baltabai, Shymkent, September 25, 2015.

[104] Copy of registration denial on file with Human Rights Watch.

[105]Human Rights Watch phone interview with Erlan Baltabai, November 7, 2016.

[106] Human Rights Watch interview with Nurbek Kushakbaev, Aktau, September 19, 2015. Copy of denial on file with Human Rights Watch.

[107]Copies of OCC trade union’s lawsuit and court decisions on file with Human Rights Watch.

[108]Human Rights Watch interview with Amin Eleusinov and Nurbek Kushakbaev, Aktau, June 1, 2016.

[109]Copy of April 29, 2016 denial on file with Human Rights Watch.

[110]Human Rights Watch interview with Amin Eleusinov, Aktau, June 17, 2016.

[111] Human Rights Watch interview with Dosym D., Zhezkazgan, September 23, 2015. Copies of denials on file with Human Rights Watch.

[112] Human Rights Watch interview with Andrei Prigor, Kokshetau, April 28, 2015.

[113]“Trade union of mass media workers registered in Kazakhstan” [“Профсоюз работников масс-медиа зарегистрирован в Казахстане”], RadioTochka, December 23, 2015, http://radiotochka.kz/19706-profsoyuz-rabotnikov-mass-media-zaregistriro... (accessed September 29, 2016).

[114] Ibid.

[115]Human Rights Watch Skype interview with Lyudmila Ekzarkhova, August 17, 2016.

[116]Ibid.

[117]Copy of the letter on file with Human Rights Watch.

[118] A public association called the “Union of Judges in Kazakhstan” was formed on December 19, 1996, but it is not a registered trade union, and as such, does not have the same legal status and cannot carry out collective bargaining or call a strike, for example.

[119] Under Article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), states party undertake to ensure “the right of everyone to form and join the trade union of his choice, subject only to the rules of the organizations concerned, for the promotion and protection of his economic and social interests.” Under article 2 of ILO Convention 87, it is the right of workers “without distinction whatsoever, to establish and join organizations.”

[120]ILO Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2014, published 104th ILC session (2015) Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) Kazakhstan, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMM... (accessed September 27, 2016). In its comments on the draft bill in June 2013, the International Labour Organization commented that police and military can be the only possible exception to the application of Convention 87.

[121]Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, art. 5, point 4.

[122] Ibid.

[123] CEARC: Individual Observation concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No 87) Kazakhstan (ratified: 2000) adopted 2014, published 104th ILC session (2015) http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMM... (accessed August 13, 2015).

[124] Lawmakers began drafting a new Labor Code following President Nazarbaev’s announcement in May 2015 of ‘The 100 concrete steps to implement the five institutional reforms.’ Point 83 calls for “the liberalization of labour relations and development of a new labour code.” “The 100 concrete steps to implement the five institutional reforms,” para. 83.

[125] Human Rights Watch interview with Svetlana Katorcha, email correspondence. See also: Sevostyanova, Irina, “New draft trade union law allows for the protection of workers’ rights, claims the relevant ministry” [“Новый проект трудового кодекса обеспечит защиту интересов работников, уверяют в профильном министерстве”], Vlast.kz, August 27, 2015, https://vlast.kz/obsshestvo/12736-novyj-proekt-trudovogo-kodeksa-obespec... (accessed September 6, 2016).

[126]Ibid.

[127]Human Rights Watch interview with Nikolay N., Kokshetau, September 20, 2015. Human Rights Watch interview with Svetlana Katorcha, Almaty, April 29, 2016.

[128]See for example: FPRK, “Trade Unions – for the protection of workers rights!” [“Профсоюзы – за сохранение прав работника!”], FPRK website, July 23, 2015 http://www.fprk.kz/ru/node/992 (accessed August 2, 2016); and FPRK, “The Labor Code should protect rights” [“Трудовой Кодекс должен защищать права”], FPRK website, September 7, 2015, http://www.fprk.kz/ru/node/1143 (accessed August 2, 2016).

[129]FPRK, Trade Unions – for the protection of workers’ rights, FPRK website, July 23, 2015, http://www.fprk.kz/en/node/999 (accessed August 2, 2016).

[130] Labor Code, Chapter 16.

[131]ILO, “Memorandum of Technical Comments on the Draft Labour Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan,” September 2015. Copy on file with Human Rights Watch.

[132]Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, para 36.

[133]Labor Code, art. 156.

[134] Labor Code, arts. 51 and 52.

[135]Human Rights Watch interview with Nikolay N., Kokshetau, April 27, 2015.

[136] Human Rights Watch interview with Askhat A., Aktau, September 18, 2015.

[137]ILO, “Memorandum of Technical Comments on the Draft Labour Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan,” September 2015. Copy on file with Human Rights Watch.

[138] The ILO comments also suggest including a specific definition of sexual harassment, which the law does not provide, as it is a “serious form of sex discrimination,” para. 10.4 of the ILO technical comments.

[139]ILO, “Memorandum of Technical Comments on the Draft Labour Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan,” September 2015. Copy on file with Human Rights Watch.

[140]The ILO has defined collective bargaining as “all negotiations which take place between an employer, a group of employers or one or more employers' organisations, on the one hand, and one or more workers' organisations, on the other, for: (a) determining working conditions and terms of employment; and/or; (b) regulating relations between employers and workers; and/or; (c) regulating relations between employers or their organisations and a workers' organisation or workers' organisations.” ILO Convention No. 154, art. 2.

[141]Legislation also provides trade unions the right to conclude regional, industrial and national agreements as well. Trade Union Law, art. 16, point 8 and art. 18, point 4.

[142]Labor Code, art. 157.

[143]Vaal, Tamara, “Trade Unions Should Become Stronger - MZSR” [“Профсоюзы должны стать сильнее — МЗСР”], Vlast.kz, September 3, 2015, https://vlast.kz/novosti/12832-profsouzy-dolzny-stat-silnee-mzsr.html (accessed September 6, 2016).

[144] Complaint against the Government of the United States presented by the Transport Workers Union of America AFL-CIO (TWUA) and the Transport Workers Union of Greater New York, AFL-CIO, Local 100 (Local 100), Case No. 2741, para. 765. See also ILO Digest of Decisions and Principles, para. 935.

[145] Human Rights Watch interview with Erlan Baltabai, Shymkent, September 25, 2015. In the months after Baltabai was elected, membership in the union surged from approximately two dozen workers to about 300 workers, he said.

[146]Copy of letter on file with Human Right Watch.

[147]Copy of letter on file with Human Rights Watch.

[148]Copy on letter on file with Human Rights Watch.

[149]Copy of letter on file with Human Rights Watch.

[150]Copy of September 4 complaint to Prosecutor General’s office on file with Human Rights Watch.

[151] Human Rights Watch interview with Erlan Baltabai, Shymkent, September 25, 2015.

[152] Ibid. See also: “Class conflict: bourgeoisie vs. the proletariat” [“Классовыйконфликт: буржуазияпротивпролетариата], RadioTochka, December 27, 2013, https://radiotochka.kz/1436-.html (accessed September 29, 2016).

[153] Copy of letter of initiation of collective bargaining on file with Human Rights Watch.

[154] Copy of letter on file with Human Rights Watch. 

[155] Copy of agreement on file with Human Rights Watch.

[156]Human Rights Watch interview with Kanatbek Murzatov, Satpaev, November 3, 2014.

[157] Human Rights Watch interviews with Kanatbek Murzatov, Satpaev, November 3, 2014, and Valery Chaika, September 21, 2015, Karaganda.

[158] Human Rights Watch interview with Kanatbek Murzatov, Satpaev, November 3, 2014.

[159] In a separate case, IndustriALL, a global union that represents 50 million workers in the mining manufacturing and energy sectors worldwide, reported in January 2013, that Kazakhmys, a copper company, similarly interfered in the Mining and Metallurgy Workers Union of Kazakhstan, by “forcing TUMMWRK members to quit their [independent] union and join the company-controlled one.” See: IndustriALL, “Copper company busts union in Kazakhstan,” IndustriALL website, January 17, 2013, http://www.industriall-union.org/copper-company-busts-union-in-kazakhstan (accessed September 29, 2016).

[160]Human Rights Watch interview with Kanatbek Murzatov, Satpaev, September 22, 2015.

[161] Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, art. 24, pt. 3; Kazakhstan Labor Code, art. 171.

[162] Labor Code, art. 176. In 2014, the ILO’s CEARC requested Kazakhstan to clarify which organizations fall into the category of ‘dangerous industrial activities. See: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0 ::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:3192111; On December 30, 2014, by order 353 of the Minister of Investment and Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan, rules identifying “hazardous production facilities” was adopted. It was registered at the Ministry of Justice on February 20, 2015 as № 10310. See: http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/V1400010310#z10.

[163] Ibid.

[164] Criminal Code, art. 402.

[165] The ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA), which examines complaints from workers' and employers' organizations against ILO members and whose jurisdiction Kazakhstan has recognized, “has made it clear that [the right to strike] is a right which workers and their organizations (trade unions, federations and confederations) are entitled to enjoy,” that any restrictions on this right “should not be excessive,” and that the “legitimate exercise of the right to strike should not entail prejudicial penalties of any sort, which would imply acts of anti-union discrimination.” Bernard Gernigon, Alberto Odero, and Horacio Guido, ILO Principles Concerning the Right to Strike, 2000, point 11.d.

[166]ILO Digest of Decisions and Principles, para 668.

[167]“Criminal sanctions should not be imposed on any worker for participating in a peaceful strike and therefore, measures of imprisonment should not be imposed on any account: no one should be deprived of their freedom or be subject to penal sanctions for the mere fact of organizing or participating in a peaceful strike.” Complaint against the Government of United States presented by the Transport Workers Union of America AFL-CIO (TWA) and the Transport Workers Union of Greater New York, AFL-CIO, Local 100 (Local 100), Case No. 2741, para 772.

[168]General Survey of the reports on the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, Report III (Part 4B), International Labour Conference, 81st Session, 1994, Geneva, para. 171.

[169]In 2014, CEACR found that “the requirements of section 289 of the Labour Code may constitute an obstacle to the exercise of collective bargaining rights by trade unions. It further considers that a representative union should have the right to present its demands to the employer without prior approval by an enterprise workforce.” See: Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2014, published 104th ILC session (2015) Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) - Kazakhstan (Ratification: 2001), http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P1 3100_COMMENT_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_NAME,P11110_COMMENT_YEAR:3189275,103542,Kazakhstan,2014 (accessed November 11, 2016).

[170] Tereshenko, Andrei, “ArcelorMittal Temirtau drags out negotiations for higher wages” [“«АрселорМиттал Темиртау» затягивает переговоры о повышении зарплаты”], Novosti Karagandi, February 8, 2012, http://www.nv.kz/2012/02/08/25622 (accessed September 6, 2016).

[171]Human Rights Watch interview with Marat Mirgayazav, Karaganda, April 23, 2015. See also: Veber, Elena, “Miners achieved a 10 percent wage increase” [“Шахтёры добились повышения зарплаты на 10 процентов”], Radio Azattyk, June 22, 2012, http://rus.azattyq.org/a/korgau-zhaktau-karaganda-temirtau/24622828.html (accessed September 6, 2016).

[172] Human Rights Watch interview with Nurbek Kushakbaev, Aktau, September 19, 2015.

[173]Ibid.

[174] Copy of responses from the Mangistau Department of Labor and the Prosecutor’s office on file with Human Rights Watch.

178 Human Rights Watch interview with Nurbek Kushakbaev, Aktau, June 17, 2016.

[176]Copies of letters from trade union to company complaining of delays on file with Human Rights Watch.

[177] Human Rights Watch interview with Aibek A., Aktau, June 16, 2016.

[178]Copy of court decision on file with Human Rights Watch.

[179]See the interview of Adil Niyazov, head of Techno Trading LTD confirming that “We took the ultimate measures against the six activists, that is, we terminated their contracts…for being absent at work for more than three hours”, “Techno Trading LTD head on protesting workers” [“Глава Techno Trading LTD о протесте рабочих”] March 14, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=931Fz2GHAXw (accessed November 4, 2016). Mr. Niyazov also stated “the rest of the workers were severely reprimanded.”

[180]Human Rights Watch interview with Askhat A., Aktau, June 16, 2016. At the time of writing, workers had challenged their dismissals in court and were at the appeals stage.

[181]Human Rights Watch interview with Nurlan N., Aktau, June 16, 2016.

[182]Human Rights Watch interview with Aibek A., Aktau, June 16, 2016.

[183] Letter from S. Zhanasov, General Director of KazStroyService to Human Rights Watch, October 28, 2016.

[184]Ibid.

[185]“Construction workers in Uralsk go on strike,” [“В Уральске сотрудники строительной компании вышли бастовать”], Novosti Kursiv, May 12, 2015, http://www.kursiv.kz/news/kompanii/v_uralske_sotrudniki_stroitelnoy_komp... (accessed on August 5, 2016).

[186]Urnaliev, Sanat, “Strikers in Chinarev oil field promised a raise” [“Бастовавшим на Чинаревском месторождении обещают надбавку”], Radio Azattyk, May 13, 2015, http://rus.azattyq.org/a/27013617.html (accessed on August 5, 2016).

[187]Letter from S. Zhanasov, General Director of KazStroyService to Human Rights Watch, October 28, 2016. “Lawsuit filed against striking workers in WKR” [“На бастовавших рабочих в ЗКО руководство подало в суд”], Infopolis, June 26, 2015, https://informburo.kz/novosti/na-bastovavshih-rabochih-ao-ngsk-kazstroys... (accessed August 5, 2016).

[188]Letter from S. Zhanasov, General Director of KazStroyService to Human Rights Watch, October 28, 2016.

[189]Urnaliev, Sanat, The Uralsk strike case goes unreviewed” [“Дело о забастовке близ Уральска осталось без рассмотрения”], Radio Azattyk, August 4, 2015, http://rus.azattyq.org/a/27169254.html (accessed August 5, 2016).

[190] Letter from S. Zhanasov, General Director of KazStroyService to Human Rights Watch, October 28, 2016.

[191]“28 strikes took place in Kazakhstan since the start of the year” [“ВКазахстанесначалагодапрошло 28 забастовок], RadioTochka, July 10, 2015, http://radiotochka.kz/12785-v-kazahstane-s-nachala-goda-proshlo-28-zabas... (accessed September 29, 2016).

[192] Vaal, Tamara, “Trade unions in Kazakhstan resolved 80 labor conflicts in three years” [“80 трудовых конфликтов за три года решили профсоюзы в Казахстане”], Vlast.kz, June 9, 2015, http://vlast.kz/novosti/11466-80-trudovyh-konfliktov-za-tri-goda-resili-... (accessed September 6, 2016)

[193]CEACR: Direct Request concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No 87) Kazakhstan (ratification: 2000), adopted 2003, published 92nd ILC session (2004), http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:13100:0::NO::P13100_COM....

[194] UN Human Rights Council, “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect, and Remedy’ Framework.” The UN Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding Principles in Resolution 17/4, A/HRC/17/L.17/Rev1.1.

[195]OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011 Edition): Recommendations for Responsible Business Conduct in a Global Context, May 25, 2011, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/oecdguidelinesformultinationalenterprise... (accessed July 28, 2016).

[196] International Labour Office Governing Body, ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning multinational enterprises and Social Policy, 204th Session, Geneva, November 1977, as amended at its 279th (November 2000) and 295th Session (March 2006), fourth ed. 2006, paras. 7, 42-56.

[197]ILO Freedom of Association Digest of Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO Fifth (revised) ed. 2006, paras. 859, 761.

[198] Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, Principles 14 and 15.

[199] Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, Principle 17.

[200] Ibid.

[201]Kiai, Maina, Statement By The United Nations Special Rapporteur On The Rights To Freedom Of Peaceful Assembly And Of Association At The Conclusion Of His Visit To The Republic Of Kazakhstan, January 27, 2015, http://freeassembly.net/news/statement-kazakhstan (accessed September 6, 2016).

[202] Ibid.

[203]Human Rights Watch interview, Erlan Baltabai, Shymkent, September 25, 2015.

[204]Ibid.

[205]Copy of request on file with Human Rights Watch. See also: Toiken, Saniya, “Oil workers criticize new draft Labor Code,” [“Нефтяники критикуют проект нового трудового кодекса”], Radio Azattyk, August 11, 2015, http://rus.azattyq.org/content/mangistau-neftyaniki-trudovoy-kodex-nedov... (accessed August 15, 2016).

[206]Copy of denial on file with Human Rights Watch.

[207]Copies of denials on file with Human Rights Watch.

[208]Human Rights Watch interview with Marat Mirgayazov, Karaganda, November 1, 2014. See also: “Miners pushed to protest” [“Шахтеров до митинга довели”], Nasha Yarmarka, February 21, 2014, http://nasha-yarmarka.kz/ru/news/id/1509 (accessed August 5, 2016).

[209] Human Rights Watch interview with Marat Mirgayazov, Karaganda, November 1, 2014.

[210]Human Rights Watch, Striking Oil, Striking Workers: Violations of Labor Rights in Kazakhstan’s Oil Sector, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2012), https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/09/10/striking-oil-striking-workers/viol..., section 3.

[211]Labor Code, art. 17.

[212]“Ombudsman recommended that ArcelorMittal Temirtau prevent social tensions” [“Омбудсменрекомендовалкомпании"АрселорМитталТемиртау"недопускатьсоциальнуюнапряженность], Radio Tochka, March 28, 2014, http://radiotochka.kz/1943-.html (accessed August 5, 2016). See also: “Rules for appeals”, website of the Human Rights Ombudsman of the Republic of Kazakhstan: http://www.ombudsman.kz/en/about/ombudsman.php.

[213]Human Rights Watch interview with Sultan S., Aktau, September 18, 2015.

[214]Human Rights Watch interview with Marat Mirgayazov, Karaganda, November 1, 2014.

[215] Human Rights Watch interview with Askhat A., Aktau, April 20, 2015. See also: Toiken Saniya, “Oil company workers ask to look at falling prices” [“В нефтяной компании рабочих просят оглянуться на падение цен”], Radio Azattyk, August 17, 2015, http://rus.azattyq.org/content/too-techno-trading-ltd-mangystaumunaigaz-... (accessed September 6, 2016).

[216] Ibid.

[217]“The Ombudsman’s office sent ArcelorMittal Temirtau leadership a note expressing its concern about the social tensions at the enterprise” [“Учреждение Омбудсмена направило в адрес руководства АО «АрселорМиттал Темиртау» обращение, в котором выражена обеспокоенность сохраняющейся социальной напряженностью на предприятии”], Website of the Office of the Ombudsman in Kazakhstan, March 26, 2014, http://www.ombudsman.kz/news/detail.php?ID=2248 (accessed August 5, 2016).

[218] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Marat Mirgayazov, October 25, 2016.

[219]Ibid.

[220]Ibid. See also: “Head of <<ArcelorMittal Temirtau>> explained reduction in salaries,” KazInform, July 28, 2015, http://www.inform.kz/en/head-of-acelormittal-temirtau-explained-reductio... (accessed October 25, 2016).

[221]“ArcelorMittal Temirtau employees to receive full salary,” TengriNews, February 11, 2015, https://en.tengrinews.kz/companies/ArcelorMittal-Temirtau-employees-to-r... (accessed August 26, 2016); and Kamalova, Gyuzel, “ArcelorMittal Temirtau and local labor authorities locked in battle over wages cuts,” TengriNews, August 14, 2015, https://en.tengrinews.kz/companies/ArcelorMittal-Temirtau-and-local-labo... (accessed September 29, 2016).

[222]“Labor Inspectorate files court complaint against ArcelorMittal Temirtau” [“Инспекция труда подала в суд на «АрселорМиттал Темиртау»”], Radio Azattyk, August 17, 2015, http://rus.azattyq.org/content/news/27192755.html (accessed September 29, 2016).

[223]Veber, Elena, “ArcelorMittal put aside decision to cut wages” [“«АрселорМиттал» отложила решение о сокращении зарплаты”], Radio Azattyk, August 21, 2015, http://rus.azattyq.org/a/27200899.html (accessed September 29, 2016).

[224]CEACR: Direct Request concerning Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) Kazakhstan (Ratification: 2001), adopted 2014, published 104th ILC session (2015), http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMM... (accessed July 25, 2016).

Video: Workers' Unions Under Attack in Kazakhstan

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Kazakhstan’s new trade union law, adopted after unresolved labor strikes in 2011, has made it more difficult to organize independent unions in the country. Changes to the labor and criminal codes have contributed to an environment hostile to worker activism. Human Rights Watch interviewed more than 50 trade union leaders, labor activists, and workers in key industries across Kazakhstan, and documented harassment, surveillance, and, in some cases, spurious legal prosecution or dismissals in apparent retaliation for labor activism. The Kazakh government should take immediate steps to lift restrictions on workers’ rights and the ability to organize.

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